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Archive for June, 2006

Rapid Fire — Weekend Edition

Friday, June 30th, 2006

* Ford: Hybrids? Never mind
* Electrolux death ray
* Nuke clowns: Keep chas­ing, ABC
* Raptor export ban over?
* More heavy-​​breathing over Nork mis­sile
* Pentagon wind farm fight heats up
* Gurkhas in Afghanistan
* AT&T main source for NSA data­base?
* Bank-​​tapping: “A Secret the Terrorists Already Knew
* Gitmo rul­ing big blow to Bush
* Brazil’s buf­falo cops
*
Milspace about to be axed?

(Big ups: MG, RC, FT)

Ja! German Bot Spies By Satellite

Friday, June 30th, 2006

Check it out, frauleins: The German Federal Armed Forces are exper­i­ment­ing with a pro­to­type, satellite-​​controlled robot that can go on recon mis­sions, while its human oper­a­tor hangs out in Berlin.
satom_on_the_300dpi.jpgThe satel­lite link, which can trans­mit video at 2 Mbps and receive con­trol chan­nel data up to 128 Kbps, makes the RoboScout some­thing of an odd­ball in the unmanned ground vehi­cle (UGV) world. As Peter J. Brown notes in the lat­est issue of Via Satellite mag­a­zine, satel­lite sig­nals are easy to lose in the urban canyons and forested areas where UGVs are likely to oper­ate. Plus, the uneven ground can cause the ‘bots to tilt by 20 or 30 degrees in one direc­tion or another — which means lock­ing onto a satel­lite gets even trick­ier. Most robot-​​makers go for radio-​​control, instead.
RoboScout was one of more than 20 UGVs shown off dur­ing May’s European Land-​​Robot Trial — sort of a Continental answer to Darpa’s Grand Challenge, but with­out the “‘win­ners’ and ‘losers,’” the orga­niz­ers note. The machines were put through a series of obsta­cles dur­ing their time under the Bundeswehr’s care in Hammelburg — “stairs, nar­row passes, and col­lapsed ceil­ings… as well as ditches, fences and fire.” And from the looks of the couple-​​thousand pic­tures taken at the event, RoboScout (and many of the other UGVs) han­dled them­selves rather well. Achtung!

New Twist in Dragon Armor Tale

Thursday, June 29th, 2006

After a few sol­diers started wear­ing Dragon Skin body armor, the much-​​hyped alter­na­tive to the stan­dard Interceptor defenses, the Army banned the flex­i­ble armor — and allegedly threat­ened to cut off the life insur­ance poli­cies of any­one wear­ing it. Then, the Army took a dif­fer­ent tack, say­ing it would start test­ing the Skin, to see if it was up to snuff.
Pinnacle Armor Dragon Skin Test_1.jpgNow, one of the offi­cers in charge of those tests is pub­licly diss­ing the Dragon armor, Jane’s Nathan Hodge reports.

In com­ments posted on an online dis­cus­sion forum, Karl Masters, direc­tor of engi­neer­ing for Program Manager — Soldier Equipment, said he recently super­vised tests of Dragon Skin, a vest made by California-​​based Pinnacle Armor.
“I was recently tasked by the army to con­duct the test of the 30 Dragon Skin SOV 3000 level IV body armor pur­chased for T&E [tests and eval­u­a­tion],” Masters wrote in a 6 June post­ing. “My day job is act­ing prod­uct man­ager for Interceptor Body Armor. I’m under a gag order until the test results make it up the chain.
“I will, how­ever, offer an enlight­ened and informed rec­om­men­da­tion to any­one con­sid­er­ing pur­chas­ing an SOV 3000 Dragon Skin — don’t.“
Masters added that he would not rec­om­mend the vest, par­tic­u­larly given the threat from 7.62 x 54R armor-​​piercing rounds.
“I do, how­ever, highly rec­om­mend this sys­tem for use by insur­gents,” he added…
Pinnacle offi­cials have con­sis­tently main­tained Dragon Skin passed the tests that were con­ducted in May, and said army offi­cials agreed to con­tinue tests at a later date. They say they are await­ing word from the army on the resump­tion of test­ing…
After repeated inquiries, an army pub­lic affairs offi­cial referred Jane’s to Pinnacle for more infor­ma­tion on the results of test­ing. Lieutenant Colonel William Wiggins, an army spokesman, said the safety of use mem­o­ran­dum regard­ing Dragon Skin is still in force.
“As our research com­mu­nity comes up with new prod­ucts, we’ll field them,” Col Wiggins said. “You can be assured that we field the best body armour in the world.” 

