Nancy Pelosi ordinarily bugs the living hell out of me. Every time I see her botoxed face on TV, I cringe. But someone one her staff Congressmen Dave Obey and John Murtha have just put together an extremely smart and provacative report on the state of Army readiness. Take a read, and post your thoughts. Here’s a snip:
In June of 2003, the Pentagons planners assumed that the U.S. would withdraw all of its combat brigades from Iraq roughly 20 months after the end of major combat operations. Those plans were revised in September of that year, and assumed a complete withdrawal about one year later than had previously been expected. Today, there are 16 U.S. combat brigades in Iraq (including 2 Marine Corps regiments), and there is little prospect that the deployment rate will decrease in the near future…
The Army currently has 39 active-duty combat brigades, as it builds to a total of 42 under the restructuring plan known as modularity. Over the coming months, roughly 19.5 combat brigades will be committed to Iraq and Afghanistan. Army doctrine calls for 2 units to be held in reserve (for rest and training) for every unit deployed. As of today, the Army has only one unit in reserve for every unit deployed a ratio that history shows cannot be sustained for any length of time without serious adverse consequences to the force…
Army military readiness rates have declined to levels not seen since the end of the Vietnam War. Roughly one-half of all Army units (deployed and non-deployed, active and reserves) received the lowest readiness rating any fully formed unit can receive. Prior to 9/11, only about 20 percent of the Army received this lowest rating a fact driven almost exclusively by shortfalls in the reserves…
Of the 16 active-duty, non-deployed combat brigades in the United States managed by the Armys Forces Command, the vast majority of them are rated at the lowest readiness ratings. These ratings are caused by severe equipment shortages.
Of particular concern is the readiness rates of the units scheduled to deploy later this year, particularly the 1st Cavalry Division. This division and its 4 brigades will deploy to Iraq in October at the lowest level of readiness because of equipment shortfalls. To meet its needs, this unit like virtually all other units that have recently deployed or will soon deploy to Iraq must fall-in on equipment in theater. Operating unfamiliar, battle weary equipment increases the potential for casualties and accidents…
Funding shortfalls have created backlogs at all of the Armys key depot maintenance facilities. At Anniston Army Depot in Alabama, some 600 M1 tanks sit in disuse. At Red River Army Depot in Texas, 700 Bradley Fighting Vehicles and over 450 trucks have not been serviced. Roughly 2,600 Humvees are sitting idle at various Army depots. Tens of thousands of small arms, communications sets, and other key items have been similarly backlogged.
UPDATE 7:18 PM: It should be noted that this assessment closely mirrors what the Army has been saying itself, again and again, in private meetings on Capitol Hill.
“There are no more troops to send to Iraq,” Daniel Benjamin writes in Slate. “That is the unmistakable message of an Army briefing making the rounds in Washington. According to in-house assessments… not a single one of the Army’s Brigade Combat Teams its core fighting units currently in the United States is ready to deploy. In short, the Army has no strategic reserve to speak of.”
How pathetic. The US military can’t sustain 150,000 combat troops plus their support troops indefinitely. Is the problem money, logistical resources or lack of personnel? The US military gets what they deserve for living in their China fantasy the last ten years.
Typical insurgencies and normal post conflict stabilizations missions last 10–15 years. Iraq, Afghanistan, and any other country we take on (Iran) are no different. Blame the Powel Doctrine, for wanting a “drive by shooting”, instead of long-term recovery effort.
This reality needs to be planned and financed prior to interventions. If we do not plan for that contingency, then don
Gee Whiz! One more example of the Dubya-Rummy incompetence. What else is new? Think they can handle anything else — Iran, North Korea, Christian-Islamic war (see Pope’s historic commentary and hysterical response)? Some of the above, all of the above.
The US went into Iraq with the Army we had at the time, not the Army of 1991, which was considerably larger but less ‘shock and awe’ inspiring. The JCS have decided, wisely, to not deploy the brigades with their heavy equipment, each brigade deploys and uses the Abrams, Bradleys, HETTs that are in theater. So if the Army is cash poor, should they emphasise maintaining the stateside equipment as highly as they would like? I don’t think so, I think they are concentrating their money on the equipment their soldiers will be fighting with, I would like our reserve to be combat ready as well, but that isn’t the real world. Bush refused to ask us to sacrifice to win this war on terror and one consequence of that is that we are fighting on the cheap.
The Army is simply too small to do much else, which accounts for Rumsfeld’s much maligned comment, “you fight with the Army you have”.
