Jimmy Wu is an MIT grad in mechanical engineering, and a missile defense systems engineer at Boeing — and a 1st Lieutenant in the Alabama National Guard, currently deployed in Iraq.
Back in the day, armored personnel carriers had a carefully-defined mission: As the battalion task force would roll forward, the APCs and other mechanized infantry would dismount and clear out an enemy position, allowing the tanks to exploit the breakthrough. To handle the job, APCs needed enough armor to survive that approach march — and a whole lot of guns, to survive that dismounted attack. By the end of the Cold War, APCs had bulked up so big that they had evolved into Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicles (AIFVs) like the Bradley: carrying almost an entire squad, with enough weapons to take on tanks, and the armor to back it up.
But Iraq has shown that all that muscle doesn’t necessarily work on the modern, non-linear battlefield. While everyone appreciates the Bradley’s armor and its the chaingun in the firefight, the thing is expensive to operate. (Witness the broken Bradleys in the depots that the Army does not have the money to fix.) Moreover, the Bradley usually are not carrying its full complement of dismounts these days; infantrymen are driving the Humvees to add more guns on the convoys, instead. When the APC is no longer carrying its infantry, it loses its raison d’etre. We might as well get a cavalry vehicle that can do the job better.
In fact, as OIF shows, on the modern non-linear battlefield, the mech infantry does not work as mech infantry anymore. The legs are more akin to the light cavalry of old, patrolling the lines of communication, establishing presence, and looking for the enemy. In this context, the infantry does not operate in the battalion attack, it works in a section/squad attack perspective. The shift in the mech infantry paradigm requires a new APC: One that works well as a light cavalry vehicle and can carry a good load of infantry.
The American experience with Humvees and other armored vehicles are indicative: When they roll out the gate, the infantry squad normally splits itself into two vehicle or more. This is because 1) more vehicles means more gunners on top to fight the crucial first few minutes of an ambush, 2) an IED or RPG would not take out the whole squad, and 3) the squad will have space for passengers or survivors. A rough civilian analogy would be a police squad car: A squad car normally does not have officers in the back seat.
What we have, in fact, is a small APC/liason vehicle, in the vein of the Italian 4x4 Puma or the American ASV. Such a small APC seats about 5 soldiers, including the gunner. The small APC allows the squad to spread itself out on the distributed battlefield. The small APC allows the mech squad to fire and maneuver on the march, restoring the offensive capability to the mech squad. The small APC, by virtue of its size, automatically limits its weapon load to infantry support weapons (50 cal, rockets) instead of engaging in the AIFV arms race. As fire control/weapon system is a major component of the vehicle cost, the less sophisticated small APC acts as a natural limit against the cost growth of a program like Future Combat Systems.
To outfit an infantry squad with small APCs may be slightly more expensive than with a single AIFV. However, if you add in the up-armored Humvees with electronic countermeasures to the AIFV squad, the cost projection would be a wash. And we are not arguing against a full-sized APC such as the M-113 Gavin. The Gavin, or a Stryker, can be useful when we need to bring more dismounts. The modern mechanized company team should have a mix of small APCs, full-sized APCs, and tanks to carry out its new cavalry missions on the non-linear battlefield. And as we start looking for Humvee replacements, let’s keep in mind a small APC, instead of a better jeep.
– Jimmy Wu
If you read the fine print of FCS’s requirements for the next-generation of APCs, you will see the Army plans to go back to the old heavy, tracked formula.
My impression of the Army force planners I interact with is that they hope operations in Iraq and Afghanistan will discourage similar wars in the future. The uniforms, in particular, don’t want adopt new vehicles based on their experience in Iraq because it would encourage the government to deploy them to similar missions in the future.
They take the old Sam Huntington/Les Aspin approach to force planning. Build the force to fight the Iraqi and North Korean army and just hope that is enough to handle any peacekeeping/phase IV requirements.
Sounds like what the author is recommending is a lot like a Nyala, Bushmaster or a similar vehicle: Less than a Stryker, but more than a Humvee, and with enough aremor to take an IED or RPG without much damage to the occupants. The Canadians and Aussies are using these to good effect in leading convoys in their areas of operations.
