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Home » The Defense Biz » Fighter Mafia Alumns on the Defense Budget

Fighter Mafia Alumns on the Defense Budget

F-22ARaptor.jpg
Today, America spends more on defense than at any time since the end of World War II, based on the Pentagon’s own offi­cial bud­get data. The pre­vi­ous high point in post-​​World War II defense spend­ing was 1952 — dur­ing the Korean War — at $589 bil­lion in today’s dol­lars. The Pentagon’s bud­get request for the cur­rent fis­cal year totals $670 bil­lion, or a sub­stan­tial 14 per­cent above the pre­vi­ous high water mark.

U.S. defense spend­ing is now also larger than the rest of the world — com­bined. The CIA’s 2007 Word Fact Book esti­mates all other nations to spend about $400 bil­lion on defense. That amount is for not just our poten­tial oppo­nents, who­ever they might be; that’s the entire rest of the world.

We are told we must worry about China and Russia and pre­pare against them; some­thing we should really lose sleep over is how they can be such a major con­cern — to those who point them out as loom­ing threats — with defense bud­gets of just $81 bil­lion and $21 bil­lion, respec­tively, accord­ing to the CIA.

A sim­i­lar basis for wor­ry­ing is why the Pentagon’s bud­get has trended up over the decades, while its forces have been shrink­ing. Today, we have the small­est defense inven­tory since 1946. For exam­ple, with a spend­ing level con­sid­er­ably higher than in 1985 when the Cold War raged and after Ronald Reagan increased the Defense Department’s bud­get, we have now 10 active Army divi­sions, not the 17 we had in 1985; less than 300 naval com­bat­ants — com­pared to 542 in 1985, and we have just over 12 active Air Force tac­ti­cal air wings, not 25. 

A major rea­son is incompetence.


According to the “score­card” of the Office of Management and Budget on how well U.S. agen­cies are run, the Pentagon has ranked among the worst since the rat­ings began. By bad man­age­ment, don’t think of just “waste, fraud, and abuse” and incom­pe­tent book-​​keeping — the mea­sures OMB uses. Add to those the inces­sant deci­sions in the Pentagon and Congress that favor bureau­cratic and self­ish inter­ests, rather than the needs of war. Those lat­ter fac­tors pro­vide most of the expla­na­tion for why the Pentagon bud­get deliv­ers less for more.

Consider just one exam­ple; the Air Force’s F-​​22 fighter air­craft. It began in the early 1980s as the Air Force’s solu­tion to main­tain­ing air supe­ri­or­ity over the Soviet Union dur­ing the Cold War. However, a lot of his­tory unfolded between the “Raptor’s” con­cep­tion back then and the Air Force’s announce­ment on December 12, 2007 that after more than two decades of devel­op­ment the F-​​22 had finally reached “full oper­a­tional capa­bil­ity,” mean­ing that it was ready to go to war.

There is, how­ever, no war for it to go to. While there are, of course, two very real ones in Iraq and Afghanistan, the F-​​22 is yet to fly a sin­gle sor­tie over the skies of either coun­try. Nor has the Air Force announced any inten­tion to send the F-​​22 to either theater.

The Air Force is quite right to keep the F-​​22 far away from those con­flicts. The air­plane is irrel­e­vant to both, since its pri­mary mis­sion — to shoot down enemy air­craft — is use­less against our oppo­nents — al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other insur­gents — who have no air force and don’t want one. Worse, if the F-​​22 were it to appear in those the­aters, it would almost cer­tainly harm our war efforts. It is not just that its huge logis­tics tail would strain our already over­stretched sup­port forces in both theaters.

But also, the F-​​22 has oper­at­ing lim­i­ta­tions. While it can carry two medium sized bombs to attack ground tar­gets, it is a capa­bil­ity so mod­est our oppo­nents in Iraq and Afghanistan might not even notice. It would also be ungra­cious to com­pare the F-​​22 to the ridicu­lously cheap, sim­ple A-​​10 close air sup­port air­craft that is built specif­i­cally for the ground sup­port role and that has been indis­pens­able for sup­port­ing sol­diers in com­bat in both wars. It would be even more bad-​​mannered to point out that each A-​​10 can deliver per day eight times, or more, the pay­load that an F-​​22 can.

More to the point, the F-​​22 would be counter-​​productive. Data from Afghanistan indi­cate that U.S. and allied forces may have killed more inno­cent civil­ians than the enemy has in the past year, and from Iraq we read report after report of civil­ians killed as a result of US action. A major part of those “col­lat­eral” civil­ian casu­al­ties come from air­craft fly­ing too fast and too high to pos­i­tively iden­tify exactly what they are guid­ing their muni­tions to. As such, the F-​​22 is too “thin-​​skinned” to endure ground fire, even from assault rifles, and it is too expen­sive to risk fly­ing close enough to the ground to iden­tify tar­gets. In a form of con­flict where win­ning over the civil­ian pop­u­la­tion is key to suc­cess, F-​​22 par­tic­i­pa­tion — along with that of other high fly­ing, high speed air­craft — may help the enemy more than us.

By keep­ing the F-​​22 at its US bases, the Air Force is doing our forces in Iraq and Afghanistan a great favor.

Counter-​​productivity in 21st cen­tury war­fare notwith­stand­ing, the F-22’s advo­cates would leap to argue that in its intended role — shoot­ing down enemy fight­ers — it is unsurpassed.

Let’s pre­tend for the moment that there exists, or will soon, an enemy air force for which the F-​​22 would be rel­e­vant. How, then, could the F-​​22 help?

We con­tend that as an indi­vid­ual per­former in real world air-​​to-​​air com­bat, the F-​​22 is a huge dis­ap­point­ment. The Air Force vocif­er­ously dis­agrees — based on its hypoth­e­sis that air wars can be fought and won by long range, radar-​​controlled mis­siles fired at ene­mies you can­not see or visu­ally — that is, reli­ably — iden­tify. This “beyond-​​visual-​​range,” radar-​​missile hypoth­e­sis has been tested in real world com­bat, and it has failed repeat­edly. If ever the F-​​22 finds itself in an air war against a seri­ous oppo­nent, all of us will find out who is right.

Here, we will focus on three issues about which there can be lit­tle argu­ment and that explain how the F-​​22 con­tributes might­ily to our shrink­ing, less ready-​​to-​​fight forces, while bring­ing vastly increased cost.

Force Size: Back in the 1980s, the U.S. Air Force planned to buy 750 F-​​22s to fight the Soviet air force. For devel­op­ment and pro­cure­ment, Congress is gen­er­ously pro­vid­ing $65.3 bil­lion, a huge sum. However, because no stake­holder was inter­ested in exer­cis­ing dis­ci­pline over the design, weight, and cost of each F-​​22, that $65.3 bil­lion will only buy 184 air­craft, not enough to be a real threat to any major oppos­ing air power. 

