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Archive for November, 2005

PROPAGANDA ‘R’ US?

Wednesday, November 30th, 2005

The Army has been plant­ing sto­ries favor­able to the coali­tion in Iraqi news­pa­pers, accord­ing to doc­u­ments obtained by the L.A. Times.
The Financial Times weighed in today:
Many of the arti­cles are pre­sented in the Iraqi press as unbi­ased news accounts writ­ten and reported by inde­pen­dent jour­nal­ists. The sto­ries trum­pet the work of U.S. and Iraqi troops, denounce insur­gents, and tout U.S.-led efforts to rebuild the coun­try. … As part of a psy­cho­log­i­cal oper­a­tions cam­paign that has inten­si­fied over the past year, one of the mil­i­tary offi­cials said that the task force [respon­si­ble for plant­ing the sto­ries] also has pur­chased an Iraqi news­pa­per and taken con­trol of a radio sta­tion, and is using the out­lets to chan­nel pro-​​American mes­sages to the Iraqi pub­lic. Neither is iden­ti­fied as a mil­i­tary mouth­piece.Small Ferrell.jpg
This news should come as no sur­prise to those fol­low­ing the coalition’s infor­ma­tion war­fare cam­paign in Iraq. But plant­ing sto­ries rep­re­sents the seed­i­est — and least com­mon — tac­tic for shap­ing Iraqi atti­tudes. The main cam­paign of the infowar is the coalition’s efforts to train up Iraqi jour­nal­ists in Western-​​style jour­nal­ism. Division and brigade pub­lic affairs shops through­out Iraq work hand-​​in-​​hand with local reporters, help­ing them gain access to impor­tant sto­ries, equip­ping them with tech­nol­ogy they oth­er­wise could not afford and encour­ag­ing them to net­work, check their sources and tell both sides.
Seriously. I’ve seen it hap­pen in Tikrit with the 42nd Infantry Division, in east­ern Iraq with the 278th Cavalry Regiment and with British forces in Basra. A cou­ple bad apples don’t rep­re­sent the entire coali­tion infowar effort.
Take, for exam­ple, the Diyala radio sta­tion near Baqubah, where Iraqi jour­nal­ists host call-​​in talk pro­grams and the provin­cial gov­er­nor deliv­ers speeches. Last year a bus­load of radio employ­ees were mas­sa­cred by insur­gents, so the 1st Infantry Division began patrolling the area and posted guards at the sta­tion. Now it’s secure. And sadly, in Iraq these days, secure means free.
Does that make every­thing that comes out of the Diyala radio sta­tion pro­pa­ganda?
THIS JUST IN: Defense News quotes White House spokesman Scott McClellan respond­ing to the alle­ga­tions:
“We’re very con­cerned about the reports,” … McClellan told reporters. “We have asked the Department of Defense for more infor­ma­tion.
“We want to see what the facts are.
“The United States is a leader when it comes to pro­mot­ing and advo­cat­ing a free and inde­pen­dent media around the world, and we will con­tinue to do so,” McClellan added.
“We’ve made our views very clear when it comes to free­dom of press.
“And in terms of this spe­cific issue, again, what we want to do is find out what the facts are and then we�ll be able to talk about it more at that point,” he said.

–David Axe

So Much for Withdrawal

Wednesday, November 30th, 2005

Well, so much for those plans to with­draw American forces from Iraq. President Bush’s big speech at the Naval Academy “did not break new ground or present a new strat­egy,” the AP notes. So that means, despite the chat­ter before­hand, no new sched­ule for bring­ing troops home.
GI_point.jpgWhat Bush did say is that “as Iraqi forces become more capa­ble the mis­sion of our forces in Iraq will con­tinue to change.”

We will con­tinue to shift from pro­vid­ing secu­rity and con­duct­ing oper­a­tions against the enemy nation­wide to con­duct­ing more spe­cial­ized oper­a­tions tar­geted at the most dan­ger­ous ter­ror­ists.
We will increas­ingly move out of Iraqi cities, reduce the num­ber of bases from which we oper­ate and con­duct fewer patrols and con­voys.
As the Iraqi forces gain expe­ri­ence and the polit­i­cal progress advances, we will be able to decrease our troop lev­els in Iraq with­out los­ing our capa­bil­ity to defeat the terrorists.