Rapid Fire 06/​29/​06

Thursday, June 29th, 2006

buff_nyc.jpg* Buffalos, Cougars take Manhattan
* Supremes: Gitmo tri­als no-​​go
* Russia and China get lit­toral war­ships, too
* Ultrasound to treat war wounds (back­ground here)
* Raptor goes 108 and 0
* Stealth radar can’t be spot­ted
* Heart-​​rending good­bye in Ramadi
* Mmmmmm… astro­turf!
* VA employee had take-​​home OK
* Homeland net: lights on, no one home
* Soldiers’ fam­i­lies get threats
* Cybersecurity czar: crooked?

(Big ups: BB, RM, EH, DID, CP)

Miniature Bomb, Heavyweight Punch

Thursday, June 29th, 2006

You hear a lot of big claims in this indus­try. So when I read about a 31-​​inch, 64-​​pound weapon that’s sup­posed to have more killing power than a 1,000-pound clus­ter bomb, I was more than a lit­tle skep­ti­cal.
After all, a typ­i­cal clus­ter bomb dis­trib­utes over two hun­dred BLU-​​97 bomblets over a wide area. Together they pro­duce thirty times as many shrap­nel frag­ments as the 64-​​pound mini-​​munition, Textron Systems’ Clean Lightweight Area Weapon. It was hard to see how CLAW could com­pete.

claw combo.JPG

But it turns out that CLAW can be awfully deadly, in its own right. After ejec­tion, CLAW descends by para­chute, and a prox­im­ity sen­sor det­o­nates it six­teen feet above the ground. That means its frag­ments get dis­persed far and wide. In con­trast, the BLU-​​97 only goes off on con­tact with the ground, which sends a lot of frag­ments into the dirt instead of into tar­gets. (Check out this video to see what CLAW does to a 16 by 12 foot tar­get.)
The design of the war­head cas­ing helps, too. It’s a steel cylin­der scored on the inside, so that it forms dia­mond or arrow­head shaped frag­ments, over two thou­sand of them. A spe­cial pro­pri­etary tech­nique is used to cut the pat­tern on the war­head cas­ing, cre­at­ing frag­ments which are bullet-​​sized (about 7 grams/​114 grains) and effec­tive over a very wide radius. BLU-​​97 frag­ments are much smaller (about 30 grains) and less effec­tive.
The explo­sive fill­ing of CLAW is PAX-​​21, which is both more pow­er­ful and more sta­ble than pre­vi­ous explo­sives. The com­bi­na­tion of explo­sion and frag­ments pro­duces thor­ough cov­er­age of a cir­cu­lar area over 140 yards across, effec­tive against tar­gets includ­ing per­son­nel, soft vehi­cles, parked air­craft and anti-​​aircraft sites. Textron Systems have pre­cisely quan­ti­fied this per­for­mance with ground tests, and their claim about its effec­tive­ness looks like a strong one.
CLAWs small size means that strike air­craft could carry it in large num­bers, but at present its being mar­keted as the ideal weapon for killer drones. Even some­thing as large as a Predator drone can only carry two Hellfire mis­siles. For the same weight you could carry sev­eral CLAWs, but it also means that even smaller UAVs could be armed for the first time. The devel­op­ment of this type of minia­ture muni­tion and even smaller weapons are in the pipeline brings the pos­si­bil­ity of large num­bers of armed UAVs on the bat­tle­field for the first time.
(CLAW is not effec­tive against heavy armor, but the same GPS-​​guided Universal Aerial Delivery Dispenser which deliv­ers it can also be loaded with a BLU-​​108 anti-​​tank weapon with four target-​​seeking war­heads.)
But per­haps the most impres­sive thing about CLAW is how much work has gone into mak­ing sure it only explodes when its meant to. There is a triple-​​redundant fuz­ing sys­tem the prox­im­ity fuze, a ground con­tact fuze, and a time delay. If all of these fail, then the bat­tery dis­si­pates within sec­onds and the muni­tion is inert. Its not just unex­ploded, but unex­plod­able.
You could hit the CLAW with a ham­mer, run over it with a trac­tor or put it in a fire, and it will not det­o­nate. You could take it apart with­out any per­sonal risk. The insen­si­tive explo­sive really is insen­si­tive.
The only way you could make it explode would be to take it to a lab­o­ra­tory, says Richard D. Sterchele, Textrons Business Development Manager for Smart Weapons.
This means that unex­ploded CLAWs can­not be turned into IEDs. Iraq is awash with weaponry, but in other con­flicts like Vietnam guer­ril­las have used unex­ploded bombs as a major source of explo­sives.
More impor­tantly, it does not leave haz­ardous unex­ploded bomblets scat­tered around. The fail­ure rate of BLU-​​97 is widely quoted at around 6%, so each CBU-​​103 leaves about a dozen poten­tially lethal bomblets to be cleared up. It is hard to over-​​emphasize just how dan­ger­ous these are; accord­ing to the USMCs Multi-​​Service Procedures for Operations in UXO Environment:

Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity Studies show 40 per­cent of the duds on the ground are haz­ardous and for each encounter with an unex­ploded sub­mu­ni­tion there is a 13 per­cent prob­a­bil­ity of det­o­na­tion­Thus, even though an unex­ploded sub­mu­ni­tion is run over, kicked, stepped on, or oth­er­wise dis­turbed, and did not det­o­nate, it is not safe. Handling the unex­ploded sub­mu­ni­tion may even­tu­ally result in arm­ing and sub­se­quent detonation. 

In one inci­dent in 1991, seven mem­bers of the 27th Engineer Battalion were killed dur­ing oper­a­tions to clear a run­way at As Salam when a pile of dud BLU-​​97s exploded.
In the Cold War sce­nario, where the enemy was an invad­ing Soviet horde, unex­ploded bomblets may not have been seen as a prob­lem. But in sce­nar­ios like Iraq and Afghanistan where US engi­neers are likely to have to deal with them, the argu­ment for a clean weapon like CLAW is a com­pelling one.
It remains to be seen whether the Pentagon will take up CLAW, which is a pri­vate com­pany ini­tia­tive. Live CLAW muni­tion tests from oper­a­tional UAVs are being con­ducted by the U.S. Air Force and Army over the sum­mer 2006. Its a frac­tion of the cost of a clus­ter bombs, but the sav­ing in lives could be much more impor­tant. But in the world of defense pro­cure­ment, unfor­tu­nately its not always that sim­ple.
David Hambling

White House NYT Bashers: Hypocrites

Wednesday, June 28th, 2006

Since 9/​11, nobody — and I mean nobody — has done more report­ing on the government’s attempts to track ter­ror­ists through their data trails than the National Journal’s Shane Harris. (The guy ate Spam and knocked back Tequizas with John Poindexter, for chris­sake!) So I couldn’t be more psy­ched to wel­come Shane to the Defense Tech fam­ily. This is the first of what I hope will be a long string of posts for the site.
cheney_grimace.jpgBush admin­is­tra­tion offi­cials have been lin­ing up to con­demn The New York Times for reveal­ing a pro­gram to track finan­cial trans­ac­tions as part of the war on ter­ror­ism. But if the Times rev­e­la­tion about a pro­gram to mon­i­tor inter­na­tional exchanges is so dam­ag­ing, why has the admin­is­tra­tion been chat­ter­ing about efforts to mon­i­tor domes­tic trans­ac­tions for nearly five years?
Shortly after the 9/​11 attacks, many jour­nal­ists includ­ing this one were briefed by U.S. Customs offi­cials on Operation Green Quest, an effort to roll up ter­ror­ist financiers by mon­i­tor­ing, among other things, “sus­pi­cious” bank trans­fers and ancient money lend­ing pro­grams favored by peo­ple of Middle Eastern descent.
I inter­viewed Marcy Forman, direc­tor of Green Quest, at her Washington offices in December 2001, when I was a writer for Government Executive mag­a­zine. Our meet­ing was sanc­tioned by Customs’ pub­lic affairs office, and came at a time when the White House was eager to talk about all the work fed­eral agen­cies were doing to hunt down ter­ror­ists. Forman told me the kinds of peo­ple, trans­ac­tions, even loca­tions that the gov­ern­ment was tar­get­ing. (These are details, it should be noted, that the recent Times piece did not reveal.) Among the poten­tially sen­si­tive items Forman told me, which were published:

