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	<title>Comments on: Air Force Bomber Redux…</title>
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	<link>http://defensetech.org/2007/05/04/air-force-bomber-redux/</link>
	<description>The Future of the Military, Law Enforcement and National Security</description>
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		<title>By: http://www.linksoflondons.co.uk</title>
		<link>http://defensetech.org/2007/05/04/air-force-bomber-redux/#comment-160625</link>
		<dc:creator>http://www.linksoflondons.co.uk</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 21 May 2009 02:30:50 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://deftech.usmilblog.com/?p=2497#comment-160625</guid>
		<description>Links of London
Links of London Jewelry
Links of London Charm
Links of London Necklace
Links of London Bracelets
Links of London Earrings
Links of London Rings
Designer from UK
Diamond
Gold&amp;Silver
Links Jewelry
Links Necklace
Links Charm
Links Earrings
Links Rings
</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Links of London<br />
Links of London Jewelry<br />
Links of London Charm<br />
Links of London Necklace<br />
Links of London Bracelets<br />
Links of London Earrings<br />
Links of London Rings<br />
Designer from UK<br />
Diamond<br />
Gold&amp;Silver<br />
Links Jewelry<br />
Links Necklace<br />
Links Charm<br />
Links Earrings<br />
Links Rings</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: Gary Loftis</title>
		<link>http://defensetech.org/2007/05/04/air-force-bomber-redux/#comment-160623</link>
		<dc:creator>Gary Loftis</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 30 Apr 2009 17:43:34 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://deftech.usmilblog.com/?p=2497#comment-160623</guid>
		<description>Let me begin my remarks by establishing my background. I am a retired Air Force officer with just shy of 2000 hours as a B-52 Radar Navigator (bombardier). I also served as Assistant Editor of The Air University Review and Deputy Director of Curriculum at Squadron Officer School. Bomber doctrine has been a real, close-up concern for most of my adult life, so what I write here is more than just a casual opinion.
A manned long-range bomber is and will be a necessary part of successful military operations for the forseeable future. Think of a bomber as long-range artillery that can devastate enemy operations and logistics with great precision hundreds of miles behind the front, or in his homeland. While we are currently involved in a guerilla battle, to assume there is no great war in the future would be naive.
That said, there are variables that may or may not be necessary.
Speed is important because it limits exposure to enemy defenses, but speed brings tradeoffs. Greater speed means increased fuel consumption and, therefore, smaller weapon loads and shorter range. Supersonic speeds dictate either smaller airframe design (e.g., B-58, FB-111) or exotic material content (e.g., YF-12, SR-71). Also, as enemy defenses become more sophisticated, speed alone loses much of its edge.
Stealthiness provides a marginal way to defeat enemy electronic defenses, but only until those defenses catch up technologically. It also is expensive, requiring cutting-edge (e.g., radar-absorbing) materials and radical airframe design; the latter makes flight characteristics very unstable and makes computerized control systems essential.
The most complex, and least valued component of modern bomber design is the crew. The more an aircraft depends on computers for threat assessment, weapon delivery, and egress, the more limited it becomes. In 1981, a flight of 6, 25-year-old B-52Gs (with 30-year-old defensive and weapons delivery systems) successfully struck 48 simulated targets at Red Flag, despite the state of the art F-15 and F-5 aggressors searching frantically for them. The bombers were never located because human electronic warfare officers were operating jammers and defensive systems in unpredictable ways. (I know this because I was on the lead bomber and was in the subsequent debriefing at Nellis AFB).
The ability to apply creativity and ingenuity to a situation requires a  human crew. Computers cannot create. Regardless whether the government goes with speed  or stealth, the minimum  requirement for a long-range bomber is a live crew!
