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Archive for January, 2005

MCCAIN TARGETS “FUTURE COMBAT”

Monday, January 31st, 2005

For years, Sen. John McCain has been rip­ping the Pentagon over its sweet­heart deals with Boeing. Now, the Senator is going after the biggest deal of all — the $127 bil­lion Future Combat Systems ini­tia­tive.
NLOS_cannon.jpgFuture Combat Systems, or FCS, is the most com­plex, most expen­sive upgrade the American mil­i­tary as ever tried. It calls for the reboot­ing of almost every com­po­nent of Army hard­ware, from armored vehi­cles to software-​​based radios to fly­ing drones to the uni­forms G.I.s wear. And Boeing — which got into hot water over its, um, pecu­liar arrange­ment with the Air Force for leas­ing tankers — is one of two com­pa­nies over­see­ing the sprawl­ing effort.
Since FCS began in the late 90’s, the project’s tech­nolo­gies has been rejig­gered, its dead­lines have been shifted, and its goals have been reshaped.
Next month, “Mr. McCain, a senior mem­ber of the Senate armed ser­vices com­mit­tee, intends to look at the vast FCS pro­gram as part of a series of hear­ings on Pentagon pro­cure­ment prac­tices,” the Financial Times reports. “Mr. McCain was con­cerned about the struc­ture of the deal, in which the army has essen­tially out­sourced man­age­ment of the con­tract to Boeing, in addi­tion to cost over­runs… He is also expected to ask the Government Accountability Office [GAO], the over­sight arm of Congress, to look into FCS.“
The GAO tore into the pro­gram and its man­agers this past April for lung­ing ahead with FCS, even when they knew its dead­lines and tech­nolo­gies weren’t at all real­is­tic. What’ll hap­pen next, under McCain’s direc­tion, is anyone’s guess. But I’m bet­ting that there are a whole heap of prob­lems just wait­ing to be uncov­ered here.
THERE’S MORE: “I first requested doc­u­ments regard­ing the [tanker lease] pro­posal in June 2003. Regrettably, since then the DoDs pro­duc­tion of doc­u­ments has been rid­dled by dis­rup­tion, obfus­ca­tion and delay,” McCain wrote in a let­ter to Defense Secretary on Saturday. “Some doc­u­ments that were pro­duced were doc­tored; oth­ers that should have been pro­duced, were improp­erly with­held. To date, after months of assur­ances, par­tial pro­duc­tion on only about 7 out of 36 request cat­e­gories have been pro­duced.“
AND MORE: FCS is “a huge pro­gram, and obvi­ously we need to have a hear­ing on it. I have no pre­con­ceived notions about it,” McCain told Inside the Army today after a Senate pol­icy lun­cheon. “I’m not against it. I’m not for it. I’m not try­ing to do any­thing other than exer­cise our legit­i­mate over­sight of the program.”

Sen. Jeff Sessions (R-​​AL) told Inside the Army he sup­ported the idea of a hear­ing on FCS — if only to help sen­a­tors help the Army bal­ance its bud­get, a task com­pli­cated by mount­ing bills from the war in Iraq and other oper­a­tions. Hearings could help law­mak­ers eval­u­ate whether cer­tain tech­nolo­gies could be accel­er­ated even more to help sol­diers fight the war in Iraq, Sessions said.
The new FCS right now, we need more [unmanned aer­ial vehi­cles] which are part of the Future Combat System, but we need them now in Iraq. So you might take some of the money from some of the things that are not crit­i­cal to today and say we’re going to accel­er­ate this part of the Future Combat System, which might sort of be con­tra­dic­tory to the plan we had prior to 9–11 FCS devel­op­ment, Sessions said. But, he added, some of the other things may slip on the timetable.

