Seeing the Counterinsurgency Forest From the Trees

A cou­ple of weeks ago, it occurred to me that when the Petraeus and Crocker reports hit Washington, there would be all these data points and prob­a­bly lit­tle con­text within which to make sense of them.

So I con­tacted a friend of mine to see if he would be will­ing to help Defense Tech and Military​.com read­ers see the for­est from the trees as all these Iraq reports hit the press. Dave Dilegge is edi­tor of the Small Wars Journal, a for­mer intel­li­gence offi­cer in the Marine Corps and a fre­quent strate­gic con­sul­tant and war gamer for the Corps. Hes very tapped in with the Petraeus, Nagl, Kilcullen, Hoffman (both B. and F.), etc. coun­terin­sur­gency brain trust, and knows darn well of what he speaks.

The fol­low­ing is an excerpt of an excerpt from a piece I asked Dave to bang out for the Military​.com Warfighters Forum page. Id ask you to read the more com­pre­hen­sive piece HERE, and to make sure you book­mark the Small Wars Journal page as you try to wrap your brain around all the con­flict­ing infor­ma­tion were going to get in the com­ing weeks on progress in Iraq.

How to Make Sense of the Petraeus Plan…

What fol­lows are his­tor­i­cal prin­ci­ples of COIN oper­a­tions as out­lined in the open­ing pages of FM 3–24.  I’ve pro­vided some abbre­vi­ated com­men­tary on the “things to look for” and poten­tial road­blocks in regards to recent and ongo­ing oper­a­tions in Iraq. Again, not to judge, but to pro­vide an insight on how FM 3–24 is play­ing out in Iraq.

Historical Principles for Counterinsurgency

1. Legitimacy is the Main Objective

This is a big (and elu­sive) COIN prin­ci­ple (along with Principle 8: “Long-​​term Commitment”) in Iraq — fos­ter­ing devel­op­ment of effec­tive gov­er­nance by a legit­i­mate government.

Things to look for: Increased (or decreased) abil­ity of the cen­tral gov­ern­ment to pro­vide secu­rity; selec­tion of national lead­ers in a man­ner con­sid­ered just and fair by a major­ity of cit­i­zens; high level of pop­u­lar par­tic­i­pa­tion and sup­port for polit­i­cal processes; cul­tur­ally accept­able level of gov­ern­ment cor­rup­tion; cul­tur­ally accept­able level and rate of polit­i­cal, eco­nomic, and social devel­op­ment; and a high level of accep­tance by major social insti­tu­tions. In the near-​​term, look for move­ment on leg­isla­tive ini­tia­tives such as the oil frame­work law, rev­enue shar­ing, and de-​​Baathification reform.

Roadblocks: Shia inse­cu­rity about retain­ing polit­i­cal dom­i­nance, wide­spread Sunni unwill­ing­ness to accept a dimin­ished polit­i­cal sta­tus, fac­tional rival­ries within the sec­tar­ian com­mu­ni­ties result­ing in armed con­flict, and the actions of extrem­ists such as al-​​Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and ele­ments of the Sadrist Jaysh al-​​Mahdi (JAM) militia.

2. Unity of Effort Is Essential

Unity of effort is essen­tial at every ech­e­lon and by every orga­ni­za­tion — mil­i­tary and civil­ian — U.S., other Coalition and Iraqi. Well-​​intentioned but unco­or­di­nated actions can can­cel each other out and/​or pro­vide vul­ner­a­bil­i­ties suited to be exploited by adversaries.

Things to look for: Continued close coop­er­a­tion and coor­di­na­tion between Amb. Crocker and Gen. Petraeus and their staffs — same with coali­tion part­ners. Close coor­di­na­tion, coop­er­a­tion and com­bined oper­a­tions between Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) and mil­i­tary units. Expansion of the PRT pro­gram to include access to pre­vi­ously denied areas in Iraq. Close coor­di­na­tion, coop­er­a­tion and com­bined oper­a­tions between U.S. mil­i­tary and PRTs and Iraqi secu­rity forces (local and national).

