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Archive for August, 2007

New Combat Rifle Enters the Fray

Friday, August 31st, 2007

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Theres been a lot of debate recently about the whole issue of small arms, par­tic­u­larly with the effec­tive­ness of the Colt M4 car­bine. The Armys reli­a­bil­ity study demon­strated that if well lubed, the M4 per­forms largely with­out fight-​​ending stop­page. But theres con­tin­ued argu­ment over the knock-​​down power of the 5.56mm round, the reli­a­bil­ity of the M4 if con­stant care isnt pos­si­ble and on the whole issue of whether or not theres a bet­ter oper­at­ing sys­tem out there. 

The debate is just reach­ing a crit­i­cal point, with the Army recently cav­ing to pres­sure from Capitol Hill and agree­ing to hold a sand­storm test between its M4 and a cou­ple other car­bines that fire on a dif­fer­ent oper­at­ing sys­tem many say is more reli­able. With the end-​​strength increase in the Army and Marine Corps and the over­all focus of bud­get atten­tion on land forces, momen­tum may be build­ing to issue a new infantry rifle as the Army and Marine Corps build new brigade com­bat teams and infantry battalions. 

Theres no one in the DoD offi­cially say­ing this yet, but a lot more peo­ple in high places are ask­ing pre­vi­ously taboo ques­tions on whether its time to throw the stoner design to the side. 

Weve already taken a look at three of the most pop­u­lar com­peti­tors to the M4: the XM8, the H&K 416 and the FN SCAR — or Mk-​​17 and Mk-​​16. Well, a buddy passed along another inter­est­ing entrant into the new car­bine world (thats not to say there arent oth­ers out there, but this ones the new kid on the block) which seems to meld all the best aspects of the pre­vi­ous three rifles into one.

Made by Longmont, Colorado-​​based Magpul Industries Corp., the Masada does have that first per­son shooter gamer nerd look to it. But look at the specs and it seems the Masada has some inter­est­ing aspects that would make oper­a­tors give it a sec­ond look. One thing I noticed was the two inter­change­able low­ers one for 5.56mm, the other for AK-​​47 7.62x39 ammo. So for shoot­ers going native in the AO, this could be the ticket — of course, as long as you have a com­pat­i­ble barrel.

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The Dragon Enters the Bear’s Den

Friday, August 31st, 2007

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Two Chinese naval ships vis­ited the Russian port city of St. Petersburg on the Gulf of Finland on August 27. This is believed to be the first time that a Chinese war­ship has vis­ited the one-​​time Russian cap­i­tal, which remains the coun­trys sec­ond city and a major port, naval cen­ter, and ship­build­ing cen­ter of Russia.

The Peoples Liberation Armys mis­sile destroyer Guangzhou and the replen­ish­ment ship Weishanhu are on an 87-​​day cruise that is also tak­ing them to ports in Britain, France, and Spain. The two ships are under the com­mand of Vice Admiral Su Zhiqian, the deputy com­man­der of the South Sea Fleet. (The PLA Navy is divided into three fleets — the North, East, and South Sea Fleets.)

The two ships, expected to travel some 23,000 nau­ti­cal miles on their cruise, are among Chinas most mod­ern naval units. The cruise appar­ently has a dual mis­sion — train­ing for the offi­cers and enlisted men, and demon­strat­ing the increas­ing naval capa­bil­i­ties of China.

The Guangzhouwas built in China, being com­pleted in 2004. She is a multi-​​purpose destroyer, with anti-​​air, anti-​​submarine, and anti-​​ship weapons. A heli­copter is embarked in the ship, which has a full load dis­place­ment of 6,500 tons. It is sig­nif­i­cant that the Guangzhou is a Chinese-​​built ship and not one of the four Russian-​​built Sovremennyy-​​class mis­sile destroy­ers deliv­ered to China from 1999 to 2006.

The Weishanhu, a 22,000-ton replen­ish­ment ship com­pleted in 2005, can trans­fer fuel, pro­vi­sions, and muni­tions while under­way to ships along­side or astern. She, too, has a heli­copter capability.

Norman Polmar

China Rolls Over Taiwan

Thursday, August 30th, 2007

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I know its kind of ran­dom, and the sourc­ing is a bit strange com­ing from the American Conservative mag­a­zine, but a piece writ­ten by a UPI reporter in the mag­a­zine that posits how a poten­tial con­flict between China and the United States over Taiwan would go is worth a read.

