<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/" > <channel><title>Comments on: Labouchere of Arabia</title> <atom:link href="http://defensetech.org/2006/11/13/labouchere-of-arabia/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" /><link>http://defensetech.org/2006/11/13/labouchere-of-arabia/</link> <description>The Future of the Military, Law Enforcement and National Security</description> <lastBuildDate>Fri, 10 Feb 2012 05:05:24 +0000</lastBuildDate> <sy:updatePeriod>hourly</sy:updatePeriod> <sy:updateFrequency>1</sy:updateFrequency> <generator>http://wordpress.org/?v=3.3.1</generator> <item><title>By: Jack</title><link>http://defensetech.org/2006/11/13/labouchere-of-arabia/#comment-199875</link> <dc:creator>Jack</dc:creator> <pubDate>Thu, 06 May 2010 21:48:03 +0000</pubDate> <guid isPermaLink="false">http://deftech.usmilblog.com/?p=2245#comment-199875</guid> <description>I think he is running the show well. Light and fast would be the way to go. I would even hazzard to suggest the pseudo-teams employed by the Rhodisians. Then move to the track-and-destroy tactics of Koevoet, combined with the unconventional self sefficiency of 32 Bn, where they actively scavenged off the opposite side. You need to remove the enemies ability to move around as much as possible to deny him the chance to decide the where and when of the ambush. They have the initative by and large, since they can choose when to engage. But, as mentioned above, you need to have a certain mindset for this kind of work. It tends to be much more hunting than trading blows. </description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I think he is running the show well. Light and fast would be the way to go. I would even hazzard to suggest the pseudo-teams employed by the Rhodisians. Then move to the track-and-destroy tactics of Koevoet, combined with the unconventional self sefficiency of 32 Bn, where they actively scavenged off the opposite side.<br /> You need to remove the enemies ability to move around as much as possible to deny him the chance to decide the where and when of the ambush. They have the initative by and large, since they can choose when to engage.<br /> But, as mentioned above, you need to have a certain mindset for this kind of work. It tends to be much more hunting than trading blows.</p> ]]></content:encoded> </item> <item><title>By: mimi labouhere</title><link>http://defensetech.org/2006/11/13/labouchere-of-arabia/#comment-150989</link> <dc:creator>mimi labouhere</dc:creator> <pubDate>Fri, 11 Sep 2009 19:06:28 +0000</pubDate> <guid isPermaLink="false">http://deftech.usmilblog.com/?p=2245#comment-150989</guid> <description>hey this is my amazing dad u r talking about i am 12 and i love him to bits and he is risking his life doing his amazing best to help his country so shut your mouths and listen to every true word the guy who wrote the article has said SO THERE THAT IS WHAT IT FEELS LIKE TO BE TOLD OF BY A 12 YEAR OLD love you daddy from mimixx </description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>hey this is my amazing dad u r talking about i am 12 and i love him to bits and he is risking his life doing his amazing best to help his country so shut your mouths and listen to every true word the<br /> guy who wrote the article has said<br /> SO THERE THAT IS WHAT IT FEELS LIKE TO BE TOLD OF BY A 12 YEAR OLD<br /> love you daddy<br /> from mimixx</p> ]]></content:encoded> </item> <item><title>By: mimi labouhere</title><link>http://defensetech.org/2006/11/13/labouchere-of-arabia/#comment-150988</link> <dc:creator>mimi labouhere</dc:creator> <pubDate>Fri, 11 Sep 2009 19:00:23 +0000</pubDate> <guid isPermaLink="false">http://deftech.usmilblog.com/?p=2245#comment-150988</guid> <description>hey this is my amazing dad u r talking about i am 12 and i love him to bits and he is risking his life doing his amazing best to help his country so shut your mouths and listen to every true word the guy who wrote the article has said SO THERE THAT IS WHAT IT FEELS LIKE TO BE TOLD OF BY A 12 YEAR OLD love you daddy from mimixx </description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>hey this is my amazing dad u r talking about i am 12 and i love him to bits and he is risking his life doing his amazing best to help his country so shut your mouths and listen to every true word the<br /> guy who wrote the article has said<br /> SO THERE THAT IS WHAT IT FEELS LIKE TO BE TOLD OF BY A 12 YEAR OLD<br /> love you daddy<br /> from mimixx</p> ]]></content:encoded> </item> <item><title>By: Rob Dodson</title><link>http://defensetech.org/2006/11/13/labouchere-of-arabia/#comment-150903</link> <dc:creator>Rob Dodson</dc:creator> <pubDate>Sun, 19 Nov 2006 01:23:14 +0000</pubDate> <guid isPermaLink="false">http://deftech.usmilblog.com/?p=2245#comment-150903</guid> <description>There is a significant difference between light and heavy here....it is the mindset that each is designed to counter.  Light is normally used against unconventional or guerrilla warfare.  Heavy against conventional forces.  The initial effort was against one of the most conventional forces in the Middle East.  The resulting mess is against an unconventional force.  We did not plan, although there were plenty of indications this would happen, for such an eventuality.  We are stuck with conventional forces in an unconventional environment, save this Brit and maybe a few others.  