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Archive for March, 2006

“A Mushroom Cloud over Las Vegas…”

Friday, March 31st, 2006

…Is what will almost, but appar­ently not quite, be seen on June 2. According to the Defense Threat Reduction Agency , the dust cloud from Divine Strake, a mas­sive con­ven­tional explo­sion sched­uled to take place at the Nevada Test Site this sum­mer, “may reach an alti­tude of 10,000 feet (3,048 meters) [but] is not expected to be vis­i­ble off the Nevada Test Site.”

boom.jpg

The open-​​air test will ignite 700 tons of ammo­nium nitrate/​fuel oil, good for 593 tons of high-​​explosives equiv­a­lent, accord­ing to the Washington Post . The Associated Press describes the test as the largest-​​ever open-​​air chem­i­cal explo­sion at the Nevada site by a fac­tor of forty. Due to the size of the blast and its sen­si­tive loca­tion at the home of the United States’ erst­while nuclear test pro­gram DTRA has taken the trou­ble to warn the Russians ahead of time of the upcom­ing test. 

The tests pur­pose, accord­ing to Defense News, is “to exam­ine ground shock effects on deeply buried tun­nel struc­tures.” The WaPo describes the test as “a con­ven­tional alter­na­tive” to the polit­i­cally ornery Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator, or “nuclear bunker-​​buster.”

Heres my $64,000 ques­tion, though: is this (700-​​ton!) explo­sive really a con­ven­tional “alter­na­tive,” or is it a stand-​​in being used to sim­u­late a low-​​yield nuke? 

By the way a “strake is “a straight­edge used for lev­el­ing a bed of sand .” 

Center for Defense Information sci­ence fel­low Haninah Levine has been pass­ing tips and com­ments to Defense Tech for months. This is his first post for the site.

(Big ups: Xeni, DS)
UPDATE 11:08 AM: “Ain’t noth­ing you can do when it’s Strakes on a moth­er­fuck­ing plain.“
UPDATE 04/​03/​06 12:15 PM: John Fleck, from the Albuquerque Journal, has the answer to whether Divine Strake is nuke-​​related. “A Pentagon bud­get request is explicit about its
pur­pose: to “improve the warfighter’s con­fi­dence in select­ing the small­est nuclear yield nec­es­sary to destroy under­ground facil­i­ties while min­i­miz­ing col­lat­eral dam­age.“
Meanwhile, Globalsecurity​.org decodes the media gob­bledy­gook sur­round­ing the Divine Strake test.
UPDATE 04/​03/​06 5:15 PM:“In response to an email ear­lier today, a DTRA spokesper­son con­firmed that Divine Strake is the same event that is described in DTRA bud­get doc­u­ments as being a low-​​yield nuclear weapons shock sim­u­la­tion,” the FAS Strategic Security Blog notes.

It also turns out that Divine Strake is “an inte­gral part” of STRATCOM’s new Global Strike mis­sion, which is nor­mally reported to develop mainly non-​​nuclear capa­bil­i­ties against time-​​urgent tar­gets. Global Strike is one of the plil­lars of the Bush admin­is­tra­tions so-​​called New Triad which is said to be reduc­ing the role of nuclear weapons.

Army’s About Face on Soldier-​​Bought Armor

Friday, March 31st, 2006

sov-2-front.jpgAP: “Just six months after the Pentagon agreed to reim­burse sol­diers who bought their own pro­tec­tive gear, the Army has banned the use of any body armor that is not issued by the mil­i­tary.”

In a new direc­tive, effec­tive imme­di­ately, the Army said it can­not guar­an­tee the qual­ity of com­mer­cially bought armor, and any sol­dier wear­ing it will have to turn it in and have it replaced with autho­rized gear.
Army offi­cials told The Associated Press on Thursday the order was prompted by con­cerns that sol­diers or their fam­i­lies were buy­ing inad­e­quate or untested com­mer­cial armor from pri­vate com­pa­nies — includ­ing the pop­u­lar Dragon Skin gear made by California-​​based Pinnacle Armor.

The Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans of America, which is usu­ally mega-​​critical of the Pentagon’s higher-​​ups, agrees with the Army this time. “The Army has to ensure some level of qual­ity… They don’t want sol­diers rely­ing on equip­ment that is weak or sub­stan­dard,” exec­u­tive direc­tor Paul Rieckhoff tells the AP.
But Soldiers for the Truth con­tends that, “Despite all the evi­dence to the con­trary, includ­ing [Army Program Executive Office] Soldier’s own bal­lis­tic tests con­ducted at two Army research lab­o­ra­to­ries that irrefutably proved Dragon Skin was a supe­rior prod­uct, the offi­cers charged with pro­vid­ing America’s war­riors with the best pro­tec­tion pos­si­ble con­tinue to main­tain that the Army’s home-​​grown Interceptor OTV body armor is supe­rior.” The site also has the inter­nal Army e-​​mail telling com­man­ders to diss the Dragon Skin.

A. There may be Soldiers deployed in OIF/​OEF who are wear­ing a com­mer­cial body armor called “Dragon Skin,” made by Pinnacle Armor, in lieu of their issued Interceptor Body Armor (IBA). Media releases and related adver­tis­ing imply that Dragon Skin is supe­rior in per­for­mance to IBA. The Army has been unable to deter­mine the verac­ity of these claims.
B. The Army has been involved in the devel­op­ment of Dragon Skin and the dif­fer­ent tech­nol­ogy it employs. In its cur­rent state of devel­op­ment, Dragon Skin’s capa­bil­i­ties do not meet Army require­ments. In fact, Dragon Skin has not been cer­ti­fied by the Army for pro­tec­tion against sev­eral small arms threats being encoun­tered in Iraq and Afghanistan today.

The Naked Cartridge

Friday, March 31st, 2006

Ladies and gen­tle­men: Jimmy Wu. He’s a 1st Lieutenant in the Alabama National Guard, an MIT grad in mechan­i­cal engi­neer­ing, and a mis­sile defense sys­tems engi­neer at Boeing. (Nice resume, hunh?) Jimmy also, in his words, “loves to shoot.” So ammo is the sub­ject in the first of what I hope will be a long line of posts for Defense Tech.

Soldiers hate lug­ging gear around, espe­cially in a hot and sweaty place like Iraq. But going with­out ammo — they hate that even more. So they load up on bul­lets, when they go on patrol.

cased_caseless.JPGA dif­fer­ent kind of ammu­ni­tion, being tested out by the Army, could help. Caseless ammu­ni­tion give us a lighter round, allow­ing the sol­dier to carry more of ‘em. A reg­u­lar car­tridge has the bul­let, the cas­ing, and the pro­pel­lant pow­der inside the cas­ing. In most rifle ammu­ni­tion, the cas­ing is big­ger than the bul­let. Caseless ammu­ni­tion dis­cards the brass and instead molds the pro­pel­lant around the bul­let, giv­ing a lighter and more com­pact round. For exam­ple, a sol­dier car­ry­ing the HK G-​​11 rifle can carry up to 10 times more ammu­ni­tion, for the equal weight, than a sol­dier with an M-​​16.

Caseless ammu­ni­tion is not a new idea. The con­cept has been with us as long as the auto-​​loading rifle, but it took awhile for the tech­nol­ogy to mature. Back in the 1980s, the US Army tried out case­less ammu­ni­tion under the Advanced Combat Rifle pro­gram, but it didn’t go any­where fol­low­ing the end of the Cold War. Germany did the same to their HK G-​​11.

Today, fol­low­ing expe­ri­ence in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US Army is pay­ing atten­tion again to sol­dier load. The Armament Research, Development and Engineering Center has been work­ing on a tech­nol­ogy demon­stra­tion pro­gram, with a light machine­gun pro­to­type to be built FY06. Perhaps this time around, case­less ammu­ni­tion will finally take hold in the United States.