SOMETHING BEAUTIFUL

Monday, January 31st, 2005

As most reg­u­lar read­ers know, I’ve been extremely skep­ti­cal about American involve­ment in Iraq. The White House’s jus­ti­fi­ca­tion for going to war always seemed shaky to me; its exe­cu­tion, nearly as wob­bly.
But the sight of so many Iraqis risk­ing their lives to vote yes­ter­day, that was beyond inspi­ra­tional. And I have to give the President and his team credit here. They had the col­lec­tive stones to stick with these elec­tions — even when seizures of vio­lence made the plan look like fan­tasy. And they had fore­sight to pre­dict the elec­tri­fy­ing power of the bal­lot in Iraq — no mat­ter how con­fused, how rushed, or how scary the elec­tion may have been.
In Iraqis, the White House saw a group who couldn’t wait to grab con­trol of their lives, after so many years with­out lever­age at all. The President’s peo­ple were right. And, as a result, some­thing beau­ti­ful hap­pened on Sunday.
Here’s how one friend, who’s been help­ing the Iraqis set up these elec­tions, described yesterday’s events:

Today was a day for vot­ers and elec­toral work­ers, and both groups exceeded expec­ta­tions. Throughout the day, we worked the phones to get updates from friends and asso­ciates across Iraq. The phras­ing of one seemed to have been echoed by many: we heard explo­sions and gun­fire, but we were together and were not afraid. A quin­tes­sen­tial exam­ple of what hap­pened here today is relayed in an anec­dote from Quadisiyah, a dis­trict of Baghdad at the end of the penin­sula. Voters lined up out­side a polling sta­tion and then scat­tered when an insur­gent appeared down the street with an RPG and fired. The grenade missed its tar­get, and an hour later the vot­ers regrouped, in greater num­bers, to fin­ish the job.
Nearly forty died across Iraq today in the vio­lence that had been promised. Nine sui­cide bombers also vis­ited polling sta­tions. Insurgents chased down vot­ers exit­ing polling sta­tions and hit them with grenades. And there were mor­tars. They waited an hour or so until after the polling sta­tions opened here before hit­ting in force. And then there was silence, and in that silence, a peo­ple beset by hard­ship went about the busi­ness of self-​​expression. The honor of the fallen was upheld by the unde­terred.
A cou­ple weeks ago, a bright young friend of mine asked me who is this Ben Franklin guy? I asked what made him won­der and he said, still star­ing at his inter­net screen, because he said that peo­ple who think there is a choice between secu­rity and lib­erty deserve nei­therI think thats pretty cool, would there be any prob­lem with my print­ing this out and hang­ing it on the wall? No prob­lem at all, Mohammed, print away.

NUKE LAB FEE SLASHED

Saturday, January 29th, 2005

We’ve known for a while now that the “two com­puter disks that sup­pos­edly dis­ap­peared last sum­mer, prompt­ing a vir­tual shut­down of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, in fact never existed.” But what’s inter­est­ing in this AP rpe­ort is that the Department of Energy has gone ahead and decided to slash the lab’s man­age­ment any­way.

In a harshly worded review that described severe secu­rity weak­nesses at the nuclear lab, the U.S. Energy Department con­cluded that bar codes were recorded for the disks but the disks them­selves were never cre­ated. A sep­a­rate FBI inves­ti­ga­tion sup­ported that find­ing, accord­ing to the report.
“The weak­nesses revealed by this inci­dent are severe and must be cor­rected,” accord­ing to the report.
As pun­ish­ment for the prob­lems, the Energy Department slashed by two-​​thirds the man­age­ment fee it paid to the University of California for run­ning the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Out of a pos­si­ble $8.7 mil­lion, UC will get only $2.9 mil­lion; it is the largest fee reduc­tion ever imposed on a national lab­o­ra­tory.
“Although mul­ti­ple inves­ti­ga­tions have con­firmed that the ‘miss­ing’ disks never existed, the major weak­ness in con­trol­ling clas­si­fied mate­r­ial revealed by this inci­dent are absolutely unac­cept­able and the University of California must be held account­able for them,” National Nuclear Security Agency Administrator Linton Brooks said in a statement.