SOF is an answer, however, there is also a brutality that goes with unconventional warfare that American generally abhors.  So, do you want to win or do you want to just engage?  Win is a change in strategy, engage will continue to put us in harm&#039;s way and make the world mad. </description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>There is a significant difference between light and heavy here.…it is the mindset that each is designed to counter.  Light is normally used against unconventional or guerrilla warfare.  Heavy against conventional forces.  The initial effort was against one of the most conventional forces in the Middle East.  The resulting mess is against an unconventional force.  We did not plan, although there were plenty of indications this would happen, for such an eventuality.  We are stuck with conventional forces in an unconventional environment, save this Brit and maybe a few others.  SOF is an answer, however, there is also a brutality that goes with unconventional warfare that American generally abhors.  So, do you want to win or do you want to just engage?  Win is a change in strategy, engage will continue to put us in harm’s way and make the world mad.</p> ]]></content:encoded> </item> <item><title>By: David Noziglia</title><link>http://defensetech.org/2006/11/13/labouchere-of-arabia/#comment-150902</link> <dc:creator>David Noziglia</dc:creator> <pubDate>Thu, 16 Nov 2006 20:42:43 +0000</pubDate> <guid isPermaLink="false">http://deftech.usmilblog.com/?p=2245#comment-150902</guid> <description>The real question is:  What&#039;s the mission? Light is good for one mission.  Heavy is good for another.  High-tech is good for one mission.  Basic is good for another. So the problem with Iraq -- at least from the military point of view, leaving aside the delusional thinking that put us there in the first place -- is that we&#039;ve never, never, never matched the force to the mission. The force that invaded was in fact even too heavy to defeat the undermanned, demoralized, poorly led regular and RG troops that the Iraqis had. However, the force that invaded was too light, and the wrong mix, to secure the country to prevent the chaos that ensued, and to act against the many different insurgency groups that we now face. Trying to say that there is some magic number of troops that will put things right is as much a fantasy as the lies that preceeded -- and have filled the media ever since -- the invasion. Let the word go out, from this day forth, that THERE IS NO ONE SINGLE ANSWER TO ALL PROBLEMS!!!!! Is that too hard to understand? </description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The real question is:  What’s the mission?<br /> Light is good for one mission.  Heavy is good for another.  High-tech is good for one mission.  Basic is good for another.<br /> So the problem with Iraq — at least from the military point of view, leaving aside the delusional thinking that put us there in the first place — is that we’ve never, never, never matched the force to the mission.<br /> The force that invaded was in fact even too heavy to defeat the undermanned, demoralized, poorly led regular and RG troops that the Iraqis had.<br /> However, the force that invaded was too light, and the wrong mix, to secure the country to prevent the chaos that ensued, and to act against the many different insurgency groups that we now face.<br /> Trying to say that there is some magic number of troops that will put things right is as much a fantasy as the lies that preceeded — and have filled the media ever since — the invasion.<br /> Let the word go out, from this day forth, that THERE IS NO ONE SINGLE ANSWER TO ALL PROBLEMS!!!!!<br /> Is that too hard to understand?</p> ]]></content:encoded> </item> <item><title>By: jvd</title><link>http://defensetech.org/2006/11/13/labouchere-of-arabia/#comment-150901</link> <dc:creator>jvd</dc:creator> <pubDate>Thu, 16 Nov 2006 19:10:04 +0000</pubDate> <guid isPermaLink="false">http://deftech.usmilblog.com/?p=2245#comment-150901</guid> <description>&quot;His mission: to intercept illegal weapons and foreign fighters&quot; Would you patrol a border in a British challenger main battle tank? The Royal Hussars is a tank regiment and they have challenger 2 tanks. Question is how effective would they be in this role? He&#039;s got air support in 15 minutes and I bet he can fall back on well defended fortress positions within 48 hours with that kind of mobility. &quot;Observing one recent firefight between tribal fighters and Iraqi cops, Labouchere chose not to step in. By Iraqi standards, he says, it was simply a &quot;conversation&quot;.&quot; Perhaps on the ground they have abandoned the idea of establishing a liberal democracy. In not supporting the police force he is acting against the overall alliance objective. But maybe that&#039;s called for, like in Afghanistan perhaps we should fall back from the idea of establishing democracy in the short or medium term and focus on keeping terrorists from establishing bases. Its the al quaeda level of organisation achieved over the 90s that allowed them to launch the 9/11 attacks and if we can simply keep any non state actor from organising to such sophistication we are on the offensive in the war on terror. In that sense his approach is a realistic one at this point in time. </description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>“His mission: to intercept illegal weapons and foreign fighters“<br /> Would you patrol a border in a British challenger main battle tank? The Royal Hussars is a tank regiment and they have challenger 2 tanks. Question is how effective would they be in this role? He’s got air support in 15 minutes and I bet he can fall back on well defended fortress positions within 48 hours with that kind of mobility.