– Jimmy Wu

iRobots Sell, But Who’s Buying?

Thursday, March 30th, 2006

irobots_shelf.JPGSomeone must be using them, I guess. Otherwise, why would Naval Sea Systems Command buy another $26 mil­lion worth of iRobot’s explosive-​​disposal machines? But I’ve never met a bomb squad tech­ni­cian who actu­ally both­ered with one of the things. Too flimsy, they all say. Too hard to oper­ate.
The Baghdad Bomb Squad used their iRo­bots to dec­o­rate their shop. Not far away, at the U.S. military’s cen­tral robot depot for Iraq, the iRo­bots sat on shelves, serenely gath­er­ing dust, while Foster-Miller’s Talon robots would come back, scarred and in pieces, after being chewed up by a bomb.
Foster-​​Miller, though, doesn’t have the PR mega­phone that iRo­bot does. It doesn’t have a cute, lit­tle house­hold machine to go along with its bat­tle­field mod­els. And when you go to mil­i­tary trade shows, you only see Foster-​​Miller spo­rad­i­cally. iRo­bot always seems to have a booth. Maybe there’s a con­nec­tion, some­where in there, to that big sale?
(Big ups: JQP)
UPDATE 1:50 PM: Of course. I shoulda fig­ured. “Sen. John Kerry Visits iRo­bot to Congratulate Company on $26 Million U.S. Navy Contract.”

Stealth’s Radioactive Secret

Thursday, March 30th, 2006

This is the first in two-​​part series from exotic weapons guru David Hambling.
Theres a sim­ple tech­nol­ogy that could trans­form civil avi­a­tion, slash­ing fuel con­sump­tion, reduc­ing green­house emis­sions and cut­ting noise. The prob­lem is, nobody knows about it yet. It’s a mil­i­tary secret.
Stealth01.jpg The way tech­nol­ogy migrates from clas­si­fied weapons pro­grams to every­day life is the theme of my book, Weapons Grade. (Did I men­tion it was out in paper­back this week?) We wouldnt have jet air­craft, com­put­ers or satel­lite com­mu­ni­ca­tions with­out such pro­grams. But when they stay secret, the pub­lic ben­e­fit is lost. What would have hap­pened to the elec­tron­ics indus­try if the tran­sis­tor had not been declas­si­fied in 1949?
Plasma aero­dy­nam­ics offers tan­ta­liz­ing promises of improv­ing air­craft per­for­mance. By pro­duc­ing a thin layer of charged par­ti­cles around an air­craft you can change the behav­ior of the bound­ary layer, sig­nif­i­cantly reduc­ing fric­tion. The charged layer also absorbs radar, improv­ing stealth.
When my col­league Justin Mullins wrote about the sub­ject for New Scientist mag­a­zine back in 2000, it seemed to be an obscure Russian tech­nol­ogy dat­ing from the late 70s which the US was just begin­ning to exam­ine. But it offered real ben­e­fits, with a poten­tial drag reduc­tion of up to 30%.

A cut in drag of 1 per cent means you can increase an airliner’s pay­load by about 10 per cent, or it could sim­ply fly far­ther or faster, Mullins pointed out, Just imag­ine the effect this could have on cash-​​strapped airlines.

The Russians seemed to be years ahead, even mar­ket­ing a plasma stealth add-​​on device said to reduce radar returns by a fac­tor of a hun­dred.
He con­cludes by won­der­ing if the tech­nol­ogy can actu­ally work in practice.

Either the new labs are a huge waste of time and money, or the American mil­i­tary knows some­thing we don’t.