This piece comes on a day that Chinese defense chief Cao Gangchuan told his Japanese coun­ter­parts Chinas mil­i­tary is not a threat to secu­rity in the region and that his defense buildup and devel­op­ment are becom­ing more transparent.

But he did reit­er­ate that the main jus­ti­fi­ca­tion for Chinas accel­er­at­ing defense spend­ing and buildup is pri­mar­ily due to ten­sions over the Taiwan issue.

Give the futur­is­tic “The Chips are Down” piece a read and see what you think…food for thought at least.

…Beijing announced that if the newly elected gov­ern­ment in Taiwan declared inde­pen­dence, China would inter­vene mil­i­tar­ily. The United States responded by dis­patch­ing two car­rier task forces attached to the USS Abraham Lincoln and the USS Ronald Reagan. Besides the usual high-​​tech arma­ment, includ­ing ship-​​to-​​shore mis­siles, ship-​​to-​​air mis­siles, and ship-​​to-​​ship mis­siles, and 400-​​odd war­planes aboard the car­ri­ers, the com­bined task force also included two Battalion Landing Teams, some 4,000 Marines.

The Chinese had nowhere near as many war­ships, planes, or tanks, but they had 350,000 men aboard trans­port ship­sand they had a secret weapon in orbit.

As the Chinese expe­di­tionary force approached Taiwan, they crossed an imag­i­nary red line drawn across a Pentagon map, breach­ing the point American gen­er­als esti­mated would be one from which the Chinese would not turn back.

From his com­mand post aboard the USS Ronald Reagan, Adm. Anthony S. Samuelson picked up a secure tele­phone con­nect­ing him directly to the Pentagon and to the office of the sec­re­tary of defense. The sec­re­tary picked up on the first ring.

Tell me its good news, admiral.

Wish I could, sir. They are now in fir­ing range and are not about to turn around. It looks like this is it.

The sec­re­tary of defense asked the admi­ral to stand by. He picked up a bur­gundy phone on his desk.

The pres­i­dent answered instantly. Madame President, said the sec­re­tary, You must order the attack. If we are to pro­ceed, it must be now.

The pres­i­dent scanned the room, mov­ing her eyes around the Oval Office where her national secu­rity advis­ers were gath­ered. Each in turn nod­ded his head, indi­cat­ing a silent yes. The pres­i­dent of the United States put the phone to her ear and told her sec­re­tary of defense to pro­ceed. With a heavy heart, Chelsea Clinton placed the receiver back in its cradle.

As the first Chinese sol­dier set foot on the beaches of Taiwan, the order was received from Adm. Samuelsons head­quar­ters to open fire.

Minutes before the order was given, some 300 miles up in space, a Chinese sci­en­tific satel­lite released a burst of electro-​​magnetic energy aimed at American and Taiwanese forces. Other sim­i­lar satel­lites posi­tioned strate­gi­cally around the Earth released a num­ber of sim­i­lar bursts directed at strate­gic U.S. mis­sile silos in the con­ti­nen­tal United States, Korea, and Australia.

Total con­fu­sion fol­lowed. Not one order issued elec­tron­i­cally by U.S. command-​​and-​​control cen­ters reached its tar­get. Missiles fired from the ships of the Seventh Fleet went straight into space and exploded harm­lessly above the earth. The Abrams M1A1 tanks started to turn around in cir­cles like demented pre­his­toric dogs try­ing to bite their tails. The few planes that man­aged to take off from the car­ri­ers crashed into the South China Sea. Search-​​and-​​rescue heli­copters were unable to even start their engines.

The Chinese were able to walk ashore and take Taiwan with­out fir­ing a sin­gle shot. 

(Gouge: NC)

– Christian

Amazing MRAP Survival Photos

Thursday, August 30th, 2007

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Ive caught a lot of flak for my lack of enthu­si­asm with the MRAP vehi­cle. Some read­ers have maligned my intent, expe­ri­ence, report­ing and gen­eral under­stand­ing of the issue with­out con­sid­er­ing my argu­ment care­fully and read­ing closely to what I say.

I rec­og­nize that my stance on the MRAP debate is con­tro­ver­sial and con­trar­ian, but I see that as part of my job as DefenseTech edi­tor to seed the conversation.