Which says to me: kiss the “oil-​​spot” the­ory good­bye. That’s the idea, which has been gain­ing momen­tum in polit­i­cal cir­cles since an August Foreign Affairs arti­cle, to use our troops to set up safe havens in Iraq, and then slowly grow them out.
But to do that, you need troops — lots of troops — to fill a city up, and patrol vir­tu­ally every cor­ner. If I’m read­ing between the lines of Bush’s speech right, that’s not the idea here — despite talk in the President’s “National Strategy for Victory in Iraq” or “clear[ing]” out and “hold[ing]” insur­gent epi­cen­ters.
Speaking of the “Strategy,” it ain’t. The doc­u­ment reads more like a mar­ket­ing doc­u­ment than a focused plan for win­ning a war. And there are some mighty odd state­ments in it, as Dr. AC Wonk notes. For exam­ple, the Strategy claims that:

As of November 2005, there were more than 212,000 trained and equipped Iraqi Security Forces, com­pared with 96,000 in September of last year.

But “Iraq did not, how­ever, have 96,000 trained and equipped Iraqi Security Forces… in September 2004,” the Wonk responds.

Adam Entous with Reuters obtained inter­nal Defense Department doc­u­ments in September 2004 that revealed only 8,169 had com­pleted the full eight-​​week acad­emy train­ing. 46,176 of what are pub­licly called trained and equipped forces were listed pri­vately as untrained. 

Whatever the num­bers, Bush’s bot­tom line is clear: no big changes to Iraq strat­egy, despite all the heavy-​​breathing. “Stay the course,” he repeated four times at the end of his Annapolis speech. “Our clear, hold, and build strat­egy is work­ing,” add his plan.

Calling all Catamarans

Wednesday, November 30th, 2005

In this age of ris­ing ship­build­ing costs, uncer­tain naval strat­egy and shrink­ing pro­cure­ment bud­gets, nobody knows for sure what the future U.S. fleet will look like. But one thing’s for sure … it’ll include a lot of pon­toon boats.
Everybody knows about the much-​​ballyhooed Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), a pro­gram for up to 75 small mod­u­lar ves­sels opti­mized for coastal com­bat. Less glam­orous but per­haps more impor­tant to future oper­a­tions is the forth­com­ing Joint High-​​Speed Vessel (JHSV), which is man­aged by the Navy’s Program Executive Office for Ships.
The JHSV is a cata­ma­ran – basi­cally a 100-​​meter pon­toon boat. Catamarans and their three-​​pontoon cousins, tri­marans, have been the sub­ject of a lot of mil­i­tary exper­i­men­ta­tion of late. The Marines are using a cata­ma­ran, the WestPac Express, to trans­port infantry bat­tal­ions to train­ing events in the west­ern Pacific. The Navy has two JHSV pro­to­types, HSVX-​​1 and HSV-​​2, that have been pressed into ser­vice in hurricane-​​relief efforts, while the Office of Naval Research has been test­ing LCS con­cepts with its FSF-​​1 cata­ma­ran. The Army has a tri­maran, TSV-​​1X, that it uses for expe­di­tionary logis­tics.
The idea behind the JHSV is to equip Military Sealift Command (or — and I’m spec­u­lat­ing here — JHSV.jpgTransportation Command) with a fleet of fast, cheap ves­sels capa­ble of trans­port­ing and deploy­ing a battalion-​​sized Marine land­ing teams, an Army Stryker com­pany, Special Forces teams or an equiv­a­lent load of cargo at aus­tere shallow-​​water ports. JHSV would sup­port two H-​​60 or H-​​6 heli­copters and vertical-​​launch UAVs like Scan Eagle.
“The JHSV will not be a com­bat­ant ves­sel,” reads a Navy press release. “Its con­struc­tion will be sim­i­lar to high-​​speed com­mer­cial fer­ries used around the world, and the design will include a flight deck and an off-​​load ramp which can be low­ered on a pier or quay wall — allow­ing vehi­cles to quickly drive off the ship.“
Think of the JHSV and its broth­ers as super–LCACs, or amphibi­ous LCSs minus the guns. The Navy and Marines would use them as ship-​​to-​​shore con­nec­tors in their Seabasing con­cept. The Army might employ them at the the­atre level for rapid maneu­ver, replac­ing its cur­rent tri­marans. Special Forces Command wants cata­ma­rans as off­shore com­mando bases, in the same vein as the new SSGNs, but a lot cheaper. Retired Rear Adm. George R. Worthington, in the October Proceedings, advo­cates arm­ing the Special Forces cata­ma­rans with loi­ter­ing mis­siles for coastal land-​​attack.
In fact, JHSV’s low price-​​tag, around $100 mil­lion (ver­sus $1 bil­lion for the new San Antonio-​​class amphibi­ous trans­port) all but guar­an­tees its place in the future fleet. The first pro­duc­tion ves­sel is slated for FY2008.
– David Axe

