From my story posted as today’s lead headline on Military.com:
Marine commanders in Iraq are asking the Pentagon to slow down deployment of IED-resistant vehicles in order to give them more time to figure out how best to employ the heavily-armored trucks, a top Corps official Wednesday.
Congress and the Pentagon have devoted billions to a crash program to field so-called Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles that are said to protect troops from deadly roadside bombs more effectively than up-armored Humvees. But the vehicles are more than four times heavier than an armored Humvee and may require different tactics for their use.
“I would say ‘relax,’ we don’t know how we’re going to use them, nobody does,” said Brig. Gen. select Larry Nicholson, deputy commander of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command based in Quantico, Va. “And anyone who says … ‘this is exactly how many we need and this is exactly how we’re going to use them’ is not being truthful.”
Commanders in Iraq are asking military officials in the U.S. to send “a few more” MRAPs, “then let us figure it out,” Nicholson said during a panel discussion on the future of the MRAP, sponsored by the non-partisan Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, a defense think tank with close Pentagon ties.
I found this comment interesting, and I pressed Nicholson on it, remarking that it sounded to me like these vehicles had been imposed upon Iraq commanders rather than requested by them. Nicholson responded that the commanders issued the first tanks didn’t necessarily know how they were going to employ them and in what numbers — a point to which Andy Krepinevich, CSBA chief, agreed, remembering that the Wermacht figured 400 tanks would be needed in a Panzer division, but later decided a mix of vehicles with fewer tanks would be needed. I found Nicholson’s analogy unconvincing. If commanders were really asking for the vehicles, they’d know damned well how they needed to use them.
The push-back from the field stands in sharp contrast to Pentagon moves to field more than 15,000 MRAPs over the next two years, including 1,500 by the end of 2007. The Marine Corps has an estimated 380 MRAPs in service with II Marine Expeditionary Force in al Anbar province so far, and the service is forecasted to receive a total of 3,700 MRAPs.
Nicholson strongly advocated the deployment of MRAPs for Marine operations in Iraq; despite his caution on the rate they’d be fielded.
The MRAP “is a vehicle that allows us to get to, and circulate amongst, the population better,” he said. “The continued introduction of the MRAP as the primary transport vehicle will not change the way we conduct counterinsurgency.”
The other thing Nicholson said was to remark on the incredible progress won by the Marines in Anbar. He noted that 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines had just left Ramadi and that during their seven month deployment there had zero KIA. That’s incredible. The first night I arrived in Ramadi in December 2005, an IED attack killed three Marines and wounded several more. I was on the QRF that responded to the hit and helped pick boots up off the ground with shredded feet still in them. But I wondered why the MRAP was so urgently needed when the success in Anbar had been realized with those vehicles being used solely as EOD platforms. He didn’t have a good argument for that.
But analysts with the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, who sponsored the Oct. 16 event on Capitol Hill, said the MRAP has yet to prove its place in future service equipment plans. The gas-guzzling MRAP could impose a strain on logistics, suck funding away from needed vehicle upgrades in the future and could run counter to the intent of counter-insurgency doctrine, which stresses close contact with the population.
“Our concern is there seems to be this rush to judgment on spending a fairly large amount of money on a program that hadn’t been planned for and not much discussion about how you actually plan to operationalize this and incorporate it into the force,” said Dakota Wood, former Marine transport officer and co-author of the CSBA analysis report “Of MRAPs and IEDs: Force Protection in Complex Irregular Operations.”
MRAPs are said to cost as much as $800,000 per vehicle, he added, with up-armored Humvees coming in at about $150,000 each — leading Wood to call the MRAP a “million dollar Kleenex.”
The Pentagon plans to spend nearly $25 billion on MRAP buys.
Other experts disagreed with the CSBA report, however, saying MRAP use today hasn’t precluded troops from dismounting their vehicles and interacting with the Iraqi people.
“I generally agree with the purchase of MRAPs in large numbers,” said retired Army Col. Bob Killebrew, a former Special Forces officer and frequent Pentagon consultant, during the panel discussion. “I find unpersuasive the argument that MRAP will have some kind of doctrinal impact on the conduct of the war in Iraq.”
“It will have no effect at all on the current tactics of putting troops out on the beat and on their feet taking on insurgents in Baghdad and elsewhere,” Killebrew added.
To be honest, I found both sides of the argument persuasive, though the retirees’ rejoinders had a whiff of Old School, Heavy Forces, I told you so rhetorical overtones to them. I have great respect for formers, but sometimes they get a little hidebound in their thinking and more political than practical. The experts’ rejection of the notion of an expeditionary revolution was dead wrong, but their contention that MRAPs would not serve as “armored cocoons” I think was spot on when I remembered the success Stryker brigades are having in Iraq.
While the CSBA report cautioned that the heavy MRAP vehicle would overburden an Army and Marine Corps aiming toward a more expeditionary future, others countered that the lust for lightness has been proven empty given the difficulties of counterinsurgency operations.
“This slow building of alliances and the confrontation of growing terrorist threats by other people’s armies who have more at stake in it than us is going to be the next military strategy of the United States,” Killebrew said. “We should build as many [MRAPs] as we need now to protect our troops in Iraq, and we should be prepared, as we withdraw eventually, to turn over MRAPs to people who are going to live in that area and who are going to have to continue to contend with the war.”
{ 17 comments… read them below or add one }
I still suspect that this is partially a method of accellerating the full motorization of the IA…
What’s wrong with having a balance? MRAPs in the urban areas with heavy forces and Humvees for the lighter forces? Why is that so hard to try to accept?
If your primary threat is from IED why not be prepared for IEDs with MRAPs. If your primary threat is from a mobile, conventional force meet that threat with a better mobile, conventional army.
