The just-foiled airline bomb plot has precedents, The New York Times reminds us:
The plot to blow up several airliners flying between Britain and the United States bears a striking resemblance to a plot hatched by al Qaeda operatives 12 years ago to simultaneously blow up airliners over the Pacific.
That plot was hatched in Manila by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who was starting his climb to be a top lieutenant to Osama bin Laden, and by Ramzi Yousef, who was the mastermind of the first bomb attack on the World Trade Center in 1993. It was financed by bin Laden.
Which is perhaps why U.S. officials are saying the current plot bears Al Qaeda’s fingerprints. But remember, it’s open-source terrorism we face. That this plot looks like the Manila plot means only that the terrorists are drawing from the same well of tactics and philosophy, not that there’s any formal Al Qaeda command and control in place.
Does it even mean anything any more to invoke Al Qaeda?
–David Axe
UPDATE 8/11/06: Sure enough, officials have told Time that there is no evidence of Al Qaeda command and control:
Though the plot has all the hallmarks of an al Qaeda operation, U.S. officials cautioned that there isn’t yet evidence of a direct link between the plotters and the organization’s top leaders. “We’re not convinced this particular operation is connected to the al Qaeda chain of command,” Charles Allen, Chief of Intelligence for the Department of Homeland Security, told reporters on Thursday afternoon. As for whether the attack was being timed for the fifth anniversary of Sept. 11, Allen said he thought the attack would simply be launched when it was ready. “I am a long standing believer that terrorist plotters or planners execute when they have all of the plot together,” said Allen. “We have no evidence this was timed to any particular holiday or special event.”
Is there anybody who still believes in such OPR stund “terror plots”?
When the politicos invoke Al Queda, it means that it’s gonna cost us another couple of hundred million to watch elderly American women forced out of their wheelchairs by TSA “operatives”. Whilst they still let people from Pakistan, Iran, Lebanon ad nauseum on aircraft.
Somebody save us, please
“hiring one understanding chemistry to build explosives, hiring one understanding the weakpoints of the jet, purchase chemicals needed for the explosives, training for handling the explosives and detonaing it, organizing the team preparing it for the terror, purchasing tickets to ride on airlines.“
You could “hire” me or anybody else with a decent engineering grade and get all of that in one package. This isn
b is exactly right, “hiring” has nothing to do with it. Sure, there probably are some professional guerillas or bombmakers willing to do business with Islamic radicals, but that is probably more of a liability then what they bill for.
pedestrian makes the same mistake that many national security experts do when they imagine how terrorist groups are organized. Since such groups generally don’t have the ability to tax, their resources (including potential salaries) are very limited.
They, therefore, must rely on members who are motivated to participate for a reason other othan money. This limit on resources also forces them to come up with innovative ways to attack their opponents (the state).
What I don’t get is why screeners weren’t already looking for hydrogen peroxide and acetone in carry-ons already. I guess they were too busy hassling people with toenail clippers and manicure scissors to realize that certain household chemicals could easily be turned into explosives. Maybe I should buy the TSA a copy of the Anarchist’s Cookbook ($18.87 new at Amazon) for Christmas…
Invoking Al-Queda is an ideological cry moreso than a command one. This doesn’t belittle the underlying theme that these terror plots are part of a campaign that focuses on certain islamic fundementalist ideals.
I’m also glad that someone like b is niave enough to believe that one jack of all trades could conduct all operational needs of a campaign without being detected.
“Invoking Al-Queda is an ideological cry moreso than a command one.“
daskro, what does that have to do with anything? Either you are bankrolled and commanded by a member of al Qaeda or you are not. Don’t make the same mistake the U.S. did during the Cold War and assume that Mid Eastern and South Asian terrorists are the same. Sure, they may all be Islamic radicals, but there are very subtle distinctions in organization motivation, composition and objectives.
While funding for Islamic radicals does not come from a tax base (the way funding for US radicals does), it is a mistake to think that there is not an organized system for funding these groups.
For example, Saudi Arabian royals only stay in power by virtue of funding fundamentalist groups who would otherwise bring down the government. Saudi money comes from oil revenue. This is a very well organized system.
I’d suggest reading Matthew Yeomans’ Oil: Anatomy of an Industry and Posner’s Secrets of the Kingdom: The Inside Story of the Secret Saudi-U.S. Connection for a better understanding of how US citizens are funding Islamic radicals.
Noah, I don’t disagree with your point (whether Islamic radicals can tax doesn’t matter when you have a group of wealthy donors), but there is a cap to how much revenue that a non-state actor can reasonably raise. As non-state actors, most terrorist organizations don’t have the sovereign power to tax people.
In the case of a non-state actor operating in a weak state, there have been cases where terrorist groups have effectively taxed the local population. Hezbollah is a good example of this, as is the MILF in Philippines. Even in these cases though, there is only so much either group could effectively tax.
My point is that we shouldn’t engage in the mistaken belief that we can somehow outspend terrorist groups. We’re not up against the Soviet Union. Terrorists are on comparatively tight budgets, so they have to compensate by relying on higher member motivation and continuous tactical innovation to overcome their budgetary limitations.
The cost of 9/11 to al Qaeda is estimated at $500k while the cost of 9/11 to the US is conservatively $500 billion and still rising (direct costs in NYC, global economic costs following, security measures, increased military spending, Afghan & Iraq wars, energy costs, etc.) Economically, this is a return on investment on the order of at least 1,000,000 to 1.
With this kind of effectiveness, restraints on funding have little effect. It is also important to keep in mind that funding for Islamic fundamentalists has come from many sources including at one point Israel itself (in an attempt to destabilize Arab states). Much of this money flows through untraceable Hawala networks.
Our great leaders don’t talk asymmetric economic warfare because 1) we’ve already lost and 2) the vast profits being made by various defense and energy concerns that have been ‘justified by the so-called war on terror. But all of this is clearly evident, not only in the positioning of ineffective $1,000,000 PATRIOT missiles against $1,000 Katushya rockets and the estimated 250,000 bullets per kill in Iraq but also in the Raython STUNNER program, with an estimated interceptor cost of only $300,000 to $400,000 each (after development costs, of course).
Indirect economic attrition is the very same technique the US used to defeat the Soviet Union
You made an excellent point Noah, which brings us back to what Robert Pape referred to as the “strategic logic” of Islamic terrorism. Whether a terrorist attack is successful really depends on how it can provoke the target to react, not essentially the amount of damage it causes.
Look at how two decades of terrorism has done to Israel. The Israelis countered armed militias in the 1980s, suicide bombers in the 1990s and mortar and rocket fire today. Israel’s political decisions, technology and infrastructure have reduced the danger to Israeli citizens on a steady incremental basis.
The margin of protection afforded by each step declines even as the cost goes up. The problem is that public expectations for the protective capability of each new anti-terrorism policy or technology often remains the same. In the end, a democratic society can effectively dig itself into a political and economic hole.
This tendency is completely unrelated to the terrorist group’s overall performance. Mere operational survival could be the only requirement for an ultimate endgame.
I think the critical issue is that we look at terrorism through the wrong lense. Using a term like “asymmetrical warfare” confines the total impact of a campaign of terror to a mere assessment of tactics. A strategy of terrorism will produce disproportionate effects when compared to inputs, but more importantly, the effects may increase over time even when the volume of inputs remain unchanged.
I would definitely suggest reading Robert Pape’s “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism” to see an interesting statistical comparison of multiple terror campaigns and their effects.
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