I’m fairly anti M113. I drove those off and on in the Army in the 90s (the M113A2 variant) and it was a gigantic POS. Under Powered, under armored, and unreliable. We shot up an old one out at NTC as it was getting retired and 7.62 rounds out of an M60 at 100 meters were punching though the sides at about 50% success.
The Bradley is JUST FINE with the different missions its asked to perform. If the Army needs to find another vehicle, then the Army can bolt on some armor onto the M113A3. The A3 model of the 113 series was a major improvement over the older Vietnam era A2 model. I know first hand since I used to TC both the A2 and A3 113 variants.
As for the Army not having enough money to fix broken Bradleys in the Depots, the Army needs to find the monies and take them out of the Stryker program. The Stryker is like a huge BTR 80 with a buttload of electronics and only a damn .50 cal MG to protect it.
The Bradley is just fine for the mission over in Iraq and the Insurgents hate the sight of a Bradley when it starts to kick that Insurgent arse.
The small APC can satisfy both high intensity and low intensity conflict requirements.
In high intensity operations, the current Transformation Thought™ is to deploy a lot of small teams on the battlefield, have them find the targets, and then call in artillery or air to blow them up. That was basically the approach the Marine Warfighting Labs were experimenting with during the late 90s. With such an approach, you need a lot of small APCs to support these small teams. A Bradley would be too big.
In low intensity operations, as I described, you again need a lot of small teams in small APCs.
With the current modular design toward armor, we just need to design the small APC to “up-armor” during high intensity operations. We can also up-gun the small APC with, say, the McDonnel Douglas ASP 30 mm chaingun, which is basically a 50 cal on steroids, if necessary.
The brass may not like the small APC approach because it means a lot more pieces on the battlefield, making it more of a confusion and more prone to traffic jams.
In fact, the current Mech Inf Platoon already splits up the infantry squad into 2 6-men teams, each in its own Bradley, so the dismounts are already familiar with the coordination piece within squad.
Consider this, Our next SET of conflicts could run to Viet type jungles, Iraq deserts, Lebanon urban streets, so do we need 1 universal set of wheels, or a multiple arsenal of combat vehicles. My thought, from a maintenance and logistics viewpoint, is 2 vehicles. A very fast, light gunned 3 man vehicle, and a STRYKER type vehicle, able to move with MBT and associated armored vehicles. The idea of logistics maintenance is to have few types and lots of replacement resources. end
Although it may have been by accident, BT characterized a key internal debate that occurred during the drafting of the 2005 QDR.
Army brass in Army Forces Command is all about picking up a man-intensive core competency like phase IV operations. The uniforms over at Army Materiel Command want to go back to planning for two geographically disconnected, but simultaneous Persian Gulf Wars. Army gearheads love that kind of planning because it is rich in technology and involves a wide variety of weapons platforms.
Ultimately, the two groups agreed to split the difference. The Army now is moving toward a force structure that can fight one insurgency and one Persian Gulf-style war. It is very expensive to maintain two different sets of land vehicles and equipment, so the Army is again trying to split the difference by armoring up light, mobile vehicles and toning down some of their plans for heavy transport vehicles.
The problem is that this attempt to find a vehicluar middle ground is that it will probably generate things that are a jack of all trades, but a master of none.
There must be a mix of combat vehicles in our mechanized infantry force. Battalion-sized task forces should be built around each type of Vehicle; with Bradleys accounting for the most, and the rest split between Strykers and M113A3s.
The Bradley is our best option for an Infantry Fighting vehicle for intense combat operations. The Stryker is the best we have for Urban fighting and for UN/NATO-sponsored “Peacekeeping” operations. The M113A3 is more easily air-transportable than the others. It is the only one can be air-dropped as part of an airborne operation; and is the only one that can “swim” rivers and lakes. (I was in one of the ‘A2’ variants that swam from the South Korean mainland to a contested Island in the Yellow Sea back in 1974.)
I honestly don’t see the imperative for having a ‘Cavalry’ unit at all. I believe that the author is promoting it as a way of stretching the capability of an under-manned Army to maintain a ‘presence’ over a wider area.
At 2 infantry per vehicle, there’s no way that these troops can be deployed in dismounted combat. Take one casualty and whatever their mission was; it would have to be aborted.
