
Controversy over the tanker deal continues to snowball as Boeing quietly waits for momentum against NG/EADS to build in its favor before launching a public assault on the deal.
Rep. John Murtha’s hearing last week was downright embarrassing, with the HAC-D chairman lecturing Air Force officials on his ability to kank the deal on a whim — “We appropriate the money, so you can’t do anything if we tell you you can’t” he basically said. Then Murtha went on to compare the Boeing loss to the Dubai Ports World deal, saying the reflexive, jingoistic, anti-trade reaction that scuttled that deal could rear its ugly head here again too.
Never shying away from a tap dance on the fringes of political polemics, he then pushed the start button on hanging the whole nefarious deal with NG/EADS on McCain’s head:
“Because of the individual in the other body stopping what the Air Force had already approved to do … is costing billions of dollars and we’re at a point where we don’t know how long it’s going to take to get these things [KC-135s] out of the air…”
Lemme get this straight: You thought the Boeing lease deal that McCain exposed was a better idea than an open and fair competition for the replacement? Do you remember, Mr. Murtha, that deal lead to jailing of a Boeing official and the resignation of a couple more? Unbelievable.
Here’s what our friends at Aviation Week had to say about the affect of the deal on Boeing bigwigs:
Arrogance about its relationship with the U.S. Defense Dept., lack of focus on customer requirements and reluctance to provide detailed pricing data contributed to Boeing’s stunning loss late last month of a Pentagon contract to build aerial refuelers. “Boeing ‘knew more than the customer’ what the customer wanted, and in its arrogance it didn’t listen,” says a source close to the 767 tanker team. The proposal’s executive group spent a lot of time “doing some soul-searching” as a result.
The defeat could bring on a wave of personnel changes for top executives involved in crafting the proposal. And it could reshape Boeing’s business strategy for capturing U.S. defense work. The company lost the $300-billion Joint Strike Fighter program to Lockheed Martin in 2001 and, while it still has an active F/A-18 product line, it is unlikely to break back into the fighter market. Last year, Boeing’s unmanned combat air system design lost to Northrop Grumman’s X-47 in a Navy project.
While the company still has strong rotorcraft, space and missile defense businesses, its place among airframers is unclear.
And the New York Daily News has gotten into the fray:
Angry Boeing supporters are vowing revenge against Republican presidential candidate John McCain over Boeing’s loss of a $35 billion Air Force tanker contract to European plane maker Airbus.
Boeing supporters in Congress are directing their wrath at the Arizona senator for scuttling an earlier deal that would have let Boeing build the next generation of Air Force refueling tankers.
“I hope the voters of this state remember what John McCain has done to them and their jobs,” said Rep. Norm Dicks (D-Wash.), whose state would have been home to the tanker program and gained about 9,000 jobs.
McCain said he is keeping an open mind on the contract, but in the past he has boasted about his role in blocking a 2004 version that gave the contract to Boeing.
He has run ads touting his role in fighting “pork” such as the tanker project and cited it in a recent debate.
So let me get this straight…It is McCain’s fault for exposing what many consider a criminal deal between the Air Force and Boeing? Why isn’t the wrath being directed toward Boeing for its earlier finagling and for its loss based on the merits of the two competitors this time? Politics, my friends, politics…
And here’s a Machiavellian strategy for you: maybe there won’t be a resolution to this debate/controversy at all until after the election in November since it could prove useful as a campaign issue once the Democratic nominee is anointed. Since McCain is tied so directly to the tanker tango, why not keep it alive for a while to use on the stump in Red states that lost jobs in the deal?
(Thanks to NC for the gouge)
– Christian


All these senators telling whats best for our air force. Jesus christ let the air force do its dam job.
As for blaming McCain, that is just rediculous. Obviously there was foul play, or there wouldn’t have been a 600m+ fine, as well as two (three?) people in jail. We are willing to accept a lesser product and laziness when it comes wrapped in am American flag?
From what I’ve read EADS/Northrup offered a better aircraft & sooner… Why Boeing didn’t, is beyond me. StrategyPage sums it up…
“The two big factors were superior performance (fewer of the AirBus aircraft were needed to get the job done) and more reliable performance of the suppliers.“
“49 of the AirBus tankers would be available by 2013, only 19 of the Boeing version would be ready.“
“The KC-30 carries 20 percent more fuel than the other candidate, the KC-767, plus more cargo pallets (26 versus 19) and passengers.Thus the KC-30 can stay in the air longer, while transferring more fuel.“
“How AirBus Beat Boeing“
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htproc/articles/20080309.aspx
also..
“Breaking Silence About the B-3″
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htairfo/articles/20080310.aspx
Over the past week, I’ve slowly become strongly convinced to support the EADS/Airbus side of this deal.
