Here’s a hot topic: Stryker Losses Raise Questions. The press seems to be catching up to the fact that one of the central battles in this summer of “the surge” is shaping up in Diyala province northeast of Baghdad. As noted two months ago, Stryker infantry units are leading the “surge” into the region, in pursuit of insurgents, terrorists, and militiamen who fled Baghdad when the “surge” was first announced. Though the increased mobility afforded by the 8-wheeled light armored vehicles is a great advantage when fighting in a fluid and shifting environment, all isn’t perfect:
A single infantry company in Diyala lost five Strykers this month in less than a week, according to Soldiers familiar with the losses, who spoke on condition of anonymity because they are not authorized to release the information. The overall number of Strykers lost recently is classified.
In one of the biggest hits, six American Soldiers and a journalist were killed when a huge bomb exploded beneath their Stryker on May 6. It was the biggest one-day loss for the battalion in more than two years.
“We went for several months with no losses and were very proud of that,” a senior Army official said in Washington, speaking on condition of anonymity because he is not authorized to comment publicly. “Since then, there have been quite a few Stryker losses.“
The problem certainly seems to be IEDs, and even critics are quick to point out that many of larger bombs being encountered lately, including the much-feared and much-hyped explosively formed penetrators (EFPs), threaten not only Strykers but Bradleys and Abrams tanks, as well. But as the concept of the Stryker is based around the idea of more mobility at the expense of armor protection, the concerns are justified and warrant a close look.
The Stryker is basically an armored truck, designed to wheel troops into the fight and bring some extra firepower and advanced communications and navigation equipment along for the ride. It was never intended to take the punishment that a Bradley fighting vehicle can take, but it’s speed and relatively quiet operation give it benefits that the tracked mechanized infantry just don’t have. Lesser protection and weaker firepower, however, can obviously be a problem in the wrong situation.
The question is, are fights like the combat in Diyala the “wrong situation” for the Stryker to be in?
“It is indeed an open question if the Stryker is right for this type of warfare,” said Michael O’Hanlon, a senior analyst with the Brookings Institution. “I am inclined to think that the concept works better for peacekeeping. But based on data the Army has made available to date, it’s hard to be sure.“
There’s no doubt the Stryker would be safer in a less-lethal environment, but isn’t that true of any vehicle? In Balkan-type peacekeeping, wouldn’t armored Humvees usually be plenty? And check out the picture I posted of Strykers from 5–20 Infantry arriving in Baqubah back in March for some junk by the side of the road. I wrote:
Cement block and a couple of empty boxes? Bombs?
Who knows?
There’s no doubt the roadside bomb is one of the greatest threats we face today, and there’s no doubt that it will continue to be whether the Stryker is on the road or not.
Critics are usually pretty quick to jump on the Stryker, though sometimes folks get a little carried away. For instance, this AP article notes that the Stryker may be out of its element because
powerful bombs — not rocket-propelled grenades or small arms fire — are the main threat.
However, anyone who has been following the Stryker will know that before the first deployment to Iraq in late 2003, the principle criticism was that the vehicle was vulnerable specifically to rocket-propelled grenades. When the Army attached a skirt of cage-like slat armor to the Strykers to protect against the RPG threat, critics just laughed. Then the slat armor proved itself to be quite effective.
Also, the article notes that
Trouble started as soon as the Strykers arrived in Baqouba, the provincial capital of Diyala. U.S. commanders ordered the vehicles into Baqouba’s streets at dawn the day after they arrived. The hope was that the large, menacing vehicles — armed with a heavy machine gun and a 105mm cannon — would intimidate insurgents and reassure local residents.
The problem with this is that the first Strykers with the 105mm cannons, the Mobile Gun System (MGS) variants, didn’t arrive in Iraq until a couple of weeks ago. The 4th Brigade, 2nd Division is the first Stryker Brigade to get the MGS. When “the Strykers arrived in Baqouba”, the 4–2 was still picking its way through protesters on the way to load up in Tacoma, Washington.
None of this means, of course, that the Stryker isn’t vulnerable to large roadside bombs. I don’t think anyone is disputing that it is. But it doesn’t do anything to add to the credibility of non-stop criticism of the Stryker.
