The short-takeoff-and-vertical-landing (STOVL) F-35B is either what makes the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program the stuff of genius — or a sure bet for failure.
Think about it.
With the F-35B, the JSF program lays claim to an unprecedented aerodynamic hat trick: one common fighter design/three very, very different ways to take off and land. On the other hand, the F-35B is the biggest headache to develop and is already the leading cause for a two-year-delay and $5 billion cost overrun. And the aircraft still has yet to fly.
The F-35B also happens to be the diplomatic glue that attracts an international partnership to chip in one-tenth of the JSF’s development cost. Only two of the eight JSF partners want the STOVL aircraft, but one of those is the UK. And if the JSF program loses the UK, you may say goodbye to the rest of the international partners and hello to Eurofighter Typhoon Tranche 3. (Without international cover, the JSF also may look a lot more inviting to the increasingly rapacious budget-cutters in the Pentagon.)
So let’s hope the F-35B’s largest customer — the US Marine Corps — knows what it’s doing.
It is in this context that I was so interested to read the new book, Harrier II: Validating V/STOL, by Lon O. Nordeen. Perhaps, by understanding why the USMC believes the Harrier — and the F-35B — are so necessary, we may understand the disporportionate influence it wields over the JSF program.
First, it has to be understood that, historically-speaking, V/STOL is an aerodynamic fetish. To understand this point, please check out the aptly-titled V/STOL Wheel of Misfortune. Of the 45 V/STOL projects attempted in history, only four — the Harrier, the V-22, the CL-84, and F-35B –ventured much beyond the prototype stage. Three of them involve the Marines.
In his book, Nordeen unfortunately chooses not to analyze or comment but to straightforwardly present the USMC’s obsession with the Harrier as a product of Vietnam. Close air support seemed to be quite a topic of discussion (imagine that?) at the time. To deal with the issue, the Air Force wanted to buy the A-10, the Army favored the Lockheed AH-56A Cheyenne and the USMC focused on the AV-8A Harrier. Asked by Congress to pick the best option, DOD (surprise!) backed all three. (The Cheyenne was later cancelled.)
It’s clear from Nordeen’s writing that the USMC likes V/STOL because of the obvious: its fighters don’t need a long runway or an aircraft carrier to take off. In the Falklands War, Royal Air Force GR Mk. 3 Harriers arrived — and operated — in the South Atlantic war zone on board the container ship Atlantic Conveyor (until the ship was struck by an Argentine exocet missile). Such basing flexibility briefly appealed to the US Air Force, which in 2004 and 2005 flirted with the idea of buying a bunch of F-35Bs.
Whether that flexibility is really worth the price in reduced aerodynamic performance and increased maintenance burden is unfortunately not within the scope of Nordeen’s book. Even within his chosen limits, however, it is negligent as a historian for him to omit any reference to the Harrier’s tragically horrendous safety record.
While the V/STOL Harrier fleet were a potent force in the Falklands conflict, the advantage of basing flexibility alone hasn’t proved pivotal in any modern engagement since. It is impressive to think of the devotion the Marines lavish on this one aerodynamic quality, perhaps to the detriment of all else.
With due respect, Stephen, there’s another consideration with the USMC’s preference for a V/STOVL fighter: the Gator Navy. The Gator Navy’s primary fixed-wing air defense and CAS is the Harrier, will be the F-35B, and The LHD, LHA, and LH(X) designs cannot support CTOL aircraft without substantial redesign. So either the USMC would have to convince the USN to pay the cost of converting them, or base the entire Marine fighter force to the Navy Supercarriers. And since there’s only 11 Supercarriers, which don’t normally operate with the ARG/MEU(SOC)s, that would leave an awful lot of Marines with potentially no fixed-wing cover.
In addition, while forward-basing hasn’t proved “decisive” on a Falklands level since that war, the LACK of forward basing has arguably hurt, alot. How many targets of opportunity have escaped since 2002 because a cruise missle or fighter was too far away when the order was given?
Stephen, you forgot the YAK-38 Forger as an operational VTOL aircraft. And how can you call the Canadair CL-84 “much beyond the prototype stage” when only four were built?
And the benefits of being able to operate off of one of the 7 LHD’s or the five LHA’s is pretty important to the USMC. (Double the number of hulls they can operate off of, and what exactly is the point of the Wasp class without S/VTOL aircraft?)
Hey Moose, I see where you’re coming from, but that’s a slightly different point. Yes, the ARG’s are pretty useless without the Harriers (although there are some alternatives). But, even so, that’s really a consequence of V/STOL, not a justification.
