Theres an interesting piece in todays issue of USA Today with an update on how the U.S. military is reacting to the spate of helicopter shoot-downs earlier this year.
Instead of looking solely to technological answers to the problem, commanders are restricting helo flyways, funneling them into narrower and narrower flight paths.
The enlargement of several “no-fly zones” north of Baghdad marked as red circles on aviation maps may be yielding results. Enemy fire brought down at least seven U.S. military helicopters between Jan. 20 and Feb. 21, but there have been no new reported shootdowns since that period.
But, interestingly, the Army in Iraq is also shifting to more and more night operations. Thats a tactic the Marines have been using for at least the last two years over most of Iraq, flying troop transport missions under night optical devices in blackout conditions.
Electronic countermeasures can only do so much as weve seen with counter-IED efforts so TTPs have to make up for the rest. But there could be a down side.
Enlarging the no-fly zones may push pilots repeatedly into the same areas, creating a pattern insurgents could detect, said Chief Warrant Officer Bobby Remington, who pilots a UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter with the 2nd Battalion.
“It’s just a matter of time before the enemy realizes, ‘Hey, they used to come that way, now they’re coming this way,’ ” Remington said.
And one has to wonder if the latest order from Sadr for his militia forces to hole up during the initial stages of the Baghdad security crackdown has more to do with the respite than anything else.
Interesting– I read recently that majority of the recent downings had been pinned on truck-mounted AA machineguns. When coupled with predictable flight patterns, they proved deadly– an echo of the F-117 shootdown during the Kosovo campaign. SP (among others) posted about it recently at
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htada/articles/20070319.aspx
although I’m waiting for more confirmation before passing judgement.
With all this in mind, further restricting flight paths seems incredibly stupid. No doubt I’m missing something here.
I read an article that quoted a female intel Lt. saying they have found Stinger missiles being used by the insurgents!. Does any one know what the hell is going on over there?
Well, we did used to give Stingers out to people over there. Some of those are probably still around.
“Well, we did used to give Stingers out to people over there. Some of those are probably still around.“
No we didn’t. If you mean the ones in Afghanistan-those are reallllllly old. Probably the AA guns on trucks.
This is a good idea.
By restricting flight paths, US forces can better patrol the reduced area and either stop attacks or make sure they kill the terrorists after the attack, just like this:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pwQBg2UfZMU
The problem with trying to scatter flight paths and make them unpredictible is that there is so much traffic, and helicopters are so loud and visible over a wide area that the terrorists can just set up spotters and move their AA trucks into the path of a random oncoming helicopter. US forces cant watch everywhere at once.
If you channel flights through certain areas, US forces can keep an eye on those areas and make sure that the terrorists’ first ambush is his last.
Once the terrorists see that their tactics aren’t producing results, and are just getting themselves killed, they’ll change tactics. I think that is what has already happened: they had a few successes, the US reacted, and now theyre back to trying to figure out something else.
Strategies evolve. As things become more predictable, casualties tend to rise. Keep your enemy guessing what your gonna do next and your odds improve. Of course, it doesn’t help to have public announcements of what you will do next.
This is a little like SIGINT in a way. If you spread your information evenly across a broad spectrum, your OPFOR will always be able to find at least some of your information and have some resources in place to intercept some of it. Of course, if you use the same channel and codes all the time, eventually they’ll figure out where it is and compromise it.
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A useful approach is signal-hopping: changing codes and channels on a relatively regular basis so that you minimise your predictability and thus maximise your security.
When we’re talking about _physical_ assets rather than signals, having some degree of concentration allows you to concentrate your defences, too. However, putting all your eggs in one basket means there’s a lot of places where you aren’t that OPFOR can exploit. Mobile force security is always going to be something of a balancing act, to my thinking.
[Disclaimer: I have no operational military experience, so please tell me if I’m full of crap
Looks like the insurgents AA has achieved its goal then: limiting US helicopter operations. As i mentioned, shoot-downs are not necessarily the most important result.
No, shoot-downs are the tactical goal because they generate headlines, and headlines/propaganda are the strategic goal because they keep the money and manpower flowing.
If the US military channels flight paths, that does not limit operations. At most, it slightly increases fuel costs, if the trips are longer.
It is doubtful stingers are the biggest threat.Most of the attacks have occurred in flights well under 1000 feet…most likely caused by AA or concentrated small arms fire (PKMs?) (like to Blackwater attack recently..most of the personnel on board suffered gunshot wounds).