If murtha talked to me like that i would deck his old ass in the throat. that loser knows nothing about airborne refueling ops and to tell the airforce what plane they need according because hes getting kick backs from boeing is bullshit.
There is a lengthy report in Flight this week where US politicians are quoted as saying “this is not a done deal, all we have to do is stop the money and it is dead” and even talk of changing the law for defence bids. How can this be right just because the USAF wants the best tanker it can get?
Whareagle,
Only Boeing can answer that. It may have something to do with this:
“But Barksdale said Boeing doesn’t yet have a preference, despite having already sunk about $1 billion into developing the 767 variant.“
“777 to be Boeing’s alternative proposal for tanker” (September 26, 2006)
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/businesstechnology/2003275629_777tanker26.html
Also, I have yet to see a time table on which the KC-777 could have been produced. Heck, according to StrategyPage, “49 of the AirBus tankers… by 2013, [vs] only 19 of the Boeing version…”. And the 767 is a smaller aircraft.
Whareagle
the 767 ‘frakentanker‘ being offered is about the limit of what they can do with the 30 year old airframe — it takes bits from the –200, –300 , –400 and freighter versions (and isn‘t actually built yet either)
the japanise aircraft isn‘t the same as the boeing offering.
Boeing has been actively developing the B767 as a tanker for the last ten years as the successor to the KC-135 series. It is now actively being built and delivered to Japan and Italy. All corporate future tanker development funds have gone to this platform because Boeing decided this was the best aircraft in its inventory for the tanker role and worldwide sales. EADS made the same business decision regarding its Airbus 330 series aircraft after winning contracts in Great Britain, Saudi Arabia and Australia. EADS took a look at its inventory of platforms and made the same business call on the 330 as Boeing did on the 767. EADS put all its future tanker development funds into the 330 to the extent they even built a custom automatic refueling boom for the 330 with their own money. Request for proposals from the USAF are not tied to a specific platform but more to its perceived needs. The Air Force stated their needs in the request and the vendors respond with their best proposal based on how their product met the Air Force need, with their lowest cost, an explanation of manufacturing risk, delivery schedules, and related findings. The Air Force selects the winner and issues a development contract for initial production of test aircraft to validate the proposal. If successful, the Air Force then commits for a production contract and series production of operational aircraft is commenced.
Boeing had no more time to develop the 777 as a tanker than did EADS, say, for the 320. Both vendors took their best shot with the aircraft they decided were their best hope for worldwide sales. Both decisions were influenced by corporate politics, Boeing wanted to keep the 767 in production for the US military as commercial sales were dwindling and the line scheduled to close.
It is a tough loss for Boeing. The stockholders face the end of the 767 line and also the premature closing of the C-17 line in California as the new Northrop-Grumman KC-45As cargo ability will supplement the C-17s in inventory and remove the need for future C-17s beyond what the Air Force has generally requested.
If the NG-EADS tanker was such a political mistake, Congress should never have let them bid on the project in the first place. However, if the goal was to provide the USAF the best tanker for the best price, I think they got it right.
Frank Shuler
USA
Good Morning Folks,
All the pi**ing and bit**ing aside the Aie Force and Boeing are still locked in a cold war mentality. Reality say that future conflicts will be fought in land lock countries of South Asia and a Pacificcentric defense stratigy in the future, the EADS Airbus 330 has the range and the additional capacity that the 767 simply just lacks furl capacity and endurence/range to meet these projected needs.
The argument about runways is a non starter. The Air Force just doesn’t put fueling depots in hazardious areas, and as far as the ability to carry 19 pallets vs. 6 and 90 more passengers along with more fuel for it’s customers makes the Airbus 330 a no brainer.
The bonus could be with higher capacity and a shrinking Air Force the tanker demand might drop from 500 to say 300 a savings for the tax payer.
The jobs issue seems to be a zero sum deal. For every job lost by Boeing (or jobs that don’t yet exist but would have) a job will be created by Northrop/Grumman only in a different part of the country.
ALLONS,
Byron Skinner
Frank Shuler
Boeing developed the KC767 based upon the requirements they wrote for the usaf 10 years ago for the lease to buy ; this got scrapped and a new RFP came out stressing they wanted airframes that could fly further , with more cargo/fuel/people — boeing then chose to offer the KC767 even though they knew it was up against the A330.
boeing dropped the ball but will use all the lobbying it can to get there out of date product purchased; but look at all the issues with the 7late7 to see how much they messed up.
Whareagle,
As Camp said only Boeing can say for sure why it offered the 767 & in the configuration it did but…
Boeing had already won the previous tanker contract but that contract was cancelled do to that questionable actions of Druyun & Sears and the USAF was forced to start over & recompete the contract.