Let’s imagine a very long protracted conflict where airpower is in extensive use, unlike Afgahnistan or Iraq. Add to the scenario airbases becoming targets of tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missile and sabotage by enemy SOF. Then you will see the mobility and ground survivability of V/STOL’s through use of a FARP and relocatable airstrips. And only then will the USMC will be hailed as visionaries able to see the future of warfare.
Hey Chris, you’re right. I should have included the YAK-38. It didn’t have a pretty operational record, but it was indeed a big fleet for the Soviets.
I’m not expert.. by any stretch.. but the Flying flapjack looks like it would be a great modern air craft. Put some stealth abilities into it.. maybe an internal bombbay… and you’d be smoking!
But I think it would be too big for stealth cababilities.. but everything else makes sense
– large surface area = good lift lots of carry potential
– more fuel storage
– Flat front, good for low radar detection
Maybe with modern materials and computer assisted design… the flap jack would kill..
Add on that NASA plane that can change it’s frame in flight… could be very interesting.
Two comments:
1) VTOL also gives the Harrier the capacity to “viff” (vector in forward flight), which allegedly gave it a high kill ratio at low altitudes in Red Flag exercises some time ago. The lift fan may have similar attributes for future ACM, particularly flight at the high angles of attack necessary to fully exploit future air-to-air missile capabilities.
2) Don’t forget that work is already under way to use the lift fan bay for a directed energy weapons suite. That capability might be worth the extra engineering costs.
The F-35B will happen. It is the only new fighter that the Marines and the British can launch off their Aircraft Carriers. By cutting the F-35B, you’d be asking the Marines and British to either replace their Carrier Fleet or consider disbanding it.
And having secondary Blue Water air wings atop much less expensive ships is an advantage worth the wait and the cost.
I like the F-35B’s VTOL capabilities, but miss VTOL F-109, which sounds like a jet version of a tilt rotor V-22. I wonder why F-109 was cancelled.
AH-56A is pretty cool too, even the price and technology was a challenge. How would it have performed in the world today if it was in service, especially in the assymetric warfare just like in Iraq?
Just wanted to respond to a couple of points earlier in the discussion:
I think the AH-56 would have serious problems with survivability in current operations in Iraq. From what I’ve read, one of the justifications for dumping the AH-56 and going on to the AAH/AH-64 Apache programs was that Vietnam had taught the US Army that they needed to build a lot more armour and survivability features into their helicopters, which had proven extremely vulnerable and suffered huge losses to ground fire. AH-56 started in 1965, so hadn’t benefitted from those lessons.
As far as the Flying Flapjack, I don’t think that a jet-powered version would be especially practical. The effectiveness of the prop-powered version came from directing the prop slipstream over the wing surface in such a way that improved lift and also reduced induced drag by counteracting the vortices along the edges of the wing/body. Without that prop slipstream, you’d just have a big low-aspect ratio wing that would be pretty draggy.
VTOL has always been troublesome, as can be witnessed by the (continually growing) list of failed aircraft. When I approached a senior engineer while at Rockwell asking about VTOL he pulled out a study done by “some smart-aleck young engineer.” To summarize, if you took all the thrust required for VTOL, lose all the weight and complexity required for the clap-trap doors, nozzles, etc., and just shoved the thrust out the rear end, a same-planform aircraft could STOL in ~10–20% of CTOL aircraft.
Mr Skinner is correct re: the flapjack. The propwash over the surface is what gave it the extraordinary results.
One interesting statistic came out of the first Gulf War. Approx 15% of conventional aircraft struck by missiles were shot down. (my # might be slightly off, but not by far). The percentage of Harriers shot down when struck by a missile? 100%! The basic reason is that most missiles are heat-seaking, which head to the hottest parts, namely the nozzles. Where are the nozzles on each? F-18/F-15/F-14/F-16…they’re many feet behind the critical components of the engines and even the aircraft. Where are the nozzles on a Harrier? Directly below the wings, directly astride the engines, fuel lines, control systems…the heart of the beast.
The list of STOL technologies/techniques/tricks is probably orders of magnitude longer than VTOL, with just as high a percentage of failure (if not higher). It still comes down to physics and the air: there’s only so much you can make it do. Until we start modifying the air (plasma?) to alter the physics I just don’t see VTOL improving.
Just my $0.02.
Yes, the F-35B Lighting II V/STOL should proceed as planned. The need for a supersonic V/STOL aircraft was proven during Desert Storm and in the Faulklands.
AV-8B Harrier II has been intergrated into Marine Corps amphibious warfare doctrain. Cutting the program will only cause a deficiet in the over all war fight plans and doctrains.
