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Archive for August, 2006

China Top Card in Pentagon Shuffle

Thursday, August 31st, 2006

xin_47080331080723207961.jpgSo, imag­ine you are the Rumsfeld Defense Department. You are locked in a “global strug­gle against vio­lent extrem­ists” stretch­ing from“stretching from Indonesia through the Middle East,”. You have 150,000 troops sta­tioned in Iraq as the cen­tral front in said strug­gle. The United States is fac­ing major for­eign pol­icy crises in Iran and Lebanon, of other which might involve your beloved Pentagon.
You decide to ele­vate one Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense with regional respon­si­bil­i­ties to become a full Assistant Secretary over a region. This is an easy call. You pick: Asia-​​Pacific.
Oh, sure, sure, you have no exit strat­egy for Iraq and you are siz­ing up air defenses around Tehran, but c’mon … real men hate on China.
Of course, focus­ing on China … er the Asia-​​Pacific … was the plan, from the first Defense Strategy Review by Andy Marshall which report­edly “cast the Pacific as the most impor­tant region for mil­i­tary plan­ners…” I kind of admire the stick­tu­itive­ness of the whole thing, 9/​11 and Iraq be damned.
You almost won­der why they didn’t have the stones to pin the 9/​11 attack on Jiang Zemin. After all, their friends did.
I’ve posted the new orga­ni­za­tion at my blog, Arms Control Wonk​.com. USD℗ Eric Edelman explained the issue as one of match­ing up to State and NSC:

The sec­re­tary sensed that we were mis­aligned in some ways … and we wanted to make it eas­ier for Policy and the (com­bat­ant com­mands) to fig­ure out what the right address was (in the other agen­cies) to go for­ward solv­ing prob­lems. I think this will make it a lit­tle eas­ier to oper­ate inter­a­gency.

Now, when I was at Policy — oh so briefly — the fact that the State Department Bureaus were headed by Assistant Secretaries, one level higher than the equiv­a­lent DOD offices, was kind of irri­tat­ing.
And maybe I am being too cyn­i­cal. As an “Asia expert” — what­ever that means — I am psy­ched to see my region get­ting atten­tion. And, were I ever lucky enough to hold that office at OSD, I’d appre­ci­ate the extra step to full Assistant Secretary.
But, really, wouldn’t a sin­gle “Assistant Secretary for South West and Central Asia” with DASD’s for the Middle East, South Asia and Central Asia bet­ter pro­tect the country’s inter­ests?
Jeffrey Lewis, cross posted at Arms Control Wonk​.com

Air Force Wants Software Spies

Thursday, August 31st, 2006

What if you could send a com­puter pro­gram to do the job of a spy, or a bomber, or drone? It sounds like sci­ence fic­tion — and it’ll prob­a­bly stay that way, for a long, long time. But Air Force researchers think there’s enough to the idea to start fund­ing a trio of com­pa­nies for ini­tial work into these attack­ing, snoop­ing “Cyber Craft.“
cybercraft1.JPG“Using the Cyber Domain to con­duct mil­i­tary oper­a­tions… has sig­nif­i­cant poten­tial,” an Air Force paper announces. Examples include long-​​term intel­li­gence activ­i­ties, like “being to mon­i­tor a mil­i­tary bar­racks, accu­mu­late finan­cial infor­ma­tion on a poten­tially hos­tile nation, or pro­vide sta­tus on the polit­i­cal cli­mate of a South American coun­try.“
Researchers think the pro­grams could answer shorter-​​term, tac­ti­cal ques­tions, too. “Like who is in this build­ing across the street, where are the tanks located in a par­tic­u­lar town or vil­lage that is going to be entered by friendly forces, or whats the lat­est intel­li­gence regard­ing adver­sar­ial forces in a par­tic­u­lar town or vil­lage.“
Obviously, it would take more than a bulked-​​up Web crawler to get the job done. Cyber Craft would have to be able to hop from stan­dard com­puter net­works to elec­tri­cal grids to wire­less nets and back, over and over again.

Cyber agents will need to embody the abil­ity to covertly travel across these medi­ums, con­stantly assess­ing the net­work lay­out, mor­ph­ing itself as net­works change, and remain­ing covert while main­tain­ing the integrity of its mis­sion. Increased use of data hid­ing tech­niques and data hid­ing detec­tion tech­niques add addi­tional com­plex­ity to the Cyber craft weapon arse­nal… Cyber weapons will need to per­form real-​​time con­tin­u­ous self-​​assessment of the adver­sarys detec­tion capa­bil­ity and be able to make instant deci­sions to morph or self-​​destruct. Both these func­tions will be required in covert­ness and with the deci­sion infor­ma­tion sent back to its Cyber Craft home.