If you take the infantry out of the ‘Cavalry’, you have an armored scout or escort vehicle, capable of ‘drawing fire’ or providing rear area or convoy security. We don’t need a vehicle/unit specifically intended to draw fire; and the armored Humvee can pull security detail just as well.
Good Afternoon Folks,
As someone who has been in combat in an APC, (the M-113 ACAV, 11ACR Vietnam) I can see the point the Lt. made. The concept of an “Infantry Battlefield Taxi” is one of those Cold War ideas that just won’t go away.
The day of the dismount in combat is going away very quickly and none to soon. The fighting style of the Calvary, mounted is the most productive on the insurgent battlefield. With current sensors and overheaad recon. the need for a manned CFV is no longer necessary.
With a reduced military risking Infantry in an APC in an enviroment that included IED’s and modern RPG’sis just is not in the cards. Urban combat is down, dirty and dangerious and is the perfect place for unmanned platforms. Better to call in the M-88 recovery vehicle then an “Dust Off” anytime.
ALLONS,
Byron Skinner
While Im aware of the many attributes of the Stryker in fighting insurgencies.Silent,Quick and Deadly. The achilles heel is that wheeled vehicles will not go where or over what tracked vehicles can, without having to be towed or change flat tires.As a former Cavalry Scout M113/M3 I can attest to the fact that every mission is dictated by METT-T. Mission,Enemy,Terrain,Troops and Time.Scouts must traverse any terrain to perform reconnaisance, and can not always stay on hard packed dirt or dry roads.BLACKHORSE!
RE: The primary purpose of an Army — to be ready to fight effectively at all times — seemed to have been forgotten.…
The leadership I found in many instances was sadly lacking and I said so out loud. The unwillingness of the Army to forgo certain creature comforts, its timidity about getting off the scanty roads, its reluctance to move without radio and telephone contact, General Matthew B. Ridgway, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, U.N. Forces
Commander during Korea War, Airborne Commander in WWII
ARE YOU KIDDING ME !!!!!!
Where in the name of .., your biggest gun IS your radio, call for back up , med-evact and more
Two areas to look at here: The old British Army concepts of employing “armoured cars” for patrol and escort work of all kinds, and the German Army’s early post-war half-section APCs.
Given that most modern “armoured cars” have become as complex and costly as tanks, there seems to be a place for a vehicle like the South African Mamba/RG-32M,RG-31 and similar vehicles from Australia and in the US to operate as both an armoured car (armed with MGs and AGLs) and a half-section APC. The good visibility from inside will also be useful.
That said, 8x8 or 6x6 layouts would be useful to enable a vehicle to pull back or be pulled back after a mine detonation. A tracked vehicle that hits a mine in a narrow urban street — or a mountain road — is not only a dead duck, it also blocks the road.
What price a small, 6x6 Mamba type vehicle?
I’m going to get all sci-fi-ish when I say “powered body armor.” All our soldiers would be walking tanks! Too bad the technology isn’t there yet.
I like Lt Wu’s thoughts, however our military brass never quite seem to get a handle on what’s needed for a certain locale, or intensity level fight. Perhaps, we just need more variety in our force mix.
There is a truism, that Armies march on roads and fight in fields. Wheeled vehicles should not be your fighting vehicles. There is no way these will perform as well in mud or snow or cross country as a tracked vehicle.
With the National Training Center, MOUT training,simulators,and super computers, how is it that we are behind on the learning curve all the time. Our potential enemies force capabilities and intentions predictions are horrid. The Viet Cong schooled us on jungle warfare, and now we’re scrambling some 4 years on
on how to handle terrorists and IED’s in an Urban fight.
We have lost the initiative in Iraq because of short sightedness and intransigence on the part of our military leadership.
as a Cav. scout i found the Humvee to be just right. you could mount a TOW system on 1, a .50 on another. you could mix it up. it had the speed to get out of danger too. it is not a good choice for urban warfare. we are fighting a guerilla war, in the midst of a civil war. I think having a Bradley there when the shooting starts is a real advantage. it can be used for recon, but you cannot remain stealthy with 2 or 3 in addition to ur Humvees. i heard nothing but good things about Stryker. when they deploy the MGS, and the one with the mini-gun, it should give the dismounts a good edge. i read the Army is buying a number of Cadillac-Gage APC’s. a little late, but good for the urban environment. good for scouting too. its the APC the Saudi’s used in masse during ’91. dual .50’s, some had TOW. put a mini on 1 of them, and watch the fireworks.