Operation Green Quest is focus­ing on the infor­mal, largely paper­less form of money exchange known as hawala, which is Arabic for to change.
Few under­cover agents can pen­e­trate Middle Eastern com­mu­ni­ties and money laun­der­ing rings because they look like out­siders and don’t speak the lan­guage. As a result, Green Quest has to be more clever, by set­ting traps on the Internet and work­ing to flush cur­rency traf­fick­ers out of their hid­ing places.
Treasury and FBI inves­ti­ga­tors have iden­ti­fied hawala as a means by which the alleged Sept. 11 ter­ror­ists may have received money from over­seas.
Green Quest inves­ti­ga­tors, who’ve spent their careers dis­man­tling money laun­der­ing rack­ets, were blind­sided by the exis­tence of the sys­tem. Most of us couldn’t spell hawala before Sept. 11, Forman said.
The agen­cies’ [involved in Green Quest] coop­er­a­tive efforts have recently cul­mi­nated in raids of alleged money laun­der­ing oper­a­tions that aid sus­pected ter­ror­ist net­works.
Green Quest also wants to lower the thresh­old at which bank deposits and elec­tronic funds trans­fers must be doc­u­mented. Dropping the ceil­ing from $10,000 to $750, Forman said, may force money traf­fick­ers to try to get their cash out of the coun­try by hand. They would then be sub­ject to cap­ture by a beefed-​​up cadre of Customs Service offi­cers at bor­der cross­ings, air­ports and seaports. 

Green Quest was only one of the admin­is­tra­tions efforts to com­bat ter­ror­ist financ­ing which offi­cials dis­cussed pub­licly. More than two years after 9/​11, fed­eral offi­cials tes­ti­fied before a con­gres­sional field hear­ing in Miami and “detailed efforts to stop the ille­gal financ­ing of ter­ror­ist net­works.” A senior adviser for the Treasury Department “named sev­eral ini­tia­tives, such as the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), which is devel­op­ing tech­nol­ogy to let finan­cial insti­tu­tions report sus­pi­cious trans­ac­tions more eas­ily and quickly.” The adviser also named the sys­tem FinCEN was devel­op­ing to man­age a data­base built to search finan­cial trans­ac­tions. And he said the depart­ment was work­ing directly with finan­cial insti­tu­tions to help them “develop soft­ware to bet­ter iden­tify poten­tial terrorist-​​financing activ­i­ties.“
These details, pro­vided by Customs and Treasury offi­cials, undoubt­edly gave ter­ror­ists some insight into how the U.S. gov­ern­ment was track­ing them, and what inves­ti­ga­tors knew about ter­ror­ism financ­ing. These offi­cials wer­ent whistle­blow­er­s­they were sanc­tioned by the admin­is­tra­tion to dis­pense this infor­ma­tion.
In the wake of the lat­est Times rev­e­la­tion, Rep. Peter King of New York, the Republican chair­man of the House Homeland Security Committee, wants the attor­ney gen­eral to inves­ti­gate and pros­e­cute reporters and edi­tors of the Times for aid­ing the cause of our ene­mies. What King and oth­ers crit­ics havent addressed is how the pub­li­ca­tion of spe­cific details, over the past half decade, about the tech­niques the gov­ern­ment employ­ees to track ter­ror­ists money doesnt also aid their cause.
Shane Harris
UPDATE 06/29/9:34 AM: Intel Dump takes a very dif­fer­ent point of view. Meanwhile, Bob Kerrey — and even, to some extent, Peter King — won­der the Times’ dis­clo­sure actu­ally helps coun­tert­er­ror efforts.

Bob Kerrey, a mem­ber of the 9/​11 com­mis­sion, [said] that if the news reports drive ter­ror­ists out of the bank­ing sys­tem, that could actu­ally help the coun­tert­er­ror­ism cause.
“If we tell peo­ple who are poten­tial crim­i­nals that we have a lot of police on the beat, that’s a sub­stan­tial deter­rent,” said Mr. Kerrey, now pres­i­dent of New School University. If ter­ror­ists decide it is too risky to move money through offi­cial chan­nels, “that’s very good, because it’s much, much harder to move money in other ways,” Mr. Kerrey said.
A State Department offi­cial, Anthony Wayne, made a par­al­lel point in 2004 before Congress. “As we’ve made it more dif­fi­cult for them to use the bank­ing sys­tem,” Mr. Wayne said, “they’ve been shift­ing to other less reli­able and more cum­ber­some meth­ods, such as cash couri­ers…“
Since [9/​11], the Treasury Department has pro­duced dozens of news releases and pub­lic reports detail­ing its efforts. Though offi­cials appear never to have men­tioned the Swift pro­gram, they have repeat­edly described their coop­er­a­tion with finan­cial net­works to iden­tify accounts held by peo­ple and orga­ni­za­tions linked to ter­ror­ism…
Representative Peter T. King, Republican of New York, con­vened a hear­ing in 2004 where Treasury offi­cials described at length their efforts, assisted by finan­cial insti­tu­tions, to trace ter­ror­ists’ money. But he has been among the most vehe­ment crit­ics of the dis­clo­sures about the Swift pro­gram, say­ing edi­tors and reporters of
The New York Times should be impris­oned for pub­lish­ing gov­ern­ment secrets.
In an inter­view on Wednesday, Mr. King said he saw no con­tra­dic­tion. “Obviously we wanted the ter­ror­ists to know we were try­ing to track them,” Mr. King said. “But we didn’t want them to know the details.”

