Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s resignation is, of course, all about Iraq. But the implications of Rumsfeld’s departure go way, way beyond the conduct of today’s war. The shape of America’s military for decades to come is at stake.
Over his six year tenure at the Defense Department, Rumsfeld came to personify a number of technology-heavy efforts to remake the armed services. Rumsfeld’s presumptive successor, Robert Gates, is going to have to make big decisions about what happens to those projects, soon after he settles into his office in the Pentagon’s E-Ring.
For instance, Rumsfeld became a champion of the idea that the American military had to change itself — from an array of heavy, plodding forces to a reconfigurable collection of lighter, quicker, better-networked units. Every vehicle, every commander, every drone, and every grunt would eventually be connected to a wireless Internet for combat, under the doctrine, known alternatively as “revolution in military affairs” or “force transformation.” By sharing so much information, U.S. forces would be able to make decisions lightning-fast, outmaneuvering and outwitting any foe. Missions that used to take countless thousands of soldiers could be accomplished with a few, wired-up troops, the theory went.
Faith in “transformation” is one of the big reasons why Rumsfeld overruled his generals, and cut the invasion force for Iraq by more than half. It explains, in part, why troop levels were kept low, even as the war effort began to unravel. And the “transformation” guide star kept research and development funds for a networked military flowing, even as a cash crunch hit the rest of the military. Will the new Defense Secretary stick with those decisions?
It’s one of several questions I ask in a piece for Popular Mechanics, which should be on-line soon. I’ll let you know when it is.
UPDATE 8:40 PM: It’s up.
UPDATE 8:58 PM: Go read John Noonan’s almost poetic elegy for Rummy and transformation, now.
UPDATE 8:59 PM: For anyone that thinks I’ve been too harsh on Rummy — the “good riddance” comment really seemed to piss folks off — please do not read Phil Carter’s latest piece in Slate. The Army captain, just back from Iraq, is absolutely withering in his critique of his former boss’-boss’-boss’-boss’-boss.
When Rumsfeld took office in 2001, he swept in with promises to transform America’s militaryto move from the industrial age to the information age by revolutionizing both America’s military hardware and the way it does business. He presented himself as a successful CEO who would hammer the Pentagon’s notoriously recalcitrant bureaucracy into shape. Yet, despite all his rhetoric, it’s not clear that he actually accomplished much in this area. The Rumsfeld defense budgets allocated more money to areas that he prioritized, such as missile defense and sophisticated systems like the Joint Strike Fighter and Future Combat Systems, but these were marginal changes from the 1990s, consistent with the ways the services were moving already. Despite his best efforts, Rumsfeld never managed to fundamentally change the way the Pentagon does business, partly because he ran into a solid wall of opposition from the military establishment, defense contractors, and Congress.
In battling these foes and others, Rumsfeld didn’t just lose the fight, he also did a great deal of damage to the military and to the country. Thanks to Bob Woodward, we now know a few more salacious details about his spats with senior military leaderssuch as the way he emasculated former Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Richard Myers. We also know how he handpicked officers for key positions in order to ensure that every senior general or admiral was a Rumsfeld company man, a policy that had a tremendously deleterious and narrowing effect on the kind of military advice and dissent flowing into the office of the secretary of defense.
if i recall correctly, then Gen. Tommy Franks was the one who wanted the troop numbers we have, and he is the one that commanded the US ground forces.
Livio:
Not exactly. The original plan was for 385,000 troops. But Rumsfeld put a ton of pressure on Franks, et. al. to cut troop numbers — which Franks eventually did. See Michael Gordon’s “Cobra II” for details. I’ve also added a link to a news article by Gordon. But the book is really the best resource.
nms
But let’s be clear, the reason Rummie overruled his generals wasn’t because the force was transformed, it was because he thought that he could minimize his up-front expenses and then pull out quick. The OFT guys were working the concepts and experiments which were to transform the force, and the doctrine being developed as “top-down driven” was/is still being developed in the J8. The force that won in Iraq and Afghanistan were developed and trained by the Clinton administration.