Tankguy, I’ve been trying to find info on this nomorenarcissism on youtube — thats why I’m here. I’ve already reported him for raping some videos that I know for fact aren’t his. If you have any information from the net on this guy, contact me on youtube — username: mattphillips83
Thanks,
CPL/USMC
Just a point, the M-113 is not know as the “Gavin” by anyone but model builders and those unaware of its real designation. If you are in the military, its just called a “113”. Calling it anything else just confuses people.
Its a decent platform, but not a superweapon. Does the Brad suck? Sure, in many ways. Its huge, expensive, smoky, loud, has too small a troop compartment, and lacks a roof hatch that allows the infantrymen to fight mounted. Is it better than the 113 for most types of close combat operations? Yep. Its firepower, armor, and mobility make it pretty useful.
Well Mike (I won’t call you 1LT, an officer and gentleman doesn’t behave like you), your hatred for the Marines is almost legendary. Makes me wonder why you hate them so much. A little branch rivalry is fine, but such outright hatred displayed by an officer. No, that’s extremely bad behavior.
Now, bringing in this argument about Arnhem… Oh dear. You do realize that the British at Arnhem faced… an SS tank division? That meant: heavy tanks incoming, together with highly motivated and well trained/equipped infantry. Surely you believe that Tetrachs/Locusts light tanks perform well against… Tigers or Panthers, or even StuGs or Pzkw 3s…
The M113 is outdated, face it. I’d rather ride on an Austrian Pandur than on an M113 on today’s battlefield. The M113 is from when? The 1960s? Oh dear sweet penguins! Why not ride a Tiger into a modern battle?
Or maybe, we should scrap our Type 89s and replace them with M113s? Sorry, that won’t happen. We like to use decent, up-to-date equipment. That said, we use LAVs as well. The Komatsu LAV is very well liked by the 1st airborne brigade and it performed as expected at Camp Samawa.
To Miss Murphy… may I suggest the latest Batmobile? The one from Batman Begins, yes. Flying cars only exist in movies, Ms Murphy. If you try to jump with a regular vehicle like you see it in movies, you can usually scrap it afterwards. That goes for tanks as well. Not to mention… how are you going to reach the necessary speed for such a jump with a vehicle of the mass of a tank? It’s nice that a “mini M113” (stop calling it Gavin, that’s not it’s designation) can roll out of a CH-47, but… the CH-47 is taller than a LAV and thus an even easier target. It’s huge, loud and can be seen easily. The enemy will know you’re unloading something and prepare ambush points. One RPG into the tracks and your “great” M113 is stuck. What then? Climb out and push? With a LAV I can, at least flee faster than with an M113. And well, I take it you’ve never driven a decent car cross country… It’s very well possible. And a tank can fail due to mechanical problems just as easily as a regular car.
Oh and, before I forget it, the M113 has never been named “Gavin”. I don’t know where you get that info from, because… it’s simply made up.
And, finally, the only person with a real technohubris here is you Mike. Tankers know about their role in combat, at least professional ones do (may I suggest working with those for once?). Tankers know their part, they work with the flyboys and the infantry, because that’s the only way it works. That said, you’re the one who wants to airdrop M113s and have the airborne will it all by itself (which is NOT possible anyway). Reality chech for Mike please. Thank you.
More on Armored Vehicle Design:
http://www.geocities.com/armorhistory
http://www.geocities.com/armorhistory/infantrytanks.htm
More on LTG Gavin’s Creation of the M113
http://www.geocities.com/gavinpetition
More on Armored Vehicle Design:
http://www.geocities.com/armorhistory
http://www.geocities.com/armorhistory/infantrytanks.htm
More on LTG Gavin’s Creation of the M113
http://www.geocities.com/gavinpetition
Here’s some VIDEOS to illustrate why TRACKS are far superior to wheeled trucks and why LIGHT M113 Gavin tracks are what’s needed for a CLOSED TERRAIN 3D CAVALRY:
http://www.youtube.com/view_play_list?p=ECC22F67FB62B985
Here’s some VIDEOS to illustrate why TRACKS are far superior to wheeled trucks and why LIGHT M113 Gavin tracks are what’s needed for a CLOSED TERRAIN 3D CAVALRY:
http://www.youtube.com/view_play_list?p=ECC22F67FB62B985
Sparks,
You must live a very sad life. Never in my 58 years on this planet have i ever seen someone with such an unhealthy obsession like you have.