“As an exam­ple of a Cyber Craft appli­ca­tion, con­sider a squad of marines enter­ing a res­i­den­tial area,” the Air Force paper offers.

Current intel­li­gence is about 20-​​mins old and the squad leader requires updated infor­ma­tion. The squad leader finds an elec­tri­cal out­let and plugs in. This out­let allows access to the power grid of the town and sub­se­quently access to the adver­sarys com­puter net­work. The squad leader injects a Cyber Craft into the sys­tem, whose mis­sion is to locate a) any insur­gents or b) locate any hid­den mil­i­tary facil­i­ties… The Cyber Craft detect[s] some activ­ity at a mil­i­tary instal­la­tion within 1000-​​ft of the Marines loca­tion. The Cyber Craft per­forms a ‘recce mis­sion’ to gather intel­li­gence on the insur­gents (exact loca­tion, num­ber, arms, etc.) and sends back data/​information to the marines. However, in the mean­time the marines have moved and have located a dif­fer­ent means of con­nect­ing to the net­work. The Cyber Craft has ‘sensed’ this shift so read­dresses the feed­back infor­ma­tion to the marines new loca­tion and port. The ‘Cyber Craft’ acquires a pos­i­tive ID, and sends an alert mes­sage back to the marines that the insur­gents are about to leave and may be head­ing their way… The Cyber Craft exe­cutes its orders (turns power off, locks the doors), sends back an acknowl­edge­ment and self destructs.

There’s not much of this that today’s soft­ware can do, the Air Force researchers acknowl­edge. “Agent devel­op­ment, agent size and com­plex­ity, detec­tion tech­nol­ogy, real­time agent learn­ing and self mor­ph­ing tech­nol­ogy, RF and net­work pen­e­tra­tion tech­nol­ogy are a few of the tech­no­log­i­cal chal­lenges requir­ing addi­tional invest­ment.“
But the Air Force, ear­lier this year, did hand out con­tracts to three firms to start work­ing the prob­lem. Assured Information Security of Rome, NY got a $99,170 grant to “research and develop a CyberCraft soft­ware tool that will be able to covertly enter a net­work and move about the net­work to detect intru­sions or other abnor­mal­i­ties.” Indialantic, FL out­fit 3 Sigma Research is look­ing to build “Cyber Craft orga­nized in to ‘cells’ to enhance sur­viv­abil­ity and increase resiliency to attack.” And Solidcore Systems, out of Palo Alto, will try to put together a sys­tem that include[s] a har­bor (a host), and a dock (a con­trol envi­ron­ment for Cyber Craft exe­cu­tion) and cyber craft them­selves (ordi­nary pro­grams that can get launched to hosts and run there).“
Of course, build­ing the Cyber Craft, hard as it is, may wind up being the project’s sim­plest part. The real ques­tions come if and when fight­ers start to deploy the things. For instance, “How can we trust the Cyber Craft to ‘do the right thing?’”

The goal is to develop a sys­tem that fol­lows the ‘fire-​​and-​​forget’ method­ol­ogy. However, with this phi­los­o­phy comes the dan­ger of a Cyber Craft mor­ph­ing into some­thing that per­forms unin­tended actions that would be harm­ful to friendly forces or pro­vide an adver­sary with infor­ma­tion about the senders inten­tions, posi­tion, etc. One way of con­trol­ling a Cyber Craft is have it ‘dis­solve’ after com­plet­ing its mis­sion. However, depend­ing on the level of the Cyber Craft (strate­gic, oper­a­tional, and tac­ti­cal) the mis­sion length can go from min­utes to years… Thus, the dam­age that can be inflicted by a rogue Cyber Craft could be significant.