Spooks = Bloggers

Tuesday, November 29th, 2005

computer.cia.jpgEarlier this year, for­mer Army intel offi­cer (and Defense Tech home­boy) Kris Alexander told our spooks to start blog­ging if they wanted to get seri­ous about track­ing terrorist-​​types.
Afterwards, he got a flood of e-​​mails from gov­ern­ment suits ask­ing him for help to imple­ment the idea. I’m not sure if CIA agents were among the callers. But either way, the agency seems to have got­ten the mes­sage. The lead from a Washington Post arti­cle a few days back: “The CIA now has its own blog­gers.“
(Big ups: CA)

Recon on Radio Project

Tuesday, November 29th, 2005

Over the last year, we’ve spent a whole lot of time chron­i­cling the woes of the Joint Tactical Radio System. That’s the Pentagon’s star-​​crossed $6.8 bil­lion effort to replace their with just a few dig­i­tal ones. It’s the back­bone of the military’s effort to mod­ern­ize itself. And it is not going well.
jtrs_scenario.jpgBut “Jitters,” as the pro­gram is Pentagonese, hasn’t got­ten much main­stream press atten­tion — largely, I think, because its sprawl­ing and con­fus­ing, even for a Defense Department project. (Jitters has four “clus­ters” of radios, for exam­ple — the last of which is “Cluster 5.”)
The cur­rent issue of Defense Technology International (pgs 30–34) does the best job I’ve seen so far at pick­ing through the Jitters tan­gle, detail­ing what’s work­ing, and what’s hold­ing the radio project back. Check it out.

Withdraw, then What?

Tuesday, November 29th, 2005

Lots of peo­ple who read this site are die-​​hard sup­port­ers of President Bush. Folks who shook their heads in dis­gust at Rep. John Murtha’s call to with­draw American troops from Iraq; who nod­ded in agree­ment when White House press sec­re­tary Scott McClellan responded that now “is not the time to sur­ren­der to the ter­ror­ists.“
sandbags.jpgSo guys: I’m curi­ous to hear your reac­tions to the Administration’s appar­ent newfound-​​readiness to take tens of thou­sands of U.S. forces out of Iraq, pronto.
As some­one who’s been skep­ti­cal about the war since before it began, I’m wor­ried that pulling out — with­out a viable Iraqi mil­i­tary, and with­out a dis­cern­able “vic­tory” to declare — gives the global Jihadist move­ment a gigan­tic win. After this war, and the fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan, there are a whole lot of rad­i­cal Islamists out there who are going to see the score­board as Jihadists 2, Superpowers 0. Which, as a res­i­dent of the most-​​bombed city in America, is more than unnerv­ing. Because that first score is what even­tu­ally lead to the Twin Towers get­ting knocked down.
And even if the ter­ror­ists never return to New York, with­out American troops, how do we keep a thoroughly-​​screwed up Iraq from becom­ing “a hor­nets’ nest,” as Martin van Creveld puts it, with “a hun­dred mini-​​Zarqawis spread[ing] all over the Middle East, con­duct­ing acts of sab­o­tage and seek­ing to over­throw gov­ern­ments in Allah’s name.“
What’s the plan? (And, for God’s sake, don’t tell me it’s air power.)
THERE’S MORE: Eighteen months ago, when a left-​​leaning defense ana­lyst told me that the U.S. mil­i­tary in Iraq was paving the way for Salvadoran-​​style death squads, I blew him off as a Bush-​​hater. I guess I owe him an apol­ogy now.

