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	<title>Comments on: Killer Drone Clings to Life</title>
	<atom:link href="http://defensetech.org/2007/01/22/killer-drone-clings-to-life/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://defensetech.org/2007/01/22/killer-drone-clings-to-life/</link>
	<description>The Future of the Military, Law Enforcement and National Security</description>
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		<title>By: TrustButVerify</title>
		<link>http://defensetech.org/2007/01/22/killer-drone-clings-to-life/#comment-155246</link>
		<dc:creator>TrustButVerify</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 23 Jan 2007 01:37:11 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://deftech.usmilblog.com/?p=3405#comment-155246</guid>
		<description>Nicholas,
I understand the meaning of &quot;intercept&quot; which you&#039;re referring to, but in this case I&#039;m taling about the ability to *detect* a transmission, not comprehend it.
I think you have a valid point regarding potential dual-use of wireless infrastructure. This still puts an adversary a step behind- assuming said adversary can afford the mountains of hardware such a solution would entail. The adversary is still reacting to our threat. The dection network is hypothetical, but the UCAV is already proven.
Granting your proposition, who might we expect to deploy it? The Chinese or the Russians might be able to pull it off on some scale; can anyone else say the same?
I&#039;m in a poor position to judge, but I like your point about Moore&#039;s Law.
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		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Nicholas,<br />
I understand the meaning of “intercept” which you’re referring to, but in this case I’m taling about the ability to *detect* a transmission, not comprehend it.<br />
I think you have a valid point regarding potential dual-use of wireless infrastructure. This still puts an adversary a step behind– assuming said adversary can afford the mountains of hardware such a solution would entail. The adversary is still reacting to our threat. The dection network is hypothetical, but the UCAV is already proven.<br />
Granting your proposition, who might we expect to deploy it? The Chinese or the Russians might be able to pull it off on some scale; can anyone else say the same?<br />
I’m in a poor position to judge, but I like your point about Moore’s Law.</p>
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		<title>By: Ken Larson</title>
		<link>http://defensetech.org/2007/01/22/killer-drone-clings-to-life/#comment-155245</link>
		<dc:creator>Ken Larson</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 23 Jan 2007 00:41:12 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://deftech.usmilblog.com/?p=3405#comment-155245</guid>
		<description>Good Post.  I enjoyed your commentary.
On related matters, USA Today has recently  reported  in its Washington Section that the CIA plans to utilize more open sources and blogs in its intelligence work and outsource more of its intelligence software development to commercial contractors in an attempt to re-establish itself as the premiere world intelligence agency.
The &quot;Strategic Intent&quot; is posted on the CIA public web site. Defense Industry Daily further reports that General Electric is gobbling up Smith&#039;s Industries for $4.8B.
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/2007/01/ge-buys-smiths-aerospace-for-48b/index.php
I am a 2 tour Vietnam Veteran who recently retired after 36 years of working in the Defense Industrial Complex on many of the weapons systems being used by our forces as we speak. Let&#039;s look at this for a moment and do our patriotic duty by reading along with the CIA (after all, they have announced they are reading this blog)
1. The new CIA approach comes exactly at the formation of the agency</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Good Post.  I enjoyed your commentary.<br />
On related matters, USA Today has recently  reported  in its Washington Section that the CIA plans to utilize more open sources and blogs in its intelligence work and outsource more of its intelligence software development to commercial contractors in an attempt to re-establish itself as the premiere world intelligence agency.<br />
The “Strategic Intent” is posted on the CIA public web site. Defense Industry Daily further reports that General Electric is gobbling up Smith’s Industries for $4.8B.<br />
<a href="http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/2007/01/ge-buys-smiths-aerospace-for-48b/index.php" rel="nofollow">http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/2007/01/ge-buys-smiths-aerospace-for-48b/index.php</a><br />
I am a 2 tour Vietnam Veteran who recently retired after 36 years of working in the Defense Industrial Complex on many of the weapons systems being used by our forces as we speak. Let’s look at this for a moment and do our patriotic duty by reading along with the CIA (after all, they have announced they are reading this blog)<br />
1. The new CIA approach comes exactly at the formation of the agency</p>
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	<item>
		<title>By: TrustButVerify</title>
		<link>http://defensetech.org/2007/01/22/killer-drone-clings-to-life/#comment-155242</link>
		<dc:creator>TrustButVerify</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 22 Jan 2007 19:09:46 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://deftech.usmilblog.com/?p=3405#comment-155242</guid>
		<description>Nicholas,
I disagree, with certain qualifiers.