“Future Combat” Needs Info Chief

Thursday, August 31st, 2006

OCPA-2005-09-28-122149.jpgTalk about a thank­less job. The Army is plan­ning to spend $300 bil­lion or more on a mas­sive effort to make its forces quicker, lighter, and much bet­ter net­worked. The pro­gram, Future Combat Systems, has come under intense scrutiny — and not just for its bloated bud­gets and constantly-​​shifting expec­ta­tions. FCS is also an infor­ma­tion tech­nol­ogy under­tak­ing for the ages, try­ing to link together count­less thou­sands of next-​​gen tanks, fly­ing drones, fight­ing vehi­cles, and robotic ground sen­sors all into a sin­gle “System of Systems Common Operating Environment.“
If you’ve got a head hard enough to think you can pull this off, give the folks at defense con­trac­tor SAIC a ping. They’re look­ing for deputy CIO for Future Combat Systems — “min­i­mum of 15 years expe­ri­ence in both clas­si­fied and unclas­si­fied enter­prise infor­ma­tion man­age­ment” required.
“Proficiency with Microsoft prod­ucts and com­mon office soft­ware appli­ca­tions” is a must, SAIC tells job-​​seekers. “Candidates must pos­sess excel­lent oral and writ­ten com­mu­ni­ca­tion skills with the abil­ity to com­mu­ni­cate dif­fi­cult con­cepts to var­i­ous audi­ences; and, have the abil­ity to accom­plish tasks under lim­ited super­vi­sion.“
Hmmm… $300 bil­lion. Limited super­vi­sion. Maybe that job doesn’t sound so bad, after all.
(Big ups: Sailfast)

Iraq’s Biowar Labs: Mystery Solved?

Thursday, August 31st, 2006

mobile lab.jpgOkay, just when you thought that the whole Curveball-​​Iraqi bio­log­i­cal weapons story couldn’t get any weirder, it does. Milton Leitenberg of the Center for International Security Studies has pro­vided me with the exclu­sive third (and last) part of the story behind the story of the alleged Iraqi mobile bio­log­i­cal war­fare labs. In Part 1, he revealed that in 2001 the U.S. gov­ern­ment had fab­ri­cated a “mobile BW lab” for the pur­poses of train­ing SOCOM oper­a­tives on how to iden­tify and exploit an adversary’s BW pro­duc­tion facil­ity. In Part 2, Leitenberg dis­cusses how a U.S. con­trac­tor devel­oped the now infa­mous graph­ics of an Iraqi mobile BW lab — not based on any exist­ing mobile BW lab or any hard intel from Curveball, but rather based on “the processes he [Curveball] described,” which were “assessed by an inde­pen­dent lab­o­ra­tory as work­able engi­neer­ing designs.“
In Part 3, Leitenberg com­pletes the full rid­dle inside the enigma within a mys­tery. It may be that we can trace back the idea of a mobile BW lab­o­ra­tory to Scott Ritter dur­ing his tour of duty in Iraq in 1998 with UNSCOM. Ritter was try­ing to obtain infor­ma­tion from the Iraqi National Congress, specif­i­cally on Iraq’s intel­li­gence agen­cies and WMD pro­gram. In 1998, he talked to Ahmed Chalabi about his sus­pi­cion that Saddam may have had mobile chem­i­cal or bio­log­i­cal weapons labs, which would explain the UNSCOM’s lack of suc­cess in find­ing any evi­dence. In late 1999–2000, Curveball — the brother of a top lieu­tenant to Ahmed Chalabi — starts talk­ing to the German intel­li­gence about mobile Iraqi BW labs, who for­wards this infor­ma­tion to the CIA. At the same time, Chalabi is talk­ing to Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, and Feith about the dan­ger of Iraq’s “WMD pro­gram.“
So here we have a rumor started by a for­mer U.S. marine sup­port­ing a UN inspec­tion team, where he passes the idea to Chalabi, who passes it to German intel and U.S. defense offi­cials, both of whom pass the story to the CIA. The agency devel­ops graph­ics drawn by a U.S. con­trac­tor based on Curveball’s story and might have known of the mock-​​up BW lab built for SOCOM, both of which “con­firms” the con­cept that Iraqi mobile BW labs exist, which leads to SecState Powell’s speech at the UN in February 2003 and the media’s echo cham­ber agree­ing with the pres­i­dent that there’s enough evi­dence to go to war against Iraq.
And as a bonus at the end of this short paper, Leitenberg reveals that Scott Ritter was pulled into a British intel­li­gence op called “Operation Mass Appeal” run by MI6 in 1997. The pur­pose of “Operation Mass Appeal” was to leak weak and not “action­able” data about Iraq’s WMD pro­gram to the media, who would fall upon it like hun­gry wolves and keep alive the pub­lic impres­sion that Saddam had an active WMD pro­gram, despite the lack of offi­cial gov­ern­ment endorse­ment. Leitenberg notes that the dis­in­for­ma­tion oper­a­tion func­tioned sim­i­lar to the DOD Office of Special Plans, but didn’t involve dis­in­for­ma­tion regard­ing the Iraqi mobile BW pro­duc­tion vehi­cles.
Call George Clooney. I’ve got his next movie plot all ready.
Jason Sigger, cross­posted at Armchair Generalist