As it turns out, they cer­tainly do.
A lot of infor­ma­tion on stealth dis­ap­peared from the pub­lic domain decades ago when the whole sub­ject turned black. Which was why I was sur­prised to find the orig­i­nal patent for plasma stealth still intact.
Patent 3,127,608 is called “Object Camouflage Method And Apparatus,” and “relates to a method of mak­ing air­craft or other objects invis­i­ble to radar.” The inven­tor, one Arnold L. Eldredge, describes the the­o­ret­i­cal basis of plasma stealth accu­rately.
The most sur­pris­ing thing is the date. The patent was filed on August 6th, 1956. The tech­nol­ogy has been around for fifty years.
But the big prob­lem is with his appa­ra­tus Eldredge uses an elec­tron gun, which would be way too big to carry on an air­craft. In fact, thats a prob­lem with this whole plasma idea. Apparatus to gen­er­ate the mil­lions of volts needed is big, bulky and imprac­ti­cal; even these days the Russians are talk­ing 100 Kg and tens of kilo­watts.
But there is a way — check out Patent 4,030,098 (1962) Method and means for reduc­ing reflec­tions of elec­tro­mag­netic waves assigned to the Secretary of the Army and the rather sim­i­lar Patent 3,713,157 (1964) belong­ing to North American Aviation, later absorbed by Boeing Energy Absorption by a Radioisotope Produced Plasma
Both of these use the same basic con­cept: a coat­ing of radioac­tive mate­r­ial pro­duc­ing a flux of either Alpha of Beta par­ti­cles ion­ize the air, pro­duc­ing the desired layer of plasma. Its a clever solu­tion. Radioactive paint weighs vir­tu­ally noth­ing, does not require any power input and can be dirt cheap. One of the sug­gested emit­ters is Strontium-​​90, which is pro­duced in abun­dance as a waste prod­uct by nuclear reac­tors.
Its also quite safe. With a thin pro­tec­tive coat­ing to pre­vent it from flak­ing off, the soft radi­a­tion (unlike dan­ger­ous Gamma radi­a­tion) is not a haz­ard to pilot or main­te­nance per­son­nel. This type of mate­r­ial is only dan­ger­ous if inhaled or ingested.
I checked out the idea with some peo­ple who know about these things — Martin Streetly, Editor of Jane’s Radar & Electronic Warfare Systems and Professor Igor Alexeff, for­mer President of the IEEE Nuclear and Plasma Sciences Society and an author­ity on plasma tech­nol­ogy.
Both con­firmed that the idea, though exotic, was sound enough in the­ory. Interestingly, nei­ther had come across the idea before. And both observed one obvi­ous dis­ad­van­tage from the point of view of stealth. The radi­a­tion lev­els involved 10 Curies per square cen­time­ter would give the plane a vis­i­ble glow at night, mak­ing it a bea­con to enemy air defenses.
Did this prob­lem mean that the whole idea was shelved — or were radioac­tive stealth coat­ings taken fur­ther?
Well be look­ing at some sur­pris­ing answers in part two
David Hambling

Highway Watch Revisited

Thursday, March 30th, 2006

As I men­tioned the other day, over the next cou­ple of weeks, a bunch of new voices are going to join the cho­rus here at Defense Tech. The first to take a solo is IBM home­land secu­rity ana­lyst Christian Beckner, who runs my favorite domes­tic defense blog, Homeland Security Watch.
Since 9/​11, there’s been a ton of atten­tion paid to air­port secu­rity. The job of lock­ing down ports and rail yards has drawn atten­tion, too. But what about trucks? After all, truck and car bombs have long been ter­ror­ist favorites. That’s the topic Christian takes on in his first post.

tankertruck.jpgFleet Owner mag­a­zine has an arti­cle today that inter­views the depart­ing direc­tor of the American Trucking Association’s Highway Watch pro­gram, cites the program’s accom­plish­ments, and high­lights some of the chal­lenges that it faces:

To date, Highway Watch has trained nearly 250,000 trans­porta­tion pro­fes­sion­als to iden­tify and report emer­gen­cies and sus­pi­cious activ­i­ties. [Don] Rondeau noted that although many large car­ri­ers have been trained and devel­oped secu­rity pro­to­cols, he believes vul­ner­a­bil­i­ties remain in many medium and small truck­ing companies.

