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	<title>Comments on: Terror Plot Deja Vu</title>
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	<link>http://defensetech.org/2006/08/10/terror-plot-deja-vu/</link>
	<description>The Future of the Military, Law Enforcement and National Security</description>
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		<title>By: cheap silkroad gold</title>
		<link>http://defensetech.org/2006/08/10/terror-plot-deja-vu/#comment-135119</link>
		<dc:creator>cheap silkroad gold</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 14 Aug 2008 08:15:29 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Shop where one buys cheap silkroad gold and sells trader goods.
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		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Shop where one buys cheap silkroad gold and sells trader goods.</p>
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		<title>By: Tibia money</title>
		<link>http://defensetech.org/2006/08/10/terror-plot-deja-vu/#comment-21364</link>
		<dc:creator>Tibia money</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 14 Aug 2008 08:11:33 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://deftech.usmilblog.com/?p=2099#comment-21364</guid>
		<description>I didn&#039;t hesitate to think more time and try playing at once. Now I love the Tibia money Game very much.
</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I didn’t hesitate to think more time and try playing at once. Now I love the Tibia money Game very much.</p>
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		<title>By: Robot Economist</title>
		<link>http://defensetech.org/2006/08/10/terror-plot-deja-vu/#comment-135112</link>
		<dc:creator>Robot Economist</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 13 Aug 2006 02:52:14 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://deftech.usmilblog.com/?p=2099#comment-135112</guid>
		<description>You made an excellent point Noah, which brings us back to what Robert Pape referred to as the &quot;strategic logic&quot; of Islamic terrorism.  Whether a terrorist attack is successful really depends on how it can provoke the target to react, not essentially the amount of damage it causes.
Look at how two decades of terrorism has done to Israel.  The Israelis countered armed militias in the 1980s, suicide bombers in the 1990s and mortar and rocket fire today.  Israel&#039;s political decisions, technology and infrastructure have reduced the danger to Israeli citizens on a steady incremental basis.
The margin of protection afforded by each step declines even as the cost goes up.  The problem is that public expectations for the protective capability of each new anti-terrorism policy or technology often remains the same.  In the end, a democratic society can effectively dig itself into a political and economic hole.
This tendency is completely unrelated to the terrorist group&#039;s overall performance.  Mere operational survival could be the only requirement for an ultimate endgame.
I think the critical issue is that we look at terrorism through the wrong lense.  Using a term like &quot;asymmetrical warfare&quot; confines the total impact of a campaign of terror to a mere assessment of tactics.  A strategy of terrorism will produce disproportionate effects when compared to inputs, but more importantly, the effects may increase over time even when the volume of inputs remain unchanged.
I would definitely suggest reading Robert Pape&#039;s &quot;The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism&quot; to see an interesting statistical comparison of multiple terror campaigns and their effects.
</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>You made an excellent point Noah, which brings us back to what Robert Pape referred to as the “strategic logic” of Islamic terrorism.  Whether a terrorist attack is successful really depends on how it can provoke the target to react, not essentially the amount of damage it causes.<br />
Look at how two decades of terrorism has done to Israel.  The Israelis countered armed militias in the 1980s, suicide bombers in the 1990s and mortar and rocket fire today.  Israel’s political decisions, technology and infrastructure have reduced the danger to Israeli citizens on a steady incremental basis.<br />
The margin of protection afforded by each step declines even as the cost goes up.  The problem is that public expectations for the protective capability of each new anti-terrorism policy or technology often remains the same.  In the end, a democratic society can effectively dig itself into a political and economic hole.<br />
This tendency is completely unrelated to the terrorist group’s overall performance.  Mere operational survival could be the only requirement for an ultimate endgame.<br />
I think the critical issue is that we look at terrorism through the wrong lense.  Using a term like “asymmetrical warfare” confines the total impact of a campaign of terror to a mere assessment of tactics.  A strategy of terrorism will produce disproportionate effects when compared to inputs, but more importantly, the effects may increase over time even when the volume of inputs remain unchanged.<br />
I would definitely suggest reading Robert Pape’s “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism” to see an interesting statistical comparison of multiple terror campaigns and their effects.</p>
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		<title>By: Noah</title>
		<link>http://defensetech.org/2006/08/10/terror-plot-deja-vu/#comment-135111</link>
		<dc:creator>Noah</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 12 Aug 2006 16:11:35 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://deftech.usmilblog.com/?p=2099#comment-135111</guid>
		<description>The cost of 9/11 to al Qaeda is estimated at $500k while the cost of 9/11 to the US is conservatively $500 billion and still rising (direct costs in NYC, global economic costs following, security measures, increased military spending, Afghan &amp; Iraq wars, energy costs, etc.) Economically, this is a return on investment on the order of at least 1,000,000 to 1.
With this kind of effectiveness, restraints on funding have little effect. It is also important to keep in mind that funding for Islamic fundamentalists has come from many sources including at one point Israel itself (in an attempt to destabilize Arab states). Much of this money flows through untraceable Hawala networks.