I would like to point out that you represent yourself to be a commisioned officer in the US Army Reserve. You refuse to provide proof of this. One can assume that you at least profess to know what the term officer and gentleman means…from your actions you are neither. You have done the following.
1. You have disparaged and cursed fellow officers and enlisted personnel from all branches.
2. You have disparaged and cursed Combat Veterans that have served in past and current conflicts.
3. You have launched a one man campaign against the USMC and you daily spread lies and vitriol about them. Your videos on Youtube are a prime example of this.
4. Anyone who does not agree with you on your ludicrous naming of the M-113 Armored Personnel Carrier is cursed and mail spammed. Believe me you are the ONLY person who does this… (except perhaps your various other personalities on the internet…you know what i am talking about. I dont want to embarass you)
This is just a small sample of your gross misconduct as a supposedly commisioned officer in the US Army Reserve.
Please get help.
Tankguy is a envious loser.
When confronted with FACTS he runs back to what he thinks the mommy/daddy Army want him to do, he does not examine anything on its own merits. He’s a Tory fascist; if he were around back in 1776 he’d not have been a patriot fighting for INDEPENDENCE because he’s a lemming who longs for DEPENDENCE.
Oh, yeah one more thing.
The M113A3 Super Gavin that is up-armored has a PERFECT protection record in Iraq. Don’t believe crap feed into the open by the corrupt Army brass bent on lying about Stryker trucks to further their racket. There is an actual factual database that’s not open to the public. The Stryker truck has a horrific record of losses. Demand Congress hold hearings which can be behind closed doors–what the Army Stryker-o-philes FEAR MOST—that despite all the $$BILLIONS wasted on 309 Stryker trucks in Iraq, 1, 775 (good number, huh?) of mostly VANILLA M113A3 Gavins have done a far better job of protecting our men and the Super Gavins have done a flawless job–better than even v-hulled MRAPs.…which if Strykers were so greaaatttt why are we buying MRAPs?
Strykers are road-bound, poorly armored crap obviously, that’s why and buying new MRAP trucks saves face over up-armoring, v-shaping M113 Gavins which is actually the BEST choice.
I found Lieutenant Wu’s editorial interesting, and given his experience with the Alabama Guard in Iraq, I must consider his perspective with some seriousness. I do think that some of what he wants has arrived in vehicles like the RG-31 and the Cougar, and that more may yet be available in the forthcoming (and somewhat smaller) JLTV.
It’s also nice to see that Mike Sparks is still out there having fun. I do wish that he’d finally just tell us with which unit he serves.
More to the point, I’d definitely like to know about this study that Army Times cited regarding combat casualties. I studied this issue in 2006, and briefed OSD/PA&E on my findings, but my dataset suffered from suppositions introduced by my interpretations of the Army’s sometimes laconic fatality reports. Still, if anyone is interested, it’s available on my website: http://www.jameshasik.com.
Oh, one more thing. Anyone wondering whether Mike Sparks has completely lost it should check out what his 2nd Tactical Studies Group does:
http://www.geocities.com/roswell.geo/
Whoa.
Mike,
I too have experience on CH-47s, but mine is vastly different from yours. While you like play dress up and pretend way in the hulk parked outside the business park, I actually flew into Baghdad in one. I know this is so far removed from your experiences that it defies your ability to grasp. I base my facts on cold, hard observations made on the ground in Iraq. Not things that I pontificate upon sitting in a recliner in my living room. So to refute your patriot vs. dependent insult, I would recommend that you sir, pick up a gun and get in the fight. Until you do, your opinions and views mean absolutely zero to me. Less than zero, they don’t even register. I think the majority of people exposed to your school of thought have been able to identify that your claims and stories are pure fiction. When you have ground combat experience in Iraq, then you are qualified to present facts regarding what is happening on the ground.
You can continue to hurl insults and pound your chest and pretend that anyone care about what you think. I most cetainly don’t. I am more concerned with the 25 target to my front that what an armchair soldier has to say.