Rapid Fire 11/​29/​05

Tuesday, November 29th, 2005


* Cybercrime big­ger than drugs
* Virtual autop­sies beat real ones
* Crappy FBI IT: slightly less crappy
* Counter-​​terror finan­cial fight FUBAR
* Nuke arse­nal shift?
* Iris-​​spotting tech opens up?
* Armored Jag leaves lot

(Big ups: Geek Press, /​.)

‘Duke’ Gone; Air Force Bummed

Monday, November 28th, 2005

Sure, it means one less crook on Capitol Hill. But Randy “Duke” Cunningham’s res­ig­na­tion from Congress also means that the Air Force loses one of its biggest allies in the leg­is­la­ture.
duke_resigns.jpgCunningham “pleaded guilty Monday to con­spir­acy and tax charges and tear­fully resigned from office, admit­ting he took $2.4 mil­lion in bribes to steer defense con­tracts to con­spir­a­tors,” says the AP.
But before Cunningham got cozy with the likes of shady secu­rity analy­sis firm MZM, Inc. and dodgy dig­i­tal doc­u­menter ADCS Inc., the guy was a hero — the first American fighter ace of the Vietnam War, shoot­ing down five Russian MiGs. He went on to become an instruc­tor at the Navy’s “Top Gun” school, and then to Congress, where he got deeply involved with mil­i­tary mat­ters. Especially mat­ters with wings and big price tags.
When Pentagon chiefs wanted to cut $10 bil­lion or so from the Cold War-​​inspired, $40 bil­lion F-​​22 Raptor jet, Cunningham “lec­tured” Rumsfeld that “no air­plane in the world can touch the F-​​22,’” accord­ing to Defense News. “Other U.S. pilots ‘are going to die 95 per­cent of the time’ if they fight [new] Russian Su-​​30s and Su-​​37s [fighter jets].“
Many for­mer Top Gun grad­u­ates, like for­mer Marine Gen. Tom Wilkerson, aren’t so sure. Earlier this year, he told me that the days of dog­fights were over, basi­cally, and that “maybe you don’t need any fighter pilots at all.” Let’s just say he wasn’t impressed with the Raptor ratio­nale.
But credit Cunningham with being con­sis­tent. He cited the same 95% death rate back in 2000, when he was push­ing his col­leagues to bankroll the AIM-​​9X advanced air-​​to-​​air mis­sile and Boeing’s “look-​​and-​​shoot” Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System. “We needed those five years ago,” he told Defense Daily. The Su-​​30s and Su-​​37s “have a helmet-​​mounted site that they can turn their head and lock you up, and that mis­sile will make the cor­ner. Ours won’t.“
A year later — before 9/​11, before the Predator drone became so famously suc­cess­ful over Afghanistan — Cunningham was agi­tat­ing for Congress to pay for the devel­op­ment of the next-​​generation “Predator B” unmanned spy plane. The Air Force in March announced that it would be buy­ing 144 more of the drones over the next five years, for a $5.7 bil­lion.
THERE’S MORE: Will some­one please explain why the Bush admin­is­tra­tion “hired Duke-​​briber “MZM, a ‘defense and intel­li­gence firm,’ to buy office fur­ni­ture for the White House?

Ward to Wingers: Get Lost

Monday, November 28th, 2005

The tone is prob­a­bly a lit­tle dif­fer­ent from the one I’d take. But I couldn’t agree with Military​.com edi­tor and (F-​​14 flyer) Ward Carroll’s sen­ti­ments more.