Moreover, given the need to main­tain a train­ing base in the US and con­sid­er­ing the demon­strated daily sor­tie rate of sim­i­larly com­plex air­craft already in our inven­tory, the Air Force will be lucky to be able to fly 60 F-​​22 sor­ties per day at the start of an over­seas con­flict against a major oppo­nent. That num­ber will shrink as inevitable com­bat attri­tion and main­te­nance down-​​time take their toll. The force size that the F-​​22 pro­gram gen­er­ates is sim­ply too puny to reg­is­ter against the major air threat the F-​​22 advo­cates hypothesize.

Pilot Skill: Unfortunately, we can expect that same tiny F-​​22 force to attrite all too rapidly in com­bat for the sim­ple rea­son that the Air Force no longer ade­quately sup­ports pilot train­ing. F-​​22 pilots get only ten to twelve hours of flight train­ing per month. When we pro­vided 20 to 25 hours per month to train pilots for Vietnam, our pilots com­plained — rightly — it was inad­e­quate. At the height of their prowess in the 1960s and ‘70s, the Israelis gave their fighter pilots 40 to 50 hours of flight train­ing per month. 

The his­tory of air war­fare shows all too clearly that the most impor­tant deter­mi­nant of who wins and who dies in an aer­ial dog­fight is pilot skill, not air­craft per­for­mance. Because they have raided pilot train­ing accounts to feed increas­ingly vora­cious pro­cure­ment pro­grams (such as the F-​​22), Congress and the Air Force have vir­tu­ally guar­an­teed high pilot losses for us in any hypoth­e­sized, large scale air war.

If the advo­cates of more air power for the U.S. were seri­ous about win­ning and sav­ing American pilots lives, they would dou­ble, then triple, the amount of money avail­able for pilot flight train­ing before spend­ing a sin­gle penny on new air­craft. Revealing its real pri­or­i­ties, in help pay for the pork it added to the 2008 DOD appro­pri­a­tions act, Congress cut air force train­ing by $400 million.

Unit Cost: The cur­rent plan to buy 184 F-​​22s for $65.3 bil­lion cal­cu­lates to $354.9 mil­lion per air­craft. The Air Force con­tends that such a cal­cu­la­tion is unfair; it dis­trib­utes the cost of all prior test­ing and devel­op­ment equally to every air­craft. The Air Force would rather use a cal­cu­la­tion for prospec­tive pur­chases — what it calls “fly­away” cost, which con­sid­ers the devel­op­ment costs to have been sunk and that the only cost that should count now is the cost-​​to-​​go. Various esti­mates are cir­cu­lat­ing in the Pentagon to buy an addi­tional 198 F-​​22s at a “fly­away” cost that varies from $176.8 mil­lion to $216.3 mil­lion per copy. (Even at the lower range, it would still make these new F-​​22s the most expen­sive fighter air­craft ever bought by any nation — except for, of course, ear­lier F-​​22s.)

The F-22’s cost his­tory makes it painfully obvi­ous that we should con­sider the higher end of the cur­rently adver­tised cost band to be a cost floor for any new pur­chase. At every stage, the F-​​22 has cost more than promised. For exam­ple, when Lockheed and the Air Force were push­ing a three year con­tract to buy 60 air­craft now being deliv­ered, “fact sheets” and lob­by­ing mate­ri­als widely dis­trib­uted on Capitol Hill were promis­ing a “fly­away” price of $130 mil­lion per air­craft; instead, Congress was required to actu­ally appro­pri­ate approx­i­mately $180 mil­lion per copy. (In 1986, the Air Force orig­i­nally promised a “fly­away” cost of $35 million.)

Time has not been kind to the F-​​22; nei­ther to its costs, nor to its rel­e­vance. Even in the wars the F-​​22 advo­cates pos­tu­late against a Chinese or Russian air force, the F-​​22 is deeply flawed, and its ulti­mate impact is to degrade our most impor­tant assets in the air, our pilots and their skill.

The most promi­nent mis­sion that Lockheed and the Air Force are cur­rently push­ing to buy more F-​​22s is demon­strated in recent news­pa­per arti­cles and adver­tise­ments. Nowhere do these talk about a dan­ger­ous new air threat that explains the need for more F-​​22s. Instead, they focus on the 44 states that will receive cor­po­rate spend­ing and jobs. Put another way, it is Congress’ lust for pork and the per­verted think­ing that jobs and prof­its should drive defense spend­ing, not the threat, that is dri­ving the cam­paign to buy more F-​​22s.

The over­all defense bud­get is stuffed to the gills with sim­i­lar exam­ples. Budget-​​inflating, war-​​irrelevant, dubious-​​performing, and pork-​​ridden exam­ples in the other mil­i­tary ser­vices include the Navy’s DDG-​​1000 destroyer, the Army’s Future Combat System, and the Marines Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle. In fact, such pro­grams are now the norm; it is the war-​​relevant, cost-​​effective ones that are scarce to the point of extinction.

There should be no doubt how we got to where we are.

– Winslow Wheeler, Pierre Sprey, and James Stevenson

(Editor’s note: Pierre Sprey was one of three design­ers who con­ceived and shaped the F-​​16; he also led the tech­ni­cal side of the US Air Force’s A-​​10 design con­cept team. James Stevenson is for­mer edi­tor of the Navy Fighter Weapons School’s Topgun Journal and author of The Pentagon Paradox and The $5 Billion Misunderstanding about the Navy’s F-​​18 and A-​​12. Winslow Wheeler is the direc­tor of the Straus Military Reform Project of the Center for Defense Information in Washington. Previously, he worked for four U.S. sen­a­tors from both polit­i­cal par­ties and the Government Accountability Office on national secu­rity issues.)

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February 7th, 2008 | The Defense Biz | 3828101 Comments »http://defensetech.org/2008/02/07/fighter-mafia-alumns-on-the-defense-budget/Fighter+Mafia+Alumns+on+the+Defense+Budget2008-02-07+15%3A55%3A20paisley You can skip to the end and leave a response. Pinging is currently not allowed.