When you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in coming, the men’s weapons will grow dull and their ardor will be dampened. If you lay siege to a town, you will exhaust your strength, and if the campaign is protracted, there sources of the state will not be equal to the strain. Never forget: When your weapons are dulled, your ardor dampened, your strength exhausted, and your treasure spent, other chieftains will spring up to take advantage of your extremity. Then no man, however wise, will be able to avert the consequences that must ensue.
Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has never been seen associated with long delays. In all history, there is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare. Only one who knows the disastrous effects of a long war can realize the supreme. importance of rapidity in bringing it to a close. It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the evils of war who can thoroughly understand the profitable way of carrying it on.
The skillful general does not raise a second levy, neither are his supply wagons loaded more than twice. Once war is declared, he will not waste precious time in waiting for reinforcements, nor will he turn his army back for fresh supplies, but crosses the enemy’s frontier without delay. The value of time-that is, being a little ahead of your opponent-has counted for more than either numerical superiority or the nicest calculations with regard to commissariat.
In war, then, let your great object be victory, not lengthy campaigns. Thus it may be known that the leader of armies is the arbiter of the people’s fate. the man on whom it depends whether the nation shal~ be in peace or in peril.
Sun Tzu wrote these words before christ, before the tribes of the hebrews, at the time when civilization existed in only a few pockets of the planet, yet his words are still relavent. Will rumsfield’s reforms be remembered a thousand, two thousand or three thousand years hence? i highly doubt it.
The longer a force trained for fast motorized warfare is used to garrison iraq the more it will unravel as the disconnect betweeen doctrine and reality shake the faith of the rank and file. If the military transforms into an occupation force it will find that the traits to be successful as a “police force” will prove detrimental when engaged with revolutionary guard battle groups as the israelis have discovered in s.leb. The military is on the horns of a dilemma and the president and his staff are asleep at the wheel daydreaming about the new middle-east and containing china.
I like the picture to guys I think I have even seen it on Aljizz. Great work everyone has to do thier part ya know greater good real evil and all that.
Good Morning Folks,
Perhaps we are at the junction where war stops and politics begain. The efforts of the U.S. in Iraq and now Afghanistan are at best at a quagmire but more likely in reverse. The report from marine Col. Peter Devlin that was all over the web last week and badly quoted by the Washington Post and The New York Time this week in a nut shell sums up all of Iraq.
More troops were needed back in 2003 but now I think any increase would be a waste of resources. With out any quantinable political goals in Iraq the U.S. has no business in Iraq.
All the point brought up by “Robot Economist” are correct, out ground forces are dieing both figuratively and literlly because of Iraq. Maybe the defination of winning in termsof the 19th.and 20th. Century no longer apply.
There are going to be other “Wars” in this struggle with Terrorists is waisting respurces in Iraq in the best interest of the future.
Politically Saddam didn’t go away. The judge yesterday declaired him NOT TO BR A DICTATOR maybe that an opening Washington should use to reduce our burden we call Iraq.
Saddam is a politician not a religious zellot and cutting a deal with him is a real possibility. With in the proper constraints like U.S. forces based in Iraq and an Iraqi military structured for domestic purposes not agression agaist it’s neighbors maybe he is the answer to the question the Bush Administration is to afraid to ask.
ALLONS,
Byron Skinner
I’d like to know how many of those units posted a low level of readiness because they were in the process of reorganizing. That’s an entirely different matter from being worn out. And it’s not true that units uniformly take 2–3 years to reorganize; the plans for shifting units and people around are complex, but some units (like, say, the three existing maneuver brigades of the 82nd Airborne) will essentially just be conducting an admin reorganization, and shedding a battalion.
Falling in on unfamiliar equipment isn’t exactly a new phenomenon for the Army. Deploying brigades at the National Training Center used to fall in on complete unit sets when they deployed, to save on the rail load and transportation requirement; at the end of each deployment they turned the stuff back in again. The claim that it’s hard to fall in on the equipment you’re trained on seems pretty thin to me.
I was always skeptical of whether or not a 500,000 man Army was big enough to handle the old 2 MTWs planning model. What if we didn’t win that first war in 30–60 days and the other conflict flaired up?
After 9/11, I fully expected to see Rumsfeld nudge U.S. troop levels up by at least 100,000 if not 200,000. The problem is that doing so would be incredibly expensive. If military recruiters are dipping into Category 4 to fill the enlisted ranks. Adding more roles would only make a bad situation worse.
