That’s according to DOD’s Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) office. Total JSF program cost is now estimated at $329 billion for a 2,443 aircraft buy, up from the original 2001 baseline estimate of $197 billion for 2,852 fighters (all figures are in then year dollars). The jump in the per unit price triggers a Nunn-McCurdy “critical breach,” requiring a “recertification” from Defense Secretary Robert Gates that the fighter is vital to national security; which, of course will happen.
So how does JSF now compare on price to the recently cancelled F-22? The F-22 cost about $360 million per copy. The aircraft that looks more appealing as JSF costs climb is the F/A-18E/F at around $90 million a copy. Pressure is building from lawmakers on the Hill for the Navy and Marines to buy more Hornets as the current fleet gets older and the arrival date for the JSF continues to slip.
Over at DOD Buzz, my colleague Colin Clark reports that EADS has confirmed that it is looking at a possible independent bid for the KC-X tanker competition. A company press release cautions that the tanker RFP still favors “a smaller, less capable aircraft” and the larger EADS offering “may not be fully valued.” But EADS’ public statement does leave options open:
“Yesterday the US Department of Defense (DoD) indicated it would welcome a proposal from EADS North America as prime contractor for the KC-X tanker competition. This is a significant development. EADS is assessing this new situation to determine if the company can feasibly submit a responsive proposal to the Department’s request for proposal (RFP).”
The quest for a low-cost, low-tech, irregular warfare aircraft to provide ground pounders with long loitering, on-call recon and strike got a big boost recently when Joint Forces Command’s Gen. James Mattis threw his support behind the Navy and Air Force “Imminent Fury” effort.
Mattis told the Senate Armed Services Committee last week that he was taking a personal interest in the classified project, being run chiefly out of the Navy’s Irregular Warfare Office, that is looking at small turboprop aircraft for ground support. The sought after design falls somewhere between the Vietnam era OV-10 Bronco and A-1 Skyraider. It must stay aloft for a long time for surveillance needs but also have the punch to provide precise fire support when needed; a true “over the shoulder” aircraft for small ground units doing distributed operations in remote locations.
Mattis thinks using top-line fighter jets for close air support to troops patrolling rural villages in Afghanistan is overkill. As he diplomatically puts it: “Today’s approach of loitering multi-million dollar aircraft and using a system of systems procedure for the approval and employment of airpower is not the most effective use of aviation fires in this irregular fight,” he told the SASC. A light irregular warfare aircraft could also help build partnerships with foreign air fleets that operate large numbers of such aircraft.
Last summer, the Air Force requested aircraft manufacturers provide designs for a Light Attack Armed Reconnaissance (LAAR) aircraft, a low-tech and low-cost design that must be currently flying as they want it fielded within the next couple of years. Two early entrants are Brazilian manufacturer Embraer’s Super Tucano (pictured) and Hawker Beechcraft’s AT-6. Air Force chief Gen. Norton Schwartz has talked about possibly creating an irregular warfare wing that would operate the aircraft.
“A LAAR aircraft capability has the potential to shift air support from a reactive threat response, to a more proactive approach that reduces sensor to shooter timelines, with immediate and accurate fires, providing surveillance and reconnaissance throughout a mission, while providing communication and navigation support to troops on the ground,” said Mattis.
Here again is another example of Mattis pushing the services to work together on low cost, vitally needed programs that support troops in the field fighting today’s wars.
As promised, Lockheed Martin pulled off the first vertical landing of the F35B today. LockMart’s test pilot hovered for a minute at 150 feet and then “rode 41,000 pounds of thrust” provided by the Pratt & Whitney F135 turbofan and dropped like a feather to the tarmac. The company said the F-35B featured in today’s video is one of three F-35B STOVL aircraft undergoing flight trials at Patuxent River. The press release claims that the F135 is the most powerful engine ever flown in a fighter aircraft. I have to say, the rotating engine duct is pretty cool.
The failure of the Army’s Non Line-of-Sight-Launch System (NLOS-LS) Precision Attack Missile (PAM) to hit its intended targets in a recent series of live fire tests might not just be an Army problem. See, the NLOS-PAM system, also called “missiles-in-a-box,” is also supposed to outfit the Navy’s Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), giving the ships a much needed long-range strike weapon.
The NLOS-LS was to substitute for the LCS’ lack of vertical launch system cells — which can handle anti-ship, anti-aircraft or land attack missiles — carried on larger surface ships, if in a smaller package. The only weapon the LCS currently carries is a single 57mm rapid fire cannon that can range out to nine miles.
The missiles-in-a-box for LCS were to come in two versions, the PAM, with a range of around 40 miles, and a Loitering Attack Missile, that when fully developed was to have nearly a 124 mile range. The missiles would give the LCS some of the much needed firepower it currently lacks, and when coupled with ship launched aerial drones, an over the horizon strike capability.
In a mostly favorable white paper on the LCS, Martin Murphy, of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, pointed to the LCS’ lack of organic fires as a serious shortcoming. If the missiles don’t come on line anytime soon, the LCS’ operational effectiveness could be negatively impacted.
As we reported last month, during live fire tests in late January and early February, the NLOS-PAM missed its target four out of six times. Senior Army leaders are pretty fed up with the costly missile system (each missile costs roughly $466,000), according to Army sources, and are considering cheaper solutions.
If the Army decides to pass on NLOS-LS, where does that leave the Navy and LCS? Can the LCS hull accommodate the larger VLS cells and what would the ship have to give up to fit them?