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  1. Scott Keyes says:
    February 8, 2008 at 2:59 pm

    Unless thier Bio’s are BS ONE of the peo­ple who wrote this was instru­men­tal in two of the bet­ter and more cost effec­tive large weapons sys­tems pro­cured in the last few decades … the other one worked for the GAO among other things.
    To say they know noth­ing of the sub­ject and go rant­ing about social pro­grams shows exactly how many thick headed closed minded axe grind­ing troglodytes can fit on a forum (the 21st cen­tury ver­sion of Angels danc­ing on pin­heads I guess)
    The arti­cle is about the weapons sys­tems devel­op­ment and pro­cure­ment process and how its bro­ken. A B2 Bomber… of dubi­ous value costs about $2billion and took decades to develop and field… the Osprey costs more than $65 mil­lion per copy .. the can­celed OICW.. an infantry weapon too heavy to carry impos­si­ble to fire prone and and cost­ing $30,000 per copy (esti­mated mass pro­duc­tion cost) and ‘not par­tic­u­larly air deploy­able’ Stryker are two more exam­ples…
    This isnt work­ing… lets talk about some stuff that did and you’ll see the dif­fer­ence.
    the M1911a1 pis­tol and the M2HB stayed in ser­vice for bet­ter than half a cen­tury and you still wouldnt feel too put out to bring EITHER of them to a mod­ern bat­tle­field… If you count the M1 and the M14 as con­tin­u­ous devel­op­ment of a sin­gle design that makes another weapon that more than half a cen­tury after its ini­tial design that STILL isn’t out of place on a mod­ern bat­tle­field and which you could stand next to the best arms of today and have ratio­nal pro­po­nents who could argue that its still a bet­ter weapon. THE JEEP for cry­ing out loud.. from idea to pro­to­type in two weeks .. cheap , sim­ple, effec­tive and loved for half a cen­tury.. until replace by the Hummer..not cheap, not sim­ple, and only MARGINALLY more effec­tive* not to men­tion the OICW , the Sergeant York, the Bradley it goes on.…
    We used to do bet­ter.
    *I* think, on no evi­dence at all, that one prob­lem is the last gen­er­a­tion of American engi­neers to actu­ally work with their hands on the mate­ri­als.. who grew up around lathes and welders and sol­der­ing irons and bread­boards just flat did bet­ter work… but the the big­ger prob­lem , the sick­ness that kills empires is when the orga­ni­za­tional objec­tive (profit, bureau­cratic turf, con­gres­sional pork) trumps the nom­i­nal objec­tive (engi­neer­ing excel­lence in ser­vice of util­ity) AND when you REWARD adher­ence to the for­mer SO HEAVILY with MORE money and pro­mo­tions and pro­tec­tions and ignore or belit­tle those who autis­ti­caly per­se­vere in the lat­ter then you will increas­ingly get what we are get­ting now and EVENTUALLY we are going to be BEATEN IN THE FIELD by a tech­no­log­i­cally supe­rior enemy. And if you think its wrong to think or say that America COULD lose .. then you con­tribute to the blind pig head­ed­ness that will make it a future real­ity.
    We need the best of our imag­i­na­tions and tal­ents work­ing to field sim­ple eco­nom­i­cal BRILLIANT designs that will stand the test of time…as we once did .. or America’s sol­diers (and our prin­ci­ples and ideals) WILL have the most expen­sive and com­pli­cated bat­tle­field debris in the his­tory of the world as their grave mark­ers.
    * digres­sion on the Hummer: unless you feel the need to turn it into a bad armored car.. in which case.. maybe buy an ACTUAL armored car (prob­a­bly at a lower cost and higher sur­viv­abil­ity than a ‘kit­ted’ Hummer) instead? Really what IS the dif­fer­ence between say an old M8 scout­car and a kit­ted hummer?

    Reply
  2. brknutz says:
    February 8, 2008 at 3:36 pm

    If we can buy F-​​22s for only $365 mil­lion per arti­cle, just think what we could buy at $1 bil­lion per arti­cle. All we need to do is levy higher taxes on an already over­taxed pop­u­la­tion.
    The F-​​22 is almost use­less out­side of a cpn­trolled fight where the out­come has already been pre-​​arranged. Yes, it is the most capa­ble fighter out there, but what real world value trans­late into? Should we maybe go pick a fight with China just to prove this point? China, BTW, is just field­ing it’s new J-​​10, fighter. While prob­a­bly not as capa­ble as the F-​​22, they could lit­er­ally afford to buy seven of them for the cost of one F-​​22.
    This thing is going to wind up being a very expen­seive air show jet, with a role rel­e­gated solely to deter­rence. hav­ing an irrel­e­vant ground attack capa­bil­ity, it will remain use­less in the cur­rent con­flicts. While any­one with a lick of sense knows that a war with China or Russia is unlikely at best, it is a vir­tual cer­tainty we will be fight­ing in asym­met­ri­cal the­aters for years to come. Shouldn’t we at least enter­tain the idea of devel­op­ing plat­forms that can oper­ate in this envi­ron­ment as well?
    My per­sonal opin­ion is that Merrill McPeak’s fighter-​​centric legacy lives on, even in a time where there is no real need for these types of air­craft. The real value added by the fighter com­mu­nity has been in their abil­ity to strike ground tar­gets, a role that I beleive has even been passed on to the F-​​15C dudes. It seems odd to me that the Air Force would even enter­tain the thought of buy­ing some­thing with such a small air to ground capa­bil­ity.
    I fly bombers, and I know that in a real world sit­u­a­tion I will need some sort of air cover. That being said, I have no doubt that the job could be done just as effec­tively by some other plat­form. I would pre­fer to see the money spent on the F-​​22s go to a more value-​​added cause. For this price the Navy could pur­chase and equip six new car­ri­ers, hold­ing more than 480 air­craft. I’m pretty sure that wpould be far more ben­e­fi­cial than 180 new F-​​22s. I would feel safer anyway.

    Reply
  3. David says:
    February 8, 2008 at 3:44 pm

    In reply to irtusk: |quote|F-22 oppo­nents keep call­ing it ‘deeply flawed’ but never quite man­age to iden­tify what exactly this mys­te­ri­ous flaw is|unquote|
    The flaw is the con­cept, not the air­craft itself. As with the F-​​4 back in the late 50’s it was intended to be a stand-​​off fighter focussing on mis­siles to the extent of ignor­ing close-​​in capa­bil­i­ties. As a result, it became a bet­ter bomber than it was a fighter. It could barely hold its own against the Mig 19 due to the fact that it hon­estly couldn’t defend itself against guns. Sure, it could try to run away, but then they made them­selves vul­ner­a­ble to the MiG’s mis­siles. It wasn’t until the F-​​4E that they actu­ally put in the plane.
    Don’t get me wrong, the F-​​4 did a great job as far as it went. It was far supe­rior to the F-​​105 it was sent to sup­port and pro­tect. But as an air-​​to-​​air fighter, it took us from a 15:1 loss ratio against the VC to a 1:1 ratio… not very good con­sid­er­ing Korea only 10 years before with a 30:1 win ratio against the MiG 15.
    So what’s the flaw? Not the plane itself, but the con­cept that this needs to be a “One-​​plane-​​does-​​it-​​all” instead of an air-​​to-​​air fighter. The result would be a lighter, even more fuel-​​efficient air­frame with even higher maneu­ver­abil­ity against any oppo­si­tion. Ok, so in one exer­cise a sin­gle Raptor went up against a squadron of Eagles; no argu­ment. You’re also look­ing at a mod­ern plane against a near-​​obsolete plane. Has any­one actu­ally taken it up in an even, unre­stricted match against a MiG 35? What about newer MiGs and Yaks? Is it really com­pa­ra­ble? I don’t know.
    Honestly, expect­ing a mere 200 planes to pro­tect US assets from poten­tially hun­dreds or even thou­sands of oppo­nents is like expect­ing John Henry to beat the steam ham­mer 40 times in a row with­out rest. He might beat a few, but he can’t win them all. Sure, fewer num­bers can be effec­tive; the F-​​15 with its 750 or so air­frames replaced some­thing over 2500 F-​​4s. But the F-​​15 was sup­ported in turn by the F-​​16 and the A-​​10. With mod­ern pro­jec­tions being what they are, the F-​​35 is hardly going to be able to replace both the –16 and the –10.
    For that mat­ter, how many peo­ple remem­ber the F-​​20? How many remem­ber what hap­pened to it?