The only other way to draw up more warm bodies would be to bring back the dreaded “d-word.” I honestly don’t think even a Republican-dominated federal government could whether that decision. The political class is so devoid of former uniforms that I doubt either party could stomach a draft (or weather the 2008 election).
All the military logisticians who read this will probably agree with me when I say reset is more than just an administrative affair. You honestly can’t push down too hard on the reset timeline without damaging unit cohesion and equipment turnaround.
The two theater war that the Pentagon pushed during the 1990’s was always BS. It was totally not plausible, in the threat nor our ability to respond. They needed a justification for Congress’ and the Pentagon’s expensive weapons systems.
The military did a lot a COTW during the 90’s though, we all know about them. Apparently no one ever listened to any after action reports, because if they did, they would have shifted resources, training and focus away from the conventional hi-tech nation-state war, that they dream of, to what we actually required then, and now.
Taking down Governments is easy, quick and requires few combat troops. Keeping the
“The US went into Iraq with the Army we had“
There is a vast difference between a conscripted (citizen’s) army and a volunteer army, which in principle agrees with the mission. Vietnam taught that imperial wars of aggression cannot be fought with a conscripted army (draft dodgers, conscientious objectors, fragging officers, etc.).
“Prevailing wage rates are just too high in the private sector for the uniformed services to compete.“
Which is why the volunteer army is primarily composed of the lower socio-economic strata, as they have little or no other opportunity. This level of recruits results in lower performance.
“Then no man, however wise, will be able to avert the consequences that must ensue.“
The US administration has violated every rule Sun Tzu wrote as well as the entire Powell Doctrine, learned at such bitter cost in Vietnam.
“With out any quantinable political goals in Iraq the U.S. has no business in Iraq.“
Ah, but with very definite strategic and economic goals, this administration will not revise what is essentially a very successful economic policy despite strategic and humanitarian failures, loss of life, loss of stature, etc. If you disagree with the economic success of this action, I suggest you look at the stock performance of various related industries and investment firms such as the Carlyle Group. (http://www.hereinreality.com/carlyle.html)
The size of the military is relevent only to wars of conquest the US initiates (and we clearly initiated this one). The US has enemies (comprised exclusively of those who have been trodden upon by empire), but none have even the slightest chance of raising a conventional military challenge (this may change as forces and capabilities are depleted and opponents trained in anti-US combat.
Reset is complicated, but the degree of change varies from unit to unit. For some organizations, there’s a lot of equipment swapping, fielding, and serious change; for others — the three brigades I mentioned in the 82nd — it’s essentially just institutionalizing their usual organization for deployment. It’s hard to generalize without a fairly detailed level of knowledge. There’s risk associated with the force transformation, but the maneuver brigades in the ac will be largely transformed by 2010 — but if it didn’t happen quickly, what are the odds that it would ever happen at all? Stretch it out to fifteen or twenty years, and you leave a lot of wiggle room to every parochial service interest to subvert, alter, or slow the process.
It’s great to talk about increasing active duty endstrength, but really — where are the troops going to come from? If we can just barely fill our quotas for the existing force, how on earth would we fill for a force that’s 100,000 stronger? And once we get them, remember that we commit to a full career life cycle plus lifespan retirement costs for that force. DoD’s budget looks like General Motors’ already — add another 100k to that, and guess what you get — both now and twenty years down the road?
Did any 1 consider that the actions taken of patrolling iraq and setting up strips and bases while over there give us in a great location if our troops had to go bust iran down if they were to get out of hand? Seeing how some on here decided 2 use great quotes to get their opinions across 2 the readers, has ne 1 ever heard of “keep ur friends close, and ur enemies even closer?” holding iraq keeps iran so close that they would fear doing ne thing 2 drastic that would result in an american retaliation
The friend took me to the game, but she own was leaving the game. A person to game is boring, every day, I only know to upgrade and earn ro zeny. I can not sad dot this mess of feelings and moving. Once, the two boys for me quarreled utterly, until I leaved and tool sad. Later, I found a boy to married, I think perhaps all this to change, and I pray to become a reality, a few days after he disappeared. A person was playing a marriage number, what would it have taken place.
Three years ago, after friends introduced, I played the Rappelz game. At that time, I dazed and confused, I like to go my own way, I have a lot of rappelz rupees, but I became the most evil villains in the game. Until I encountered her, I found the meaning of survival.
My negative, as my boss
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