On a final note, it might be worth looking at the Canadian Army for a minute. They just announced that they will be leasing 20 mine-resistant Leopard 2 A6M tanks from Germany and will send them to Afghanistan before the end of the summer. Last fall, Canada already sent a few tanks to beef up its forces in Afghanistan. Prior to that move, Canada’s primary armored vehicle in the country had been the LAV-3, which is what the US Stryker is based upon. One of the reasons for sending the tanks (which is a very controversial issue in Canada, by the way) was because of the LAV-3’s vulnerability to mines and roadside bombs.
In addition to the leased German tanks, Canada is planning to purchase 100 Dutch Leopard 2s as well. Remember, armies still need tanks.
–Murdoc
{ 23 comments… read them below or add one }
My sister in law feels that if we would just put our lethal weapons away and hope the enemy will put theirs away. Maybe we should declare a truce and hope the enemy will become our friends and not bomb our movie houses and elementary schools. Remember hope is an option. Hope is often the best strategy before you experience a disaster because you don’t have to think , only do what feels good.
Please try not to laugh at people like her. You might hurt their feeling or offend them.
Bob X from Texas
The Stryker never lived up to the hype. Still 14.5 armor protection is better than 7.62mm protection. Like all the orignal military tools, it was not designed for this type of warfare.
The US should abandon the concept of the APC all togather. There is no vehicle in Iraq that can withstand a few hundred pounds of HE. Losing eight guys to one IED is tragedy; one that appears to be occurring more often.
An armored 4 man ‘V’ shaped hull vehicle is the best the military can do right now. Fight a decentralized opponet with decentralization. I think 150 thousand armored one man vehicles would be ideal. That would help neutralize the resource/effort/reward tactic of the insurgents. That follows my theme of the ‘many and cheap’, not the ‘few and expensive’. The Sherman or the King Tiger?
Mass kills make good insurgent PR, which affects US public opinion, which is the strategy of the insurgents.
Quiet and stealth are less critical in urban environments, where spotters could be and are everywhere. Until the new invisibility tech is deployed, of course …
The old Army tracked-vehicle advocates are saying, I told you so. It wasn’t just the fact that tracked vehicles are much better at getting around in the mud; it is also the fact that on the battlefield that our soldiers are on in Iraq, mobility and quietness are not really what is needed there (from what I am reading). The Stryker is supposed to work best in an army vs. army environment like on the plains of Europe in a US vs Soviet conflict where you need mobility and quietness. We don’t have that sort of environment in Iraq, and what we really need are scads of MRAP and M1 tanks. Yes I know the M1 guzzles fuel; it needs updating with a different powerplant, but man can it take a beating from _almost_ anything! Maybe an armored personel carrier based on the M1 chassis and armor like the Israelis do would be the ticket.
@BT:
Driving around with four men each in armoured vehicles consumes so much fuel that the tooth-to-tail ratio is necessarily bad.
That hurts especially in a war that’s characterized by especially vulnerable supply convoys. No matter whether it’s done or not – it’s simply not efficient and wasting resources does simply not help to win.
The British were very successful with offroad patrols in rural areas with their Land Rovers…unarmed vehicles.
In urban operations, it’s quite disgusting if an infantry unit needs one quarter of its men to guard its vehicles while the others are dismounted, isn’t it?
And finally – who knows whether IEDs will be relevant at all in the next conflict?
Stryker is another piece of equipment not designed for the current conflict. US Mil is just trying to do the best it can with the shoddy equipment it has with various workarounds; up-armored HMVEE and modded Stryker. Even the Abrams has had to get a redesigned urban kit thrown on, because of lessons learned.
Only real choice is to make sure the Pentagon realizes that EFP and IEDs are the new form of assymetrical warfare with lower risk and better results than RPG. Then invest in MRAP vehicles–of course such an investment to actually win in Iraq would bankrupt the country, but its only taxpayer money, right?
Also, every militia/insurgent group on the planet is very interested in learning the IED skills for their respective conflict. They are a perfect guerrilla tactic against superior heavily armored forces–low investment, big return, huge psychological value. This is the urban warfare of the future.
It’s interesting to see canada mentioned in this article. It is incorrect to mention that Canada is sending Leapords over there cause they claim ‘it’s physiological’. The reason why it’s controversial is because the war is very unpopular anyways and some Canadians would rather be winding down.. than winding up.