This is a real change of busi­ness for an Energy Department that usu­ally looks the other way when one of its nuclear cen­ters screw up. The lab watch­dogs at Project on Government Oversight may feel that any fee is too much for the University. But this seems to me to be a proper step.

DRONES, LASERS = I.E.D. SPOTTERS

Friday, January 28th, 2005

There were a cou­ple of anti-​​IED tech­nolo­gies I didn’t get to men­tion in my recent Wired News piece. One of ‘em comes from Navy-​​funded engi­neers at Advanced Ceramics Research in Tuscon, Arizona. They’re out­fit­ting their Silver Fox unmanned plane with a radio fre­quency emit­ter. The sig­nal returns when the wave encoun­ters a det­o­na­tion wire. And that tips troops off to the fact that an hand­made bomb might be nearby.
st_helens8.jpgDayton, Ohio’s Spectra Research is also get­ting some Navy money to spot the jury-​​rigged weapons. But the com­pany has a whole dif­fer­ent approach to doing it. By using a series of laser flashes over a wide array of the infrared, ther­mal, and visual wave­lengths, the company’s tech­nol­ogy can — hope­fully — spot sus­pi­cious shapes as they appear on the road.
Similar sen­sors are often fooled by weather or light con­di­tions. Spectra’s is dif­fer­ent, promises com­pany pres­i­dent Gordon Little. But by using so many dif­fer­ent bands of light, Little thinks his project could lead to “greatly reduced false alarms.“
But there’s a big short­com­ing in the tech­nol­ogy, Little admits. If an IED is buried in the ground — and they often are — Spectra’s sen­sor would be pretty much use­less. “Buried objects would not bepar­tic­u­larly acces­si­ble to us,” he sighs.

CIMOLI’S COPTER DIARIES

Thursday, January 27th, 2005

Chief Warrant Officer Gordon Cimoli served 10 months in Iraq fly­ing a Black Hawk heli­copter. And, as you can imag­ine, he has stack of sto­ries that illus­trate the incred­i­ble strain that these pilots undergo. Here are a cou­ple of excerpts from his diaries…
Crew in Objective Rams, Iraq Day 4_jpg.jpg

We were descended for land­ing and we found that we couldn’t see any­thing at all. We could not see where the ground ended and the sky began. Fred slowed down and started a descent but we found that we were not really descend­ing as we intended to. Instead we lin­gered at 100 to 120 feet at almost zero for­ward air­speed. We finally made our descent to the ground and at about 25 feet we had a dust cloud sur­round­ing the air­craft. Remember, this is all under NVG’s [night vision gog­gles] with zero illu­mi­na­tion from the moon. We basi­cally landed with no visual ref­er­ence to the ground below us. It was cer­tainly scary but what we have come to expect
This type of fly­ing goes against all we were taught through­out our fly­ing career-​​when you can’t see the ground and/​or the hori­zon, you are fly­ing under IMC (instru­ment mete­o­ro­log­i­cal con­di­tions), but instead, we fly just as we are VMC (visual mete­o­ro­log­i­cal con­di­tions) even though we can­not see the ground or any­thing in front of us. It is def­i­nitely chal­leng­ing and at the end of every flight, Fred and I look at each other and ask, why are we doing this?
***