    Reply
  4. CR says:
    February 8, 2008 at 4:21 pm

    RobS–
    Your response is the typ­i­cal con­ser­v­a­tive knee jerk reac­tion when con­fronted with some­thing that does not fit your pre-​​conceived notion of what is “right”-
    One of the major points of this insight­ful arti­cle is “What are we get­ting for all of this money that is being laid out?” Are we get­ting bet­ter tech­nolo­gies for coun­ter­ing IEDs which are killing our troops? Better equip­ment for counter insurgency/​terrorist oper­a­tions?
    Instead of ask­ing the hard, well thought out crit­i­cal ques­tions go ahead and rely on the stan­dard con­ser­v­a­tive bullcrap…“its the media.…it’s the left wackos.….it’s unions.…blah, blah, blah.…“
    It’s much harder to ask the tough ques­tions and face reality.….good job

    Reply
  5. Alexander Lebsn says:
    February 8, 2008 at 4:49 pm

    How many 5th gen­er­a­tion fight­ers are out there? If I recall corectly only the F-​​22 and the F-​​35 are qual­i­fied as such. The Su-​​37 may be if they ever get into full pro­duc­tion. Putting a cou­ple squadron of the finest fight­ers ever made into the hands of the finest pilots ever trained would be more than a match for most nations out­side NATO. If any coun­try attempts an air-​​war, the risk of send­ing dozens of their own air­craft up against a dozen of F-22’s, they would take severe causu­al­i­ties.
    Like most rea­sons we field and put to use for is because of deter­ence. To stop a war from hap­pen­ing. The F-​​22 is the pin­ni­cle of mod­ren avi­a­tion, that would be quite a deter­ent. I’ve defi­natly per­fer pay­ing the price to guan­tee the fact that the skies over the U.S. is guarded by air­craft that are unri­valed.
    Now to add Future Combat Systems to the Army, and some new DD(X) stealth destoy­ers, then maybe we could hit a tril­lion dol­lars a year

    Reply
  6. irtusk says:
    February 8, 2008 at 5:16 pm

    > The F-​​22 is almost use­less out­side of a cpn­trolled fight where the out­come has already been pre-​​arranged
    sure
    > Yes, it is the most capa­ble fighter out there
    slightly con­tra­dic­tory is an under­state­ment
    > The flaw is the con­cept, not the air­craft itself.
    so you’re say­ing the F-​​22 isn’t flawed?
    > As with the F-​​4 back in the late 50’s it was intended to be a stand-​​off fighter focussing on mis­siles to the extent of ignor­ing close-​​in capa­bil­i­ties.
    pray tell how the F-​​22 ignores close-​​in capa­bil­i­ties
    it is the most agile fighter in the world and has a can­non, i’m still not see­ing the flaw
    > So what’s the flaw? Not the plane itself, but the con­cept that this needs to be a “One-​​plane-​​does-​​it-​​all” instead of an air-​​to-​​air fighter. The result would be a lighter, even more fuel-​​efficient air­frame with even higher maneu­ver­abil­ity against any oppo­si­tion.
    so even though it’s the fastest, most manouev­er­able fighter with some of the longest range of any fighter, it’s still not fast enough, manouev­er­able enough or long-​​legged enough
    ooooooookay
    actu­ally it was designed just how you sug­gest. The motto of the design team was ‘not one pound for air to ground’. The F-​​22 was designed soley as a no-​​compromise A2A weapon. Later, a (lim­ited) A2G capa­bil­ity was tacked on to jus­tify the pro­gram to con­gress, but make no mis­take, it is a no-​​holds-​​barred dog­fighter
    > Honestly, expect­ing a mere 200 planes to pro­tect US assets from poten­tially hun­dreds or even thou­sands of oppo­nents is like expect­ing John Henry to beat the steam ham­mer 40 times in a row with­out rest.
    the USAF had the exact same con­cern
    for­tu­nately, they put a plan in place to deal with it
    you have heard of the F-​​35 yes? 1500+ of them should be plenty to sat­isfy any ‘quan­tity con­cern’
    (PS the F-​​15s and F-​​16s aren’t going any­where soon either)
    > One of the major points of this insight­ful arti­cle is “What are we get­ting for all of this money that is being laid out?” Are we get­ting bet­ter tech­nolo­gies for coun­ter­ing IEDs which are killing our troops? Better equip­ment for counter insurgency/​terrorist oper­a­tions?
    there is a dan­ger in so totally focus­ing on COIN oper­a­tions that we lose our abil­ity to fight the ‘Big War’. Just because boomer subs are irrel­e­vant to Iraq doesn’t mean they are irrelevant.

    Reply
  7. Grant says:
    February 8, 2008 at 5:38 pm

    Not one of you men­tioned the fact that There are three lev­els of inter­na­tional par­tic­i­pa­tion. The lev­els gen­er­ally reflect the finan­cial stake in the pro­gram, the amount of tech­nol­ogy trans­fer and sub­con­tracts open for bid by national com­pa­nies, and the order in which coun­tries can obtain pro­duc­tion air­craft. The United Kingdom is the sole “Level 1″ part­ner, con­tribut­ing US$2.5 bil­lion, about 10% of the devel­op­ment costs[34] under the 1995 Memorandum of Understanding that brought the UK into the project.[35] Level 2 part­ners are Italy, which is con­tribut­ing US$1 bil­lion; and the Netherlands, US$800 mil­lion. Level 3 part­ners are Canada, US$440 mil­lion; Turkey, US$175 mil­lion; Australia, US$144 mil­lion; Norway, US$122 mil­lion; and Denmark, US$110 mil­lion. Israel and Singapore have joined as Security Cooperative Participants.