</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Let me begin my remarks by establishing my background. I am a retired Air Force officer with just shy of 2000 hours as a B-52 Radar Navigator (bombardier). I also served as Assistant Editor of The Air University Review and Deputy Director of Curriculum at Squadron Officer School. Bomber doctrine has been a real, close-up concern for most of my adult life, so what I write here is more than just a casual opinion.<br />
A manned long-range bomber is and will be a necessary part of successful military operations for the forseeable future. Think of a bomber as long-range artillery that can devastate enemy operations and logistics with great precision hundreds of miles behind the front, or in his homeland. While we are currently involved in a guerilla battle, to assume there is no great war in the future would be naive.<br />
That said, there are variables that may or may not be necessary.<br />
Speed is important because it limits exposure to enemy defenses, but speed brings tradeoffs. Greater speed means increased fuel consumption and, therefore, smaller weapon loads and shorter range. Supersonic speeds dictate either smaller airframe design (e.g., B-58, FB-111) or exotic material content (e.g., YF-12, SR-71). Also, as enemy defenses become more sophisticated, speed alone loses much of its edge.<br />
Stealthiness provides a marginal way to defeat enemy electronic defenses, but only until those defenses catch up technologically. It also is expensive, requiring cutting-edge (e.g., radar-absorbing) materials and radical airframe design; the latter makes flight characteristics very unstable and makes computerized control systems essential.<br />
The most complex, and least valued component of modern bomber design is the crew. The more an aircraft depends on computers for threat assessment, weapon delivery, and egress, the more limited it becomes. In 1981, a flight of 6, 25-year-old B-52Gs (with 30-year-old defensive and weapons delivery systems) successfully struck 48 simulated targets at Red Flag, despite the state of the art F-15 and F-5 aggressors searching frantically for them. The bombers were never located because human electronic warfare officers were operating jammers and defensive systems in unpredictable ways. (I know this because I was on the lead bomber and was in the subsequent debriefing at Nellis AFB).<br />
The ability to apply creativity and ingenuity to a situation requires a  human crew. Computers cannot create. Regardless whether the government goes with speed  or stealth, the minimum  requirement for a long-range bomber is a live crew!</p>
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		<title>By: Jailcitykid</title>
		<link>http://defensetech.org/2007/05/04/air-force-bomber-redux/#comment-29093</link>
		<dc:creator>Jailcitykid</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 19 Sep 2008 10:47:18 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://deftech.usmilblog.com/?p=2497#comment-29093</guid>
		<description>Finally a carrier based aircraft in the class of a F111. Just like the F111 was originally intended.
Somebody inform Australia in a hurry
</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Finally a carrier based aircraft in the class of a F111. Just like the F111 was originally intended.<br />
Somebody inform Australia in a hurry</p>
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		<title>By: ohwilleke</title>
		<link>http://defensetech.org/2007/05/04/air-force-bomber-redux/#comment-160619</link>
		<dc:creator>ohwilleke</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 09 Sep 2007 09:08:08 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://deftech.usmilblog.com/?p=2497#comment-160619</guid>
		<description>The A-12 was cancelled, in a nutshell, because the technology required to make it work was too much of a stretch to achieve on a cost effective basis in 1991.  The notion that the same thing might be less challenging technologically sixteen years later, after a period of revolutionary advances in the science and implementation of aircraft with new materials, advanced avionics, aerodynamic innovations, and stealth technology, is hardly a stretch.
In other words, it is entirely possible that Cheney, that bastard that he is, may have made the right decision for 1991, and that somebody else may be making the right decision in basically reinventing the A-12 now.
The technology has arrived, although I seriously doubt that the mission that its successor is designed to carry out (medium range, medium weight bombing runs) really ought to be a priority for the Air Force.  The Air Force has the F-15E, F-16, F-35A, F-117, and A-10 for short range bombing missions.  It has the B-52, B-1 and B-2 for long range bombing missions.
It isn&#039;t as if the long range bomber fleet is so overtaxed that it can&#039;t handle a medium range, medium payload run from time to time.  There is slack in the system to allow the big guys to run those kinds of missions.
For my druthers, I&#039;d rather see a B-52 successor, perhaps modeled on a Boeing 747 or 737, than a successor to the F-111 and the A-12.  If the medim range bombing mission were so vital, we wouldn&#039;t have retired the F-111 long before any replacement was in place.
</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The A-12 was cancelled, in a nutshell, because the technology required to make it work was too much of a stretch to achieve on a cost effective basis in 1991.  The notion that the same thing might be less challenging technologically sixteen years later, after a period of revolutionary advances in the science and implementation of aircraft with new materials, advanced avionics, aerodynamic innovations, and stealth technology, is hardly a stretch.<br />
In other words, it is entirely possible that Cheney, that bastard that he is, may have made the right decision for 1991, and that somebody else may be making the right decision in basically reinventing the A-12 now.<br />
The technology has arrived, although I seriously doubt that the mission that its successor is designed to carry out (medium range, medium weight bombing runs) really ought to be a priority for the Air Force.  The Air Force has the F-15E, F-16, F-35A, F-117, and A-10 for short range bombing missions.  It has the B-52, B-1 and B-2 for long range bombing missions.<br />
It isn’t as if the long range bomber fleet is so overtaxed that it can’t handle a medium range, medium payload run from time to time.  There is slack in the system to allow the big guys to run those kinds of missions.<br />
For my druthers, I’d rather see a B-52 successor, perhaps modeled on a Boeing 747 or 737, than a successor to the F-111 and the A-12.  If the medim range bombing mission were so vital, we wouldn’t have retired the F-111 long before any replacement was in place.</p>
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		<title>By: murc</title>
		<link>http://defensetech.org/2007/05/04/air-force-bomber-redux/#comment-160618</link>
		<dc:creator>murc</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 07 May 2007 03:57:58 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://deftech.usmilblog.com/?p=2497#comment-160618</guid>
		<description>Brian H - you know what countries I&#039;m talking about...Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, syria, etc...basically a bunch of middle eastern countries.
