I’ve been a skeptic of the bio-terror threat for a long time, now. The weapons seemed awfully finicky, compared to old-fashioned explosives. And the learning curve to acquiring these bugs and viruses looked steep, for a relatively low-tech operation like Al Qaeda.
Now, I’m less sure. In this month’s Technology Review there’s an article on the spread of bioweapons gear and know-how that’s downright spooky, even to skeptics like me.
It starts with the Soviet bioweapons effort:
When the program was founded in the 1970s, its goal was to enhance classical agents of biological warfare for heightened pathogenicity and resistance to antibiotics; by the 1980s, it was creating new species of designer pathogens that would induce entirely novel symptoms in their victims…
The Russians’ achievements tell us what is possible. At least some of what the Soviet bioweaponeers did with difficulty and expense can now be done easily and cheaply. And all of what they accomplished can be duplicated with time and money. We live in a world where gene-sequencing equipment bought secondhand on eBay and unregulated biological material delivered in a FedEx package provide the means to create biological weapons.
The article then goes on to describe some might scary weapons, including one that “in effect triggered rapid multiple sclerosis.” And it makes a compelling case for how smallpox could be modified, with the help of a $5000, second-hand machine.
So how does the public defend itself, when this kind of knowledge and sophistication is spreading? None of the scientists interviewed had any blockbuster solutions. But they all agreed: the Bush administration’s approach — spinning up dozens of new hot-zone labs, all handling deadly agents — has been shortsighted, even dangerous.
“There are now more than 300 U.S. institutions with access to live bioweapons agents and 16,500 individuals approved to handle them,” [Rutgers Universitys Richard] Ebright told me. While all of those people have undergone some form of background check — to verify, for instance, that they aren’t named on a terrorist watch list and aren’t illegal aliens — it’s also true, Ebright noted, that “Mohammed Atta would have passed those tests without difficulty.“
Furthermore, Ebright told me, at the time of our interview, 97 percent of the researchers receiving funds from the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases to study bioweapon agents had never been funded for such work before. Few of them, therefore, had any prior experience handling these pathogens; multiple incidents of accidental release had occurred during the previous two years.
Slipshod handling of bioweapons-level pathogens is scary enough, I conceded. But isn’t the proliferation of bioweaponeering expertise, I asked, more worrisome? After all, what reliable means do we have of determining whether somebody set out to be a molecular biologist with the aim of developing bioweapons?
“That’s the most significant concern,” Ebright agreed. “If al-Qaeda wished to carry out a bioweapons attack in the U.S., their simplest means of acquiring access to the materials and the knowledge would be to send individuals to train within programs involved in biodefense research.”
(Big ups: Glenn)
UPDATE 03/15/06 9:13 AM: Chem-bio specialist (and former intermittent Defense Tech guest-blogger) Jason Sigger calls BS on TR, saying, “This is the prime example of why you shouldn’t let scientists evaluate issues of terrorism or military combat just because the weapon’s lethality derives from the hard sciences.”
did i miss it?
what connection das the image have to the content?
ok, supoosedly biologic-warfare-effects — but what source?
It’s an example of the smallpox rash.
nms
I was just recovering from reading, “Plague Wars”, and, “The Coming Plague”, Now this happens! Let me see now…Tuna Fish..3 or 4 Cases should see me through..and LOTS of Tuna Helper..veggies of course..and canned soup..
Noah, normally your posts are enlightening and all, but I don’t see the point of that disturbing photo — no context given for what we’re looking at — so it just seems gratuituously shock-inducing.
Not the most fun thing to see in my brand new Google rss reader.
Just when I thought it was safe to go outside again after reading, “Plague Wars”, and, “The Coming Plague”..this happens!
Now..off to the supermarket for a few cases of Tuna..and lots of Tuna Helper.„veggies of course and masks, and Lysol spray…and
I’m always a little reluctant to accept that an organization like AQ would be interested in unleasing a contagious biological agent. My reasoning is that if it is highly contagious like small pox, it would quickly spread back to say Mecca. Additionally, I would have to say that (as poorly equiped as the West is) the West is far better equiped to deal with a public health crisis than say Yemen. But, I’m no expert.
I’ve been writing about biowar since I began blogging. The only argument I have against AQ or other terrorist groups using it is that it has far more potential points of failure than their normal weapons. You have to produce the weapon and not die. You have to containerize the weapon and not die. You have to transport the weapon, not die and not kill it. And, you have to release it successfully.
The Aum Cult in Japan failed several times in its efforts to release anthrax. It’s far easier to create a bomb or crash an airplane successfully than it is to use a bio weapon successfully.
The deaths in the Third World would not bother AQ. Remember, Islam is a religion of submission. Whatever happened after the release of a bioweapon would be the will of Allah.