Our great leaders don&#039;t talk asymmetric economic warfare because 1) we&#039;ve already lost and 2) the vast profits being made by various defense and energy concerns that have been &#039;justified by the so-called war on terror. But all of this is clearly evident, not only in the positioning of ineffective $1,000,000 PATRIOT missiles against $1,000 Katushya rockets and the estimated 250,000 bullets per kill in Iraq but also in the Raython STUNNER program, with an estimated interceptor cost of only $300,000 to $400,000 each (after development costs, of course).
Indirect economic attrition is the very same technique the US used to defeat the Soviet Union </description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The cost of 9/11 to al Qaeda is estimated at $500k while the cost of 9/11 to the US is conservatively $500 billion and still rising (direct costs in NYC, global economic costs following, security measures, increased military spending, Afghan &amp; Iraq wars, energy costs, etc.) Economically, this is a return on investment on the order of at least 1,000,000 to 1.<br />
With this kind of effectiveness, restraints on funding have little effect. It is also important to keep in mind that funding for Islamic fundamentalists has come from many sources including at one point Israel itself (in an attempt to destabilize Arab states). Much of this money flows through untraceable Hawala networks.<br />
Our great leaders don’t talk asymmetric economic warfare because 1) we’ve already lost and 2) the vast profits being made by various defense and energy concerns that have been ‘justified by the so-called war on terror. But all of this is clearly evident, not only in the positioning of ineffective $1,000,000 PATRIOT missiles against $1,000 Katushya rockets and the estimated 250,000 bullets per kill in Iraq but also in the Raython STUNNER program, with an estimated interceptor cost of only $300,000 to $400,000 each (after development costs, of course).<br />
Indirect economic attrition is the very same technique the US used to defeat the Soviet Union</p>
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		<title>By: Robot.Economist</title>
		<link>http://defensetech.org/2006/08/10/terror-plot-deja-vu/#comment-135110</link>
		<dc:creator>Robot.Economist</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 11 Aug 2006 18:39:03 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://deftech.usmilblog.com/?p=2099#comment-135110</guid>
		<description>Noah, I don&#039;t disagree with your point (whether Islamic radicals can tax doesn&#039;t matter when you have a group of wealthy donors), but there is a cap to how much revenue that a non-state actor can reasonably raise.  As non-state actors, most terrorist organizations don&#039;t have the sovereign power to tax people.
In the case of a non-state actor operating in a weak state, there have been cases where terrorist groups have effectively taxed the local population.  Hezbollah is a good example of this, as is the MILF in Philippines.  Even in these cases though, there is only so much either group could effectively tax.
My point is that we shouldn&#039;t engage in the mistaken belief that we can somehow outspend terrorist groups.  We&#039;re not up against the Soviet Union.  Terrorists are on comparatively tight budgets, so they have to compensate by relying on higher member motivation and continuous tactical innovation to overcome their budgetary limitations.
</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Noah, I don’t disagree with your point (whether Islamic radicals can tax doesn’t matter when you have a group of wealthy donors), but there is a cap to how much revenue that a non-state actor can reasonably raise.  As non-state actors, most terrorist organizations don’t have the sovereign power to tax people.<br />
In the case of a non-state actor operating in a weak state, there have been cases where terrorist groups have effectively taxed the local population.  Hezbollah is a good example of this, as is the MILF in Philippines.  Even in these cases though, there is only so much either group could effectively tax.<br />
My point is that we shouldn’t engage in the mistaken belief that we can somehow outspend terrorist groups.  We’re not up against the Soviet Union.  Terrorists are on comparatively tight budgets, so they have to compensate by relying on higher member motivation and continuous tactical innovation to overcome their budgetary limitations.</p>
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		<title>By: Noah</title>
		<link>http://defensetech.org/2006/08/10/terror-plot-deja-vu/#comment-135109</link>
		<dc:creator>Noah</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 11 Aug 2006 15:41:59 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://deftech.usmilblog.com/?p=2099#comment-135109</guid>
		<description>While funding for Islamic radicals does not come from a tax base (the way funding for US radicals does), it is a mistake to think that there is not an organized system for funding these groups.
For example, Saudi Arabian royals only stay in power by virtue of funding fundamentalist groups who would otherwise bring down the government. Saudi money comes from oil revenue. This is a very well organized system.
I&#039;d suggest reading Matthew Yeomans&#039; Oil: Anatomy of an Industry and Posner&#039;s Secrets of the Kingdom: The Inside Story of the Secret Saudi-U.S. Connection for a better understanding of how US citizens are funding Islamic radicals.
</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>While funding for Islamic radicals does not come from a tax base (the way funding for US radicals does), it is a mistake to think that there is not an organized system for funding these groups.<br />
For example, Saudi Arabian royals only stay in power by virtue of funding fundamentalist groups who would otherwise bring down the government. Saudi money comes from oil revenue. This is a very well organized system.<br />
I’d suggest reading Matthew Yeomans’ Oil: Anatomy of an Industry and Posner’s Secrets of the Kingdom: The Inside Story of the Secret Saudi-U.S. Connection for a better understanding of how US citizens are funding Islamic radicals.</p>
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		<title>By: Robot.Economist</title>
		<link>http://defensetech.org/2006/08/10/terror-plot-deja-vu/#comment-135108</link>
		<dc:creator>Robot.Economist</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 11 Aug 2006 15:29:57 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://deftech.usmilblog.com/?p=2099#comment-135108</guid>
		<description>&quot;Invoking Al-Queda is an ideological cry moreso than a command one.&quot;
daskro, what does that have to do with anything?  Either you are bankrolled and commanded by a member of al Qaeda or you are not.  Don&#039;t make the same mistake the U.S. did during the Cold War and assume that Mid Eastern and South Asian terrorists are the same.  Sure, they may all be Islamic radicals, but there are very subtle distinctions in organization motivation, composition and objectives.