Shawn came in to the tent at 12:30am and told me about a Chinook crew that just went inad­ver­tent IMC (flew into the clouds on acci­dent). They recov­ered here to Udairi with no prob­lem. As it turned out, 2 more air­craft when into the clouds also. These were Alpha com­pany birds. One air­craft came back and the other air­craft did not. No one has had radio con­tact with this air­craft since they entered the clouds. Hope they come back.
I was talk­ing to Fred about it and it would be very easy to fly right into a cloud with­out real­iz­ing it at night. When we fly NVG flights, it is nearly impos­si­ble to see the ground and even more dif­fi­cult to see what is com­ing up in front of you. I can fore­see this hap­pen­ing to more crews if the weather were worse. The only thing we have going for us is that the weather is typ­i­cally not cloudy like it is in Germany. However, today, we had so much rain that it is now evap­o­rat­ing and form­ing low clouds.
While I was writ­ing a let­ter to Stef, the com­man­der walked into the tent to wake up the 1SG Not a good sign Sam just came in and stood next to me. He did not look good. I could tell that the worst had hap­pened and asked him, “Are they not com­ing back?” He said no. They found the air­craft not far from here. Sam walked back out with the Commander and the 1SG. More infor­ma­tion to fol­low. About an hour later, [the Commander] offi­cially told us the facts as they knew them at the time: 2 CH-47’s went IIMC, they recov­ered. 2 UH-60’s went IIMC and only one recov­ered. CPT Gibbons and 1SG Webb left in a Humvee and came upon the burn­ing wreck­age. There were no survivors.

IRAQ COPTERS ON DANGER’S EDGE

Thursday, January 27th, 2005

It’s not clear, yet, why the Marines’ CH-​​53E Super Stallion heli­copter crashed near the bor­der of Jordan and Iraq (although weather is a prime sus­pect). But this New York Times arti­cle describes just how dan­ger­ous fly­ing one of the copters over Iraq can be.
stallion.jpg

[After three U.S. heli­copter were shot down by insur­gents in November, 2003], American com­man­ders ordered pilots to fly eva­sively at all times. American heli­copters rou­tinely fly at tree-​​top level, bob­bing and weav­ing on their way to their des­ti­na­tion. Like the Super Stallion that went down Wednesday, Army and Marine heli­copters often fly at night, when the threat of attack is dimin­ished. Helicopter pilots say that they are still rou­tinely shot at from the ground but that the tac­tics have largely pre­vented the insur­gents from hit­ting them.
Because the heli­copters fly so low, one of the prin­ci­pal dan­gers is elec­tri­cal and tele­phone wires, which the chop­pers often leap over in flight.
The CH-​​53E Super Stallion involved in the crash is the largest and heav­i­est heli­copter used by the American mil­i­tary.
“Look at its sheer size — it’s huge,” said Richard Aboulafia, a mil­i­tary indus­try ana­lyst at the Teal Group, a north­ern Virginia aero­space and con­sult­ing firm. “It’s a mon­ster, and with size comes the fact that it is not very maneu­ver­able.“
Weather, too, presents spe­cial prob­lems.
“Helicopters are fairly frag­ile pieces of equip­ment,” said Ivan Oelrich, direc­tor of the Strategic Security Project at the Federation of American Scientists, a Washington non­profit group. “It’s rough for them to oper­ate in a dusty, desert envi­ron­ment where the dust can get into the machin­ery. And they are vul­ner­a­ble to ground fire because they fly at slow speeds, close to the ground…“
Before Wednesday’s crash, the CH-​​53E Super Stallion had a strong safety record, some­thing ana­lysts said was due to the matu­rity of its design and the reli­a­bil­ity of its equip­ment.
The heli­copter first came into ser­vice in 1981, although it is based on a design that dates to the Vietnam War. Produced by the Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation, the heli­copter was bought almost exclu­sively by the Marine Corps. Production ended about five years ago.
ii112801a.jpg

