In the key areas of defining and developing FCS capabilities, requirements definition is still fluid, critical technologies are immature, software development is in its early stages, the information network is still years from being demonstrated, and complementary programs are at risk for not meeting the FCS schedule.
Ouch…
Read the latest in a series of critical GAO reports on the progress of the Army’s FCS program.
Even though the development of FCS will finish late in its schedule, commitments to production will come early. Production funding for the first spinout of FCS technologies and the early version of the FCS cannon begin in fiscal years 2008 and 2009.
Why? Because the Oklahoma congressional delegations insist on it for Ft. Sill’s sake.
Production money for the core FCS systems will be requested beginning in February 2010, with the DOD fiscal year 2011 budget requestjust months after the go/no-go review and before the stability of the design is determined at the critical design review. In fact, by the time of the FCS production decision in 2013, a total of about $39 billion, which comprises research and development and production costs, will already have been appropriated for the program, with another $8 billion requested.
Doesn’t this seem a little backwards? Of course it does. If you’re smart, get the money first — before you’ve determined if the system really works, right? Can you imagine if we were saying the same thing about missile defense?
Also, the Army plans to contract with its lead system integrator for the initial FCS production, a change from the Armys original rationale for using an integrator. This increases the burden of oversight faced by the Army and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
No way…make it too confusing for anyone else to make sure you’re executing the contract in the most efficient manner? Nobody would ever do that!
Competing demands from within the Army and DOD limits the ability to fund higher FCS costs. Thus, the Army will likely continue to reduce FCS capabilities in order to stay within available funding limits.
Again…ouch…
Can we please just call the FCS program what it really is: a technology incubator program, a giant R&D effort for the ground pounders, please? I worry that the Army could begin slipping into the Air Froce trap by defining its future by a specific program.
– Christian
dude imagine if we could make a Heavy Unmanned Ground Attack Vehicle and just set it in the ground near a place.…..ooooo how about we send some to Darfur make a little base and ummm.….forcably patrol areas…say darfur
low manpower…and hell they cant be harder to drive than a damn tank in Battle feild games surly
hmmm ok hears what i ment by set it in the ground simply think Bolo for those of you who are allergic to great books such as these a underground maintanence and refueling station completely auto mated reay to respond at a moments notice
yeah i always have problems with that whole coherent thing.….its the add kicking in i haz bad case
correct me if im wrong wasnt the thing that killed commanche the electronics part of it to?
and why dont we use some of the tech from commanche in a new attack chopper seems to me some of that amazing manuverability would be very useful. i mean apache is awsome but realy
The FCS faces further challenge as our military engages in debate on how to address both big conventional wars and smaller unconventional wars: wars that are peacekeeping and yet also require kicking butt at full power at any time. A lot of our perspective on warfare has changed in the last five years. Doesn
One of the biggest problems with FCS, which Christian alluded to, is that the Army is trying to make large generational leaps in capabilities that are based primarily on software gains, not hardware. Software is, in my opinion, much harder to develop than hardware. FCS is an interesting concept, but DARPA and some R&D arm of the Army should be looking at new technologies and than incrementing them into existing/developing platforms rather than trying to get the whole shebang at once. FCS has set unrealistic expectations and my experience is that the majority of military people don’t sufficiently understand software development. Much like I don’t understand the intricacies of joint operations at the Brigade or Division level. It is not what I am trained for.
The basic problem is the procurement process. We are trying to spec five years ahead of the current technology, for delivery in five years. Networking technology doesn’t work that way. By the time FCS is delivered, you will be able to buy an equivalent radio set made with overseas child labor for $99 at Costco.
I believe one of the fundamental benefits of the FCS program to the Army is that the system of systems procurement model allows the Army to protect the development and procurement of items that would otherwise be vulnerable to being cut in the budgetary process. The current program structure aggregates the political influence of a diverse number of interest parties in the Army and the defense contractor community, and created political incentives across the large number of congressional districts that might potentially benefit. Furthermore, the structuring of a vast number of Army vehicles and weapon systems as a single interconnected system makes each more difficult to cut and shifts the budgetary decision power over individual vehicles from Capitol Hill and the DoD to the Army itself. Would we really be developing a new medical rescue vehicle, for example, if each of these systems were procured separately? And yet, developing it we are. It is no accident that the first system out the door is the NLOC, since tube artillery, as shown by the Crusader, was highly vulnerable in the post cold-war late 90’s environment.
Now the political and military environment has changed and the Army is shifting to adapt. I hope that the Army will concentrate mind and resources on the fundamental leap-ahead capabilities needed to fight future battles and spin out technologies as needed (indeed it looks like this is what they are doing). It would be irony of the highest order if clever political maneuvering resulted in unclear or wrong-headed thinking on actual war fighting needs.
“The basic problem is the procurement process. We are trying to spec five years ahead of the current technology, for delivery in five years. Networking technology doesn’t work that way. By the time FCS is delivered, you will be able to buy an equivalent radio set made with overseas child labor for $99 at Costco.“
Wait a minute. On one hand you are implying that we should not wait 5 years for the newest stuff to be created and then produced so it isn’t already obsolete. Then you imply that we will be able to buy it cheap commercially.