And as to whether transformation will leave OSD, it left about February 2006 when the new QDR came out justifying all the new toys that have doubled in life-cycle cost estimates over the last 2–3 years.
Totally aside from Gate’s qualities as a manager (I worked for him a while at CIA and have mixed opinions about that), what faintest background does he have to qualify him to be SECDEF? Former spy friends that I’ve heard from about this are either baffled or aghast or both.
What is the professional military saying?
Good Afternoon Folks,
Rummy’s out but I would hold off for a moment before you break out the champagne. A little history lession I believe is now called for. First Robert Gates was head of the CIA under Bush (41) who himself ran the CIA after William Colby left. Colby is widey assumed as Bush’smentor into the job as head of the CIA.
For those of you to young to remember William Colby ran the Phoenx program during the Vietnam War. Williams Colby’s own death (?) is just as strange as some of the assassnations he ordered in Vietnam. I won’t go into the history of the Phoeix Program, I’m sure mosy of you already know it, but it is mostly consider a stain on American Foreign Policy and it’s use of the 5th. SFG as an assassnation unit almost destroyed the Army’s Special Forces.
What must be kept in mind here is the fixation with and build up of Spec. Op’s. during the Rumsfeld era at the Pentagon. Bush (41) it appears has taken over Iraq from Bush (43) first with his private emmassary to the area by Bush family concierge James Baker and now the appointment of his old CIA Director as Sec. of Defense.
The only question that the Gates appointment can rise is the Phoenix Program going to be the solution to the mess in Iraq?
ALLONS,
Byron Skinner
Maneuver warfare, the objective of Rumsfeld’s force transformation, does not function properly in a defensive or reconstructive atmosphere. Much of the initiative necessary to successfully win a battle through maneuvering is lost when a force is relegated to static defenses.
Although the aged grinding method of warfare the Army was prepared for may have generated more casualties in the short term, a strategy of sweep and clear followed by minor reconstruction (think a grand scale version of Operation Sinbad) before advancement may have had a more beneficial and less costly effect over the longterm.
Rumsfeld may have had some positive effects on reorganization of the military for the 21st century, but to elevate his minor accomplishments without pointing out the major flaws in his designs is a disservice to history. Then again, there might be enough evidence of Rummy’s flaws that one tiny post on his accomplishments might be called for.
I want Tony Zinni for SecDef.
zinni for secdef!!!
Finally! Next step —- A trial for treason!
The Pentagon needed a guy like Mr. Rumsfeld to force a Transformation at least in the Army. He did cancel some costly programs that did not meet the intent of Transformation. The Crusader cancellation was forced on the artillery branch and the Comanche was given up by army aviation branch on their own. The idea of
It is easy to complain and to point a finger at someone, but it means nothing when only a few truly know all the information that was used to make the decisions these people made.
No one person in this is to blame, as no single person truly had complete control, the decision was made as a group of elected and appointed members who did the best they could with a very difficult task!
The question is, could those that complain here have done a better job of even have know where to start in finding a solution?
As it was once said, “If you do not have a solution, don’t complain about what you see as a problem.”
** I feel bad for Rumsfeld — he was the right guy at the wrong time. I think his ideas on transforming the military were largely sound — but for a wealthy republic seeking to remain wealthy but avoiding confrontations unless there was a direct threat, and limiting action againts such threats to pre-emption and/or punitive strikes/raids. Rumsfeld was totally out of step with his neo-Wilsonian boss and peers who needed a large, mass army to do all of their “democratization” (“nation-building” by any other name is just as costly, lengthy, bloody, and risky) as well as a high-tech/capital-intensive/stand-off precision attack capability. I think Rumsfeld is wrongly blamed for a policy that he was directed to execute by a president woefully ignorant in the foreign policy arena and too stubborn to learn from his mistakes.