Things are looking a bit scatterbrained in the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) these days, especially in light of a November 2005 internal memo recently obtained and published by the Federation of American Scientists. Regarding the status and location of foreign-deployed missile defense systems, the document penned by MDA Deputy Director Gen. Marvin K. McNamara reads:
- There are many operational and political sensitivities that require varying levels of protection as we consider possible deployments. Therefore, I am requiring that potential host nations being studied or considered by MDA for operational deployments not be identified by country or city name on Unclassified computer systems or networks
Political sensitivities? While you ponder that one, watch how the memo in the same breath declares:
- The names of multiple foreign countries and/or cities undergoing study for consideration as a host nation are not classified. However, to ensure they are properly protected, they must now be e-mailed or documented ONLY on Classified computer systems or networks
To recap: theyre classified, but theyre actually unclassified, therefore MDA must take measures to safeguard their unclassified secrets. As decoded by Victoria Samson of Center for Defense Information, “when they claim that the new sites for missile defense deployment are not classified, they are actually classifying them by making the contractors etc only use classified networks when discussing them. So they are, in a sense, skipping around having to justify classifying the sites and yet getting to still do so. Very clever.“
Issues of reclassification aside, the question remains as to why MDA is so hush-hush about its operational foreign deployments, that in context seems to indicate ground-based interceptors. As we pause to consider this paranoia, it may help to recreate a relevant sequence of events:
As far back as summer 2004, then-Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton stated that “were now engaged in discussions with Poland about the possibility of basing interceptors and radars here.” This statement was followed by news reports of similar third-site prospects in the Czech Republic and elsewhere in Eastern Europe, to ostensibly counter an Iranian ballistic missile threat.
But months later in February 2005, the Bush administration suffered an embarrassing setback when, after months of trying to shove missile defense cooperation down Canadas throat despite widespread domestic opposition, the Canadian Prime Minister abruptly and unequivocally pulled the plug on all such plans.
Fast-forwarding to November 2005, the administration and MDA may have learned from their Canadian missteps that when foreign missile defense deployments hinge on the outcome of democratic debate, it becomes much harder to impose less-than-popular policies upon informed electorates. That, in any case, is perhaps the most plausible explanation for the sudden classification or “secretification”? of what was previously public information.
But no sooner was the memo passed around than a PowerPoint presentation containing the supposedly classified material was used by MDA Director Lt. Gen. Trey Obering at an AIAA conference, and then circulated widely. Right there, on slide 35, the presentation gives a complete rundown of desired foreign deployments, listing Poland, Czech Republic, and even the United Kingdom as potential third site candidates. Related or not, public debate over missile defense has mushroomed in Eastern Europe this summer, with 82 percent of Czechs opposed to the idea while Warsaw sizes up missile defense with its national interests.
Whats the point of this exercise? Was MDA convinced that by classifying sort of facts that were already public knowledge, it could keep missile defense off the legislative floors in Prague and Warsaw? Did Gen. McNamara think this was the best way to avoid a repeat Canadian incident? Most befuddling, did anyone involved think they could hide something like this for more than ten minutes in Washington DC? It remains to be seen what their motives might have been, as does the fate of the third ground-based interceptor site in Europe. But one can be reasonably certain that deceiving allies and partners and ineptly at that may not be the best way to promote cooperative security.
– Scott Morrissey, CDI
UPDATE 3:41 PM Apparently the PowerPoint presentation was not leaked — it was shown at a quasi-public AIAA conference back in March. Thanks to the commenters for pointing this out!
{ 8 comments… read them below or add one }
Far be it from me to defend MDA, but Obering’s “PowerPoint Presentation” was NOT leaked — he used it at an MDA/AIAA conference in March which was attended by more than one journalist, and the negotiations with countries named in slide # 35 have since been reported by more than one media outlet.
It may seem down right pedantic to reclassify or de facto classify information, but I can see a possible purpose:
One can’t be prosecuted for failing to obey the handling rules on a piece of information, such as FOUO, SBU or “discuss it on the SIPRNET.” It could give the government leverage to have a contractor dismissed for mishandling controlled information though (they would call it “leaking”).