Roadblocks: If and when non-​​military capa­bil­i­ties sig­nif­i­cantly increase (PRTs — non gov­ern­men­tal orga­ni­za­tions, inter­na­tional and regional orga­ni­za­tions) the chal­lenge of con­duct­ing coor­di­nated and com­ple­men­tary oper­a­tions by diverse orga­ni­za­tions with inher­ently parochial objec­tives. The Iraqi national government’s abil­ity to meet the basic needs of the gen­eral pop­u­la­tion and its per­ceived legit­i­macy by a major­ity are the pri­mary obsta­cles. Without the Iraqi gov­ern­ment there can be no ‘polit­i­cal’ unity of effort.

3. Political Factors Are Primary

One rule of thumb is COIN is 80 per­cent polit­i­cal action and 20 per­cent mil­i­tary action. All mil­i­tary and non-​​military actions should con­tribute to strengthen the national government’s legitimacy.

Things to look for: Any and all indi­ca­tors of a true national gov­ern­ment capa­ble (or becom­ing capa­ble) and will­ing to take on those tasks asso­ci­ated with gov­er­nance of a coun­try. Solid steps towards national rec­on­cil­i­a­tion is key. Again, move­ment on leg­isla­tive ini­tia­tives such as the oil frame­work law, rev­enue shar­ing, and de-​​Baathification reform are critical.

Roadblocks: The pre­car­i­ous state of the Iraqi Government due to crit­i­cism by other mem­bers of the major Shia coali­tion (the United Iraqi Alliance, UIA), Grand Ayatollah Sistani, and other Sunni and Kurdish par­ties. Increase in divi­sions between Prime Minister Nouri al-​​Maliki and the Sadrists and pos­si­ble alter­nate coali­tions between Shia fac­tions aimed at con­strain­ing Maliki.

4. Counterinsurgents Must Understand the Environment

This is much more than tra­di­tional enemy order of bat­tle infor­ma­tion.  OIF COIN requires a thor­ough under­stand­ing of Iraqi soci­ety and cul­ture. Unfortunately, the insur­gents hold a home-​​field advan­tage in regards to local knowl­edge. Therefore, to be effec­tive, Coalition forces and other agen­cies require exper­tise in such skills as lan­guage and cul­tural understanding.

Things to look for: Increasing and insti­tu­tion­al­iz­ing recent and ongo­ing efforts across the board in cul­tural under­stand­ing in for­mal mil­i­tary and non-​​military doc­trine, edu­ca­tion, and train­ing. Increasing deploy­ment and inte­grat­ing with Coalition forces of sub­ject mat­ter experts to include “Human Terrain Teams”.

Roadblocks: Time, time and more time to train, edu­cate and deploy. Bureaucratic hur­dles in for­mal­iz­ing cul­tural aware­ness edu­ca­tion, train­ing and doc­trine. Availability of sub­ject mat­ter expert advi­sors in Iraq at the tac­ti­cal level where the vast major­ity of diverse cul­tural inter­ac­tion occur.

5. Intelligence Drives Operations

Without good intel­li­gence coun­terin­sur­gents are blind, wast­ing energy and often caus­ing unin­ten­tional harm while con­duct­ing COIN oper­a­tions. With good intel­li­gence they are like sur­geons cut­ting out can­cer­ous tis­sue while keep­ing other vital organs intact.

Things to look for: A con­certed effort to push intel­li­gence capa­bil­i­ties down to the low­est tac­ti­cal level.  This includes the capa­bil­ity to con­duct intel­li­gence col­lec­tion, analy­sis and dis­sem­i­na­tion.  Human Intelligence capa­bil­i­ties are key. Formalized and prop­erly resourced company-​​level intel­li­gence cells are key.  Increase in Iraqi civilian’s will­ing­ness to pro­vide intelligence/​information to coali­tion and Iraqi Security forces.

Roadblocks: Time and resources (trained per­son­nel and intelligence-​​related equip­ment) nec­es­sary to pro­vide tactical-​​level com­man­ders more than the cur­rent ad-​​hoc capa­bil­i­ties. Standardized TTP to facil­i­tate seam­less shar­ing of intel­li­gence between tac­ti­cal com­mands and dur­ing hand-​​over to follow-​​on units/​organizations. Policy issues that place bar­ri­ers on intel­li­gence shar­ing with non-U.S. Coalition part­ners and non-​​military organizations.