Israel Wants to Jam Sats

Wednesday, August 30th, 2006

Back in 2004, the U.S. Air Force sug­gested that they might be will­ing to mess with com­mer­cial satel­lites, if they were aid­ing an American foe. The idea drew howls from out­side observers. And, for a while, it seemed des­tined for an extremely quiet cor­ner of fly­boy doc­trine.
sat_dish.jpgBut now, the Israelis are pick­ing up where their American coun­ter­parts left off, Defense News’ Barbara Opall-​​Rome reports. Fed up with Hezbollah’s Al-​​Manar TV broad­casts — which stayed on the air, despite repeated aer­ial and elec­tronic attacks — the Sabras are now talk­ing pub­licly about “disrupt[ing] trans­mis­sions of enemy pro­gram­ming car­ried by com­mer­cial satellites.”

No doubt, we under­stand the power of the media, pub­lic opin­ion and mass psy­chol­ogy, said [Maj. Gen. Ido] Nehushtan, who is respon­si­ble for IDF mod­ern­iza­tion plan­ning. Al-​​Manar is a lia­bil­ity, and were going to have to improve our abil­ity to counter this threat…
…the only way to ensure per­sis­tent, reli­able, wide-​​area broad­cast denial is through an anti-​​communication satel­lite sys­tem. Israel must develop the means to sur­gi­cally tar­get sig­nals serv­ing Hizbollah with­out dam­ag­ing the space­craft or dis­rupt­ing oper­a­tions of other cus­tomers ser­viced by the broad­cast fre­quen­cies, he said…
[But] accord­ing to [an Israeli] exec­u­tive, jam­ming a com­mu­ni­ca­tions satel­lite is like inter­fer­ing with civil avi­a­tion. You can do it, but its against inter­na­tional law and youll be sub­ject to all kinds of law­suits.
It is tech­no­log­i­cally impos­si­ble, he said, to selec­tively jam only those satel­lite sig­nals that carry enemy broad­casts.
Everything goes out as a sin­gle beam, and it is impos­si­ble to jam only those chan­nels viewed as a threat, the exec­u­tive said. If you make the deci­sion to inter­fere with one [satel­lite sig­nal], then you must be pre­pared to face the con­se­quences of the col­lat­eral dam­age incurred to the many other legit­i­mate users of the sig­nal.
Robert Ames, chief exec­u­tive of the Satellite Users Interference Reduction Group… said it is rel­a­tively easy to jam a spe­cific satel­lite transpon­der.
Transponders are sep­a­rated by fre­quency, he said. All you have to do is know the fre­quency which it oper­ates on and then put up a sig­nal that is stronger than the pro­gram­ming car­rier of the satel­lite…
Satellite inter­fer­ence capa­bil­i­ties have been around since the mid-​​1970s, he added. But if the Israelis are talk­ing about tech­no­log­i­cal chal­lenges, I assume they are aim­ing for a capa­bil­ity that goes way beyond what our com­pa­nies have expe­ri­enced to date.

Rapid Fire 08/​30/​06

Wednesday, August 30th, 2006

* New CEO for CIA fund
* Israel war probe pushes on
* GIs’ cute robot res­cuer
* NASA’s fire-​​fighting drone (back­ground here)
* Predators wanna crash your party
* More mis­siles for Iran
* Hack trou­ble for robo-​​sensors?
* Ray gun chief’s stock shenani­gans?
* Martian traf­fic jam
* Cruise mis­siles for every­one
* “Calling BS on mod­ern physics
* “Genetic tro­phy hunters, beware”

(Big ups: Haninah, RC)

Whisteblower Takes to YouTube

Tuesday, August 29th, 2006

dekort.jpgABCNews​.com is run­ning a story on Michael De Kort, the Lockheed whis­te­blower that’s draw­ing a bunch of atten­tion. for air­ing his com­plaints about the company’s shoddy Coast Guard work for on YouTube. The net­work web­site was silly enough to quote yours truly about the subject.