Bear in mind that SATCOM arrays are highly directional. Yes, I know about sidelobes. But a good array combinded with spread-spectrum techniques makes interception very difficult.
An intercept network of sufficient capability to guide, or even &quot;cue&quot;, a weapons system would be quite an investment; unless I&#039;m mistaken you&#039;re talking about layer upon layer of receiver sites which would make the infrastructure of a modern cell network look like so many tinkertoys by comparison.
I&#039;m eager to discuss this. Do you see angles left uncovered?
</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Nicholas,<br />
I disagree, with certain qualifiers.<br />
Bear in mind that SATCOM arrays are highly directional. Yes, I know about sidelobes. But a good array combinded with spread-spectrum techniques makes interception very difficult.<br />
An intercept network of sufficient capability to guide, or even “cue”, a weapons system would be quite an investment; unless I’m mistaken you’re talking about layer upon layer of receiver sites which would make the infrastructure of a modern cell network look like so many tinkertoys by comparison.<br />
I’m eager to discuss this. Do you see angles left uncovered?</p>
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		<title>By: Nicholas Weaver</title>
		<link>http://defensetech.org/2007/01/22/killer-drone-clings-to-life/#comment-155240</link>
		<dc:creator>Nicholas Weaver</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 22 Jan 2007 16:41:53 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://deftech.usmilblog.com/?p=3405#comment-155240</guid>
		<description>Probably the biggest problem with UCAVs, and why the USAF has backed off from them:  They, by definition, need good communication, both to receive and to send.
I seriously doubt that the US will ever field an autonomous UCAV anytime soon, the limits to autonomous weapons in our doctrine are pretty severe because we don&#039;t want skynet/collatoral damage scenarios.
With this restriction, then, UCAVs have a serious problem:  They need to receive information from the pilot on the ground and, before getting permission to fire, they need to transmit information.
In a situation like Iraq, this isn&#039;t a problem. The opposition isn&#039;t bothering with widespread jamming and other attacks.  Even in Iran it probably would be OK.
Heck, you could strap some hellfires on the Goodyear Blimp and be good with it in Iraq as long as you are flying high enough.
For the Army, this isn&#039;t as big a problem.  Much of what the Army would use a UCAV are tactical: there are already troops on the ground nearby, so breaking radio silence/stealth on the UCAV is not a problem.
But for the USAF, its potentially a huge problem: the moment the UCAV sends a message to get confirmation-to-fire, it finds some SAMs heading its way mui pronto.
</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Probably the biggest problem with UCAVs, and why the USAF has backed off from them:  They, by definition, need good communication, both to receive and to send.<br />
I seriously doubt that the US will ever field an autonomous UCAV anytime soon, the limits to autonomous weapons in our doctrine are pretty severe because we don’t want skynet/collatoral damage scenarios.<br />
With this restriction, then, UCAVs have a serious problem:  They need to receive information from the pilot on the ground and, before getting permission to fire, they need to transmit information.<br />
In a situation like Iraq, this isn’t a problem. The opposition isn’t bothering with widespread jamming and other attacks.  Even in Iran it probably would be OK.<br />
Heck, you could strap some hellfires on the Goodyear Blimp and be good with it in Iraq as long as you are flying high enough.<br />
For the Army, this isn’t as big a problem.  Much of what the Army would use a UCAV are tactical: there are already troops on the ground nearby, so breaking radio silence/stealth on the UCAV is not a problem.<br />
But for the USAF, its potentially a huge problem: the moment the UCAV sends a message to get confirmation-to-fire, it finds some SAMs heading its way mui pronto.</p>
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