As a vet­eran I’m put off by the rhetoric (and the media’s cov­er­age of it) from the far ends of the polit­i­cal spec­trum sur­round­ing so-​​called sup­port for the troops. On bal­ance the dialec­tic is white noise, not to men­tion by in large disin­gen­u­ous. The extreme con­ser­v­a­tive doesn’t have the warfighter’s best inter­est in mind any more than the rad­i­cal lib­eral does. Sean Hannity is a poseur and Cindy Sheehan is an oppor­tunist. Neither of them knows what its like to serve. (And, by the way, hav­ing ser­vice mem­bers email you does not count as ser­vice.)
The draw of ser­vice is an intan­gi­ble, for the most part. You can’t read it in a book or see it on a DVD and get it. It lives under lofty tenets like Duty and Honor but it comes down to climb­ing into the Humvees day after day because the rest of their squad is. Their mis­sion isn’t spread­ing Freedom; their mis­sion is to keep traf­fic flow­ing along the air­port road. They’ll do it, not because the vice pres­i­dent gave them a pep talk from half a planet away, but because the cap­tain told them to and he’s a decent leader, even if he doesn’t know a thing about hip hop. And they’ll do it because a few weeks back a cou­ple of their bud­dies died when an IED went off next to their vehi­cle and there’s no way they’re going to let those insur­gent bas­tards get away with it.
From the safety and quiet of my state­side home I have the lux­ury of won­der­ing what hap­pened to the moral high ground. I’m dying to know where all the neo-​​cons went. What hap­pened to Douglas Feith and the spring dar­lings of 2003 who graced the cover of
Vanity Fair and gave whacky press con­fer­ences? Goodness gra­cious, where did they go? And who gave Janeane Garofalo a micro­phone? Does the major­ity of the new left not see what a car­toon they are — like a mid­dle school­ers con­cep­tion of a Woodstock reunion or a fea­ture length Tommy Hilfiger commercial? 

Thermobaric Foes: Explosive Threat

Monday, November 28th, 2005

Thermobaric war­heads put the power to demol­ish build­ings into the hands of the aver­age U.S. marine. But Americans arent the only ones with the weapons. The Chinese, the Russians — even guerilla groups — now have ther­mo­bar­ics’ shock­ingly destruc­tive power in their grasps.
chinese_thermo.jpgThermobarics aren’t just a more pow­er­ful ver­sion of nor­mal high explo­sive. The term encom­passes a range of dif­fer­ent types of war­head from fuel-​​air explo­sives, which release a cloud of flam­ma­ble mate­r­ial and det­o­nate it, to met­al­lized explo­sives whose expand­ing fire­ball takes in oxy­gen from the air. What they have in com­mon is that they pro­duce blast which has a lower over­pres­sure but a longer dura­tion than nor­mal con­densed explo­sives. In effect it is a shove rather than a punch: a ther­mo­baric explo­sion does not smash a hole in a wall, it pushes the wall over. An instan­ta­neous explo­sive over­pres­sure of 50 psi [pounds per square inch] is needed to kill. But one sus­tained for a frac­tion of a sec­ond at 10 psi is also lethal. Thats how ther­mo­bar­ics kill.
The basic idea goes way back, and any­one inter­ested in the back­ground — includ­ing a bizarre German WWII weapon, how a 500lb of coal dust can break win­dows five miles away and what new ultra-​​fine nanoex­plo­sives can do — should put my book Weapons Grade on their Christmas list.
But the ther­mo­baric threat isnt con­fined to his­tory books. In Iraq and Afghanistan, many US lives have been saved by the pro­tec­tion afforded by armored patrol vehi­cles, body armor and prompt med­ical atten­tion. Thermobarics may change that. Armored vehi­cles are safe only when but­toned up, as the blast from a ther­mo­baric war­head will ‘flow’ through hatches or other open­ings.
A detailed analy­sis points out that “con­ven­tional coun­ter­mea­sures such as bar­ri­ers (sand­bags) and per­son­nel amour are not effec­tive against ther­mo­baric weaponry.“
Other research indi­cates that cur­rent bal­lis­tic body armor actu­ally increases the sever­ity of blast injuries. Similarly, cur­rent com­bat med­i­cine is not geared to deal with the dam­age to lungs and intestines which are typ­i­cal of ther­mo­bar­ics — “diag­no­sis and treat­ment of blast injuries may require com­puted tomog­ra­phy, which might not be read­ily avail­able in the bat­tle­field.“
thermo2.gifIn 1988, the Russians were the first to field a shoulder-​​launched ther­mo­baric weapon, the RPO-​​A. It is also known as Shmel or Schmel from the Russian for Bumblebee.
As with the Marines ther­mo­baric SMAW-​​NE weapon, the Shmel is quite capa­ble of destroy­ing build­ings as this video shows. The Shmel com­ple­mented a wide range of other ther­mo­baric weapons includ­ing bombs, rock­ets and artillery in the Russian arse­nal. Controversially, secu­rity forces used the Shmel in the school siege at Beslan, a ques­tion­able choice for a hostage sit­u­a­tion.
New Russian devel­op­ments include a com­pact multi-​​shot ther­mo­baric grenade launcher for urban com­bat and a ther­mo­baric war­head for the RPG-​​7 used by guer­rilla forces world­wide. Similar prod­ucts are offered for export by the Bulgarians and other Eastern European nations.
Rumors of a Chinese licensed copy of the Shmel appear to be con­firmed with the emer­gence of this clone — it has the same cal­i­bre, same appear­ance and described as “fuel air blast­ing explo­sive”. Its effec­tive­ness against build­ings, bunkers is noted, as well as the fact that because the blast takes oxy­gen from the air, “per­son­nel in the air­tight space suf­fo­cates because of the oxy­gen deficit.“
Are such weapons in the hands of insur­gents and ter­ror­ists? During the Chechen con­flict, there were per­sis­tent sto­ries that Chechen sep­a­ratists had them:
“The Russian force, to explain exten­sive dam­age to build­ings in Grozny, stated that the Chechens had cap­tured a box­car full of Shmel weapons and were now using them indis­crim­i­nately,” one report noted. Newspapers reported that the weapons were recov­ered from Chechen arms caches
However, accord­ing to Tourpal-​​Ali Kaimov, a Chechen com­man­der inter­viewed by the USMC only a hand­ful of Shmel were captured.