    Reply
  8. navblk4 says:
    February 8, 2008 at 6:03 pm

    The F-​​22 and 35 are dog­fight­ers more less from
    the arti­cle. Dogfighting has just exceeded 100
    miles with a sidewinder deriv­a­tive.
    Most dog­fight­ers are approx­i­mately 100 miles
    from “the coast were I live in a very pop­u­lated
    area”. Intercept over this area could result in
    sig­nif­i­cant casu­al­ties.
    I ques­tion drones sur­veil­lance capa­bilty more so
    than tar­get recog­ni­tion and guid­ance of the drone and pay­load. I feel sur­veil­lance over a large area
    needs to be con­sid­ered before going 100% drone as
    so many say is hap­pen­ing.
    I also ques­tion fur­ther bud­get­ing for 35’s when 22 pro­jec­tions and goals have not yet been met,
    though there’s prob­a­bly not much difference.

    Reply
  9. navblk4 says:
    February 8, 2008 at 6:43 pm

    From:
    navblk4​@​military.​com
    To:
    Christian.​lowe@​military-​inc.​com
    Subject:
    Fwd: Sloppy for­mat
    Date:
    Fri, Feb 8 2008 3:16:30 PM –0800
    —- Begin Included Message —-
    From: navblk4​@​military.​com
    Sent: Fri, 8 Feb 2008 15:11:43 –0800
    To: noahmax@​inch.​com
    Subject: Sloppy for­mat
    I just posted here.
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    it.
    —- End Included Message —-
    Tech Email:noahmax@inch.com
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    Date: Fri, 08 Feb 2008 23:06:05 GMT
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    Reply
  10. Bryan2020 says:
    February 8, 2008 at 7:42 pm

    I guess the debate also rages in the Pentagon, with the high tech won­der weapons for myth­i­cal super­pow­ers crowd vs the low tech/​brains of the here and now and most likely future, COIN.
    Any cur­rent and future bud­gets that are not weighted 70 per­cent toward COIN/​Post-​​conflict is a waste of money…or worse.
    http://​www​.nytimes​.com/​2​0​0​8​/​0​2​/​0​8​/​w​a​s​h​i​n​g​t​o​n​/​0​8​s​t​r​a​t​e​g​y​.​h​t​m​l​?​_​r​=​1​&​a​m​p​;​h​p​=​&​a​m​p​;​p​a​g​e​w​a​n​t​e​d​=​&​a​m​p​;​o​r​e​f​=​s​l​o​gin

    Reply
  11. morpheus says:
    February 9, 2008 at 12:25 am

    There obvi­ously is a lot of opin­ion about these top­ics. But I think we all can agree on many things.
    1. We need a supe­rior A2A fighter.
    2. We need enough of them to han­dle any fore­see­able con­flicts.
    3. We need supe­rior A2A mis­siles.
    4. We need to engage ene­mies from a safe dis­tance as pos­si­ble.
    5. We need to be able to win the dog­fight if it comes to that though that should be our last resort.
    6. We need a good bal­ance of qual­ity vs. quan­tity to max­i­mize our spend­ing.
    7. We need a supe­rior Air to Ground plat­form just like our A2A plat­form.
    8. National defense is job one for the national gov­ern­ment.
    9. We should spend enough money to get this job done prop­erly.
    10. We should not spend more than we need to get the job done prop­erly.
    11. We need to plan for the Big War and for smaller con­flicts.
    12. Our cur­rent COIN respon­si­bil­i­ties are impor­tant and need all the right tools for the job.
    13. Our A2A supe­rior fighter is not the right tool for this job.
    14. The A-​​10, F-​​16, and F15E are good but minor tools for this job.
    15. Our past short com­ings in Iraq and Afghanistan have had lit­tle to do with equip­ment.
    16. Tactics are just as impor­tant than equip­ment.
    17. In our cur­rent con­flicts, we have adjusted our tac­tics and are hav­ing bet­ter suc­cess.
    18. Throughout the his­tory of our coun­try, we have made big mis­takes in the past on equip­ment and tac­tics. We even­tu­ally learn bet­ter and cor­rect our mis­takes.
    19. Some of these mis­takes have been with jets and mis­siles.
    20. We don’t want to repeat these mis­takes.
    21. Honest debate is always healthy.
    22. Missile tech­nol­ogy is get­ting bet­ter.
    23. Dogfighting is not as impor­tant as it used to be.
    24. Dogfighting should still be taught and prac­ticed.
    25. How good our mis­siles and tac­tics are should be kept secret.
    26. Most of us debat­ing here do not have the lat­est data on mis­siles and tac­tics.
    27. Thus none of us can resolve this debate here.
    28. Even if we could, things will change tomor­row and new con­clu­sions will be dif­fer­ent.
    29. The biggest issue today is not jets, mis­siles, or tac­tics — it is gov­ern­ment spend­ing.
    30. Our gov­ern­ment spend­ing is more of a threat to national secu­rity then any mil­i­tary foe.
    31. We need good solu­tions to this prob­lem.
    I think we can all agree on these points. Ultimately, most of us are try­ing to solve the wrong end of the equa­tion. We debate how many F-​​22s we should have rather than how to get the costs down.
    I want to know why the F22 costs so much? Why is it like $300 mil­lion a copy rather than $50 mil­lion? There has to be cre­ative ways to get the cost down. I’d love to see a break­down of the plane by areas of cost. I bet that would be very inter­est­ing. I also bet most of us don’t have a clue about this. Very few peo­ple do.
    But even then, the big­ger issue is our gov­ern­ment spend­ing on non-​​military issues. Our gov­ern­ment spends only 25% of its bud­get on our mil­i­tary. About 73% of it is spent on social secu­rity, wel­fare, and Medicare/​Medicaid. That is the real problem.

    Reply
  12. navblk4 says:
    February 9, 2008 at 1:10 pm

    Thank you for the com­ments, how­ever I don’t
    nec­es­sar­ily agree with these.
    8. National defense is job one for the national gov­ern­ment. (I can’t tell why it’s not here.)
    14. The A-​​10, F-​​16, and F15E are good but minor tools for this job. (We main­tain these areas of
    sci­ence and engi­neer­ing are never bad and never
    good. They are only char­ac­ter­ized as such.)
    19. Some of these mis­takes have been with jets and mis­siles. (This I ques­tion. Accidents or
    delib­er­ate usage should not always char­ac­ter­ize them as bad nor con­demn the entire mod­els nor clas­sify them as mis­takes.)
    21. Honest debate is always healthy.(Depends, you
    basicly already answered within these state­ments
    that it may not be.)
    22. Missile tech­nol­ogy is get­ting bet­ter. (Possibly “improv­ing” may be more proper.)
    Of course I agree with much you say, though I’ll
    edit this, all has been stricken.
    DoD is not a large entity and the mil­i­tary com­po­nents them­selves have not grown in com­par­i­son
    to other gov­ern­ment enti­ties.
    I was a memebr of IEEE and invited to a job din­ner
    with Thales. They were hir­ing 50 engi­neers. These
    jobs are short term. A young woman with the IEEE I
    spoke to at this din­ner. She works at a large aero­nau­tic com­pany, and admit­tedly is not an engi­neer. Most jobs for engi­neers are aquired by
    those in their 50’s now­days. I just saw this at
    Boeing with less than a dozen jobs.
    In 2005 I attended the 2 day math­works aero­space and defense con­fer­ence. Approximately 500 per day in atten­dance. Approximately 50% from the US and 50% for­eign. In atten­dance were the sci­en­tist and engi­neers from Boeing, Grumman, Martin, NASA, Los
    Alamos and very few pri­vate as myself.
    Are there too many paper push­ers on payrolls?

