The CSAR-X debate is heating back up again, with two powerful Senators on the Armed Services Committee telling Pentagon chief Gates they would withhold funds from the new rescue helicopter program until the DoDs investigation into the procurement process for the controversial aircraft is concluded.
Heres an excerpt…
…Complaints by Lockheed Martin Corporation and Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation, validated in part by the Government Accountability Office, call into question whether the Air Force has used a capabilities-based approach for this acquisition that is traceable, repeatable and feasible.
…We intend to offer an amendment to the Fiscal Year 2008 National Defense Authorization Act that would prohibit expenditure of any funds for the CSAR-X program during fiscal year 2008 until the later of the 60 legislative days after DoD approves the Air Force decision or the DoD provides the congressional defense committees with written notice in accordance with established procedures.
Read the entire letter obtained by Defense Tech HERE.
Additionally, the Project on Government Oversights top investigator on this case Nick Schwellenbach — posted an interesting analysis on their site the other day…
This March, Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne told Lt. General John L. “Jack” Hudson in an email that “I would like to stay with our selection” of Boeing’s HH-47 Chinook helicopter for the combat search and rescue helicopter replacement (CSAR-X), according to a protest filing by rival defense contractor Sikorsky.
Lt. General Hudson is in charge of selecting the company that receives the contract for the CSAR-X. Wynne’s statement came after the Government Accountability Office (GAO) sustained procurement protests by rivals Sikorsky and Lockheed Martin, and Congress began to scrutinize the CSAR-X program’s selection of the Chinook last
November.In February, the GAO ruled that the Air Force’s evaluation of each proposal’s costs was not made according to the evaluation criteria made in the contract solicitation. GAO recommended that the Air Force clarify its basis for evaluations and request revised proposals from the competing contractors. The Air Force released an amendment to its CSAR-X request for proposals in May, but has been met with additional protests by Lockheed Martin and Sikorsky for not
addressing the problems found by GAO. The March 3, 2007, email appears to affirm the view of some insiders that the Air Force’s response to the GAO is simply a face-saving measure.Sikorsky quoted Secretary Wynne’s email in its July 2, 2007, protest of the Air Force’s amended solicitation, which the Project On Government Oversight (POGO) has obtained. Sikorsky obtained the email and other documents from the Air Force, which was responding to Sikorsky’s legal actions, according to the protest filing. POGO does not have a copy of the email itself, so it is possible that necessary context has been left out. On its face, however, the partial quote does raise questions about the Air Force’s commitment to a fair
and transparent evaluation.Wynne’s email seems consistent with his answers to reporters after his February 28, 2007, congressional testimony before the House Armed Services Committee that he would “like to stay with what we got [referring to the Boeing HH-47] and get this product going as soon as possible.” He also stated that the Air Force is considering whether it can take corrective action “more narrowly” than what GAO had recommended, according to a Reuters article (Andrea Shalal-Esa, “US Air Force wants no long delay on new helicopter,” February 28, 2007).
“Either the Air Force is serious about fairly and transparently re-evaluating a bungled competition, or they’re wasting everyone’s time,” said POGO Defense Investigator Nick Schwellenbach, who had been investigating the CSAR-X program. “When coupled with the evaluation inconsistencies pointed out by Sikorsky and Lockheed Martin, this email seems to indicate the latter.“
And pro-Lockheed/Sikorsky DT fans sent along a copy of a letter addressed to House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee chair John Murtha from former AFSOC bubba, Maj. Gen. Richard Comer, who says:
I know a couple of the guys who were on the selection board for the CSAR-X and I have talked with them about their thought process. I believe they did their jobs honestly and with a great deal of conscientiousness. I also believe they talked themselves into what they think is the right decision. Still, I disagree, and I believe they got into a group think situation and reached the wrong conclusion on what helicopter the Air Force should require
Read the entire Comer letter HERE.
Just a little CSAR-X information grab bag for you to chew over and impress your friends during the next cocktail hour conversation.
> “Either the Air Force is serious about fairly and transparently re-evaluating a bungled competition, or they’re wasting everyone’s time,” said POGO Defense Investigator Nick Schwellenbach
or maybe they’re serious about not wanting to waste time pandering to whiney losers who can only come up with incredibly narrow and obscure objections that miss the bigger picture:
they aren’t as good and still won’t be no matter how many times they redo the competition
The H-47 frame is a current frame still being used by the Army & special forces.What was the CSAR-X competing against,the Pave Low? Whats that,the Air force version of a H-53 Sea Stallion,which only recently,they started building again & the CH-53K Super Stallion,as far as I know,hasn’t even been test flighted yet right? This whole ‘scandal’ thing is such a joke.
I mean its not like the Air Force has not used large helicopters before for Search & Rescue(Jolly Green Giant anyone?).Anybody suggest the V-22 Osprey & someone else will come up with a reason why thats wrong too.
> What was the CSAR-X competing against,the Pave Low?