To compare Afghanistan to Iraq is real apples and oranges. The Canadian army has had a lot of success with the LAV III. It’s saved many lives.. and up until recently they didn’t lose all the occupants in the vehicle from one bomb blast. From what I understand.. it was a massive bomb blast that completely destroyed the vehicle and killed all but 1 occupant.
Max in MN,
What can you replace the gas turbine in a M1A2 with? It is a totally differnt beast than the Merkava (which has a spotty record) and we still have the same flat bottom on M1A2 that is vulnerable to efps/large blasts.
get out of the vehicles.
get off of the streets.
get outside the city.
let nothing in.
wait.
surveillance, surveillance, surveillance!
strike targets of opportunity
only from the air or with snipers.
duh.
Good Morning Folks,
The desaster that is Stryker has been years in the making. Even in Iraq the Stryker where the Stryker was kept out of heavy combat has showed it’s faults. For it’s much hearlded remote gun system that is to slow to traverse and is wildy inaccurate, it being replace by old WWII era manned couplias in the field, to is rather bazzar “slat Armor” that was mostly ineffective.
2900 Strykers have been bought, 127 to be build in Canada this year of those 300 to 500 have been “combat loses” in Iraq, no official number for the obovious reasons and that was before Stryker Units were thrown into the thick of combat.
It is way to late to suggest that the Stryker be pulled in order to save lives, five Strykers in one Company were destroyed in one day, all that can be said is may God Bless the Souls of all who ride in this machine of death.
ALLONS,
Byron Skinner
Not 100% sure, Grandjester. The Crusader (now cancelled) was supposed to use a new diesel powerplant (more power, more fuel efficient than the turbine), but I’ve read stuff on the web about hybrid powerplants that should be a huge improvement on what we have now. Here’s a link to an article that talks about it. http://www.nxtbook.com/nxtbooks/mh/dti0506/
That’s grimly “funny”, Byron, considering how ballyhooed the Stryker was a few years ago by those who were pushing the insane ‘smaller, lighter, faster” idea on the Army, who tried mightily to resist the Stryker. One can only hope that the Pentagon has learned their lesson from this fiasco. Any bets?
Max, interesting stuff. The redundancy of dual power is pretty evident and the extra electricity is great for all of the power hunger littel gadgets we have become addicted to (I half expect along with radios, gps, c&c we’ll end up with espresso machines and ez-bake ovens ala Homer Simpson). Cooling and battery type/life seem to be the biggest obstacle. I would be concerned about the effects on crew during a penetrating hit through a battery compartment, nasty stuff in there. My brother has told me of issues with consumer hybrids in crashes, with firefighters using jaws of life on high voltage components. Still, anything that gets us less dependent on black gold had got to be an improvement.
My god, I am agreeing with Max on something.
The arguement about armour is interesting. I’m not much on weapons and all that.. but more into history.
this reminds me of pre-world war 1 where the invention of the dreadnaught changed everything… where people believed speed was it’s own armour. And then the battle where the british sunk 1/2 the germany navy happened and the british lost a lot of ships. I don’t know the exact dates.. but I think there is a comparision that applies.
The big difference is that armoured vehicles generally will move, stop moving, and move again.. where as battle ships keep forward motion.
“I half expect along with radios, gps, c&c we’ll end up with espresso machines and ez-bake ovens ala Homer Simpson”
LOL ;D Good stuff.
“who knows whether IEDs will be relevant at all in the next conflict?”
They’re too good not to be used in the indefinite future.
Foreign.Boy, you are talking about the Battlecruiser concept. Battleships were designed with enough armomr to withstand hits from the guns as powerfull as the ones they carry, which of course put limitations on range and speed. So the commander of Royal Navy, Jackie Fisher had a brilliant idea: why not build ships armored as cruisers but packing the big guns of the battleships? What could go wrong?
Well, plenty. The ships were originally designed for fast strike operations, but often misused. Whenever they ran into a true battleship (see Hood V. Bismark)it was all over.
It’s always been a contest of one-upsmanship between mobility, firepower, and armor, as some of the posts noted. Since we have no effective defense right now against IED’s in the form of EFP’s, heavier armor is all we have to stop them or reduce their impact rather. Mobility is good to have, but cannot stop an IED. What we really need are force fields, anti-gravity, phasers, etc, but unfortunately those are only fantasy right now.