“I think that it will be dif­fi­cult but we must do it,” Rondeau said. We have to rec­og­nize that the owner-​​operator and the mid-​​sized truck­ing com­pa­nies make up the bulk of the indus­try. They make up a sig­nif­i­cant por­tion of the risk asso­ci­ated with any poten­tial event. If youre a bad guy would you take advan­tage of a large cor­po­ra­tion, or a guy thats dri­ving in his office? At the end of the day­wed be remiss if we didnt make sure that all mem­bers that are ele­ments of the trans­porta­tion sec­tor could harden their security.”

I agree that these are real risks. The secu­rity of an open sys­tem like truck­ing is in a sense only as good as its weak­est link. That’s why I worry that we haven’t done enough to secure the truck­ing sec­tor, espe­cially haz­mat trucks, and the 770,000 ship­ments of haz­ardous mate­ri­als that are moved on trucks each day. As I noted in a post in December 2005, the only two sig­nif­i­cant things that DHS has really done on truck­ing secu­rity are fund Highway Watch and con­duct back­ground checks on haz­mat dri­vers. And while use­ful, that is not enough.
Does the truck­ing sec­tor need the same degree of secu­rity as the avi­a­tion sys­tem? Absolutely not, since the threats and con­se­quences are dif­fer­ent, and the sys­tem is inher­ently dif­fi­cult to pro­tect. But we know that ter­ror­ists have used trucks dozens of times to carry out attacks. MIPT’s ter­ror­ism data­base includes 432 inci­dent doc­u­ments that include the word “truck.” And we know that there are sce­nar­ios where a truck can be used to cause sub­stan­tial dam­age, both from painful expe­ri­ence and from hypo­thet­i­cal sce­nar­ios such as an inten­tional BLEVE. (See this video of an acci­den­tal LPG tanker truck BLEVE).
The threats and needs for truck­ing secu­rity are with­out a doubt greater than the level of fund­ing that DHS has pro­vided to address them. Instead, the DHS FY 2007 bud­get request shows lit­tle inter­est in truck­ing secu­rity; fund­ing for Highway Watch (via the truck­ing indus­try secu­rity grant pro­gram) is nowhere to be found, and the TSA wants to elim­i­nate fund­ing for a haz­ardous mate­ri­als truck track­ing pilot project which is funded at $4 mil­lion this year. And there are no new ini­tia­tives to supercede these pro­grams, as far as I can tell.
More thought needs to be given to a strate­gic, lay­ered approach to truck­ing secu­rity — one that has a role for Highway Watch, but doesn’t end there, and includes activ­i­ties such as bet­ter train­ing and enhanced information-​​sharing for state Highway Patrols, incen­tives for the vol­un­tary inclu­sion of secu­rity tools in truck telem­atic sys­tems, a more direct role for secu­rity invest­ment in the Intelligent Transportation Systems fund­ing stream, and inte­gra­tion with air and mar­itime secu­rity activ­i­ties.
– Christian Beckner, cross-​​posted from Homeland Security Watch.

Best. Bomber. Ever.