<br /> “Observing one recent firefight between tribal fighters and Iraqi cops, Labouchere chose not to step in. By Iraqi standards, he says, it was simply a “conversation”.“<br /> Perhaps on the ground they have abandoned the idea of establishing a liberal democracy. In not supporting the police force he is acting against the overall alliance objective.<br /> But maybe that’s called for, like in Afghanistan perhaps we should fall back from the idea of establishing democracy in the short or medium term and focus on keeping terrorists from establishing bases. Its the al quaeda level of organisation achieved over the 90s that allowed them to launch the 9/11 attacks and if we can simply keep any non state actor from organising to such sophistication we are on the offensive in the war on terror. In that sense his approach is a realistic one at this point in time.</p> ]]></content:encoded> </item> <item><title>By: Richard North</title><link>http://defensetech.org/2006/11/13/labouchere-of-arabia/#comment-150900</link> <dc:creator>Richard North</dc:creator> <pubDate>Thu, 16 Nov 2006 06:51:54 +0000</pubDate> <guid isPermaLink="false">http://deftech.usmilblog.com/?p=2245#comment-150900</guid> <description>This is total fantasy.  Labouchere is pratting about in the desert, with the chaps practising their off-road driving skills and having a jolly good time. Meanwhile, with Al Amarah now deserted, the militias have moved in, torched the police stations, put the local cops to flight and terrorised the local government. And that is good peacekeeping? </description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This is total fantasy.  Labouchere is pratting about in the desert, with the chaps practising their off-road driving skills and having a jolly good time.<br /> Meanwhile, with Al Amarah now deserted, the militias have moved in, torched the police stations, put the local cops to flight and terrorised the local government.<br /> And that is good peacekeeping?</p> ]]></content:encoded> </item> <item><title>By: Logan Loftin</title><link>http://defensetech.org/2006/11/13/labouchere-of-arabia/#comment-150899</link> <dc:creator>Logan Loftin</dc:creator> <pubDate>Tue, 14 Nov 2006 13:48:32 +0000</pubDate> <guid isPermaLink="false">http://deftech.usmilblog.com/?p=2245#comment-150899</guid> <description>I am surprised David Stirling&#039;s name has not entered into this conversation, as is this not the very tactics he prefected? </description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I am surprised David Stirling’s name has not entered into this conversation, as is this not the very tactics he prefected?</p> ]]></content:encoded> </item> <item><title>By: Peter</title><link>http://defensetech.org/2006/11/13/labouchere-of-arabia/#comment-150898</link> <dc:creator>Peter</dc:creator> <pubDate>Tue, 14 Nov 2006 11:06:31 +0000</pubDate> <guid isPermaLink="false">http://deftech.usmilblog.com/?p=2245#comment-150898</guid> <description>Didn&#039;t Rumsfeld  get fired because he went too light into Iraq ?. Now that he is gone, the criticism is we are too heavy. Make up your mind, I am confused </description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Didn’t Rumsfeld  get fired because he went too light into Iraq ?. Now that he is gone, the criticism is we are too heavy. Make up your mind, I am confused</p> ]]></content:encoded> </item> <item><title>By: Mitch S</title><link>http://defensetech.org/2006/11/13/labouchere-of-arabia/#comment-23964</link> <dc:creator>Mitch S</dc:creator> <pubDate>Mon, 13 Nov 2006 22:00:33 +0000</pubDate> <guid isPermaLink="false">http://deftech.usmilblog.com/?p=2245#comment-23964</guid> <description>Brings to mind Lt Col. Alan King whose book &quot;Twice Armed&quot; I just finished reading. A US commander that also realized it was crucial to build relationships with the locals and had significant success doing so. Unfortunately he just got rotated back to the US and a new bunch put in his place. If there are answers for the problems in Iraq they&#039;ll come form those that have been there such as King and Labouchere. Hope the brass is wise enough to ask them. </description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Brings to mind Lt Col. Alan King whose book “Twice Armed” I just finished reading. A US commander that also realized it was crucial to build relationships with the locals and had significant success doing so. Unfortunately he just got rotated back to the US and a new bunch put in his place. If there are answers for the problems in Iraq they’ll come form those that have been there such as King and Labouchere. Hope the brass is wise enough to ask them.</p> ]]></content:encoded> </item> </channel> </rss>
<!-- Performance optimized by W3 Total Cache. Learn more: http://www.w3-edge.com/wordpress-plugins/

Minified using apc
Page Caching using apc (User agent is rejected)
Database Caching 6/22 queries in 0.019 seconds using apc
Object Caching 742/775 objects using apc
Content Delivery Network via images.defensetech.org

Served from: defensetech.org @ 2012-02-10 00:21:03 -->
