http://defensetech.org/2006/10/17/real-korea-worry-chem-bio/ The Future of the Military, Law Enforcement and National Security Fri, 25 May 2012 09:11:53 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.3.1 http://defensetech.org/2006/10/17/real-korea-worry-chem-bio/#comment-149922 Pantera Tue, 25 Sep 2007 14:18:41 +0000 http://deftech.usmilblog.com/?p=2160#comment-149922 A big problem with DPRK chem wepaons is that it serves as a huge detterant against military action. If we were to invade North Korea, within hours they would have long range artillery pounding Seoul with Chem/bio weapons. It would be kinda like if Iraq was right next to Israel in the First Gulf War. A big problem with DPRK chem wepaons is that it serves as a huge detterant against military action. If we were to invade North Korea, within hours they would have long range artillery pounding Seoul with Chem/bio weapons.
It would be kinda like if Iraq was right next to Israel in the First Gulf War.

]]> http://defensetech.org/2006/10/17/real-korea-worry-chem-bio/#comment-149920 Marc Thu, 19 Oct 2006 14:16:27 +0000 http://deftech.usmilblog.com/?p=2160#comment-149920 But are these weapons really any worse than conventional explosives? I thought the lessons of WWI, Iran-Iraq, and Aum Shinrikio were that plain old bombs and bullets were far more effective and reliable. Of course, chemical weapons have a certain terror cachet that more conventional weapons don't, but do they really have the potential to kill or injure more than the old fashioned stuff? If so, they don't seem to have ever achieved this potential yet. The gas attack in the Tokyo subway did a lot less damage than the bomb attacks in London and Madrid. But are these weapons really any worse than conventional explosives? I thought the lessons of WWI, Iran-Iraq, and Aum Shinrikio were that plain old bombs and bullets were far more effective and reliable. Of course, chemical weapons have a certain terror cachet that more conventional weapons don’t, but do they really have the potential to kill or injure more than the old fashioned stuff? If so, they don’t seem to have ever achieved this potential yet. The gas attack in the Tokyo subway did a lot less damage than the bomb attacks in London and Madrid.

]]> http://defensetech.org/2006/10/17/real-korea-worry-chem-bio/#comment-149919 Dan Wed, 18 Oct 2006 03:03:59 +0000 http://deftech.usmilblog.com/?p=2160#comment-149919 I wonder if this is why SK and China are so reluctant to push NK harder? This never appears in the stories I read. Conventional arty raining on Seoul, refugees into China. Always that, but never B/C warfare. Anyone seen this aspect in mainstream thinking in SK or China? I wonder if this is why SK and China are so reluctant to push NK harder? This never appears in the stories I read. Conventional arty raining on Seoul, refugees into China. Always that, but never B/C warfare. Anyone seen this aspect in mainstream thinking in SK or China?

]]> http://defensetech.org/2006/10/17/real-korea-worry-chem-bio/#comment-149918 Robot Economist Wed, 18 Oct 2006 01:55:03 +0000 http://deftech.usmilblog.com/?p=2160#comment-149918 Normally, I would argue that threat of chemical and biological weapons outside of the terrorism context is relatively low because: 1) The mass to destruction ratio of nuclear weapons is geometricaly larger than CB agents. 2) The technical requirements for delivering enough chemical or biological agents to match the body count caused by a small nuclear weapons are prohibitively high for most countries. The tacit rule of thumb here is that if you are going to cross the line, you should do the most damage possible when you cross it. Chemical warheads on a few hundred ballistic missiles don't have nearly the same punch as a nuclear weapons does. The DPRK is the one very dangerous exception to this case. It has approximately around 200 metric tonnes of nerve, blister and blood agents and thousands of artillery pieces in range of Seoul to deliver them. That is the kind of existential CB threat to worry about. Normally, I would argue that threat of chemical and biological weapons outside of the terrorism context is relatively low because:
1) The mass to destruction ratio of nuclear weapons is geometricaly larger than CB agents.
2) The technical requirements for delivering enough chemical or biological agents to match the body count caused by a small nuclear weapons are prohibitively high for most countries.
The tacit rule of thumb here is that if you are going to cross the line, you should do the most damage possible when you cross it. Chemical warheads on a few hundred ballistic missiles don’t have nearly the same punch as a nuclear weapons does.
The DPRK is the one very dangerous exception to this case. It has approximately around 200 metric tonnes of nerve, blister and blood agents and thousands of artillery pieces in range of Seoul to deliver them. That is the kind of existential CB threat to worry about.

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