A great inside look at a Pentagon after-action report on that embarrassing nuke flub where the Air Force flew a couple doomsday weapons across the US without even knowing it.
Let’s hope this report doesn’t just collect dust on some general’s shelf and that the recommendations are actually implemented.
From our friends at Popular Mechanics:
One might think that the United States’ nuclear weapons — the cornerstone deterrent in the country’s arsenal — would be treated with the utmost precision.
This comfortable illusion was shaken on Aug. 31, 2007, when crews loaded six live nuclear warheads onto a B-52 bomber and flew from Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota to Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana, cruising over the nation’s heartland. Each warhead was 10 times more powerful than the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War II.
During the analysis of the incident by the Defense Science Board (DSB), released this month, the ugly truth came out: America’s nukes are so neglected that they are stored alongside conventional missiles, with nothing but an 8.5 x 11-in. sheet of paper to differentiate the two. The last day in August, Air Force personnel loaded the nuclear warheads on a routine repositioning of weapons stocks, believing them to be cruise missiles.
The system of checks and balances has degraded to a point that six of the planet’s most powerful weapons were missing for 36 hours — and no one noticed until they had landed in Louisiana. “The process and systemic problems that allowed such an incident have developed over more than a decade and have the potential for much more serious consequences,” the report warns.
So what can be learned by this near miss, and how can something worse be avoided?
1. No one Air Force command is solely responsible for taking care of nuclear weapons.
There are plenty of weapons systems and missions out there, and each one is more exciting and has a higher priority within the command structure.
The DSB report notes that, after the demise of Strategic Air Command, three operational Air Force commands took over the nation’s nuclear weapons: ICBMs went to Air Force Space Command; bombers went to Air Combat Command, and Air Mobility Command retained ownership of the refueling portion of the bomber missions. That means that there is no one central place where the nuclear mission — upkeep, training and such — is the primary mission. So the nukes got lost in the post-Cold War shuffle.
Recommendations in the report include the establishment of an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Enterprise to focus solely on nuclear missions. This person would report directly to the Secretary of Defense. The DSB report notes that the U.S. Navy, which handles nuclear missiles in its submarine fleet, has a system that keeps those weapons under one banner, “Strategic Systems Programs.” It’s commanded by a rear admiral, whereas in the Air Force the highest rank with a primary, daily focus on nukes is that of colonel. “While the attack submarines no longer routinely carry nuclear missiles, the submarine forces retain their nuclear legacy and nuclear focus,” the report says.
2. Human error was at the heart of the incident.
The staff at Minot Air Field had neglected to follow procedure for the sake of saving time. The verification of weapons — what kind, what warheads they carry, their armament status — should take about 45 minutes, and be performed before anything else happens.
“But, over time, to speed the process, breakout and convoy crews had established a process of concurrent activity,” the report states. “In this case, the breakout and convoy crew [at Minot] were connecting the trailer to the tow vehicle while the initial status verification was under way.” The checks had become pro forma, and a near disaster slipped through.
Indeed, the gaff that allowed six nukes out over three major American cities (Omaha, Neb., Kansas City, Mo., and Little Rock, Ark.) could have been avoided if the Air Force personnel had followed procedure.
“Let’s not forget that the existing rules were pretty tight,” says Hans Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project for the Federation of American Scientists. “Much of what went wrong occurred because people didn’t follow these tight rules. You can have all sorts of rules and regulations, but they still won’t do any good if the people don’t follow them.”
In fact, some see the incident as a way to draw attention to the importance of the job of babysitting nukes. “This review gave the Air Force the opportunity to improve on an already sound nuclear enterprise,” says Col. West Anderson, vice commander of the 2nd Bomb Wing at Barksdale AFB in Louisiana. “We handle weapons safely and ensure the highest possible standards of individual reliability and professional competence.“
Read the rest of the story from our Popular Mechanics parters at Military.com
– Christian
FAS.org has a detailed article on this: http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2008/02/nuclear_safety_and_the_saga_ab.php
If you scroll about halfway down, you can see a picture of the missiles with the 8.5x11 sheet of paper attached — it’s at the top of a pylon containing 6 of the weapons — not the easiest place to be seen.
I don’t get how “… a near disaster slipped through.” These things could have fallen off and hit solid concrete and still not detonate. We’ve lost many over land and sea, none detonated.
Detonating a nuclear weapon is much harder than many realize. In fact a nuke is relatively trivial until you try and detonate the thing.
I love PM, but someone’s being a bit of a drama queen here.