Noah Shac[h]tman, editor-​​in-​​chief of DefenseTech​.org, which mon­i­tors mil­i­tary hap­pen­ings both at home and abroad, says it’s nec­es­sary to ensure the public’s abil­ity to blow the whis­tle.
“I think it’s never been eas­ier for peo­ple to call B.S. on the shenani­gans of their employ­ers or their gov­ern­ment,” said Shachtman. “Whether it’s sol­diers from Abu Graib slip­ping out pic­tures and get­ting them to the press, or whether we’re talk­ing about blog­gers report­ing from the front lines. Digital media has really made it incred­i­bly easy for peo­ple who want to get their mes­sage out and bring ques­tion­able prac­tices to light.“
Shachtman says there are many exam­ples of these kinds of defense con­tract scan­dals — though he says he’s unsure if this is one of those cases. He says the promise of dig­i­tal media is ful­filled when peo­ple like Michael De Kort can be heard.
“There are plenty of hon­est peo­ple work­ing at the nation’s defense con­trac­tors and there are a lot of very hard work­ing, very smart peo­ple,” Shac[h]tman said. “Unfortunately, when there are abuses, it can be awfully dif­fi­cult for some­one to pen­e­trate the cor­po­rate walls and the gov­ern­ment walls that sur­round them.“
Tell that to Michael De Kort — if you can catch him in-​​between inter­views.
“They [the peo­ple] need to know the level of incom­pe­tence and the deci­sions that were being made,” De Kort said. “Your ethics — espe­cially after 9/​11 — can­not be deci­sions of con­ve­nience — they can’t be deci­sions of economics.”

Military Hybrids Stall

Tuesday, August 29th, 2006

For a long time, now, the Pentagon has been look­ing to land diesel-​​electric hybrid vehi­cles to improve fuel econ­omy, reduce logis­tics and allow power export. But after a decade of research and devel­op­ment, mil­i­tary hybrids are still years away from pro­duc­tion, as I describe in detail in the cur­rent National Defense Magazine:
p30_TechnologyLimitations.jpg

Right now, we do not have a cur­rent hybrid pro­gram that tar­gets field­ing, says Gus Khalil, team leader of hybrid-​​electric research at the Armys Tank Automotive Research, Development and Engineering Center, or TARDEC.
TARDEC, a divi­sion of the Research, Development and Engineering Command, in Warren, Mich., is the mil­i­tarys main research cen­ter for vehi­cle tech­nolo­gies.
Khalil and other TARDEC engi­neers have been devel­op­ing hybrid-​​electric engines and test­ing vehi­cle demon­stra­tors since 1992.
Across the Defense Department, there are around 30 hybrid-​​electric demon­stra­tor vehi­cles in some form of test­ing. These demon­stra­tors range from hybrid mod­els of exist­ing vehi­cles, such as Humvees, M-​​113 armored per­son­nel car­ri­ers and M-​​2 Bradley infantry fight­ing sys­tems, to new designs such as the Marine Corps recon­nais­sance, sur­veil­lance and tar­get­ing vehi­cle, or RST-​​V.
Some of these demon­stra­tors are more promis­ing than oth­ers. Some even offer new niche capa­bil­i­ties. But all have failed to achieve the com­bi­na­tion of per­for­mance, tough­ness, price and util­ity that the mil­i­tary demands of its vehicles.

Motor Trend explains:

Though hybrid tech­nol­ogy has been around for sev­eral years in pas­sen­ger vehi­cles, adapt­ing it for larger vehi­cles isn’t as easy, [Oshkosh VP Gary] Schmiedel said. Military vehi­cles must often carry thou­sands of pounds of cargo — 13 tons for the HEMTT — and endure hills, lit­tle pave­ment and angles that few stan­dard vehi­cles can han­dle. That all means engines and axles must be con­fig­ured just so.

Even more daunt­ing is the bat­tery prob­lem. National Defense edi­tor Sandra Erwin reported on this as far back as 2001:

The Achilles heel of hybrid sys­tems today, how­ever, is the bat­tery, [engi­neer William] Haris added. You need to have a source of energy to pro­pel the elec­tric motors. Traditionally that has been bat­ter­ies. The most com­monly used bat­ter­ies today are lead-​​acid, which are the least expen­sive. But they also are heav­ier and less effi­cient than more advanced chem­istry bat­ter­ies.
A more desir­able alter­na­tive would be nickel-​​metal-​​hydride bat­ter­ies, which have twice the energy den­sity of lead-​​acid. Energy den­sity is the amount of energy that can be stored per pound of mate­r­ial. In the long-​​term, experts are look­ing at lithium-​​ion bat­ter­ies, which have four times the energy den­sity of lead-​​acid.