The recent Chinook attack, if the insurgent video is accurate, was caused by a SAM, but given the number of Russian and Chinese-made SAMs still in Iraq, it was likely caused by a SAM-7 or 14.
It didn’t appear that the C-46 took any IR countermeasures before it was hit.Also, it was hit from the rear aspect, which would enlarge the heat signature greatly.
If Stingers were employed to any great extent, we would have seen more attacks on larger aircraft coming in and out of BIAP.
Because the Stingers ‘in the wild’ are few in number, one would also assume that they would husband them for an attack of great significance, not on a helicopter.
It is easier for the insurgents to use less capable missiles or ground fire for those results.
The fact that you have to fly on a linear path for at least some of the flight time doesn’t help.At 130 knots ground speed, you will cover around 270 ft per second. Within 10 seconds, you’ve traveled more than a half mile in a straight line, if you don’t maneuver.
If you are high enough, that would be plenty of time to be spotted and shot at, if the insurgents are lined up on your vector.It isn’t easy to be hit if you are moving fast and low, but on occasion, they will be in the right place and with the correct lead, they will succeed.
Hopefully, we are spotting them first and directing assets to kill them.
One other comment on Stingers…these missiles have a limited shelf life, especially the BCU component. This is a battery system that must be connected to the launcher assembly to power it up and allow the IR sensor to cool down before engaging a target. They can only be used once.Without it, the system is useless.I don’t think the BCUs have a 20 + year shelf life, although it may be possible to improvise it.It has been 20 years since these were provided to the Muj in Afghanistan, although Stingers may have been diverted to the bad guys from other ‘friendly’ governments since then.
My mistake, that was a CH 47 that was shot down recently, not CH 46.
Is there no way to have an automatic response to fire from the ground? bj1
Why don’t they bring back the Pink Team concept developed in Vietnam to counter the ground to air theat. Can some one else explain a little better?
No question there is a classified number of Stingers outside of ‘US controls’, but there are also capable Chinese and Russian made MANPADS.
I discount any significant threat from Stingers in the Iraq TOO…more worrisome if one is used at a civilian airport somewhere else. At that venue, no IR countermeasures could be employed, and a successful hit is more likely. Although the DHL aircraft survived the SAM-14 attack at BIAP, others may not be so lucky.
Mass groundfire seems to be the most likely culprit to these helicopter downings.
It is insane that the enemy has access to overhead imagery through tools like google earth. Last night, I could easily identify the LZ’s up at the FOB in Tikrit, or the Apaches and AC-130’s sitting on the other side of the tarmac at Djibouti IAP…it may be out of date and we may be changing routines regularly, but it doesn’t help.Amazing.
I hope we are identifying and rolling these groups up right now.
It’s perhaps not widely known, but the Netherlands has operated our own NAH-64D Apaches both over Iraq and currently in Afghanistan, and although we’ve been fired upon, we only lost one (due to pilot error) in 3 years of combat ops.
The biggest difference is both tactics and mindset in comparison with US / UK Apache ops — USAr Apaches (and to a degree British) still operate in a Cold War mode: fly low and hug the terrain by hiding behind buildings, hills etc to avoid the SAM and radar-AAA.
The RNLAF operates at medium altitude, well out of reach of small arms and RPGs. Yes, well within the MPADS/VSHORAD envelope, but we beat that with technology namely the AMASE twin jammer pods, which provide all azimuth IIR countermeasures in addition to the Apaches standard CMs.
Another big advantage is that this way the Apaches sensor range nearly doubles, giving more advance warning (albeit in seconds, but still) and more maneuvering altitude (able to dive, bank, flip etc).
We also decided to divest the money intended for the Longbow rader (NAH-64D are equipped “for but not with”) into latest generation EO equipment.
Just wondering, how many Kiowas where lost?
Regards,
Marcus
Just before my last tour in late ’05, it became policy for Air Force and Navy special operations air assets to only fly at night. No sense in us getting our SOF operators shot down before we even got them to the target.
The recent shootdowns were broad daylight convoy escorts and/or CAS(Close Air Support)flights. I do not recall during our mission briefings any mention of the presence of Stingers. I’m quite sure they would have notified us aircrewmen of that possibility. Most our our predicted threats were the garden variety small arms and RPG’s, as well as Soviet-era SA-7 and SA-14 MANPADS.