Now for FACTS:
1. Number of M-113s I have seen on patrol since arriving in the OE: Zero
2. Number of Strykers I have seen in high conflict areas: loads, I know you won’t stoop to claiming that the Sadr City area is not a hot area at the mintute, right?
Your claims of M113 superiorty continue to be your downfall, Mike. Have you patrolled though the Nuhallas of urbarn Baghdad? Do you know what the terrain is like? Do you know the composition of the road networks? Do you understand the latest TTPs of the enemy? I would venture to say the answer to all of the above questions is no. I am not lying, I am stating fact.
Again, either pick up a rifle and get in the fight, or sit on the sideline and stay the hell out of the way. Your choice.
Mike,
I reread some of your vitriol below and have a question. What are the lies that you claim I am posting?
You, yourself stated on your YouTube site that you have been out of the Reserve since the early 1990s. So, how is that currently serving?
Second, you claim to be an Infantry officer in the Army Reserve. There are VERY few infantry units in the Reserve, and they are not where you are located, so how is this possible?
Third, as asked by many here, and every other site that you have contaminated with your presence, what is your combat tour record? Which unit(s) have you deployed with? Which theaters? Iraq, Afghanistan?
Just a simple question that strikes to the heart of your accusations of lying. Mr. Sparks, the simple fact of the matter is that once again, you have painted yourself into a corner. You are once again confronted by fact, and you once again resort to name calling and insults like a petulant child. I am in Iraq, right now. There are no M-113s routinely patrolling Baghdad. There are Strykers out there though. If you underdstood the situation on the ground in Iraq, and stopped trying to interpret every shred of information through your “I hate Stryker” lenses, you would see what is happening here.
So, I am once again, standing by waiting for you to back up your claims of combat experience, your explanation of your inside knowledge of what’s happening on the ground in Iraq and how in the world you are an infantry officer in the USAR.
It is not me that is lying. I am on the ground in Iraq, you are in your living in Georgia or North Carolina. Here is a suggestion to get you involved in the fight. Since most of the boys live out on Combat Outposts now, a care package for Soldiers could get you involved in the effort. Guys like things like baby wipes, books, DVDs, magazines, tobacco products, beef jerkey, foot powder and non-melting snacks.
I think the time is overdue for you to come clean on your claims of experience Mr. Sparks. Neither I, nor anyone else on this forum cares how many books you have written, or how many websites you run. What have you done to serve your country and honor your fellow Soldiers? What have you done to gain inside knowledge of the fight on the ground in Iraq? Unless you can answer those simple question, I fear it is your credibilt that is suspect, not mine.
Reply to this post for an “Any Soldier” address for the two main Forward Operating Bases that my unit mail comes through and I will provide it.
Mike,
You haven’t answered anything. There are M113s in Iraq. They do not patrol. They may have been used in the initial invasion, but they are not being used on a large scale in the counter-insurgency fight.
I am in Iraq, right now. On the ground in East Baghdad. I have not seen one M113 outside the wire since my arrival. That is a fact. That points to the heart of your massaged data. One thing that you conveniently leave out whenever you post your numbers. Mike, M113 aren’t patrolling, so of course they aren’t getting hit. That would be like me saying that the John Deere Gator has the best track record in Iraq. Sure they are here, they are used by contractors as utility vehicles on FOBs, but they don’t patrol. Your argument is completly asinine and very telling of your complete and utter ignorance of the situation on the ground in Iraq.
You have, as always, ducked the question of your record of combat service, Mike. Very telling as well. You pop in, sling an insult similar to a school aged child and –poof– you are gone. Nothing of substance. Just like most of your published works. Nothing of substance there either.
Enjoy sitting on the side lines while those braver and more willing than yourself carry out the mission that you too have sworn to do.
Again, until you have served here, patrolled the streets of Iraq and seen what’s going on, you can not possibly offer anything of substance. It is simply a case of put up or shut up. I think you know which way I am leaning on that equation.
Let me know when you become a Soldier that shoulders some of the burden and I may entertain future exposure to your ranting and incomprehensible conclusions. Until then Mike, continue to be a good little cheerleader, just try to remember which team you are on. You seem to have a tendency to root for the other side quite a bit.
Sparks you are one sick puppy.