6. Insurgents Must be Isolated from Their Cause and Support

It is eas­ier to sep­a­rate an insur­gency from its resources and let it die than to kill every insur­gent.  While killing or cap­tur­ing insur­gents is often nec­es­sary, espe­cially when based in reli­gious or ide­o­log­i­cal extrem­ism, killing or cap­tur­ing every insur­gent is impos­si­ble and can be coun­ter­pro­duc­tive.  Insurgents must be cut off from their sources of power — and the key source is the civil­ian population.

Things to look for: Continued local rec­on­cil­i­a­tion build­ing towards national rec­on­cil­i­a­tion. As in Anbar, an increase in local Iraqi lead­ers com­ing for­ward, oppos­ing extrem­ists, and estab­lish­ing pro­vi­sional units of neigh­bor­hood secu­rity vol­un­teers. Government of Iraq sup­port in inte­grat­ing local vol­un­teers into legit­i­mate insti­tu­tions to help improve local security.

Roadblocks: Continued sec­tar­ian vio­lence and the dis­trust it pro­duces amongst the Iraqi civil­ian pop­u­la­tion. Continued attacks by Al Qaeda, asso­ci­ated insur­gent groups, and mili­tia extrem­ists. Continued exter­nal sup­port to insur­gents — espe­cially by Iran.

7. Security Under the Rule of Law is Essential

The COIN cor­ner­stone is secu­rity for the civil­ian pop­u­la­tion. Without that secu­rity no per­ma­nent reforms can be imple­mented and dis­or­der spreads. Transitioning secu­rity duties from COIN com­bat forces to law enforce­ment is key. Insurgents must be seen as crim­i­nals by the local pop­u­la­tion. In OIF Iraqi law enforce­ment orga­ni­za­tions must be seen as legit­i­mate and oper­at­ing under the Rule of Law.

Things to look for: Increased Iraqi secu­rity oper­a­tions with min­i­mal U.S. sup­port. Increased Iraqi gov­ern­ment capa­bil­i­ties to pro­vide essen­tial ser­vices. Increased pres­ence of regional and inter­na­tional Non-​​Governmental Organizations.

Roadblocks: Again, the abil­ity of the national gov­ern­ment to pro­vide secu­rity under the rule of law and con­tin­ued sec­tar­ian vio­lence, con­tin­ued attacks by Al Qaeda, asso­ci­ated insur­gent groups, and mili­tia extrem­ists and con­tin­ued exter­nal sup­port to insurgents.

8. Counterinsurgents Should Prepare for a Long-​​Term Commitment

Insurgencies are pro­tracted by nature. Constant reaf­fir­ma­tions of com­mit­ment, backed by deeds, can over­come a com­mon per­cep­tion that U.S. COIN forces lack stay­ing power. The per­cep­tion that the national gov­ern­ment has sim­i­lar will and sta­mina is crit­i­cal. At the strate­gic level, gain­ing and main­tain­ing U.S. pub­lic sup­port for a pro­tracted effort is also critical.

Things to look for: This is huge, and is a very dynamic and com­plex issue. Congressional actions that extend U.S. COIN efforts in Iraq or set con­di­tions and time­lines for with­drawal. U.S. pub­lic opin­ion polls as Congress and can­di­dates often uti­lize these polls to for­mu­late leg­is­la­tion and plat­forms. Iraqi pub­lic opin­ion polls that reflect per­cep­tion on U.S. com­mit­ment and con­fi­dence in the Iraqi national government’s future.

Roadblocks: The Washington Clock vs. the Baghdad Clock — time allo­cated by the National Command Authority vs. the time needed to suc­cess­fully con­duct COIN oper­a­tions in Iraq. Operational Tempo — the abil­ity for U.S. mil­i­tary forces to sus­tain secu­rity oper­a­tions on a level nec­es­sary to allow for Iraqi national rec­on­cil­i­a­tion. The abil­ity of the Iraqi national gov­ern­ment to achieve reconciliation.

We look for­ward to more con­tent in the future here at Defense Tech from Dave and his col­leagues at the Small Wars Journal.

– Christian

September 10th, 2007 | Strategery | 37272 Comments »http://defensetech.org/2007/09/10/seeing-the-counterinsurgency-forest-from-the-trees/Seeing+the+Counterinsurgency+Forest+From+the+Trees2007-09-10+10%3A14%3A33Ward You can skip to the end and leave a response. Pinging is currently not allowed.