    Reply
  13. pfcem says:
    February 9, 2008 at 1:16 pm

    Some of us WISH we spent about 25% on defense. It is actu­ally less than 20% (a lit­tle more or a lit­tle less depend­ing on which num­bers you believe). And where the hell did they come up with $670 bil­lion — accord­ing to every reli­able source I can find it is “only” $585.4 bil­lion ($515.4 dis­cre­tionary defense spend­ing + $70 to fund the wars in Iraq & Afghanistan). Also note that we spend more Social Security than defense & the pro­jectd growth in Social Security is SIGNIFICNLTY faster than defense…

    Reply
  14. Brian says:
    February 9, 2008 at 1:22 pm

    Grant, the rea­son none of us men­tioned that there are three lev­els of inter­na­tional par­tic­i­pa­tion is because it’s not true. There is one level of par­tic­i­pa­tion in the F-​​22. That level is: the US and the US alone.
    There are 3 lev­els of inter­na­tional par­tic­i­pa­tion in the F-​​35 pro­gram. That is a dif­fer­ent air­craft. Note the num­bers dif­fer­ence: 22 vs 35.

    Reply
  15. DC says:
    February 9, 2008 at 1:23 pm

    why would any nation try and fight us in the are­nas in which we are strongest? The Maginot line of supe­rior tech­nol­ogy in which we trust will aid us very lit­tle in future con­flicts.
    A real bonus to our armed forces would be the sac­ri­fice of a dozen F-22’s — instead spend­ing that money on broad­en­ing lan­guage and cul­tural train­ing through­out the services.

    Reply
  16. Cole says:
    February 9, 2008 at 2:31 pm

    Good com­ments Vertingetorex et all.
    “my only con­cern as far as IFF is that our allies don’t always com­ply. During OIF, Patriot mis­sile bat­ter­ies shot down at least one Brit fighter. From a guy in my old unit — I’m not going to the trou­ble of ver­i­fy­ing the inci­dent beside his word but he was at the air­base — after that inci­dent, another bat­tery locked on another Tornado, so the Brit pilot bombed the bat­tery.“
    —————————————
    A Patriot PAC-​​2 downed a Brit Tornado 4 days into OIF, killing both pilots. The next day, an Air Force F-​​16 fired a HARM at a Patriot radar that locked onto him, but nobody was hurt. Finally, a pair of Patriot PAC-​​3s were launched at a F/​A-​​18 mis­taken for a mis­sile(?), and killed the pilot even though he ejected.
    Keep in mind that 40 Patriot bat­ter­ies were in Iraq pri­mar­ily to pro­tect against the TBM threat, and 8 or 9 mis­siles were downed. Little time is avail­able to engage a mis­sile and the TTP then was to launch two Patriots against a missile…hence the two that killed the F/​A-​​18. Obviously, there was a soft­ware prob­lem and may have been an auto­mated launch prob­lem. The results and fixes were clas­si­fied and never released, but a state­ment was released to the effect that fixes were made. We will see.
    It was tragic to note no com­mu­ni­ca­tion existed between what­ever ground ele­ment was in charge of ground air defenses and AWACS which may or may not have solved some of the prob­lem. A future Single Integrated Air Picture is planned and must be auto­mat­i­cally kept cur­rent, or you are cor­rect, there may be future inci­dents.
    But two F-​​15s shot down two Blackhawks killing 26 friend­lies in 1994 with “visual ID.” Later in OIF, MLRS Batteries were engaged from the air, thought visu­ally to be Iraqi air defenses. There have been many more such inci­dents on both air and ground.
    Visual ID is often mis­taken. We can’t afford to dis­con­tinue use of AMD or air-​​to-​​air/​air-​​to-​​ground assets because frat­ri­cide occurs. We MUST fix the frat­ri­cide prob­lem, so our best mis­siles and TTP can be used as they were intended to max­i­mize the ben­e­fits of stealth air­craft and long-​​distance acqui­si­tion of air and ground tar­gets.
    The tragic loss of friendly air­craft to Patriot mis­siles should, how­ever, be a warn­ing to the authors of this arti­cle and the “more-​​is-​​better” crowd who would pre­fer con­tin­ued flight of many agile non-​​stealthy air­craft in the EARLY fight.
    More non-​​stealthy air­craft in the air, no mat­ter how agile, sim­ply means more non-​​stealthy air­craft splashed by enemy air and ground mis­siles.
    Likewise, more air­craft fly­ing air inter­dic­tion mis­sions, com­pli­cates the work of AWACS and ground/​sea air defense sys­tems to dif­fer­en­ti­ate between return­ing friend­lies and inbound threats.
    Fewer stealth air­craft fly­ing such mis­sions will be fly­ing known routes, and should hope­fully have small enough sig­na­tures that acci­den­tal engage­ment would be dif­fi­cult, because guid­ance and fuz­ing would be more dif­fi­cult by mis­taken friendly or delib­er­ate threat engage­ments.
    That does raise the inter­est­ing ques­tion of how AWACS tracks friendly stealth aircraft…but don’t tell me because I don’t want to be shot.;)
    ————————————-
    “Patriots might be quirky. But a few inci­dents like that could lead us to shorter detec­tion ranges, espe­cially if we are fight­ing on the side of an erst­while ally, like say, Vietnam against a Chinese inva­sion (how­ever that might hap­pen), long dis­tance IFF would ID both ally and enemy as poten­tial threats.“
    ————————————–
    You raise the specter of fight­ing along­side allies who have air­craft and ground sys­tems sim­i­lar to what the threat has. Examples: India air and ground sys­tems, South Korea ground sys­tems, Pakistan?
    Something must be done in the com­bat ID and TTP arena to fix frat­ri­cide. For instance, FCS has a highly capa­ble com­bat ID sys­tems built into its vehi­cles. Maybe its time to upgrade air IFF, as well.