I haven’t seen it happen myself, but I wouldn’t be surprised if it did.
“the administration and MDA may have learned from their Canadian missteps that when foreign missile defense deployments hinge on the outcome of democratic debate, it becomes much harder to impose less-than-popular policies upon informed electorates.”
Sometimes the ‘electorate’ has no interest in debate, behaves irrationally, and is generally uninformed. There is no reason to oppose having the US shield your country with missile defense, unless you simply hold anti-American views to begin with. Rational people do not oppose reaping the boon of tens of billions of US development cost and protecting their people from nuclear devestation at the hands of some rogue regime.
The only way to make a proper evaluation of whether missile defense should be rejected would require knowledge of classified information available only to the highest level of government, who should be the ones making these decisions.
People are generally uninformed, stupid, and prone to focus on their own irrational biases and fear. Look at the American irrational fear of nuclear power. Look at the absolutely moronic opposition to the transportation of napalm for deweaponization.
The missile defense people are just trying to avoid the issue from being POLITICIZED, stupid ignorant people like to take up issues like this and try to make it a referendum on US policy. In this case, I could care less, because if people want to oppose the US, Im happy to see them left vulnerable by their own ignorance.
To the contrary, the “electorate” has a critical interest in such issues, and behaves irrationally only because they are intentionally misinformed (i.e., early support for the Iraq invasion based upon Iraqi WMDs and Hussein’s “role” in 9/11).
Missile defense systems utilize irrational fear for marketing purposes: in the US, protection from ballistic missiles when the real threat is a suitcase or low-tech dirty bomb; in Asia, protection from a North Korean ballistic missile.
North Korea is a telling example. Missile (and nuclear) production has been encouraged by years of persistent provocation and diplomatic neglect. Continuous overstatement of DPRK capability, demonstrated by the failed missile tests hyped by [former] CIA Director George Tenet and others as being able to hit Alaska, follow a decades old pattern of deception leading back at least as far as the Soviet bomber and missile gaps of the late 1950
I am going to have to ignore most of your post because it is so far gone, but I do want to point one thing out: there is no such thing as a “suitcase” nuclear bomb. For some reason liberals always speak of these mythical devices thanks to recycled talking points they saw in some “news” story somewhere.
The smallest nuclear bombs ever created would be called “large, heavy backpack bombs”. The only such bomb confirmed to exist was made by the US, and these have not been around for nearly two decades:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special_Atomic_Demolition_Munition
There is no evidence the USSR even made any such weapon, and if the USSR had made equivalent weapons, they would not remain functional today as a result of limited shelf life.
Meanwhile, North Korea is overwhelmingly believed to have nuclear weapons, and has a major missile program. That is a real threat, versus the imaginary threat posed by non-existent man-portable nuclear weapons.
“there is no such thing as a “suitcase” nuclear bomb … The only such bomb confirmed to exist was made by the US”
“There is no evidence the USSR even made any such weapon”
According to the Dept. of Homeland Security: “The Soviet nuclear backpack system was made in the 1960s for use against NATO targets in time of war”
(http://www.nationalterroralert.com/suitcasenuke/).
This is particularly interesting because if it is true, it contradicts your statement, and if it is false, it supports the argument that imaginary threats against the US are hyped to support military action and unnecessary weapons projects (among other things).
More can be found here – http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/News/Lebedbomb.html, including a picture of a mock-up of a hypothetical “suitcase” nuclear bomb based on a 105 mm artillery shell device packaged in a large briefcase.
As to North Korea, it is a very limited but valuable threat that creates a highly profitable opportunity for the U.S. to further militarize and destabilize Asia, which is why the U.S. will not enage in direct negotiations with Pyongyang.
There does seem to be some evidence for real “suitcase” sized bombs having been built in the 1970′s by the Soviets for terroristic purposes:
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/russia/suitcase/comments.html
The existence of larger, Soviet “trunk-sized” bombs has already been verified.
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