</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>“Invoking Al-Queda is an ideological cry moreso than a command one.“<br />
daskro, what does that have to do with anything?  Either you are bankrolled and commanded by a member of al Qaeda or you are not.  Don’t make the same mistake the U.S. did during the Cold War and assume that Mid Eastern and South Asian terrorists are the same.  Sure, they may all be Islamic radicals, but there are very subtle distinctions in organization motivation, composition and objectives.</p>
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		<title>By: daskro</title>
		<link>http://defensetech.org/2006/08/10/terror-plot-deja-vu/#comment-21353</link>
		<dc:creator>daskro</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 11 Aug 2006 14:38:36 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://deftech.usmilblog.com/?p=2099#comment-21353</guid>
		<description>Invoking Al-Queda is an ideological cry moreso than a command one.  This doesn&#039;t belittle the underlying theme that these terror plots are part of a campaign  that focuses on certain islamic fundementalist ideals.
I&#039;m also glad that someone like b is niave enough to believe that one jack of all trades could conduct all operational needs of a campaign without being detected.
</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Invoking Al-Queda is an ideological cry moreso than a command one.  This doesn’t belittle the underlying theme that these terror plots are part of a campaign  that focuses on certain islamic fundementalist ideals.<br />
I’m also glad that someone like b is niave enough to believe that one jack of all trades could conduct all operational needs of a campaign without being detected.</p>
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		<title>By: Robot.Economist</title>
		<link>http://defensetech.org/2006/08/10/terror-plot-deja-vu/#comment-135107</link>
		<dc:creator>Robot.Economist</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 11 Aug 2006 12:36:47 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://deftech.usmilblog.com/?p=2099#comment-135107</guid>
		<description>b is exactly right, &quot;hiring&quot; has nothing to do with it.  Sure, there probably are some professional guerillas or bombmakers willing to do business with Islamic radicals, but that is probably more of a liability then what they bill for.
pedestrian makes the same mistake that many national security experts do when they imagine how terrorist groups are organized.  Since such groups generally don&#039;t have the ability to tax, their resources (including potential salaries) are very limited.
They, therefore, must rely on members who are motivated to participate for a reason other othan money.  This limit on resources also forces them to come up with innovative ways to attack their opponents (the state).
What I don&#039;t get is why screeners weren&#039;t already looking for hydrogen peroxide and acetone in carry-ons already.  I guess they were too busy hassling people with toenail clippers and manicure scissors to realize that certain household chemicals could easily be turned into explosives.  Maybe I should buy the TSA a copy of the Anarchist&#039;s Cookbook ($18.87 new at Amazon) for Christmas...
</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>b is exactly right, “hiring” has nothing to do with it.  Sure, there probably are some professional guerillas or bombmakers willing to do business with Islamic radicals, but that is probably more of a liability then what they bill for.<br />
pedestrian makes the same mistake that many national security experts do when they imagine how terrorist groups are organized.  Since such groups generally don’t have the ability to tax, their resources (including potential salaries) are very limited.<br />
They, therefore, must rely on members who are motivated to participate for a reason other othan money.  This limit on resources also forces them to come up with innovative ways to attack their opponents (the state).<br />
What I don’t get is why screeners weren’t already looking for hydrogen peroxide and acetone in carry-ons already.  I guess they were too busy hassling people with toenail clippers and manicure scissors to realize that certain household chemicals could easily be turned into explosives.  Maybe I should buy the TSA a copy of the Anarchist’s Cookbook ($18.87 new at Amazon) for Christmas…</p>
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		<title>By: b</title>
		<link>http://defensetech.org/2006/08/10/terror-plot-deja-vu/#comment-135106</link>
		<dc:creator>b</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 11 Aug 2006 05:22:30 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://deftech.usmilblog.com/?p=2099#comment-135106</guid>
		<description>&quot;hiring one understanding chemistry to build explosives, hiring one understanding the weakpoints of the jet, purchase chemicals needed for the explosives, training for handling the explosives and detonaing it, organizing the team preparing it for the terror, purchasing tickets to ride on airlines.&quot;
You could &quot;hire&quot; me or anybody else with a decent engineering grade and get all of that in one package. This isn</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>“hiring one understanding chemistry to build explosives, hiring one understanding the weakpoints of the jet, purchase chemicals needed for the explosives, training for handling the explosives and detonaing it, organizing the team preparing it for the terror, purchasing tickets to ride on airlines.“<br />
You could “hire” me or anybody else with a decent engineering grade and get all of that in one package. This isn</p>
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