    Reply
  17. navblk4 says:
    February 9, 2008 at 3:00 pm

    Hi vertin­gen­torex,
    Here is a patriot mis-​​hap.
    http://www.ima.umn.edu/~arnold/disasters/
    I did have a sim­pli­fied dia­gram and code exam­ple
    show­ing this, how­ever it appears some per­sons
    did not like it pub­lic and removed it from a
    site even though I designed the dia­gram and I wrote the code.
    I ques­tion AWAC fea­si­bil­ity com­par­ing to per_​se
    Maritelar Radar or com­pat­i­ble sys­tems, though I assume cov­er­age is greater than cur­rent Drone abil­ity.
    There is really noth­ing fur­ther to say here or
    debate with you, how­ever being shot for know­ing
    how? AWAC prob­a­bly uses the same algo­rithms or
    parts of as does CJudy, Dane, PaveP and maybe
    oth­ers. Perhaps to they add L or other band
    sen­sors for a track­ing sig­nal which is not an
    illu­mi­nat­ing sig­nal. Many away from AWAC’s know
    these things, so I don’t know why oth­ers should
    be shot.

    Reply
  18. Cole says:
    February 9, 2008 at 3:54 pm

    Navblk04,
    Appreciate the attempted clar­i­fi­ca­tion, but your link refers to a Feb 25, 1991 inci­dent where a Patriot did not kill a SCUD and 28 died and 100 were wounded. That and the threat to Israel explains why the mis­sile threat was taken so seri­ously 12 years later when the F/​A-​​18 frat­ri­cide occured in OIF, near Karbala.
    I’m sure you’ve heard the old joke, “I would tell you but then I would have to shoot you.” That was my ref­er­ence, and obvi­ously, as Morpheous points out, there are many things we don’t know in this dis­cus­sion and SHOULDN’T know…or spec­u­late about.
    That is also part of the prob­lem with the fighter mafia arti­cle. The his­tor­i­cally poor per­for­mance of Viet Nam era Sparrow radar-​​guided mis­siles does not mir­ror the clas­si­fied poten­tial of AMRAAM and current/​future threat radar mis­siles. Past capa­bil­ity of our non-​​stealthy air­craft using ECM against threat air defenses does not guar­an­tee future suc­cess against newer systems.

    Reply
  19. Vercingetorix says:
    February 9, 2008 at 4:44 pm

    Been a good con­ver­sa­tion so far:
    “why would any nation try and fight us in the are­nas in which we are strongest? The Maginot line of supe­rior tech­nol­ogy in which we trust will aid us very lit­tle in future con­flicts.“
    That assumes that we are directly attacked and drawn into con­flict. Historically, that is far and away the excep­tion, not the rule to our wars.
    It is far more com­mon that we are drawn into an already rag­ing war, such as WWI and II (Pearl Harbor of course was a direct attack, BUT the Japanese were already con­quer­ing Asia, so it holds), Korea, Vietnam, etc.
    So, yes, few nations will attack us directly, just as few nations will directly attack Russia, India or China, just as it is unlikely that Russia will hit India or China or Europe or any com­bi­na­tion thereof.
    But Saudi Arabia might not hes­i­tate to strike Ethiopia, or Ethiopia Eritrea, or Colombia against Venezuela, or even Brazil against Argentina, or Pakistan vs Iran, or wher­ever. Remember Desert Storm? Iraq didn’t hit the US, it hit Kuwait, and we responded with half-​​million troops.
    So the antes up to a major con­flict are there. And, of course, small wars will con­tinue to pop up and so we will fight more in the future.

    Reply
  20. Insaint says:
    February 10, 2008 at 4:53 am

    @Vercingetorix
    What coun­try ever atacked the US, besides Japan at Pearl Harbor?

    Reply
  21. wpnexp says:
    February 11, 2008 at 3:02 am

    Well, I hope the dinasaurs known as the Fighter Mafia read these responses and fig­ure out that they are relics of wars gone by. They seem to think we are still fight­ing in Vietnam. I appre­ci­ate Boyd for much of his fight­ing the­ory, it is very use­ful, and I appre­ci­ate Sprey as he help found the F-​​16, although he does not see the uses of the more mod­ern ver­sions which are excel­lent. But, they are really more of a nusiance lately.
    If the F-​​22 costs approx­i­mately $140 mil­lion per copy, the fig­ure I believe is most hon­est, espe­cially if you fac­tor out sunk research costs which were well spent as they do fac­tor into the F-​​35 also. It stands to prove that each fighter is no more than $0.50 per per­son here in the US. That is a bar­gain for the incred­i­ble safety it brings to the table. A squadron of 20 then cost the aver­age American a whop­ping $10. We cer­tainly can afford to buy a squadron a year until we have at least 400 planes (although I would pre­fer more like 600).
    The plane is the best there is. In close com­bat, it is reported that even our best fight­ers find it nearly impos­si­ble to even lock mis­siles onto the plane, includ­ing IR mis­siles. It will soon be launch­ing as many as 8 Small Diameter Bombs (SDBs) as far as 65 or more miles from there tar­get. Remember that the F-​​15C/​D does not even have the abil­ity to drop bombs, it is strickly air vs air. With its high Mach (Mach 1.7 has been reported) cruis­ing speed, and high alti­tude (over 65,000 feet) the SDBs may reach ranges much far­ther than even that stated above. The F-​​22s can fire AMRAAMs from greater dis­tance than the F-​​15 as it can be fired at Mach 1.7.
    The AESA radar is expected to make all other air to air radars nearly obso­lete. It is likely that the AESA will even be able to dis­able enemy air-​​to-​​air mis­siles with high power elec­tronic attacks. It is able to find, track and attack enemy air­craft at ranges that will finally allow mod­ern BVR mis­siles to excel.
    The F-​​22s make every F-​​15 and F-​​35 even more deadly in air to air com­bat, by first dis­rupt­ing the enemy, while pro­vid­ing intel to friendly fight­ers. (Note — unfor­tu­nately a crit­i­cal datalink was not ini­tially planned, but will be avail­able to assist in this in future upgrades).
    We cer­tainly need to con­tinue to pro­duce this excel­lent air­craft as we can mod­ify it for spe­cial pur­pose mis­sions in the future, some­thing we have not done mcuh in the past few years. The F-​​4 was mod­i­fied into an excel­lent Wild Weasel, the F-​​111 was turned into the EF-​​111 Raven. Who knows what great adap­ta­tions we can give to the F-​​22. It would be excel­lent in a two seat ver­sion for con­trol­ling UCAVs for exam­ple.
    While every­one was dump­ing on the B-​​2 bomber, they failed to see what it is today, a highly effec­tive bomber that can tar­get 80 sep­a­rate tar­gets today, and pos­si­ble hun­dreds in the future. That is rev­o­lu­tion­ary, and keeps our ene­mies at bay, as they know how dan­ger­ous it really is. It is a trav­esty that we are no longer build­ing updated B-​​2s today, but we at least seen the need and we will will spend bil­lions build­ing a new bomber for 2018.
    Forget the Fighter Mafia, and lets get on with the work of build­ing the best weapons in the world.