One thing I have never argued is the pro­tec­tive capa­bil­ity of the MRAP. Its con­struc­tion and design run cir­cles around the Humvee if pro­tect­ing the pax and crew is your sole pri­or­ity. Its an amaz­ing vehi­cle that can really take a pounding.

DefenseTech ran across these pic­tures that attest to the MRAPs sur­viv­abil­ity.mrap-thumb.jpg
As you can see, the entire Marine con­voy is com­prised of MRAPs, and the Cougar which was hit by the IED gets truly banged up. But no one inside was killed and every­one escaped with only minor injuries. (Check out the engine blown 100 yards away)…

I dont nec­es­sar­ily agree with the idea that all Humvees in Iraq should be replaced with MRAPs. But see­ing these pho­tos has me almost convinced.

Christian

Heat Ray Too Scary for Iraq

Wednesday, August 29th, 2007

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Many a DT reader will remem­ber the so-​​called Active Denial System a giant millimeter-​​wave elec­tro­mag­netic antenna mounted on a Humvee that could be directed at large, unruly crowds to dis­perse them with­out fir­ing a shot in anger.

The ray heats the human skin to such an uncom­fort­able level that he has to retreat. It is the hall­mark of the Pentagons non-​​lethal weapons devel­op­ment plan…and the most controversial.

Well, it looks like com­man­ders in Iraq have been plead­ing for the device, which is pretty far along in its devel­op­ment. But fear­ing the post-​​Taser back­lash from some groups, the Pentagon denied the tech­nol­ogy in favor of more lethal methods.

It would be a famil­iar scene in Iraq’s next few years: Crowds gather, insur­gents min­gle with civil­ians. Troops open fire, and inno­cents die.

All the while, accord­ing to inter­nal mil­i­tary cor­re­spon­dence obtained by The Associated Press, U.S. com­man­ders were telling Washington that many civil­ian casu­al­ties could be avoided by using a new non-​​lethal weapon devel­oped over the past decade.

Military lead­ers repeat­edly and urgently requested — and were denied — the device, which uses energy beams instead of bul­lets and lets sol­diers break up unruly crowds with­out fir­ing a shot.

It’s a ray gun that nei­ther kills nor maims, but the Pentagon has refused to deploy it out of con­cern that the weapon itself might be seen as a tor­ture device.

Perched on a Humvee or a flatbed truck, the Active Denial System gives peo­ple hit by the invis­i­ble beam the sense that their skin is on fire. They move out of the way quickly and with­out injury.

On April 30, 2003, two days after the first Fallujah inci­dent, Gene McCall, then the top sci­en­tist at Air Force Space Command in Colorado, typed out a two-​​sentence e-​​mail to Gen. Richard Myers, chair­man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

“I am con­vinced that the tragedy at Fallujah would not have occurred if an Active Denial System had been there,” McCall told Myers, accord­ing to the e-​​mail obtained by AP. The sys­tem should become “an imme­di­ate pri­or­ity,” McCall said.

Myers referred McCall’s mes­sage to his staff, accord­ing to the e-​​mail chain. 

It seems this is the sort of catch-​​22 the mil­i­tary is in when it comes to non-​​lethals. The devices con­jure up grim images of pain and dis­com­fort when you look at what they do, so groups object to them often on human rights grounds and ethics.

But whats the alter­na­tive? Getting U.S. troops and other per­son­nel killed, or using deadly force. So it looks like weve got a lit­tle ways to go before we can col­lec­tively wrap our minds around the issue and get these tools out to where theyre needed.

Watch a video of the ADS at work HERE. (Best line: “I think we had a crowd of two for about two seconds…”)

And check out the entire story posted HERE on Military​.com.