KM:
Sorry, maybe the pic was a *bit* over the top. I’m all itchy now, just looking at it.
nms
Good Morning Folks,
I think it is prudent to remain a skeptic on “Bio. Weapons”. Where as “Chemical Weapons” can be produced in nearly any country, Bio Weapons that weaponize biological materials requires a very sophisticated infrastructure, perhaps even stronger the to develope then a Nuclear Weapon.
The sources of the raw materials for Bio Weapons are secured in very controled enviroments with in the United States, Russia (former Soviet Union), China, Japan and Western Europe. The Russians watch this stuff even closer then they do nuclear materials, they are very much aware that Bio Weapons could very easly be used on them as as anyone else.
Chemical Weapons outside of use in a controled Battlespace have never been very attractive to combantants. The lessons of WWI where shifting winds blew the stuff back on its users, have been well taken.
The so called “Dirty Bomb” which uses industrial,medical, radio active, materials, waste is a more likely problem since it requires at its basics very little techicnal knowledge. But here we are at least, in its assumed size and use, have a weapon, that although it would certainly be deadly to a few would have little military effect.
Although all these weapons are with in the spectrim of possibility it appears that there best use is in propaganda by Terrorists and by U.S. Politicians beating war drumbs for the next war, Iran.
ALLONS,
Byron Skinner
Tim — yep. Can you imagine the death and destruction in the Muslim world if a virulent pathogen were released into the crowds at the Hajj to be carried back to the pilgrims’ countries of origin?
Like Chuck and Byron, I have to cry “Wrong!” If you look at the record, over a thirty year period there have been two successful BW terrorist incidents — 1984 when 751 people got sick from samonella poisoning in Oregon (and take a guess at the annual US rate of samonella poisoning today — much higher) and 2001 with the anthrax incident — 5 dead, 17 infected but lived. Where’s the threat?
Aum Shinrikyo had unlimited funds and time to get equipment through front companies — they had good facilities, four years of uninterrupted work using grad students in the hard sciences, and access to Soviet technology and assistance. They failed to produce bot tox or anthrax, they couldn’t get Q fever or Ebola, and they couldn’t do genetic engineering.
Al Qaeda — uninterrupted time of years in Afghanistan, access to equipment and technical assistance through Pakistan, money was no object, they were certainly interested — and they couldn’t make anthrax or bot tox. If these two terrorist groups couldn’t make BW agents, then there’s obviously a flaw with the article’s claim that “it’s not a question of if…“
Meanwhile, in 1999 there were 76 million cases of food-borne diseases in the USA, with 5000 deaths; somewhere between 44,000 and 98,000 deaths caused by “medical errors”; 20,000 hospital-contracted infections that led to death every year; and air pollution causing 50,000 deaths per year. What should we worry about more? the 5–10 deaths that might be caused by the next bioterrorist or the huge number of deaths caused by natural diseases and accidents in the hospitals?
Also see: http://armchairgeneralist.typepad.com/my_weblog/2006/03/the_problem_of_.html
… If these two terrorist groups couldn’t make BW agents, then there’s obviously a flaw with the article’s claim that “it’s not a question of if…“
Just because you can’t figure out how to make something right now, doesn’t mean you can’t ever figure out how to make it. I think your logic is bad.
You ask, “Where is the threat?” That’s easy: The threat is that they are working on it.
How do you stop it? At the source. The people that take up bioweapons research in foreign countries are motivated by money. You don’t find Muslim fanatics concerning themselves with the time it takes to develop and learn this stuff. You DO find poor, out of work scientists who have been rejected from their careers. So you offer rewards…substantial rewards, for information leading to the discovery and shutdown of a bioweapons lab or operation. Then you isolate the individuals that come forward, and monitor them to make sure your ‘rewards’ aren’t circulating back into the wrong hands. Obviously this isn’t the only solution. It has to be approached from many angles. But it would be a good starting point.
JoJo
Considering that the Haj pilgrims’ countries of origin would also include place like France, the USA, the UK, Germany, India and so on, it would be a very bad idea. Do you really want 747 loads of infected pilgrims returning to NY or Detroit?
Well, I wasn’t saying it would be a good idea to release smallpox at the Hajj. What I meant was that the Hajj would be one huge disease vector. All those Muslims sharing communal food packed in tight touching each other, breathing and coughing on each other. If somewhere in the world small pox were released It would quickly find it’s way to the biggest disease vectors. So, in this sense urban sprall would actually help us.
Potential just means you haven’t done anything yet. Bioengineering is incredibly difficult. Certainly, it will get easier in the future. That will bring it down from almost impossibly hard to merely extremely difficult.
Sure, scientists at MIT can train immigrants to push buttons and move containers, just like a manager at McDonalds can teach a guy to run the register. Without the MIT scientists, however, and without the billion dollar MIT labs, those untrained workers have zero hope of successful lab work.