    Reply
  22. matt says:
    February 12, 2008 at 3:43 pm

    so we have fewer air­craft with no cur­rent use. The F-​​15 fleet is slowly falling apart, and even a lot of the –16’s are get­ting old now. This makes no sense.
    Airlift capa­bities are becom­ing ever more lim­ited and a 30 year old work­horse, the A-​​10 is one of the most use­ful plat­forms in the field.
    It would seem our lead­ers and our plan­ners are deeply out of touch with the nation’s require­menst for the next 5–10 years. Further, the infra­struc­ture that brought us those cost effec­tive plat­forms has been allowed to erode to the point that we are now reliant for many key tech­nolo­gies on over­seas sup­pli­ers, of whom some are of ques­tion­able reli­a­bil­ity.
    Our defense pro­cure­ment process has become a travesty.

    Reply
  23. ohwilleke says:
    February 13, 2008 at 1:50 am

    Insaint:
    ”@Vercingetorix
    What coun­try ever atacked the US, besides Japan at Pearl Harbor?“
    * England in the war of 1812 — they burned Washington.
    * Mexico. 1840s.
    * The Confederate State of America 1861.
    * Germany (saba­teurs dur­ing WWII form­ing the basis for the lead­ing pre-​​GWB prece­dent on domes­tic enemy com­bat­ants).
    Of course, U.S. forces have been fired upon far more often.

    Reply
  24. VNCCC-VHJM van Neerven, editor says:
    February 13, 2008 at 1:05 pm

    According to JDW, the Defense Secretary, Mr. Gates, has stated that the F-​​22 is use­less at the moment. It is oper­a­tional in Iraq and Afghanistan, but, he said to JDW, not one sor­tie has been flown.
    And he con­tin­ued by say­ing that a peer-​​to-​​near-​​peer con­flict is far away.
    So methinks that, when India, Russia and China are up to snuff, then the Raptor might dive down on its smaller kin.
    But when wil there be a war with any of these three?

    Reply
  25. navblk4 says:
    February 13, 2008 at 2:11 pm

    Cole,
    The rea­son I posted that, along with lower level
    pro­cess­ing men­tioned posted in the past was to
    make engi­neers think about 24 bits? al,ah are
    8 bit reg­is­ters. ax is 16 bits and eax is 32
    bits, and I don’t know of a 24 bit reg­is­ter? I take these occurences and mis­takes highly seri­ous myself.
    Yes iv’e heard the old joke, and from law it
    appears it’s not an old joke in the past. Those
    being ordered at times to kill have been done so not fol­low­ing due process, and they them­selves end
    up dam­aged some­times mon­e­tar­ily with prison or the same out­come to them. Falcon and the Snowman was due process, and of course i’m nei­ther of those 2, and would have been pleased to pros­e­cute them myself. I agree fully with you there.
    AMRAAM I did not men­tion exact mileage though mileage is avali­able over the pub­lic inter­net.
    I’m sure any clas­si­fied aspects are not pub­lic
    over the inter­net. This arti­cle appears to show
    alleged spend­ing prob­lems, how­ever no solutions.

    Reply
  26. navblk4 says:
    February 13, 2008 at 2:25 pm

    X-​​Version: mil­i­tarycom 7.5.2333.0
    X-​​SenderIP: 71.128.65.59
    X-​​SenderID: 27082853
    From: navblk4​@​military.​com
    Message-​​Id:
    Date: Wed, 13 Feb 2008 11:22:16 –0800
    X-​​Priority: 3
    Priority: Normal
    X-​​MSMail-​​Priority: Normal
    Content-​​Type: text/​plain; charset=iso-8859–1
    To: noahmax@​inch.​com,Christian.​Lowe@​military-​inc.​com
    Subject: http://​www​.defensetech​.org/​a​r​c​h​i​v​e​s​/​0​0​3​9​9​2​.​h​tml
    X-​​Mailer: Web Based Pronto
    Mime-​​Version: 1.0
    Content-​​Transfer-​​Encoding: 7bit
    http://​www​.defensetech​.org/​a​r​c​h​i​v​e​s​/​0​0​3​9​9​2​.​h​tml
    Can you pro­vide me a login to my post to either
    delete them or edit them. Again I just posted to the sub­ject and the post appears to be writ­ten to at the same I sub­mit­ted it caus­ing bad out­put to the appear­ance.
    navblk4

    Reply
  27. navblk4 says:
    February 13, 2008 at 7:30 pm

    But Gates is con­cerned that each F-​​22 costs $140 mil­lion, while the F-​​35 Joint Strike Fighter “will be about half that, about $77 mil­lion a copy.“
    http://​www​.fas​.org/​m​a​n​/​d​o​d​-​1​0​1​/​s​y​s​/​a​c​/​f​-​3​5​.​htm
    http://​en​.wikipedia​.org/​w​i​k​i​/​F​-​3​5​_​L​i​g​h​t​n​i​n​g​_II
    Seems to be some very large dis­crepren­cies?
    Cole,
    shorter range dog fight­ing here?
    http://​www​.fas​.org/​m​a​n​/​d​o​d​-​1​0​1​/​s​y​s​/​a​c​/​f​-​2​2​.​htm
    See per unit costs.
    This seems very pricey for capa­bil­ity?
    http://​www​.fas​.org/​m​a​n​/​d​o​d​-​1​0​1​/​s​y​s​/​m​i​s​s​i​l​e​/​a​i​m​-​1​2​0​.​htm
    Price seems to be improved with capa­bil­ity?
    http://​en​.wikipedia​.org/​w​i​k​i​/​A​I​M​-​1​2​0​_​A​M​R​AAM
    AIM-​​120D: >180km (112 mi)

    Reply
  28. navblk4 says:
    February 13, 2008 at 9:28 pm

    This arti­cle dis­cusses the defense bud­get in
    some­what a neg­a­tive fash­ion.
    Appears time and money has been saved here.
    http://​www​.af​.mil/​n​e​w​s​/​s​t​o​r​y​.​a​s​p​?​s​t​o​r​y​I​D​=​1​2​3​0​3​8​314
    In house seems to be one solu­tion for effec­tive
    budgeting.

    Reply
  29. Silk road gold says:
    August 14, 2008 at 2:49 am

    Now I cher­ish the mem­ory of my bet­ter friend who once help me and give me much more Silk road gold.

    Reply
  30. Tibia coins says:
    August 14, 2008 at 2:51 am

    Characters have a vari­ety of Tibia coins skills that will raise through training.

    Reply
  31. bilat says:
    November 1, 2008 at 3:22 pm

    pogs­pogs­pogs­pogs­pogs­pogs­pogs­pogsp­gos­gp­gos­g­p­sosps­gos­gsp­gos­gsp­gos­gs­pogs­g­pos­gs­g­pos­gsp­gos­g­posop

    Reply

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