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/prv.htm
the US101 and VH-92
> Anybody suggest the V-22 Osprey & someone else will come up with a reason why thats wrong too.
as i understand it, the main reason the osprey dropped out is that it couldn’t meed the c-17 transportability requirement
The H-47 did NOT compete against the PAVE LOW! This was NOT an apples to apples competition. The US101 and the S-92 are categorized as Medium Lift while the H-47 is clearly a Heavy Lift asset. To Mr. Smiths comment, the Jolly Green is the H-53 which AFSOC utilizes todate. AFSOC is moving from the H-53 to the V-22 because of its mission requirements. Furthermore, the US Army and SOCOM does NOT utilize the H-47 for CSAR or a CSAR type missions. It is my understanding the USAF did not want to consider the H-53 because is was to Big! Those who look at rotor footprints get out the measuring stick and see the difference between the two. Take a look at the total aircraft capabilities and then respond. I do not agree with the “scandal is a joke” but the USAF needs to understand the total cost of doing business not just purchase cost. What about facilities, training, tactical doctrine? Their entire program will change not just the air vehicle executing the mission. What is that price tag going to be. Lastly, take a look at the –47, –101 and the –92 current service levels and tell me which one meets or exceeds the current USAF mission demands (flight hour requirements) and has an availability rate greater than 95%?
That story should day it all.
The reason the V-22 dropped out was twofold; first, there was the cost of the platform which made it prohibitive from a budgetary perspective (and why Boeing would rather propose a 47, remember the V-22 fuselage is built at the same plant as the 47); two, even back as far as the AoA the V-22 wasn’t considered because of disc loading (it was assumed that the V-22’s disc load would cause too much downwash).
I just wonder what’s so bad about a UH-60M CSAR variant…Army is recapping it’s 60 fleet with the M model (and some L’s) so why shouldn’t the AF do the same with it’s 60 fleet?
This entire award process was a joke. The RFP specifically outlined the need for a Medium Lift helicopter to replace the HH-60 airframes. Having done significant design work on the 92, its a logical choice for a replacement as its based upon the S-70 airframe and addresses all the issues the AF has with the current vehicle (range, payload, interior capacity). If they found the HH-60 a suitable A/C for the original CSAR role then the twin engine, medium lift, low-maintenance HH-92 would have met the new requirement with the lowest cost. The 101 is an impressive machine, but the 3rd engine presents a lot of MMH/FH issues, and LM is not doing great with the VH-71 procurement. How the HH-47 was even considered for a CSAR role is beyond comprehension from this designer’s point of view. The noise, downwash, footprint, maintenance, and vulnerability concerns seem to outweigh any of the Air Force’s weak rationale.
Using the H-60 makes sense,why then is the Air Force seemingly phasing out the Pave Hawk? Since they have H-60 helicopters already,why not upgrade them to do search & rescue? I see a crazy phasing out of stable competent systems by all services but nothing to replace them,just the excuse “the cold war’s over.” The Russians are still using a propeller driven bomber(although I seriously wonder how successful it would be in war time),but we seem to be getting rid of everything left & right. Maybe this whole H-47 being considered for search & rescue was just done to ruffle feathers & cause soap opera drama
Their current HH-60s are equipped and tasked with CSAR. The greatest irony is that the Navy is phasing out its CH-46 fleet with the MH-60S Knighthawk — a precise reversal of the situation the Air Force is proposing by awarding their CSAR contract to a chinook derivative.
> The RFP specifically outlined the need for a Medium Lift helicopter
1. no it doesn’t
2. even if it did, i’ve seen the Chinook referred to as a medium-lift helicopter even before csar-x competition started (the H-53 is heavy lift)
> The noise, downwash, footprint, maintenance, and vulnerability concerns seem to outweigh any of the Air Force’s weak rationale.
1. the downwash is no worse than the others
2. how is the maintenance worse?
3. how is it more vulnerable than the others? (all helicopters are vulnerable to ground fire)
This is a good forum to discuss rotary wing issues…the same arguments keep going around in circles, but I’ll try not to repeat what others have said!
1 — Why not upgrade or buy new H-60 airframes?
– Because the USAF has determined the current capabilities of the H-60 cannot meet its needs on the battlefield today for range and high-hot work, and no improvements can be made to over come these shortfalls.
– This is not an indictment of the H-60, I think it is the best helicopter ever built…but the USAF has decided it needs a lot more payload, range, survivability etc and you can’t stuff 10 lbs of “stuff” in a 5 lb sack.
2 — The USAF established thresholds for all the “Noise, downwash, footprint, maintenance, and vulnerability” issues…“
– Clearly each acft excels in some areas where the others do not. Selecting the winner by cherry picking SOME measures of performance and ignoring others would indeed be unprofessional, and this is exactly what we hear from some who have personal agendas at the heart of their argument.
4 — “US Army and SOCOM does NOT utilize the H-47 for CSAR or a CSAR type missions.“
– Army SOF uses the MH-47 for infil — exfil of SOF troops over long distances in denied airspace. Are we to believe this very different is this from the CSAR mission?
5 — “…take a look at the –47, –101 and the –92 current service levels and tell me which one meets or exceeds the current USAF mission demands (flight hour requirements) and has an availability rate greater than 95%?“
– Availability rate…based upon what…vendor claims that “My acft is better than yours?” Numbers from “slick” acft that are not used in the same environment, ranges, duration of flt or payloads that CSAR-X is required to operate in are a meaningless measure.
