Sea trials have found eight major concerns with the Coast Guard’s new National Security Cutter, but service officials say they are confident the ship, christened Bertholf, will pass acceptance tests soon.
Northrop Grumman Corp. is building the Bertholf as part of the Coast Guard’s Deepwater Modernization program, a $24 billion effort to upgrade the agency’s ships, aircraft and communications gear. So far, it’s been a bumpy ride — the Coast Guard had to shelve one of its boat projects as too ambitious, while another project foundered after eight upgraded 123′-foot cutters proved unseaworthy.
Now the Coast Guard is hoping the Bertholf will change the project’s momentum. The ship is a few months behind schedule, but Coast Guard officials say there haven’t been any big hiccups this year. The mid-April acceptance trials were a big milestone — the Coast Guard wants to accept the ship by the end of this month so it can start training its crew. The latest list of technical issues hasn’t dented the agency’s optimism.
“These acceptance trials are good news for the Coast Guard because the number of starred cards written for Bertholf is extremely low, considering this is a first-in-class ship. The Coast Guard is confident that the contractors will be able to resolve all materiel deficiencies aboard Bertholf in a timely manner,” Coast Guard spokeswoman Laura Williams said Monday.
The Navy also put a good spin on the Bertholf’s performance. The latest trials turned up about 2,800 “trial cards”, which identify areas that need more work. That compares to between 6,000 and 16,000 cards for first-in-class Navy ship. In addition, about 1,360 of the Bertholf’s trial cards dealt with previously identified issues. This led the Navy to commend the Coast Guard’s “superb quality assurance” while managing the project, the Coast Guard said.
Here’s the new ship’s honey-do list of major things that need fixing, as identified by Coast Guard and Navy inspectors:
- Machinery Control Monitoring System: a computer system that enables automated or manual operation of main propulsion and electrical systems.
- Line Shaft Bearings-These bearings support and align the ship’s propeller shafts. The bearings require maintenance and re-alignment.
- Starboard Anchor-The anchor machinery requires additional lubrication.
- Mooring Line Controllers-The Navy recommended modifying these line controllers for portable operation to improve crew safety.
- Gantry Crane Hoists-Designed to raise and lower the NSC’s cutter boats (Short Range Prosecutor and Long Range Interceptor), the hoists require adjustment to the wire ropes and swivel hooks.
- 57mm Ammunition Hoist-The ammunition handling system’s brake must be repaired for safe operation.
- Incinerator-Requires repair for testing.
- Flight Deck-The Navy wants the Coast Guard to correct 14 deficiencies before BERTHOLF earns certification for naval flight operations. These deficiencies include: removing hoses from the flight deck; installing sound power communications between stations on the flight deck; installing additional tie downs; correcting flight deck markings for the Aircraft Ship Integrated Secure and Traverse (ASIST) system, etc.
In addition to this major list, there are 78 other items that require additional safety-related adjustments, the Coast Guard said. The new ship also has started TEMPEST testing, a Pentagon protocol required for classified communications systems, the agency said.
Integrated Coast Guard Solutions, the Lockheed Martin-Northrop Grumman joint venture that is coordinating a big chunk of the Deepwater contracting, did not have comment on the acceptance trials when contacted Monday.
– Rebecca Christie
What does he mean by the phrase “starred cards”?
Is this the same USCG craft that a former employee raised (and later pubically campaigned) ethics and safety concerns?
Where in the world did they come up with Bertholf from? For a moment I thought this was some Scandinavian program like only sounded like a Coast Guard deal (I’m sure there must be some famous Coast Guard dude with the name who deserves respect, but just saying).
The notion of accepting a ship with thousands of known problems also seems problematic.
Two years until it is actually deployed. That’s about the same timeline as the Burke-class has. That’s after 50+ ships of the same class.
Starred cards are basically high priority fixes. Every deficiency gets a card, but starred cards are priority, IIRC. It’s been about 7 years since I did the precom thing.
78 fixes really isn’t that bad, especially for a first of class.
It is normal procedure to do a “conditional acceptance” of a vessel (check box lower left hand corner of DD250) and attach ALL the trial card deficiencies to the form. The shipbuilder is still liable for correction which could take as long as to the Post-Shakedown Availability.
IF TEMPEST involves any GFE then its a shared responsiblity, also not an unusual situation.
The PMRep meets with builder and crew to assign trial card responsiblities. He probably already has?
I see nothing nefarious in what the USCG is doing.
This process gets the ship into the govt’s hands for workups which yard cannot do.
The length of time to IOC is debatable.
RE: The name.
Ellsworth P. Bertholf was the Coast Guard’s first Commandant. Technically, the NSC cutters are referred to as the Legend Class.
http://www.uscg.mil/pacarea/bertholf/pages/historyhome.htm
leesae
While technically correct you are a bit naive and not very well informed.
If you followed these events since the 123s you would know the extent that the CG and ICGS have gone to lie and cover up major deficiencies. The 123s had missing info on their DD-250s and each delivered with he same glowing public comments. Then we found out that 8 123s were buckling and each had a massively defective C4ISR system. The system failed TEMPEST testing (those were illegally and wrongfully waived) and MOST of the C4ISR topside equipment would not survive harsh elements (etc). Of course I have proof of all of this so please feel free to contact me if you would like to understand what is really going on.
Why is it there is always a group of people who post on here that spend way too much time looking at everything that is written as a government coverup or sinister consperacy? Can’t you just accept that maybe it was a good design and that the shipyard may have done a good job.
You know there have been great advances in the treatment of paranoia over the years, maybe some of you should go see a doctor about your problems. Oh wait, you can’t do that, the doctor will just give you drugs that will help the UFO’s snatch you up and insert the government mind control devices, how silly of me.
I find it ironic that while the Navy and the Coast Guard are trying to put the best spin on this program it is troubling that a major shipbuilder cannot turn out a quality product. Meanwhile the Navy wasted no time in scuttling almost all of the Spruance Class Destroyers . I feel they rushed to get rid of these perfectly good platforms so they could throw more money down the drain on this class of ship and the new Littoral ships that are also behind schedule and way over budget. Why did someone not offer retired Spruance Class Destroyers to the Coast Guard? Or retired short hull Perry Class Frigates? I will tell you why, Because some fat cats could not grease their ever expanding pockets with graft and kickbacks. The real victim here is the American Taxpayer. We are the ones getting the shaft.
Mr DeKort perhaps I should have inserted “on naval vessels” in the first sentence? I was of course referring specifically to the NCS not the 123n problems. Nor can I address the new issues you raise.
While I cannot evaluate the details of C4ISR equipment problems on the NCS, the magnitude of the TEMPEST problem is relative. Having gone thru those inspections on naval vessels, it is next to impossible to come out with a clean bill from them. TEMPEST will get resolved and the ships will still float. That assumes CG-9 has got the contract management personnel now to overses ICGS properly.
Having been involved with the delivery on over a dozen ships to MSC, I standby my procedural comments as realistic not miss-informed.
Again as I’ve not seen any answer to my question: Is this the same USCG craft that a former employee raised (and later pubically campaigned) ethics and safety concerns?
I do research on US Navy vessels built during 1940 — 1970 and have seen vessels with a lot more discrepencies then that. In fact there were some navy vessels that when released from dry dock went straight to the bottom of the sea.
AGAIN:
Is this the same USCG craft that a former employee raised (and later pubically campaigned) ethics and safety concerns?
You idiots (all of you who commented here) ignore sincere questions and let the questioner remain in ignorance.
IDIOT