I’m not sure that it’s fair to compare the Stryker against heavier vehicles when it’s in a fight it wasn’t designed for. Perhaps the question isn’t whether or not the Stryker is a failure in Iraq. I think the question to ask might be: What are the Stryker brigades still doing in Iraq?
Answer: because there’s nothing to send to take their place.
The Stryker brigades are configured for expeditionary operations where mobility at the strategic and tactical levels are preferred. Mid, and even high intensity conflict. The Stryker vehicles were chosen because they fit that bill. Stryker brigades would have been ideal for the actual invasion of Iraq in 2003.
The problem is that they’re now placed in a low-intensity conflict where they can be attacked at close range in predictable situations in a prolonged insurgency. The threat is no longer 14.5mm heavy machine guns, or even artillery: it’s whatever can be buried on an unguarded road in the middle of the night. As many have pointed out, there’s not much anyone can do to protect against that.
Dismounted patrolling by a large infantry force capable of denying insurgents the ability to conduct operations is historically the best way to beat an insurgency. We don’t have that. So we send the Strykers, again and again, and they do well until the enemy figures out how to take them down.
Patrols can be avoided, but it’s hard to place an IED on a road when there’s someone standing guard over the road. What we need is to get the Strykers out of Iraq (so we can have a strategic reserve again) and lease about eight leg infantry divisions from India. Oh yeah, and the force fields.
What we need instead of the strykers are heavy duty mine clearing vehicles that are designed to detect and neutralize threats such as the IEDs. Such a vehicle was the Grizzly Combat Mobility Vehicle which is now on display at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds ordinance museum. Ehy is it there instead of Iraq? so Shinseki could get his all tired vehicles known as the Stryker. It was a mistake to purchase the Stryker but the leaders are going to keep trying to prove they were right regardless of how many times the facts prove them wrong.
I am also tired of hearing the Sryker advocates refering to how the soldiers love the the Stryker but not giving the rest of the story that the soldiers only like the Stryker because they didn’t have anything before or were stuck pulling combat patrols in HMMWVs.
I say we heavily arm monster trucks and kick some ass while we’re at it. Semper Fi!!
I think this is the definitive evaluation on the Stryker.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2003_rpt/stryker_reality_of_war.pdf
Stryker’s biggest operational weaknesses, IMHO:
1) Poor off-road performance. When you can’t go off-road and the enemy knows you can’t go off-road, he’s going to concentrate his ordnance on the roads. This makes for predictable deployments. Tracked vehicles don’t have this disadvantage. They can go where they bloody well please.
2) On-road, they’re well, they’re still 20 ton trucks. Makes ‘em a little tricky to maneuver in city streets. Reminds me a bit of when I kept on failing my driver’s license test as a kid. I had an ’86 Mitsubishi B2600 with no power steering and breaks. K-turns burned me more times then I care to admit. Borrowed my ex-GF’s Toyota and it was a breeze.
3) Unit-cost ($4 million unit initially, $1-$2 million amoritized–I think) vs. unit-survivability. It’s bad enough that the Pentagon has (last I checked) kept Stryker losses classified. I can find pretty reliable figures on Abrams & Bradley mobility & vehicle kills. Nada on Stryker. This kind of obfuscation suggests they’d the Powers That Be would prefer we don’t know how messy it is. Anyway, if the bad guys spend $100 bucks each for every 20 roadside bomb (for example) & get 1 kill in 20 or 2 kills in 20, they’ve effectively won. They’re fighting a war of attrition, after all, psychologically & economically.
Front a tactical/logistical (if not necessarily political) perspective, Israel, frankly, is much better equipped for battle taxi deployment in the middle-east. Shorter supply lines mean they can field their Achzarit HAPCs (some of which are being upgraded with the SAMSON RCWS & optional 30 mm, according to NIMDA). I’m not sure what will happen with the Namer–nifty convserion, but the $1.5 million unit-cost may be more then Israel can/will afford.
Others may disagree, but I just think the Stryker is a poor compromise. And an expensive one at that. And the hush-hush on unit losses makes me nervous.
Graham Strouse
grahamcstrouse@yahoo.com
Todd,
Incidentally:
I like your style. Very A-Team. Rather practical, really. Ford F-35 with a lift, skirts, decent armor, an RCWS & gun ports…maybe a kick-ass stereo system.
Very budget-minded, really, in the long run.