</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Brian H — you know what countries I’m talking about…Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, syria, etc…basically a bunch of middle eastern countries.</p>
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		<title>By: JH</title>
		<link>http://defensetech.org/2007/05/04/air-force-bomber-redux/#comment-29089</link>
		<dc:creator>JH</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 06 May 2007 19:43:35 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://deftech.usmilblog.com/?p=2497#comment-29089</guid>
		<description>Subsonic only sounds good to the bean-counters cause it costs less money. But I bet anyone that the Air Force would love supersonic. That whole talk about prompt global strike can&#039;t be just a lot of hot air.
</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Subsonic only sounds good to the bean-counters cause it costs less money. But I bet anyone that the Air Force would love supersonic. That whole talk about prompt global strike can’t be just a lot of hot air.</p>
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		<title>By: Brian H</title>
		<link>http://defensetech.org/2007/05/04/air-force-bomber-redux/#comment-160617</link>
		<dc:creator>Brian H</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 06 May 2007 17:21:39 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://deftech.usmilblog.com/?p=2497#comment-160617</guid>
		<description>murc;
I&#039;m very concerned about these &quot;rouge&quot; nations.  Are they the ones that go red when we&#039;re not looking? Or the ones that give us roguish looks?
Just confused, and blushing.
</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>murc;<br />
I’m very concerned about these “rouge” nations.  Are they the ones that go red when we’re not looking? Or the ones that give us roguish looks?<br />
Just confused, and blushing.</p>
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		<title>By: africanmuffia</title>
		<link>http://defensetech.org/2007/05/04/air-force-bomber-redux/#comment-29087</link>
		<dc:creator>africanmuffia</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 06 May 2007 17:00:54 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://deftech.usmilblog.com/?p=2497#comment-29087</guid>
		<description>When is the airforce going to realise that manned bombers are not the way to go if you are looking for endurance? If they don&#039;t then Israel (http://www.janes.com/press/articles/pc060307_1.shtml) or worse France will have the capability sooner. Countries with smaller defense budgets could attain an edge in this area because of smarter investment choices.
</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>When is the airforce going to realise that manned bombers are not the way to go if you are looking for endurance? If they don’t then Israel (<a href="http://www.janes.com/press/articles/pc060307_1.shtml" rel="nofollow">http://www.janes.com/press/articles/pc060307_1.shtml</a>) or worse France will have the capability sooner. Countries with smaller defense budgets could attain an edge in this area because of smarter investment choices.</p>
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		<title>By: Paul Zimmerli</title>
		<link>http://defensetech.org/2007/05/04/air-force-bomber-redux/#comment-160615</link>
		<dc:creator>Paul Zimmerli</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 05 May 2007 02:50:11 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://deftech.usmilblog.com/?p=2497#comment-160615</guid>
		<description>A stretched YF-23, with a lowered need for high speed, would be an exceptionally easy answer to this need.  For that matter, an expanded, manned version of one of the A-12 derivatives now being built as UAVs, would be another - if ironic - possibility.
The conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq have pointed out one error of the &quot;go-fast&quot; gang:  No matter how many F-22s, F-35s and B-2s you buy, you will still always have a requirement for a less-flashy, durable and dependable &quot;bomb truck&quot; to put a concentrated mass of iron on some tactical targets.
Any &quot;stealthy&quot; Canberras waiting in the wings?
</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A stretched YF-23, with a lowered need for high speed, would be an exceptionally easy answer to this need.  For that matter, an expanded, manned version of one of the A-12 derivatives now being built as UAVs, would be another — if ironic — possibility.<br />
The conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq have pointed out one error of the “go-fast” gang:  No matter how many F-22s, F-35s and B-2s you buy, you will still always have a requirement for a less-flashy, durable and dependable “bomb truck” to put a concentrated mass of iron on some tactical targets.<br />
Any “stealthy” Canberras waiting in the wings?</p>
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		<title>By: Perplexed</title>
		<link>http://defensetech.org/2007/05/04/air-force-bomber-redux/#comment-160614</link>
		<dc:creator>Perplexed</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 05 May 2007 02:47:27 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://deftech.usmilblog.com/?p=2497#comment-160614</guid>
		<description>The USAF keeps searching for the holy grail of bombers, a bomber with long range, big pay-load, low radar cross-section, capable of being used as a fighter and it won&#039;t ever happen.
I predict that within 10-20 years that airborne lasers (on both sides) will create such a hostile air environment that manned aircraft will have a short lifetime in the combat arena and that small, stealthy, fast RPV will dominate the airspace.
</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The USAF keeps searching for the holy grail of bombers, a bomber with long range, big pay-load, low radar cross-section, capable of being used as a fighter and it won’t ever happen.<br />
I predict that within 10–20 years that airborne lasers (on both sides) will create such a hostile air environment that manned aircraft will have a short lifetime in the combat arena and that small, stealthy, fast RPV will dominate the airspace.</p>
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