Rapid Fire 06/​28/​06 (Updated)

Wednesday, June 28th, 2006

* ACLU: stop brain scan­ning ter­ror­ists
* How to tell if the NSA snoops on you
* Bullets, password-​​protected
* ONR’s million-​​dollar con­test
* Israel’s Gaza strike — and what lead up to it
* Inside China’s space com­mand cen­ter
* Super Hornets’ sweet new radar
* Freezing Falcons
* America’s own cyanide IED
* NYT’s finance scoop: old news, no big­gie
* Beating China’s great fire­wall
* eBay = home­land secu­rity answer?
* U.S. chips com­pro­mised?
* Renewable energy: crowds?
* Starfire redux
(back­ground here)
* Switchblade redux
(back­ground here)

(Big ups: EH, Schneier)

Robo-Doggie’s New Pal

Wednesday, June 28th, 2006

Defense Tech loves robots, of course. But our favorite of ‘bot of all is the four-​​legged mechan­i­cal pack mules known as the BigDog. We’ve been bark­ing about the robo-​​fido, ever since it was a sketch on a draw­ing pad.
bigdogs2.jpgSo imag­ine the joy at Defense Tech HQ when we learned that there was a new puppy in the mechan­i­cal lit­ter — a sec­ond BigDog. The two bots were run­ning around Marine Corps Air Station New River recently — along with an exoskeleton-​​clad marine and a new trauma pod.
The robo­t­eers at Boston Dynamics have been train­ing the 165-​​pound, two-​​and-​​a-​​half foot-​​tall BigDogs to carry gear for sol­diers and marines over uneven ter­rain. So far, they’ve got­ten the pooches to “run at a rate of 3.3 mph, climb a 35 degree slope and carry a 120 pound load,” accord­ing to Marine Corps News. The bots have proved sturdy enough to take a big kick, and keep on walkin’.
Maybe it’s this stur­di­ness that’s inspir­ing some to think about the BigDogs are most than just mechan­i­cal beasts of bur­den. This arti­cle — and take this a can of salty Alpo — says Darpa “is con­sid­er­ing plans such as weaponiz­ing the BigDog robots.“
Down, boy. Down.
(Big ups: BB)

Hoax Watch, Day 10: No Nork Launch, After All

Wednesday, June 28th, 2006

Ten days ago, the New York Times and its sis­ter paper, the International Herald Tribune, ran a pair of breath­less sto­ries, warn­ing us that North Korea’s long-​​range Taepodong-​​2 mis­sile was being fueled for “take off.” Worse, the weapon could have the abil­ity to “deliver chem­i­cal, bio­log­i­cal or per­haps nuclear war­heads to tar­gets as far away as the con­ti­nen­tal United States.“
taepodong.jpgWorldwide hys­te­ria fol­lowed. Condi Rice called it a “provoca­tive act.” The Japanese prime min­is­ter said they would “respond harshly” to a launch. The Pentagon shouted that its mis­sile defense sys­tem was ready to go. A for­mer SecDef and a for­mer VP called for pre­emp­tive strikes on North Korea.
But cracks in the story appeared almost imme­di­ately. No one could really say what this Taepodong-​​2 really looked like, or what it could do. Responsible reporters recalled North Korea’s his­tory of saber-​​rattling stunts — and its ane­mic track record for test­ing mis­siles.
And then there was the fuel and oxi­dizer sup­pos­edly being loaded into the mis­sile. Corrosive stuff, it could eat through a missile’s metal cas­ing in two or three days. Which meant that the Norks had to launch quickly, or not at all. With every day this mis­sile “cri­sis” dragged on, the less likely it became.
By the begin­ning of this week, it became clear that a world-​​class hoax had gone down. Either Pyongyang had hood­winked the globe into think­ing it was about to launch — or the Times was once again hyp­ing up a national secu­rity threat.
Today, finally, the Times admit­ted the obvi­ous. Well, kinda sorta. And on page A9 — not the font page, where the Taepodong “scoop” had been orig­i­nally published.