Christian

Return of the “Elephant Gun”

Wednesday, August 29th, 2007

I was intro­duced to big bore anti-​​tank (anti-​​material) rifles back in the 80s when I became an ardent fol­lower of the board game Advanced Squad Leader (ASL was orig­i­nally pro­duced by the Avalon Hill Game Company, which was pur­chased by Hasbro, who dis­con­tin­ued pro­duc­tion of the game. ASL is now pub­lished by MLB pitcher Curt Schilling and his Multi-​​Man Publishing com­pany.) For those of you unfa­mil­iar with the game, ASL was arguably the most accu­rate and detailed squad level tac­ti­cal board game ever devel­oped, with coun­ters rep­re­sent­ing indi­vid­ual squads, lead­ers, tanks and sup­port weapons.
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Anyway, the one sup­port weapon that caught my eye was the L-​​39 Lahti 20mm AT rifle. In game terms the Lahti was heavy (5 portage points) and it fired off of the AVF kill table under the 20L col­umn (the only squad portable weapon capa­ble of doing so.) In real life terms the L-​​39 was heavy, (109 pounds, nec­es­sa­tat­ing its trans­port by rein­deer) and pos­sessed such sav­age recoil (its car­tridge, the 20 mm x 138 mm Solothurn Long, was the largest ever fired by a shoul­der fired weapon in the war) that the Finns dubbed it the “Norsupyssy” (“Elephant Gun”), but it was also capa­ble of reach­ing out 1,000m and pen­e­trat­ing 10mm of armor plate. Rendered obso­lete by advanced Soviet tank designs by 1941, the incre­di­a­ble accu­racy of the L-​​39 enabled it to remain in ser­vice as a long range sniper rifle. 

Seventy years later, the con­cept of the long range, big bore, anti-​​material rifle has come full cir­cle. With .50 cal­iber (12.7mm) rifles a dime a dozen, my ques­tion now is, who fields the new Elephant Gun of the 21st century?

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Endgame in Iraq

Wednesday, August 29th, 2007

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As many of you already know, Stratfor has been an impor­tant resource for deep analy­sis of many geostrate­gic prob­lems fac­ing the United States. While their analy­sis is typ­i­cally dry and dis­pas­sion­ate, they tend to exam­ine all angles with­out favor and do a pretty good job of dis­till­ing the issue for gen­eral consumption.

They have not been Iraq war cheer­lead­ers, nor have they been obses­sively morose in their char­ac­ter­i­za­tion of the chal­lenges there. So I thought it might be a thought-​​provoking exer­cise to include an excerpt here of their most recent analy­sis of the options in Iraq, which is posted in full on Military​.coms Warfighters Forum page.

While I under­stand none of you want this page to turn into an Iraq War site, we will be includ­ing a few more Iraq items than usual as the Sept. 15 interim report dead­line approaches.

…Following the Republican defeat in Congress in November, U.S. President George W. Bush sur­prised Iran by increas­ing U.S. forces in Iraq rather than begin­ning with­drawals. This cre­ated a win­dow of a few months dur­ing which Tehran, weigh­ing the risks and rewards, was suf­fi­ciently uncer­tain that it might have opted for an agree­ment thrust­ing the Shiites behind a coali­tion gov­ern­ment. That moment has passed. As the NIE points out, the prob­a­bil­ity of form­ing any viable gov­ern­ment in Baghdad is extremely low. Iran no longer is fac­ing its worst-​​case sce­nario. It has no moti­va­tion to bail the United States out.

What, then, is the United States to do? In gen­eral, three options are avail­able. The first is to main­tain the cur­rent strat­egy. This is the administration’s point of view. The sec­ond is to start a phased with­drawal, begin­ning some­time in the next few months and con­clud­ing when cir­cum­stances allow. This is the con­sen­sus among most cen­trist Democrats and a grow­ing num­ber of Republicans. The third is a rapid with­drawal of forces, a posi­tion held by a fairly small group mostly but not exclu­sively on the left. All three con­ven­tional options, how­ever, suf­fer from fatal defects.

Bush’s plan to stay the course would appear to make rel­a­tively lit­tle sense. Having pur­sued a strate­gic goal with rel­a­tively fixed means for more than four years, it is unclear what would be achieved in years five or six. As the old saw goes, the def­i­n­i­tion of insan­ity is doing the same thing repeat­edly, expect­ing a dif­fer­ent out­come. Unless Bush seri­ously dis­agrees with the NIE, it is dif­fi­cult to make a case for con­tin­u­ing the cur­rent course.