Also, the new generation amphibious assult ships USS Wasp (LHD-1) class of ships are designed for the intergration of the Harrier/F-35B and the Osprey. These classes of ships cannot operate conventional aircraft (due to the lack of catapults and angle-deck flight deck.
Oddly enough, the U.S. Air Force was also considering a small number of F-35B V/STOL as part of their strike packages for future battles due to the capabilities of deploying with the troops, short runways, and quick reaction strike teams in a short notice.
There are three other countries currently using versions of the Harrier:
Italy, Spain, and India.
A plan should include these three and additional countries to provided a boost in the F-35B program.
Keep the F-35B program going strong!
Yes, the F-35B Lighting II V/STOL should proceed as planned. The need for a supersonic V/STOL aircraft was proven during Desert Storm and in the Faulklands.
AV-8B Harrier II has been intergrated into Marine Corps amphibious warfare doctrain. Cutting the program will only cause a deficiet in the over all war fight plans and doctrains.
Also, the new generation amphibious assult ships USS Wasp (LHD-1) class of ships are designed for the intergration of the Harrier/F-35B and the Osprey. These classes of ships cannot operate conventional aircraft (due to the lack of catapults and angle-deck flight deck.
Oddly enough, the U.S. Air Force was also considering a small number of F-35B V/STOL as part of their strike packages for future battles due to the capabilities of deploying with the troops, short runways, and quick reaction strike teams in a short notice.
There are three other countries currently using versions of the Harrier:
Italy, Spain, and India.
A plan should include these three and additional countries to provided a boost in the F-35B program.
Keep the F-35B program going strong!
Yes, the F-35B Lighting II V/STOL should proceed as planned. The need for a supersonic V/STOL aircraft was proven during Desert Storm and in the Faulklands.
AV-8B Harrier II has been intergrated into Marine Corps amphibious warfare doctrain. Cutting the program will only cause a deficiet in the over all war fight plans and doctrains.
Also, the new generation amphibious assult ships USS Wasp (LHD-1) class of ships are designed for the intergration of the Harrier/F-35B and the Osprey. These classes of ships cannot operate conventional aircraft (due to the lack of catapults and angle-deck flight deck.
Oddly enough, the U.S. Air Force was also considering a small number of F-35B V/STOL as part of their strike packages for future battles due to the capabilities of deploying with the troops, short runways, and quick reaction strike teams in a short notice.
There are three other countries currently using versions of the Harrier:
Italy, Spain, and India.
A plan should include these three and additional countries to provided a boost in the F-35B program.
Keep the F-35B program going strong!
An unmentioned fact is that the development of this technology is unprecedented. It’s versatility is unlike the Harrier, and requires extremely intense engineering. It will cost a lot of money to do something for the first time, but once you figure it out, it gets a lot cheaper.
The F-35B has a serious business case — it is the only aircraft that can meet the USMC/UK RN requirement (not to mention the “Harrier carrier” requirements of India, Italy, Thailand, and Spain, and potentially of Japan). More importantly, if the Marines have any justification for a “high performance” fixed wing jet, it is that they need a jet organic to units operating from expeditionary strike groups (no CVNs) and from short/unprepared/minimally hardened forward air strips. VSTOL provides this capability, with the understood cost in range/payload.
However, traditional low-and-slow, eyeball-on-target CAS is obsolete in the era of ubiquitous MANPADS, SHORADS, and light AAA. CAS must be replaced by direct air support, providing NRT response to target designations by ground controllers using an illuminator (laser or MMW) or providing a 1m3 target cube based on GPS offset and laser ranging and a characterization (e.g., tank, troops in trench, mortar team in SE corner, 1st floor, masonry building, etc.).
The AF F-35A is an unnecessary airplane. It does nothing substantially better than the already in production F-22A except carry a somewhat larger (but still inadequate) bomb load; and is much weaker in range, air-to-air capability, and sustained cruise. The AF would do better buying 10 AEF’s worth of F-22s (380), updating the A-10 to A-10C, and remanufacturing or buying F-15Es with AESA radars and helmet-mounted sights, dropping the F-35, and expeditiously retiring the range/payload limited F-16.
The Navy F-35C is also of questionable value. While it has somewhat more range/payload than the F-35B, it offers no real benefit over the F/A-18E/F except stealth. It cannot match top-notch Russian– or European– air superiority aircraft. The Navy needs a replacement for the F-14D — a fast, long range, truly multi-mission aircraft, or should invest its money in supersonic, stealthy SSGN/DDG/CG-launched cruise missiles and long-loiter stealthy subsonic UCAVs.
–SteveD