The above is the question that the US Department of Defense is asking itself, courtesy of a new Defense Science Board Task Force chaired by Jacques Gansler. I wrote about the issue in a news analysis published this week in Flight International. I’ve posted an excerpt below, and you can read the full story here.
Taking an “off-the-shelf” aircraft and adapting it for a new military role was supposed to be the cheap and easy alternative to designing an all-new platform.
So, in accord with the mantra “faster, better and cheaper”, US military services since 2001 have often turned to off-the-shelf derivatives of commercial and military aircraft to satisfy new and emerging requirements for a wide range of missions, including scout and utility helicopters, VIP transports, surveillance aircraft and aerial tankers, to name but a few.
The results, however, have proved disappointing. Far from removing cost and schedule risks, procurements based on off-the-shelf aircraft and similar equipment have led to some of the most expensive acquisition fiascos for the US military over the last decade.
Examples range from aborted efforts, such as the ERJ-145-based aerial common sensor (ACS) or the 767-400ER-based E-10A, to multi-billion dollar development fiascos, as endured by the EH101-based VH-71A presidential helicopter and the Bell 407-based ARH-71A armed reconnaissance helicopter.
Despite the dubious track record, off-the-shelf alternatives remain popular. A pending contract for an unmanned maritime surveillance aircraft, as well future procurements for new signals intelligence fleets, are all expected to rely on platforms originally designed to perform a different role.
Jacques Gansler, a former US undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology and logistics (ATL), has been recruited to help solve the Department of Defense’s problem.
“A lot of the older systems also had the same characteristics” as today’s off-the-shelf aircraft programmes, Gansler says, adding: “We’ve just got a collection now of bad stories.”
Current ATL chief John Young has tapped Gansler to chair a task force aimed at evaluating the reasons why acquisition programmes based on off-the-shelf equipment often fail or face costly delays.
EH101 is primarily a medium military transport and ASW helicopter. It has a civilian version, but that’s it.
Successful examples are the Nimrod and Orion ASW planes.
There did not seem to be much of a problem with the multiple adaptations of the 707 airframe. I would suggest the problem may lie in the more recent applications and the contractors.
The problem has more to do with mission/feature creep.
This is just silly. The problem isn’t the already developed and working airframe at all. The problem is what they try to do with the airframe or the people trying to do it.
Lets not forget that these people are the same ones that seem to think that the Marines rubberband launched UAV is a deal at $70k, when you or I could build one with off the self parts for less than $10k.
And we forget to talk about the cost of custom designed airframes for use. It seems like every time we push out a new custom aircraft to replace something, it the most expensive aircraft to ever do that duty in the history of the world.
I think the biggest problem that faces the military are the bean counters who sit and figure out ways to make things not work.
They constantly try to save money by making something do everything. it then becomes overly costly and does nothing.
You need a tanker, buy a stretched 747 or something and fill it with fuel. Add on some powerful engines and make it just that a tanker, period. have interchangeability by using engines already in service. That’s the way to save money.
The F-117 was made with a lot of off the shelf parts to save money. It was a very successful aircraft and was a one trick pony.
It’s not the platform but what it is trying to be made into.
Like trying to make a Humvee into a fighting vehivcle.…dumb.
“These contractors know they can screw the government“
You are overassigning blame to the contractors. Not all of the blame is due the contractors, and not all contractors screw the Government. The dishonest part of the contractors should not be in business. However, if the Government streamlined their processes and made their specifications not so opaque, then it would be much easier for both the Government and us honest part of the contractors. In our contractor company, we are the honest part and do not screw the Government but rather work with them to get the mutually best solution.
Someone tell me why EADS is not included as an example?
“Despite the dubious track record, off-the-shelf alternatives remain popular.“
how many of these guys have stock in or are bought by the companies?
Why Do Commercial Platforms Make Such Lousy Military Aircraft?
The platform is not the problem. While basing certain military “systems” on existing commercial platforms DOES save some time & money on platform development even then turning said commercial platform requires some ‘militarization’ & “mission specific equipment”.
Simply put, MilSpec=$$$$
WADR, let’s not forget the low end of the equation. There’s a long history of civilian airframes taken into military use as trainers, utility, passenger/freight, observation/liaison, FAC, or squadron hacks.
Just by way of example, Piper Cub, Stinson Voyager, Cessna Skymaster; Beechcraft 18, Beech King Air, Shorts SkyVan/330, Grumman Goose and Widgeon, Lockheed Electra, Hudson and Lodestar; Douglas DC-3, and many more.
Looking at that history, it seems as if, you don’t futz with the design too much, or get into mission creep, things can work out OK.
Get into high intensity/threat scenarios, and it looks like you can’t avoid mission creep — or more importantly, complexity.
Note that a lot of the types above were designed before computers. Now, that’s not to say that kluge and clusterf@#ks didn’t happen before out digital helpmates; the “Greatest Generation” did TARFU and FUBAR just fine without them. But, apart from the proliferation of moving parts in modern aircraft, you’ve also got computers and software to control them. The aircraft are more complicated. More importantly, the systems for producing and contracting for them are also more computerized and complicated.