On Monday and Tuesday, two offi­cials said the intel­li­gence could, at best, be inter­preted as offer­ing only a pru­dent assump­tion that the mis­sile was fueled, and that intel­li­gence ana­lysts had described an already fueled mis­sile as a worst-​​case sce­nario.
“It is impos­si­ble to know for cer­tain whether or how much fuel is mov­ing between a closed con­tainer through a closed line to another closed con­tainer,” one offi­cial said.
Citing intel­li­gence gath­ered by “over­head sys­tems” pho­tograph­ing the mis­sile, Senator Warner said, “We are not cer­tain if it’s fueled.”

(Big ups: TP)

UPDATE 07/​06/​06 12:11 PM
: Well, so much for hoaxes! See here for cov­er­age of the Nork’s actual launch.

JSF Delays Vex Marines

Tuesday, June 27th, 2006

The Marines put all their tacair eggs in one bas­ket when they decided, in the early 1990s, to pass up the F/​A-​​18E/​F Super Hornet and wait for a ver­ti­cal take-​​off plane instead. That plane turned out to be the F-​​35B Joint Strike Fighter, and the Marines have com­mit­ted to buy­ing as many as 500 to replace around the same num­ber of sin­gle– and two-​​seat F/​A-​​18 legacy Hornets, AV-​​8B Harriers and EA-​​6B Prowlers — neck­ing down to one tac­ti­cal air­frame and sav­ing loads of cash in the process.
Sounds great, right?
The prob­lem is that the F-​​35 ini­tial oper­a­tional capa­bil­ity keeps slid­ing right thanks to weight, soft­ware and engine prob­lems. It’s unlikely the Marines will be able to field a squadron before 2012, sev­eral years later than orig­i­nally planned. Meanwhile, in Iraq, the Marines are fly­ing the life out of all their air­planes, putting as many hours on a deployed jet in just seven months as they would in two years back in the States.
usmc jet.jpgBy the time the JSF enters Marine Corps ser­vice in large num­bers, the service’s jets will be around 25 years old on aver­age. That’s old for a naval jet. But when you talk about air­craft age, there’s cal­en­dar age and then there’s fatigue age. What with all the hard use in hot, sandy Iraq and on the Navy’s car­ri­ers (to alle­vi­ate Navy force cuts, the Marines con­tribute sev­eral Hornet squadrons to car­rier air wings), the Marines jets “feel” a lot older than they actu­ally are.
The result is pre­ma­ture retire­ment for dozens of tired jets, mostly Hornets. As the fleet shrinks with­out a hot pro­duc­tion line to replace losses, the only way the Marines can keep its squadrons fully equipped is to decom­mis­sion a few squadrons and redis­trib­ute their jets. Which is exactly what will hap­pen in March 2007, when the Corps shut­ters VMFA(AW)-332 and VMFA-​​134 fly­ing the F/​A-​​18D and F/​A-​​18A+, respec­tively.
I embed­ded with 332 in Iraq this year, report­ing on the great work they were doing sup­port­ing the ground troops in restive Al Anbar province. 332 is a fine unit with one of the best safety records in the entire Marine Corps, hav­ing last crashed a jet around 30 years ago. It’ll be a shame to see them go.
On the other hand, these force struc­ture cuts them­selves don’t actu­ally reduce the num­ber of jets in Corps ser­vice. They just con­sol­i­date the exist­ing jets into fewer, larger units that can fly and main­tain the planes more effi­ciently. This is mak­ing lemon­ade out of lemons from trees planted a decade ago when the Corps pinned all its tacair hopes on a paper air­plane that is only now tak­ing shape, years late.
Here’s to hop­ing the F-​​35 pans out. If it doesn’t, the Air Force can buy new F-​​16s and F-​​15s from pro­duc­tion lines sus­tained by for­eign sales and the Navy can boost its Super Hornet order (as has already been rumored), but the Marines are screwed. As long as nobody at HQMC is inter­ested in the Super Hornet, there’s no con­tin­gency plan.
Pay 332 a trib­ute by check­ing out some of their Iraq snap­shots at Flickr.
David Axe