If there is a single overriding theme to Joint Forces Command’s newly released Joint Operating Environment 2010 report, it is the reminder that a critical component of national power is economic power; something often lost on military analysts and so called strategists. The JOE discusses at length perilous federal budget imbalances, oil dependency, the damage inflicted by the 2008 economic meltdown, declining resources, climate change and a number of the familiar and unsavory effects of globalization.
The part that really jumped out to me was where the JOE said the military’s approach to buying new high-tech weaponry has become a strategic liability and is weakening the force. A big reason is because long development timelines for new high-tech gear means troops in the field are not getting the latest and greatest in a timely or cost effective manner.
The early 21st century is the age of the asymmetric opponent, and that asymmetry extends to defense spending, the JOE says, using the IED war as an illustrative example. “The United States has spent literally billions to counter these crude, inexpensive, and extraordinarily effective devices. If one were to multiply this ratio against a global enemy, it becomes untenable.”
The JOE points out that because the Chinese have become masters at reverse engineering and because they have lower labor and material costs, they’re able to produce a comparable unit of capability at far lower cost than we are.
The failure to reform acquisition is “no longer a bureaucratic issue: it is having strategic effects,” the JOE says. Absent reform, enemies will develop weapons faster, more effectively and certainly cheaper than the U.S. That’s a pretty big indictment of the almighty military industrial complex.
Lockheed Martin released video today of the first ever F-35B “free air hover” over the tarmac at Naval Air Station Patuxent River, Md. Lead F-35B test pilot Graham Tomlinson slowed the aircraft from 200 knots to 0 knots then hovered 150 feet above the runway, said a press release. The aircraft then came in for a short 70 knot landing. Lockheed promises a vertical landing is coming soon.
Over at the Naval Institute blog, Craig Hooper harps on one of my big complaints with much of the current China analysis: engaging in simplistic bilateral comparisons of U.S. and Chinese military power. As history teaches us, great power rivalries never occur in isolation, there are always lesser powers that either get sucked in or willingly go along for the ride.
China’s strategic situation is more complicated than many assume. On its western flank sits Japan, the world’s third largest economy and possessor of a thoroughly modern military. To its south sits India (which Hooper excludes), a growing power in its own right and one that is rapidly modernizing its military. China’s rise doesn’t sit well with either country; both fought bloody wars against China in the 20th century.
But back to shipbuilding, Hooper provides a useful service by comparing China’s recent burst of shipbuilding with the U.S. and China’s neighbors.
“Using the official DOD Annual Report to Congress on the Military Power of the PRC 2005 and 2009, it looks like China’s Navy is growing. But…when China’s rate of growth is compared with other neighbors, that burst of growth over the past five years looks a lot less daunting.
The Navy’s new Littoral Combat Ship, USS Freedom, netted a pair of cocaine seizures on its first operational deployment to the Caribbean, even running down a “go fast” boat with its embarked MH-60 helicopter. “This is a perfect demonstration of what the LCS was designed for,” LCS builder Lockheed Martin’s Paul Lemmo tells Ares defense blog.
Yet, acting as naval constabulary is only one of the missions the Navy has in mind for LCS. The real test will come when the LCS must fight a swarm of small boats in the littorals, according to some analysts. As the Navy’s attention has shifted from the blue waters to the strategically vital inshore waters, it has sought out the right vessel for a more flowing style of fighting against swarms of fast attack boats, a threat that the traditional surface warfare group is ill-suited to combat.
When it comes to small boat swarms, Iran invariably comes to mind. Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps operates hundreds of speedboats armed with machine guns and rockets (Iran is thought to have around 1,000 small armed craft) that ply Gulf waters and it regularly war games swarming tactics to shut the strategically vital and really narrow Straits of Hormuz. Iran is also indigenously producing a number of different anti-ship missile armed fast attack craft.
Milan Vego, a professor at the Naval War College, says the Navy went with the LCS design without adequately assessing the fights it was likely to get in, which will be in confining waters against small boat swarms, where the LCS won’t do much to boost the Navy’s fighting abilities. The LCS is too lightly armed, “too large and insufficiently agile to engage such threats,” he writes in the September Proceedings.
I was on a conference call last week with JIEDDO commander Lt. Gen. Michael Oates, who discussed IED networks in Afghanistan, where IED attacks have doubled over the past year. While Oates was careful not to reveal much in the way of breaking news, he provided some interesting detail on the bomb networks in Afghanistan.
Bomb networks in Afghanistan differ somewhat from those in Iraq. Iraqi IED cells were largely funded by Saddam Hussein loyalists and sympathetic Sunnis in the Arab Gulf states. Bomb emplacers were the disenfranchised and the unemployed and most bombs were randomly placed. As an intelligence officer in Baghdad once told me, an emplacer would simply walk out his front door and drop a bomb onto the highway.
In Afghanistan, the networks have “almost a military-style organizational structure,” with top level direction of IED placement. Bomb emplacers follow directives from the “chain of command,” and the emplacers are usually trained fighters. “There’s a direction for where they should be emplaced, and the order is given and they’re emplaced,” he said.
I asked Oates about the Haqqani network, the military’s most lethal foe in Afghanistan; Bill Roggio of the long War Journal labels the Haqqani network “al Qaeda’s Afghan branch.” Oates said the Haqqani network was the “senior” Taliban faction operating in Afghanistan and it’s signature bomb is the “potassium chlorate-based homemade explosive.”
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