The Russian claim that the Chechens cap­tured a ‘box car’ load of these weapons was part of a Russian dis­in­for­ma­tion cam­paign. The indis­crim­i­nate use of these weapons com­bined with its destruc­tive capa­bil­i­ties pro­duced a lot of col­lat­eral dam­age and deaths/​injuries among non-​​combatants. The Russian claim was a ruse in order to place at least part of the blame on Chechen use of the Schmel.

There is at least one doc­u­mented instance of an irreg­u­lar force receiv­ing Shmel: the Cobra mili­tia in the Republic of Congo reported in 2003.

Among these ship­ments were sig­nif­i­cant quan­ti­ties of the RPO-​​A ‘Shmel’, an extremely lethal hand-​​held launcher whose pro­jec­tile uses fuel-​​air explo­sive… This is the first time this weapon has been seen in the pos­ses­sion of a non-​​state actor.

The report, by the Swiss-​​based Small Arms Survey group, does not iden­tify the source of the weapon, but does pro­vides pho­to­graphic evi­dence.
So far, insur­gents in Iraq havent got­ten their hands on ther­mo­baric weapons. And reports from Afghanistan describ­ing ther­mo­baric vic­tims as being found dead with­out a mark on them have been over­stated — and alle­ga­tions about ‘dis­placed eye­balls’ — are highly doubt­ful. But it would seem only a mat­ter of time until these weapons make them into the worlds most intense con­flicts.
Some atten­tion has been paid to the threat posed by ther­mo­bar­ics, but lit­tle has been made pub­lic. In a series of com­puter sim­u­la­tions called Project Albert, the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory has eval­u­ated the effect of arm­ing pla­toons of attack­ers and defend­ers with enhanced blast weapons in urban assault. The results are sig­nif­i­cant — when the attack­ers alone are armed with them, they are much more suc­cess­ful, but when both sides have them the advan­tage shifts towards the defend­ers.
This may be impor­tant for the future of war­fare in cities. The spread of these weapons will make such actions more destruc­tive, and it will make infantry assault even more costly in terms of lives.
Agreement on an inter­na­tional ban on the man­u­fac­ture and export of such weapons might have been pos­si­ble some years ago, but now the genie is well and truly out of the bot­tle. Now it is a mat­ter of prepar­ing our­selves with bet­ter tac­ti­cal aware­ness of what such weapons can do, and improv­ing the med­ical facil­i­ties for deal­ing with ther­mo­baric casu­al­ties.
David Hambling