How much would it cost for the Air Force to buy a giant yellow & black sticker with the words “Nuclear! Don’t Touch!”, and slap that puppy on the side?
Or maybe they could use an anti-theft devices, like the ones at Walmart or at shopping malls. You know, the ones that blares siren when the clerk forgets to degauss the security tag.
On the bright side if the U.S. military can screw up this bad… just imagine what India, Pakistan, China, & Russia haven’t told anyone.
As I understood the story, these were UN-FUZED weapons. No Detonator devicdes were incerted in the Fuze Well of these weapons. As such, they were large, very heavy nuclear clubs. If they were missiles, they might even have been “safety pinned” to prevent them from being dropped or alunched. Without the detonators, the worst that could happen, was the nuclear elimant could break open and spill the nuclear core onto the ground. That would present a nasty clean up problem but nothing more in the event of an aircraft accident. That should have been the end of this story, but NOooo, lets drag it out.
While mistakes were obviously made, now this is nothing more than the Lefts newest opportunity to defame our wonderful military and their years of safe mission accomplishmet. Enough already.
The AF has already roled a few heads, no doubt! Training and safety check enhanced and a study done as this story indicates.
I notice that no one seems very interested in looking at where our good friends in the former Workers Paradise of the USSR have placed or misplaced some of thier nuke’s. Im a hell of a lot more interested in what is and has gone on there with those weapons, than reliving this incident in which I’m sure more than a couple of careers were adversly effected.
The Ruskies have recently fielded a new ICMB on a portable launcher and put it up FOR SALE to anyone willing to pay the price. That, after fools here in America have been sending the Commies money to shore up their economy for the past number of years. What a bunch of suckers they must recognize us as being.
Lets see some info about weapons like those rather than beating up on our own guys!
1. Maintaining the safety and security of America’s most powerful weapons and technology should absolutely be considered the most important mission of the US government.
2. When in doubt, refer to Number 1. Period/Full Stop/Message Ends.
3. But, that said, this is really nothing more than a wake-up call for the leadership to start using both hands to find their own butts, pull their collective heads out, and to lace up their boots before something REALLY disastrous befalls Joe Sixpack et al.
Clearly, something is obviously amiss, so let’s get it fixed, pronto. We’ve had more than a half century to get this right, and despite decades of human errors and glitches, there hasn’t been an actual “catastrophic incident” yet.
But I think we’ve already burned enough witches over this particular (non-)fiasco.
Anyone who spent any time in SAC during the Cold War knows the AF is not the AF we knew. The demise of SAC was one of the key stupid decisions in the post-cold war gutting of the nuclear forces. Frankly, if the AF isn’t serious about the mission, take it away from them.
These unfused missiles may not have been such a great risk, but they hint at something larger (like for example the degradation of procedure). I dont really enjoy the risk that next time they notice a warhead is missing is because of that really bright flash on the horizon.
This story is extraordinarily inaccurate. We’re not talking about mixed stocks. We’re talking about some really bad paperwork oversights and piss poor procedure. Major defects, yes. but this wasnt some Iraqi munitions bunker filled to the brim with a mix-match dose of everything under the sun. And Jeff is right; these were nothing more than nuclear paperweights. Again, not good but not skirting apocalypse either. Risk was minimal but the bigger problem is the cultural approach to nuclear weapons oversight and transport.
The U.S.Air “Farce” has a long and distinguished record of less than optimal handling of nuclear weapons.(Palomares,Savannah River,some poor S.C. farmer,Kirtland AFB,etc)So,what else is new?
This story has confused me for awhile. I used to work nuke security at Minot and know how hard it is for a nuke to be accidentally loaded. Without giving away classified information I can tell you nuclear and conventional weapons are stored in two seperate locations. Taking a weapon out of a vault is not as easy as opening a door. You have multiple alarms and locks to go through just to leave the building. Leaving the storage area takes alot more work and coordination with security personnel. The only reason they bring nukes out of the area is for exercises. What probably happened is the planes were loaded for an exercise and one of the pylons were left on a plane. These execises take a long time. Working day and night, people want to get home by the time it is over. This includes the crews from Barksdale that bring their planes up for the exercise. What most likely happened is the planes started leaving before full inventory was taken and once the AF realized the screw up they tried to cover it up.
In the wake of 9/11, the United States would have been better off to leave Sadaam Hussein in power because HE HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH 9/11. ZIP. NADA. SQUAT.
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Problematic, aren
Problematic, aren