A three-​​engine craft, the heli­copter is designed to oper­ate in bad weather, day and night. It can lift more, carry it far­ther and fly faster than other heli­copters in the Pentagon’s fleet. Equipped with night vision abil­ity, it is designed to oper­ate in harsh ter­rain.
“This is a craft that can oper­ate day or night, in all types of weather,” said John Milliman, a spokesman for the Naval Air Systems Command at Patuxent River, Md. “It is a very big, very rugged heli­copter than can carry a very heavy load.“
Still, for all its bulk, the craft remains vul­ner­a­ble. If forced to fly eva­sively in bad weather, a pilot could become dis­ori­ented.
Some American offi­cials have expressed worry that the harsh con­di­tions of Iraq and Afghanistan, and the fre­quency with which the heli­copters are deployed, could have ren­dered them vul­ner­a­ble.
At an October 2003 hear­ing of the House Armed Services Committee, Representative Joel R. Hefley, Republican of Colorado, the chair­man, said the typ­i­cal Super Stallion return­ing from ser­vice in Afghanistan and Iraq was found to have 150 pounds of sand spread through­out its inte­rior.
Sand is thought to be one of the worst ene­mies of the heli­copter in Iraq, wear­ing down rotors and seep­ing into engines and elec­tron­ics. It can blind pilots, espe­cially on land­ing, when the heli­copters kick up huge clouds of dust. It mixes with lubri­cants and turns them into sticky masses of gum.
“The con­di­tions were harsh,” Mr. Hefley said. “The heat, the sand, the oper­a­tional tempo together resulted in our troops tak­ing a beat­ing.”

THERE’S MORE: A Kiowa scout copter has just crashed in Baghdad, the AP is reporting.

DEFENSE TECH GABS

Thursday, January 27th, 2005

I’ll be on the pub­lic radio show Future Tense today, talk­ing about the Pentagon’s high tech ways to stop jury-​​rigged bombs. (Here’s a link that’ll take you straight to the inter­view.)
THERE’S MORE: I’ve also got a short arti­cle in today’s Times, about a new gen­er­a­tion of music mix­ing soft­ware, for mobile phones.

MARINE HELO DOWN; 31 DEAD

Wednesday, January 26th, 2005

This is awful, just awful. Let’s hope these num­bers are off.
A U.S. Marine heli­copter trans­port­ing troops crashed Wednesday in the desert of west­ern Iraq, killing 31 peo­ple, American mil­i­tary offi­cials said. It was the dead­liest crash of a U.S. mil­i­tary heli­copter in Iraq.
970417-N-3149V-005_screen.jpgA Pentagon source said the heli­copter was a CH-​​53 Sea Stallion, which is nor­mally con­fig­ured to carry 37 pas­sen­gers, but can take up to 55. There was no imme­di­ate word on how many peo­ple were on board or what caused the crash.
The mil­i­tary offi­cials did not spec­ify the nation­al­i­ties of those on board or say how many were sol­diers.
It was the biggest loss of life in a heli­copter crash in Iraq — and could be the dead­liest sin­gle inci­dent for American forces since the U.S.-led inva­sion in March 2003.

THERE’S MORE: Back in August, a Sea Stallion crashed in Okinawa; thank­fully, no one was killed. But that same month, two Marines died when their CH-​​53 copter went down over Iraq’s Al-​​Anbar province. In 2002, two more lost their lives when the newer, Super Stallion ver­sion of the air­craft broke down in Afghanistan.