Looking at it dif­fer­ently, how­ever, there are these argu­ments to be made for main­tain­ing the cur­rent strat­egy: Whatever mis­takes might have been made in the past, the cur­rent real­ity is that any with­drawal from Iraq would cre­ate a vac­uum, which would rapidly be filled by Iran. Alternatively, Iraq could become a jihadist haven, focus­ing atten­tion not only on Iraq but also on tar­gets out­side Iraq. After all, a jihadist safe-​​haven with abun­dant resources in the heart of the Arab world out­weighs the strate­gic locale of Afghanistan. Therefore, con­tin­u­ing the U.S. pres­ence in Iraq, at the cost of 1,000–2,000 American lives a year, pre­vents both out­comes, even if Washington no longer has any hope of achiev­ing the orig­i­nal goal… 

Read the entire Endgame arti­cle in this weeks Warfighters Forum.

Christian

UPDATE: CSAR-​​X Disclosure…

Tuesday, August 28th, 2007

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UPDATE: DefenseTech has learned that while Maj. Gen. Comer did work at AIC when the com­pany was a sub­con­trac­tor to Sikorsky dur­ing CSAR-​​X com­pe­ti­tion, he was act­ing only as a con­sul­tant to AIC at the time he wrote the note posted on DefenseTech last week — but not on the CSAR-​​X account.

Maj. Gen. Comer replies:

I wrote the let­ter because I think the H-​​47 is not the right heli­copter for the need. I did work for AIC and AIC had a con­tract with Sikorsky. AIC got bought out and threw me over the side. They had no room for me after that, so I left and became a con­sul­tant. I have advised AIC a cou­ple of times since, mostly on SOF and over­seas busi­ness. I do not have an affil­i­a­tion with Sikorsky, but I do have friends in that company–as I do in Boeing and Lockheed.

There will be plenty of Chinooks avail­able for the high alti­tude mis­sions which may come up. There will also be some V-​​22s, an air­caft I am on record for sup­port­ing in greater num­bers. The AF res­cue mis­sion will need to deploy quickly, fit in lots of LZs and will ben­e­fit from not fly­ing the largest, hottest, loud­est, and most expen­sive heli­copter. That’s all I said. It’s true. 

We again want to thank alert read­ers, and Maj. Gen. Comer, for clear­ing the record…

– Christian

Full Disclosure on CSAR-​​X

Tuesday, August 28th, 2007

Our thanks goes out to an alert DT reader who brought to our atten­tion a mit­i­gat­ing fact in the ongo­ing (fueled mostly by the protest­ing par­ties) debate over the CSAR-​​X program.

On August 21, DefenseTech posted a let­ter for­warded to us writ­ten by a for­mer top gen­eral in the Air Force search and res­cue com­mu­nity who had some pretty harsh words for the source selec­tion offi­cials and the ulti­mate deci­sion to award Boeing with the CSAR-​​X contract.

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He signed the let­ter with his name and for­mer rank only. But what he left out is more reveal­ing than what he put in his letter.

It turns out Maj. Gen. Richard Comer (ret.) is the exec­u­tive vice pres­i­dent of Aerospace Integration Corporation based in Mary Esther, Fl. AIC announced with great glee in February of last year its selec­tion as a part­ner with Sikorsky to do sys­tems inte­gra­tion work for the com­pa­nys HH-​​92 CSAR-​​X bid. Both Sikorsky and Lockheed Martin are protest­ing Boeings win.

In Comers let­ter, he out­lines his cre­den­tials in the open­ing para­graph, but declines to men­tion hes employed by a Sikorsky sub­con­trac­tor. He impugns the motives of the source selec­tion offi­cials in the Air Force, say­ing they were prob­a­bly the vic­tims of group think though he caveated his remarks by say­ing the offi­cers were con­sci­en­tious and hon­est in their decision.

Our reader knows Comer and was stung by his crass asser­tion with­out ever reveal­ing that he has a finan­cial inter­est in Boeings demise, sell­ing his soul for 30 pieces of Sikorsky silver.

And he raises a very valid point. The source selec­tors in the DoD are pre­cluded by law from dis­cussing any of their moti­va­tions beyond the stated spec­i­fi­ca­tions and how the selected air­craft met them. But that hasnt stopped the pro­test­ers from pump­ing out info to folks like us here at DefenseTech under­cut­ting Boeings win and fuel­ing the fire of protest. The gov­ern­ment folks can say noth­ing while the fur is flying.