Can you buy a secure SINCGARS radio commercially. I think not. You see what happens to the Taliban when they use commercial cell phones, right?
I also get amused that FCS gets blamed for slow progress of communications systems in many ways external to FCS and that are very much wanted by other services as well.
Frankly, I think the network is oversold as an absolute necessity for FCS to be effective. Suspect the NLOS-Cannon will be pumping rounds downrange against the enemy in a couple of years, without the network, using AFATDS. Just a guess.
When the network is ready, we can install it. Meanwhile, you are learning lots of lessons about the manned ground vehicle.
“FCS is an interesting concept, but DARPA and some R&D arm of the Army should be looking at new technologies and than incrementing them into existing/developing platforms rather than trying to get the whole shebang at once. FCS has set unrealistic expectations and my experience is that the majority of military people don’t sufficiently understand software development. Much like I don’t understand the intricacies of joint operations at the Brigade or Division level. It is not what I am trained for.“
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But much of the software IS commercial produced by experts. I suspect that not a single member of the military is writing code.
In addition, much of the code used for some spin-outs is being duplicated for use on other systems. It isn’t millions of line of original code.
I know diddly squat about code and only know what I’ve read in news stories. But one of those stories spoke about the additional code costing perhaps $5 billion more than originally anticipated. Sounds like nothing compared to a $160 program with great applications outside of FCS.
The spin outs into the current force are already beginning…so yes some systems can support Abrams/Bradley. But the electrical requirements for most FCS systems cannot be achieved without the hybrid electric drive.…again just stuff read in news stores.
Other services seem to get away with expensive programs and nobody bats an eye. Look at the tanker program. Tanker X, Y, and Z over the next 25 or so years to hide/disguise the total cost of replacing tankers which I guess is three times $40 million per separate program.
Do you think someone would have a hissy fit if the Army said they were going to buy $120 billion worth of fuel trucks over the next 20 years that will never fire a round in anger? Oh wait, we are already spending much more than that for the F-22 which has yet to down a MIG or drop a bomb on the Taliban.…and likely won’t any time soon in a cost effective manner.
Christian, how much bad press did V-22 get over the years and it turned out pretty good, right.
I’ve already made a comment to the effect that Marines on V-22s or airborne troops are essentially interchangeable…so why spend so much on V-22 to drop in speed bumps for any major threat? The 82nd is a highly effective speed bump, as is!!
But speed bumps have many uses in places like Afghanistan. Then MG Petraeus was probably pretty partial to his commmanded 101st Airborne (AA) capabilities, as well. And although only
a few brigades kicked down the door in Iraq, it could have been much nastier without the 82nd and 101st mopping up the bypassed towns and securing the supply lines.
I think we all recognize that there won’t be many wars like Desert Storm anytime soon. The long war is the norm, and you need forces that can fight the long war at less cost in logistics and lives.
In closing, Christian, have you ever met a regular reporter or GAO member who liked ANYTHING about any weapons program?
It should not take $5 billion dollars to write software. Microsoft probably shipped Windows Vista for less. I know a guy who sat in his apt for a year and wrote over a million lines of very complicated code (yes, thousands of lines of code per day; of course he was, in many ways, a genius).
Looking at the recent performance of Boeing, the prime contractor, in many areas (787, tanker, rocket launcher), it’s apparent that this company is in a situation where it has a strong core team of engineers but not enough to cover all product areas or work with subcontractors to consistently execute product designs.
I have a gut feeling that they have allowed their recruitment and retention efforts for new talent atrophy and the company is winning contracts on the strength of a core team of impressive people who do not have access to a sufficiently robust support structure to actually execute their proposals.
“It should not take $5 billion dollars to write software. Microsoft probably shipped Windows Vista for less.“
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Read that Vista is only 55 million lines of code and JSF is 19 million. FCS is many times more complex than either and has 95 million lines.
JSF– 19 million lines for 1 system
FCS– 95 million lines supporting 14 systems plus the network all interlinked internally and externally to other combat, combat support, logistics, ISR, and comms systems outside of FCS.
It’s like the red wagon I had when I was a kid and now there is an adult version for tactical fun.
Well, I take that back. Turns out it probably cost MS about $10 billion to develop Windows Vista. What I don’t take back are my doubts about Boeing’s engineering depth, which has shown up in the 787, the tanker deal and the space launch program. It’s not that Boeing is not good. It just seems they’ve been biting off more than they can chew considering the breath of their business.
“a technology incubator program, a giant R&D effort for the ground pounders“
Coundn’t have said it better myself. One of the reasons I don’t like FCS is because of the money involved. We are trying to come up with the idea, create, massproduce and field all in one step. that’s silly some of this stuff is never going to work well in the field and we need to be ready to cut it when we figure it out as well as add new things on the fly.
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