Wednesday, March 29th, 2006

This may just be my favorite Aviation Week arti­cle of all time. It explores, in depth, just how influ­en­tial the B-​​2 bomber has been; a quarter-​​century later, plane-​​makers are still lever­ag­ing lessons they learned from build­ing the thing.
Best of all — and most unusu­ally, for AvWeek — the arti­cle is actu­ally writ­ten (for the most part) in English, not in Pentagonese or aero­nau­ti­cal engi­neer patois. So we can all appre­ci­ate how freakin’ cool the B-​​2 really is.
b2_flight.jpgBy almost any mea­sure, the bomber’s devel­op­ment was one of the largest, most tech­ni­cally com­plex, expen­sive and demand­ing pro­grams in aero­space his­tory. But the final prod­uct dra­mat­i­cally changed air com­bat for­ever. The B-2’s “stealth” or low observ­abil­ity (LO) enables unprece­dented pen­e­tra­tion of enemy ter­ri­tory, essen­tially neu­tral­iz­ing very costly air defense sys­tems. Precision weapon deliv­ery in all weather con­di­tions, day or night, changed an air war­fare tenet from “sor­ties per tar­get” to “num­bers of tar­gets per sor­tie.” In the B-2’s case, a sin­gle bomber car­ry­ing 16 con­ven­tional weapons can destroy 16 tar­gets. The same mis­sion once would have required dozens of air­craft drop­ping hun­dreds of bombs…
[The B-​​2 relied on] all-​​composite skins and structures–the first air­craft to use com­pos­ites so exten­sively. This chal­lenge was con­sid­ered so risky that, for a while, a sec­ond team was set up to design an alu­minum wing in par­al­lel. A metal struc­ture would have been much heav­ier, greatly reduc­ing the B-2’s range-​​payload capa­bil­ity. Thus, a con­sid­er­able effort was devoted to devel­op­ing a com­pos­ite ver­sion, and it paid off; the aluminum-​​wing option was dropped before the first Preliminary Design Review took place. “Today, [devel­op­ing a com­pos­ite wing] seems straight­for­ward, because the world’s used to com­pos­ite vehi­cles. But it was a big deal then,” Myers notes.
The bomber would have to be designed as an inte­gral sys­tem, then man­u­fac­tured to extremely tight tol­er­ances, to meet LO require­ments. Consequently, the B-​​2 became the first air­craft designed com­pletely via com­put­ers, ensur­ing design and fab­ri­ca­tion phases were tightly coor­di­nated, Myers says. However, the ana­lyt­i­cal mod­els and computer-​​aided-​​design/​manufacturing (CAD/​CAM) tools to accom­plish this weren’t avail­able in the early 1980s.
In par­tic­u­lar, the active flight con­trol sys­tem dic­tated that the entire air­craft be mod­eled pre­cisely. “I could eas­ily count on one hand the num­ber of peo­ple in the [U.S.] who had tried to go through the ana­lyt­i­cal process for an [active] flight con­trol sys­tem,” says Myers, who headed that crit­i­cal risk-​​closure area at the time…
During the Cold War, weapon sys­tem per­for­mance was given top pri­or­ity, trump­ing cost con­sid­er­a­tions. Whatever resources were deemed nec­es­sary to meet national secu­rity goals, they were made avail­able, despite the cost.
“We kept a top-​​10 list of [B-​​2 con­cerns] on the briefing-​​room wall,” Myers recalls. “We were seven years into the pro­gram before ‘cost’ made that list.” But those days are gone. “I’m not sure we’ll ever see another pro­gram like that again,” he adds. 

Rapid Fire 03/​29/​06

Wednesday, March 29th, 2006

*Can Ospreys keep from crash­ing?
* DHS “brain drain
* Predator 3, IED-​​planters 0
* Coal = jet fuel?
Kinder, gen­tler explo­sives
* Stealth robo-​​sub unveiled
* Drone bud­get, bro­ken down
* Warthog, upgraded
* Downed pilot bea­con flicks on
* Blimp/​plane mashup
* Remembering the orig­i­nal RF jammers

(Big ups: HT, RC)

Mini-​​Sensors for “Military Omniscience”