Sober peo­ple can debate the strengths and weak­nesses of the Boeing win. Were agnos­tic on the issue other than to say that it seems the Air Force picked a heavy lift heli­copter for a medium lift job. Hearing the Boeing folks talk about the supe­rior range, speed and pay­load of the HH-​​47 was kind of like hear­ing Boeing say the C-​​17 is bet­ter than the Lockheed Martin C-​​130of course, theyre dif­fer­ent air­craft in sep­a­rate classes.

But its start­ing to get to the point where the debate has devolved into the arcane world of defense con­tract­ing pro­ce­dure and who dot­ted which i and crossed what t and when. At the same time, America has hun­dreds of thou­sands of troops world­wide in com­bat who will need this capa­bil­ity and it may start get­ting to the point where the bick­er­ing comes at the cost of our troops lives.

We want to extend our deep thanks to our read­ers for pro­vid­ing us impor­tant infor­ma­tion that helps advance all the sto­ries posted on DefenseTech. Its dif­fi­cult for us to read all the com­ments on each post, so if you have cru­cial infor­ma­tion that can help expand on the posts, please send an email to the EDITOR.

Christian

Japan Launches Carrier…Sorta

Tuesday, August 28th, 2007

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The Japanese Navy — offi­cially the Maritime Self-​​Defense Force — has launched an air­craft car­rier. At least the Hyuga, launched at Yokohama on August 23, looks like an air­craft car­rier — she has a flush flight deck and a large, starboard-​​side island struc­ture. But the Hyuga is a rel­a­tively small ship as car­ri­ers go, with a stan­dard dis­place­ment of 13,500 (met­ric) tonnes and will dis­place 18,000 tonnes full load. That is about the size of the planned U.S. destroy­ers of the Zumwalt (DDG 1000) class.

The Hyuga is clas­si­fied as a helicopter-​​carrying destroyer (DDH 181) by the Japanese. She will carry an Aegis-​​type air defense sys­tem, with the U.S.-developed AN/​SPY-​​1 multi-​​function radar; her prin­ci­pal weapons arma­ment will be 64 advanced ESSM-​​type Sparrow mis­siles. She will also be fit­ted with two 20-​​mm Phalanx Gatling guns for close-​​in defense against anti-​​ship mis­siles, and she will have six tubes for anti-​​submarine tor­pe­does.
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(EDITOR: Thanks to DT reader “Camp” for links to Hyuga pics…)

More sig­nif­i­cant from an avi­a­tion view­point, the Hyuga will nor­mally oper­ate three SH-​​60J Blackhawk-​​type anti-​​submarine heli­copters and one MH-​​53E Super Stallion multi-​​purpose heli­copter. Reportedly, the ships hangar can accom­mo­date 11 of the smaller aircraft.

Ironically, the U.S. Navy briefly, and mostly at con­gres­sional insis­tence, looked at sim­i­lar aircraft-​​carrying destroyer designs in the 1970s. Based on the U.S. Spruance (DD 963) design, such ships could have oper­ated Harrier VSTOL air­craft as well as heli­copters on a mod­i­fied destroyer hull. (Congress voted fund­ing for two such ships, but instead the Navy sim­ply built another con­ven­tional destroyer.)

The Hyuga, the largest war­ship con­structed in Japan since World War II, is con­sid­ered by some observers to be the first step toward the devel­op­ment of a large air­craft car­rier. Japans con­sti­tu­tion, imposed by the United States after World War II, per­mits Japanese to have only self-​​defense forces. Many Japanese, recall­ing the effec­tive­ness of Japanese air­craft car­ri­ers in China in the 1930s and against U.S. forces in the Pacific in the early stages of World War II, con­sider car­ri­ers to be offen­sive weapons.

Japan was a leader in car­rier devel­op­ment in the 1930s and early 1940 with their short-​​lived car­rier Shinano, which was con­verted dur­ing con­struc­tion from a bat­tle­ship. It was the worlds largest car­rier to be built prior to the USS Forrestal (CVA 59), com­pleted in 1955.

The over­whelm­ing depen­dence of Japan on oil from the Middle East, with tankers hav­ing to tran­sit long ocean dis­tances, and the increas­ing Japanese political-​​economic involve­ment in the Middle East and Africa, has led many Japanese lead­ers to look at the util­ity of naval forces in a new light.

In this con­text, the inno­v­a­tive design of the Hyuga raises the ques­tion: Whats next?

Norman Polmar