JAMMERS, MICROWAVE BLASTS TARGET I.E.D.S

Wednesday, January 26th, 2005

When U.S. Army Capt. Christopher Sullivan was killed last week by a hand­made bomb, it was a tragedy for his fam­ily — and a trag­i­cally ordi­nary event for the American mil­i­tary. Improvised explo­sive devices, or IEDs, have been respon­si­ble for hun­dreds of American casu­al­ties in Iraq. And so far, there doesn’t appear to be any reli­able way of stop­ping them.
HMMWV-IED-2a.gifThe Pentagon, scram­bling for answers, is in the mid­dle of a fran­tic search for high-​​tech meth­ods to find and neu­tral­ize the jury-​​rigged weapons.
Microwave blasts, radio-​​frequency jam­mers and chem­i­cal sen­sors are among the meth­ods being explored and deployed in this largely secret effort.
But, because IEDs are cob­bled together from “what­ever the peo­ple that plant them can find,” warned Cliff Anderson, a pro­gram man­ager at the Office of Naval Research, “there is no magic bul­let” that will sud­denly end the IED threat…
Daniel Goure, vice pres­i­dent of the Lexington Institute, a Washington-​​area think tank, believes, the most effec­tive IED coun­ter­mea­sure might be a pulse of elec­tro­mag­netic energy that can “fry the cir­cuits of these bombs.“
Researchers at the Naval Surface Warfare Center’s Dahlgren Laboratory in Virginia are work­ing on such a solu­tion, called NIRF, short for Neutralizing Improvised Explosive Devices with RF. The device, accord­ing to a source famil­iar with the project, “pro­duces a very high-​​frequency field, in the microwave range, at very short range” to take out an IED’s elec­tron­ics. The Pentagon hopes to deploy NIRF in Iraq later this year.
My arti­cle in today’s Wired News has details.
THERE’S MORE: The L.A. Times has a dyna­mite story today from Al-​​Ramadi, Iraq, on the dan­gers fac­ing American con­voys there.

As he always does before trav­el­ing the road­ways of Iraq, Marine Staff Sgt. Johnathan Radel on Tuesday said a short prayer.
Lord, please keep us safe today from IEDs and VBIEDS,” he said as he sat in his Humvee, using the ini­tials for impro­vised explo­sive devices and vehicle-​​borne impro­vised explo­sive devices.
Less than five min­utes later, as the eight-​​vehicle con­voy rolled through the streets of Ramadi in the predawn dark­ness, an IED exploded beneath one of the Humvees, send­ing an orange fire­ball into the sky and shred­ding the vehicle’s back tires.

AND MORE: How does the Army’s 3rd Corps Support Command say you should han­dle IEDs? Read this brief­ing to find out.

HAIRDRESSER HAS TOP NUKE LAB CLEARANCE

Tuesday, January 25th, 2005

There’s noth­ing wrong, of course, with a hair­dresser hav­ing top-​​secret clear­ance at the world’s most impor­tant nuclear weapons cen­ter. But it is kinda funny. From the Los Alamos Monitor:

Anthony Moya is a Q-​​cleared [top secu­rity rated] com­puter tech­ni­cian at Los Alamos National Laboratory by day and a highly skilled razor-​​blade-​​sculpting hair­styl­ist at his own salon by night…
He remem­bers first dis­cov­er­ing his inter­est and tal­ent for hair­styling in the fifth or sixth grade… Moya’s par­ents went out danc­ing on Saturday nights and Moya would look over his mother’s coif­fure and snip away any unruly hairs.
“Finally, my mother let me style her hair,” Moya said. “I also trimmed my father’s mus­tache and got them both ready to go out…“
Moya said while he con­tin­ued to cut and style his family’s hair through­out the years, the tim­ing was never right to enter styling school to earn his for­mal styling license.
Over two years and 1,000 hours later, Moya received his cer­tifi­cate in bar­ber­ing, passed the state board exam­i­na­tion, and interned at an Espanola salon.
“The only dif­fer­ence between a bar­ber and a cos­me­tol­o­gist is bar­bers shave and cos­me­tol­o­gists do nails,” Moya said.
“Barbers have to learn to apply per­ma­nents, color, and blow dry hair, and use a curl­ing iron. They also learn to per­form facials. I am now cer­ti­fied in both bar­ber­ing and cos­me­tol­ogy…
In 1979, Moya went to work at the [oft-​​troubled] plu­to­nium facil­ity at TA-​​55 as a mate­ri­als tech­ni­cian and in ship­ping and han­dling… Moya now per­forms com­puter tech­ni­cian work at NMT-​​3 [the Nuclear Materials Technology divi­sion]…
“I’m just thor­oughly enjoy­ing life work­ing at the lab and styling hair at the salon.”