– It would be a disservice to the taxpayer for the USAF base its decision solely on the “sales pitch” of vendor reliability who seek to profit from the decision.
As observers of this tragic comedy…in the end we are left with one question: Who do we believe has the best interests of the rescue forces at heart?
– Those who work for the USAF and are responsible to the men and women who will take the aircraft into battle?
– Or should we believe vendors claims and finger pointing motivated by the hopes of great profit for themselves?
Are we also to believe it’s a coincidence that the letters of Senators from NY, CT, and TX, where the losing contenders would have built their acft are not interested in dollars for their states…and from retired generals who are now, or who have worked for companies that have agreements to manufacture parts with the losing contenders have the best interests of the war fighters in mind?
> The RFP specifically outlined the need for a Medium Lift helicopter
»1. no it doesn’t
»2. even if it did, i’ve seen the Chinook referred to as a medium-lift helicopter even before csar-x competition started (the H-53 is heavy lift)
1. “The PRV will provide Personnel Recovery (PR) forces with a medium-lift vertical take-off and landing aircraft that is quickly deployable and capable of main base and
austere location operations for worldwide PR missions.“
–0207224F COMBAT RESCUE AND RECOVERY, RDT&E Budget Item Justification, 02/05
This was reflected in the RFP.
2. Boeing’s own material markets the 47 series as a “tandem-rotor, heavy-lift, high-altitude” platform. The Air Force claims it had a matrix showing the 47 as a medium lift helicopter. When asked to produce it, turns out it didnt exist.
http://defensenews.com/story.php?F=2492327&C=airwar
> The noise, downwash, footprint, maintenance, and vulnerability concerns seem to outweigh any of the Air Force’s weak rationale.
»1. the downwash is no worse than the others
»2. how is the maintenance worse?
»3. how is it more vulnerable than the others? (all helicopters are vulnerable to ground fire)
1. Chinooks and AH-1 Cobras make up two-thirds of all downwash incidents all the way back to the 1970s. You can argue about downwash velocities using PAXMAN all you want at various altitudes, but Army actual measurements showed the downwash to be >100mph @ 90ft
2. The GAO stated “Sikorsky and LMSI assert that the agency
Excellent summary HAWK DRIVER.
What it sounds like to myself (and others on the 92 design team) is that the sheer size and age of the 47 was prohibitive from the start, with respect to many of your aforementioned points. Needless to say, we always viewed CSAR-X as a dogfight between our 92 and the 101, just as VXX went down. I dont think anyone ever considered the possibility that the AF would seriously consider procuring the 47 for CSAR ops after the LZ incidents we read about in Afghanistan in 2002.
All posts on this have been quite interesting and pretty fair to each platform…so all things being equal, I wonder why the AF didn’t have a fly-off or complete mission demo between platforms? Sure there are pros/cons to that as well, but in all the discussion I’ve seen here (and elsewhere), nothing had addressed why there wasn’t some sort of fly-off. Other considerations such as O&S/MILCON are obviously not addressed by the fly-off, but at least the handling/performance/etc questions are. I’m sure the answer if asked would be cost and/or schedule prohibition, but at least there would be a much better feel for the performance aspect.
The basic aircraft flight evaluation (BAFE) took place at Nellis AFB in Nevada late 2005.
“The USAF used the process to demonstrate the rival aircraft
“I wonder why the AF didn’t have a fly-off or complete mission demo between platforms?“
The flight demo occurred as C. Foskey described, but one could not have considered this a “Fly off” or use the results in such a manner.
Why??? Because none of the contenders delivered an aircraft that met all of the USAF’s CSAR-X requirements.
I suspect there are some who provided less capable machines for this flight demo and who stand to profit from the CSAR-X decision will tell you this doesn’t matter…but to the customer, the ability to achieve all the requirements in the time allotted is all that matters.
A long time ago, as a contractor to the DoD agencies, I learned that there were ALWAYS three bidders on projects to comply with the ASPR (later FAR): Kresge, Woolworth and the guy who was “supposed” to get the job! My job as senior proposal writer for a major company was always made easier if I knew that mine would be the Woolworth bid! Oh yes, we always knew. We were told (privately, of course) at the first bidder’s conference.
What’s new?
Incidentally, I do believe that downwash still is a result of weight supported by the swept area of the rotor(s). Or have they changed that engineering hueristic, too?
Apropos of nothing much… I remember a hovering 47 rolled up the PSP in front of the Phu Loi control tower one day. As I recall, there were no O-1’s on it at the time.
Cortland
All of those airforce chiefs have been fired as of june of 08, now the airforce will get the aircraft they deserve to secure the safety of our pilots, either the 101 or the sikorsky will do the job. The chinook is a great army asset but has no business in the airforce, especially the csar platform. It has a serious brown out problem and will easilly be shot down even the pilots want nothing to do with this aircraft that has rumsfeld written all over it. To the airforce wake up and get the best asset and not the cheapest buy the 101 and get the airbus tankers in the air as quickly as possible.