And even after the competion critera were changed JUST SO THAT NG/EADS WOULD COMPETE, what Boeing proposed met & exceeded all criteria. My guess is that even though the USAF was forced to recompete the contract & forced to change the criteria because the only other competitor threatened to not bid (because it had already lost & could assume would loose again otherwise) that the USAF would still choose the 767 as they did previously (since it is obviously the right aircraft for the job).
Unfortunately for Boeing the USAF had to judge the proposals based on the criteria they put in the final RFP & under those criteria the NG/EADS had a number of distinct advantages (plus there is a very anti-Boeing sentiment within the KC-X decision committee).
My problem is not with NG/EADS or the A330 derived tanker they proposed — it is/will be a quite capable tanker & serve the USAF well (within the limitations its weight/size dictate). My problem is that it is the wrong aircraft for the KC-X program. The choice of the A330 for the KC-X will (mark my words) FORCE the USAF to chose something more along the lines of the 767 for the KC-Z (the KC-Y is to replace the KC-10 & should be a larger aircraft with greater fuel & cargo capacity) & with the nature of the airline business there may not even be a commercial airliner that fits the bill by then so the KC-Z may end up having to be an all-new airframe designed from the ground up to not only replace the remaining KC-135 but all military 707-based aircraft.
Harlequin:
Another advantage EADS had in this competition was that they had a working prototype of the exact aircraft they bid. The winning 330 design was based on the Australian version of the EADS 330 tanker that uses the larger wing of the Airbus 340. As stated, EADS also built a new boom to meet the USAF requirements for this competition. Boeing never built such a dedicated USAF prototype 767 and their new automatic refueling boom was still in R&D. The NG/EADS KC-45A was deemed to have lower risk than the Boeing product.
Frank Shuler
USA
Congress can do what they want.…
…until the courts are involved, and if the NG/EADS bid is blocked, i can definitely see it heading there.
pfcem:
If the NG/EADS order stands and their version of the KC-45 actually flies, I suspect the whole concept of Future Tanker X-Y-Z goes by the wayside. By removing the smaller tanker, the Boeing 767 size aircraft from the process, it
I wouldn’t be surprised to see this go to the supreme court. Or just awarded to boeing by act of congress.
Frank Shuler,
You may be right given that a KC-Y contender (intended to replace the KC-10) has now been chosen for the KC-X (intended to replace the oldest KC-135).
irtusk,
I am really getting fed up with yout LIES (& you calling the truth lies). The program that has lead up to this existed (had been competed for & won) prior to 2006. And the criteria were changed/modified a number of times. They were changed/modified after the lease deal was cancelled & prior to 2006 (they had to just so that there would be another competion because NG/EADS were not even going to bid otherwise) & were changed/modified again between the 2006 & the “final” 2007 RFP & were even changed/modified again shortly before NG/EADs was declared the winner.
There was a prior deal to lease 100 tankers (later changed to leasing 20 & purchasing 80) which was won by Boeing. The 767 was determined to BY FAR be the better aircraft to replace the KC-135. Unfortunately (as quite often happens) even after the 767 had been chosen over the A330 there were some individuals who felt they had to “sweeten” the deal to ensure it went through & benefitted “everyone” (others were just plain stupid).
For those interrested in just how wrong irtusk is, here is a SUMMARY of the CHANGES just from the 15 Dec 2006 Draft RFP & the 30 Jan 2007 RFP (which are comparatively minor compared to the changes made up to the 15 Dec 2006 Draft RFP).
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/ABPub/2007/01/30/2003548546.pdf
ok, i did some more digging on the Revised AE litter station requirement
while what i quoted as 3.2.11.11.3 is in fact what it currently is, it appears the section numbering got changed around from the draft
in the draft, here is what 3.2.11.11.3 said:
> The aircraft shall have the capability to accept the seat rail litter stanchions used on the C-17
i found the comparable text under secion 3.2.1.6.7.3 in the final RFP
> The aircraft shall be capable of using the existing Litter Station Augmentation Set (LSAS) (THRESHOLD).
> The LSAS is a kit containing 9 C-17 litter stations providing 27 litter positions.
neither plane should have a problem meating this
heres one more comment:
i will repeat the writting of the last posted comment:
JESUS CHRIST! LET THE AIR FORCE DO ITS DAM JOB!
ADDED TO THAT PRAYER: DEAR LORD, MAKE THEM UNDERSTAND THAT THE AIR FORCE, OR ANY CUSTOMER KNOWS BEST WHAT THEY NEED, AND THEY REALLY DEPEND ON HAVING THE BEST FOR THE USA & ITS SOLDIERS.
WHEN BEING SENT, ALWAYS SEND WELL EQUIPED,AND WELL PREPARED, AND ALWAYS SEND THE BEST, THAT ARE TAUGHT,AND EQUIPEED WITH THE BEST, AND IT WILL GET DONE,RIGHT, FAST, AND WITH NO ONE MISSING..ALL RETURNING.……
AMEN LORD,
AMEN.……