I do think the guys on the hill have gone overboard with the MRAPs but they are needed. It’s the same arguement with the M16, is the Humvee the best vehicle for the situation?
The first point is that war is wasteful and you almost always over buy. The idea of Kleenex solutions doesn’t make the accountants happy, but Kleenex is very effective if you have a runny nose.
The second is that using the 0 KIA numbers from Anbar as an argument against more MRAPs is at best wrong-headed. Our success (or more correctly, the Iraqis success) in Anbar has been the result of a whole bunch of things, from tribal support to much better tactics by the Marines.
We need the MRAPs. Did Congress over-react and order way too many of them? Probably. Will they be ideal for future conflicts? Unlikely. But we need them and, to sound like a 1960s liberal for a moment, it’s only money.
Pushback from the field? Are you kidding me? We want the MRAPs here yesterday. Please stop printing articles about MRAP not being wanted or needed. You don’t like MRAP, I get that. Now you get this. We really want the MRAP in theater, we desperately need it and it will save lives.
I have never, never heard push back from the field on these vehicles. Be very careful with extrapolating the position of a single Marine general as the position of the whole Corps. Unless the Commandant says so (heck with this, it’s probably the SECDEF), vehicle deliveries probably aren’t going to slow down.
One of the many reasons why Stryker is so successful in Iraq is that it’s a heck of a lot better than a Humvee.
It seems like the Generals are afraid they will use the equipment in a way that will cause themselves to be criticized.
Obviously the equipment comes before the tactics are fully developed.
It reminds me of the operation at the beginning of the war, where due to “poor tactics” a bunch of the Apaches
> give them more time to figure out how best to employ the heavily-armored trucks
what a load of . . .
this isn’t very hard
everytime you would have sent a humvee offbase, send an MRAP instead
there, that wasn’t so bad was it?
Like someone said before,for urban environments(unless you plan on dropping a MOAB to completely level the town) you should use the MRAPs.On post,you don’t even need HMMWVs,you can use the Dodge or Ford COMBATT vehicles for “safe” on post duties.I guess you could use the HMMWV in “country” or “Jungle” environments.Again,I haven’t heard of much problems with HMMWVs in the Afghan countryside & with MATTRACKS,the HMMWVs can work in winter environments or swamp like environments.
Can somebody explain to me what the Armet “Gurkha” LAV is good for? I know that its a souped up Ford F550 Chassis,but I haven’t seen anything to say that it is an MRAP vehicle.
The South African Army effectively found a way to utilize MRAP vehicles,since most of the MRAP vehicles we use is South African in origin.Maybe an effective mix of “South African” MRAPs & Israeli styled “uparmored” M113s & converted APCs from old tank chassis’(if we still have any M60s or M48s) would be a good answer for the urban environment of Iraq.We don’t need speed in the cities,we need armored protection.We need speed in the countryside.0 to 60 in 1 second doesn’t do jack when a bus or truck or other obstacle is blocking the road.Why aren’t we using armored earthmovers more like Israel does?Where are our armored John Deeres?
I don’t know of any accountant or accountants that could budget a war and keep the expense account in the black. Especially when every other week is we’re pulling troops out, then we’re sending more in the next. Fact of the matter is the MRAP’s are a necessity, too many.. big deal, let’s try keeping the ones we don’t use in decent shape so when the next “conflict” or war comes about we can use them. Cross utilization, ACCounting 101.
They would make excellent IA in theater APCs. The would be great for shuttling a few squads to a troubled area to take care of business. Perfect vehicle for the IA, its all they need! lol.
Any American general who can’t figure out how to use what is basically a wheeled APC probably needs to be replaced, given that APC’s have been in use since at least the M3 halftrack…
YA have to realize that the MRAP was shoved down their throat. Id be concerned about the large numbers in case we ever had another real shotting war, which is just a matter of time.
These vehicles (MRAP) are also used by the Excron Corporation. They are using it for armd convoy driving.
The Excron Corporation is interested in buying MRAPs to arm their mercenaries. These mercenaries are applied in Iraq. Especially in the north of Iraq, the Excron Corporation protect the Oilfields of Heritage Oil&Gas Corporation. Heritage is a Canadian energy company which is acting world wide. The Excron Corporation especially Excron – Risk Management is a special partner of Heritage.
We also do not have the maintenance training and parts infrastructure in place to keep the ones that have been fielded running. This has been a problem since they were introducd. I know this because I spent a year over there fielding them and other CIED equipment. The companies making them do not have any surge capacity so to make spare parts they must reduce their production of vehicles.
I am interested in the MRAP program. I once read that a trained service man costs the military $500,000. A trained officer costs the military $1,000,000. I have heard stories about the protection a MRAP offers. Stories like, the MRAP was blown up as high as the telephone wires, or blown 120 feet from the explosion, and the personnel inside survived.
I have also read articles about the Humvee and its lack of ability to survive IED explosions.
If the above is true, economics says that one MRAP surviving one IED will probably save the military $2.8 million ($800,000 for MRAP and four personnel at $500,000). One Humvee lost to an IED costs the military $2.1 million ($115,000 for Humvee and four personnel at $500,000.
I was an Air Force officer and am now an accountant. One of my concerns is the way employees are treated. A company trains someone, give them a job in which they gain experience, and does not care whether they go or stay. It costs money to train people. The issue should not be “how much does the equipment cost”, but “how much does it cost to obtain an experienced employee.”
Incidentally, I saw how service men were treated in the Air Force. I say, demand that the generals and other commanders accompany the service men as they drive through the contested areas in IRAQ . Then, give them the choice on whether to go in a Humvee or a MRAP.