Wednesday, March 29th, 2006

clens_hand_only.JPGSpotting insur­gents, sort­ing out friend from foe it’s beyond tough in todays guerilla war zones. So tough, that no sin­gle mon­i­tor can be counted on to han­dle the job. The Pentagon’s answer: build a set of palm-​​sized, net­worked sen­sors that can be scat­tered around, and work together to detect, clas­sify, local­ize, and track dis­mounted com­bat­ants under foliage and in urban envi­ron­ments. Its part of a larger Defense Department effort to estab­lish mil­i­tary omni­science and ubiq­ui­tous mon­i­tor­ing.
The mil­i­tary has been work­ing on gad­gets for a while, now, that can be left behind in a bad neigh­bor­hood or a jihadist train­ing site, and mon­i­tor the sit­u­a­tion. These Camouflaged Long Endurance Nano-​​Sensors (CLENS) would be an order of mag­ni­tude smaller than pre­vi­ous sur­veil­lance gear of its type — just 60 milime­ters long, and 150 grams.
Darpa, the Pentagon’s far-​​out research arm, also wants the mon­i­tors to take up a 10,000th of the power of pre­vi­ous sen­sors. That would give the CLENS enough juice to keep watch over an area for up to 180 days.
clens_diagram.JPGThe way they’d keep watch would be dif­fer­ent, too. Not as a indi­vid­ual sen­sors, but as a net­work of mon­i­tors, com­mu­ni­cat­ing with ultra wide­band radios. The same fre­quen­cies could be used as a kind of radar, to track objects and peo­ple within the sen­sor net.
“The best way to learn about an adver­sary what hes done, what hes doing, and what hes likely to do — is through con­tin­ual obser­va­tion using as many obser­va­tion mech­a­nisms as pos­si­ble. We call this per­sis­tent sur­veil­lance,” Dr. Ted Bially, head of Darpa’s Information Exploitation Office, told a con­fer­ence last year. “Weve learned that occa­sional or peri­odic snap­shots dont tell us enough of what we need to know. In order to really under­stand whats going on we have to observe our adver­saries and their envi­ron­ment 24 hours a day, seven days a week, week-​​in and week-​​out.“
According to its recently-​​released bud­get, Darpa hopes to hand over its new, mina­ture, per­sis­tent sen­sors to Special Operations Command by the end of fis­cal year 2007.
UPDATE 8:50 AM: Speaking of mil­i­tary omni­science, Darpa’s “Combat Zones That See” effort, meant to net­work together an entire city’s worth of sur­veil­lance cam­eras, gets $5 mil­lion in next year’s budget.

Hybrid Truck’s Katrina Duty

Wednesday, March 29th, 2006

Diesel-​​electric hybrids vehi­cles are all the rage at the U.S. Army’s Tank-​​automotive and Armaments Command in Warren, Michigan. Rising fuel prices and attacks on fuel con­voys in Iraq have inspired a num­ber of pro­grams to develop more fuel-​​efficient trucks. The idea, accord­ing to indus­try, is to cut the Army truck fleet’s fuel con­sump­tion by 20 per­cent by 2010.
HEMTT ARMOR.jpgBut there are other advan­tages to hybrids, accord­ing to Gary Schmiedel at Oshkosh in Wisconsin, which builds the Army’s Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck. HEMTTs are tough moth­ers. During the January elec­tions in Iraq, I talked to HEMTT crews who bar­reled through AK fire to pick up bal­lots (see photo for the result). Schmiedel says a new breed of HEMTT, the A3 model, will retain all the rugged­ness and com­bat util­ity of its pre­de­ces­sor, but with the added capa­bil­ity to export up to 100kW of 3-​​phase AC power, thanks to its new capacitor-​​based hybrid engine.
To test the A3, and as a pub­lic ser­vice, in the after­math of Hurricane Katrina, Oshkosh sent a pro­to­type to New Orleans to serve as a mobile gen­er­a­tor. Since it uses the same stan­dard of elec­tric­ity as our pub­lic grid, export­ing power is as sim­ple as fir­ing up the HEMTT and plug­ging in your appli­ance. The New Orleans-​​deployed A3 enabled work­ers to pump out the flooded base­ment of a hos­pi­tal.
Hybrids are more expen­sive than their con­ven­tional coun­ter­parts. But they promise over­all sav­ings over their life­times thanks to reduced fuel con­sump­tion. And they offer many ben­e­fits besides, includ­ing those demon­strated by Oshkosh’s HEMTT A3 after Katrina. These days I’m on the hybrid beat for National Defense, so expect more on the sub­ject in com­ing weeks.
– David Axe