Where there’s a will, there’s a way — tech­ni­cal chal­lenges notwith­stand­ing. There are chal­lenges, and there are issues, but they dont seem insur­mount­able, Khalil told me. If some­one from a pro­gram office told us they wanted some­thing in pro­duc­tion in two years, we would have it into pro­duc­tion.
But despite the promise of a reduced logis­tics bur­dened result­ing from great fuel effi­ciency, the military’s enthu­si­asm for hybrids is cool. If not for their power export capa­bil­ity, the mil­i­tary might not be inter­ested at all.
The bot­tom line is … the tech isn’t ready, and the mil­i­tary isn’t ready to make the tech ready. So be skep­ti­cal when some hack reports that mil­i­tary hybrids are just around the cor­ner.
David Axe

Pentagon Closing Transformation Shop

Tuesday, August 29th, 2006

In the 1990s, Admiral Arthur Cebrowski began push­ing the unortho­dox idea that the Pentagon had to change itself, from a relatively-​​small col­lec­tion of heavy, plod­ding forces to a larger array of lighter, quicker, cheaper, better-​​networked units. By 2001, the notion — known alter­na­tively as “rev­o­lu­tion in mil­i­tary affairs” or “force trans­for­ma­tion” — had become offi­cial doc­trine. The Army began a mas­sive mod­ern­iza­tion effort, based, in part, around Cebrowski’s ideas. Presidential can­di­date George W. Bush embraced the con­cept dur­ing the 2000 elec­tion. Donald Rumsfeld adopted it as the cor­ner­stone of his return to the Pentagon, and installed Cebrowski as the direc­tor of a new depart­ment: the Office of Force Transformation, or OFT.
Cebrowski.jpgThe office ini­ti­ated a series of novel, seem­ingly off-​​the-​​wall projects: armored vehi­cles equipped with pain rays, sneaky ships silently bring­ing com­man­dos to shore, orbit­ing mir­rors to send lasers across the globe.
But early last year, Cebrowski was forced to retire, as he fought a los­ing bat­tle with can­cer. Observers won­dered whether OFT and its projects would sur­vive his pass­ing.
The office, at least, prob­a­bly will not, accord­ing to Defense News. Pending approval by deputy defense sec­re­tary Gordon England, “the office [will] be dis­solved by Sept. 30.“
Defense ana­lyst Bob Work thinks it “may be an indi­ca­tion of just how hard it is to bal­ance the com­pet­ing demands for trans­for­ma­tion in the midst of this pro­tracted cam­paign” in the Global War on Terror. The Armchair Generalist fears this could be the final “nail in the cof­fin” for trans­for­ma­tion. But mil­i­tary the­o­rist Tom Barnett, long allied with Cebrowski, sees the shift as the final move in bring­ing Cebrowski’s ideas into the heart of the U.S. mil­i­tary.
“Art’s suc­cess in main­stream­ing his think­ing meant that OFT always had a lim­ited shelf life. [His ideas are] every­where now,” Barnett writes. “Art him­self saw this com­ing and had no prob­lem with it. He sim­ply would have moved on to the next great def­i­n­i­tion.“
Besides, the office is “not really shut­ting down,” an OFT source tells Defense Tech.

It is being split apart and embed­ded in two other areas of OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense]. The analy­sis and study por­tion of OFT is to be rolled into a new office as part of a larger reorg of OSD Policy. [More about that here — ed.] All of the other ini­tia­tives here, like… Redirected Energy and Operationally Responsive Space are to go into a new office under [Director, Defense Research and Engineering] John Young…
So, in a sense, this is a good move. Since OSD had no inter­est in appoint­ing any­one to replace Cebrowski, the office was hob­bled.… If this is approved, OSD is say­ing we like this OFT approach [so much] that we are will­ing to apply it more broadly across the entire department.

Could be. But with costs pil­ing higher and higher for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq — and with the bud­gets for many “trans­for­ma­tional” projects swelling, fast — I worry that this could jeop­ar­dize Cebrowski’s work, not insti­tu­tion­al­ize it.

Rapid Fire 08/​28/​06 (Updated)

Monday, August 28th, 2006

* Rummy: Korea no threat
* Nork nuke test site? (more here)
* Yoga vs. IEDs
* “Hacking the Himalayas
* Holes in Heathrow case? (more here)
* Forward air control’s big upgrade
* “Fissure-​​guided mis­sile
* Drones + clus­ter bombs
* Sleek, styl­ish pep­per spray
* Hummer on steroids
* Total war, RIP
* New nuke sub debuts
* Cheney biog­ra­pher: 9/​11 nut
* Hamas big: we suck

(Big ups: ACE, RC, CP)