An aircraft manufacturer used be a big shed; subcontractors often weren’t very far away, very often on a railroad siding on a main line leading right up to the factory. For example, we had Lockheed in Burbank, Douglas in Santa Monica, Hughes in Culver City, North American in Inglewood adjacent to what is now LAX, with all of them linked by rail, and hundreds of subcontractors in between; Southern California was basically one big airplane factory. You can say the same of Kansas City, or maybe Long Island.
Now aircraft manufacturers are “lead system integrators”, governing thousands of subcontractors scattered all over the planet, linked by air, sea and land container and package freight, as well as teh Internets. Computer design and “just in time” production systems have not only facilitated complexity, but fostered it.
Don’t want to come off as a Luddite here, but one of the best books I’ve read in the past decade was Edward Tenner’s WHY THINGS BITE BACK: TECHNOLOGY AND THE REVENGE OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES. I won’t attempt to summarize it here, but it should suffice to say that the more complex you make a system, the more you should expect things to go sideways.
In the old days, turning a civilian airplane into a military airplane meant painting it green, or gray. Now we don’t do that.
Maybe we’ll need one gynormous dose of KISS to fix things.
Somehow, I don’t think more computers, processes and procedures are going to do it.
The problem is that the military keeps adding on bloat during the project. Contractors also keep looking out for ways to increase their revenue by proposing new enhancements the military will want. All the enhancements end up requiring fundamental changes to the COTS product. Project managers spend most of their time repricing/rebidding the project.
One would think there might be a way to freeze requirements up front. Instead, after the project award they all take on a 2nd life budget that becomes a black hole for taxpayer’s money.
Perhaps some significant and effective way of punishing both procurement officers and their superiors, and contractor corporate officers for overbudget projects could be found…
In many cases it does seem poor specification of requirements, and/or subsequent meddling is the problem rather than anything inherently wrong with the starting product.
The LUH for example — used in the hundreds in all weather conditions throughout the world, as a utility and medivac. Somehow the US army version ends up too hot and can’t carry stretchers. No aircon! people yell, too heavy!. Well that’s the point; if it needed aircon, then something else may or may not need a compromise, or choose another helicopter. Don’t buy it with that spec then complain.
Apparently there’s an Airbus passenger plane that makes a bloody good tanker..
The AWACS is another successful use of COTS hardware adapted to military use.
One important thing to remember is that ‘faster, better, cheaper’ was baloney to begin with, and a joke amongst engineers (emphasized by some pretty spectacular NASA failures: Stardust, Mars Polar Lander, etc) .. it was more of a bean-counter/system engineering (read: power-point bureaucrat) mantra, not an something actual engineers ever viewed as viable.
So when ‘fast-better-cheaper’ programs succeed, it should come as a surprise, but not when they fail.
Boeing 707 was no successful adaption of a civilian airframe as military aircraft. This includes AWACS.
The Boeing707 began its life as military aircraft (tanker) and became the Boeing 707 commercial airplane, so it was a successful adaption of a military airframe for the civilian airlines. Not the other way around.
It’s a given that any aircraft will face troubles when being modified for a role drastically different from the one it was intended for. For very complex and dangerous missions, the military should rely on purpose-built military hardware, not civilian off-the-shelfs that were never intended for combat. The current Marine-One replacement debacle is a perfect example of the militart trying to get an airframe to do a job for which it was never intended.
I’ve spoken to an airline pilot who
has flown both Boeing and Airbus equipment–
From what I gather, in a general sense, Boeing builds a fine, high quality plane right out of
the box that may be a little more expensive,
but operating costs and parts are reasonably priced-Airbus builds a somewhat lower quality
aircraft that is less expensive, but they gouge
you on parts after the sale. Anyone hear
something similar from those who fly both?
There’s a saying in the engineering world: “Fast. Cheap. Good. Choose any two”.
Or, to put it another way, it’s a bit like designing a main battle tank (bear with me): You’ve got 3 performance parameters in an MBT: Armor, mobility and firepower. The more you optimise one (or two) of these, the more the remaining suffer.
Same thing with “Faster, better, cheaper”: You want fast and cheap? Sure, can-do, just don’t expect it to be particularly good.
Regards,
Thomas L. Nielsen
Denmark
when we design an aircraft to meet special interests requirements and use it as a ‘jobs’ project for minorities you get what you ask for. A piece of krap that does nothing well. Military requirements will destroy most civilian eqipment in short order, especially aircraft in a war zone.
COTS is a good option for non-combatant systems if the budget allows replacement in a shorter timeframe than MIL-SPEC. Using COTS airframes is a receipe for disaster under wartime conditions when non-MIL-SPEC hardware is used. COTS is not hardy enough for the stresses of combat. Think of using an AIRBUS to replace a C-17 in a “hot” landing zone.
You never save money being cheap. Buy quality once or cheap 3 times
the HAMMER claim’s a holder
the HAMMER claim’s a holder