Most of the Pentagon’s weapon systems cost much more than they should, are built much more slowly than they could be and the entire system needs fundamental reform.
Those were the conclusions of most lawmakers and one senior defense acquisition expert at a hearing of the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee in Washington earlier this week.
Perhaps most damning, senior staff member Michael Sullivan from the Government Accountability Office told lawmakers that the system had not really been any better or worse when he started investigating defense procurement in 1986, though he conceded there were some recent small signs of improvement.
The hearing’s poster child for botched Pentagon buying was a $13.2 billion Marine Corps program called the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle. The program for the updated AAV started in 1996 when the Marines issued a contract to General Dynamics. Initially, the program won plaudits for its innovative management and it passed through the program definition and risk reduction phase in mid-2001. Then things began to fall apart. The Marines issued a contract for the next phase of the program which was supposed to cost $712 million but quickly rose by the end of 2006 to an estimated $1.2 billion.
The modernized amtrac, according to a report prepared for the Oversight Committee’s chairman, Rep. Henry Waxman (D-Calif.), weighed too much to carry combat-ready Marines and still go as fast as it should. It operated only four-and-half hours before requiring major maintenance instead of the planned 47 hours. It was so loud that Marines could not speak to each other and had to wear ear plugs.
Originally, the Pentagon planned to buy 1,025 Expeditionary Fighting Vehicles for $8.4 billion. Now the military plans to buy 593 for $13.2 billion. Costs per vehicle, according to the committee’s report, have increased 168 percent and production has slipped eight years.
But the Marines’ EFV was certainly not alone in being a botched acquisition, Sullivan told the committee. His testimony noted that not one of the 72 weapons programs his office reviewed used “the best practices standards for mature technologies, stable design and mature production processes” He told the committee that “acquisition problems will likely persist until DoD provides a better foundation for buying the right things, the right way.” Right now, the military promises it can do too much, and underestimates how much weapons will cost.
The stakes are enormous. The Defense Department plans to spend $900 billion over the next five years on developing and buying weapons. Current programs are usually 21 months late in getting initial capabilities to the soldiers, Marines and airmen who need them. That is five months later than an analysis done in 2000 indicated, according to Sullivan’s prepared testimony. Almost 45 percent of the Pentagon’s major acquisition programs are paying more than 25 percent more per system than originally planned, compared to 37 percent of programs in 2000.
The biggest problems Sullivan found in his examination of defense spending were: requirements that grew and grew and grew; turnover of program managers that raised issues of “continuity and accountability;” too much responsibility in the hands of companies for work that used to be done by government officials; and difficulty overseeing the increasingly complex job of software development.
The two Pentagon officials at the hearing conceded there was room for improvement but insisted the system is not broken and is actually beginning to improve.
James Finley, deputy undersecretary of Defense for acquisition and technology, said that when he underwent Senate confirmation many people believed the process was broken. After his first 90 days in office he concluded they were wrong. “We needed to add discipline to the process and ensure that the basic blocking and tackling in executing the acquisition process was done correctly,” he testified.
Senior Pentagon leaders developed a three-year plan and is 26 months into implementing that plan. It includes greater focus on the beginning of a program to make sure prototypes are used to get a better handle on performance, cost, how to build the system and how long it will take to build, Finley said. The Pentagon has cut the paperwork for reviews by half and has standardized red, yellow and green indicators for cost, schedule and performance. There is greater focus on program stability — keeping funding steady and limiting turnover of key personnel — and the Pentagon created earned value management system “trip wires” to help identify problems on a monthly basis, Finley said.
– Colin Clark
Sometimes I wonder whether modern program management processes are actually causing engineering problems instead of solving them. There’s a tendency to rely on adherence to a process to deliver a product instead of relying on less-formal engineering professionalism. The irony is that most of these processes are just a formalization of what a good engineering team would do anyway, but they seem to have killed the prowess they sought to enhance.
The EFV program had requirements based on the need to keep Navy Amphibious ships farther away from shore based weapons. The Ole AAV7A1 is slow in the water and forces the Navy to bring their ships within 5 miles of the landing site. The center piece requirement for EFV was to move on the water fast enough to move the ships over the horizon. To do this it must move over 25kts and that requires over 3000 horsepower. The rest of the design is built around this requirement. The second requirement is that once ashore it must keep up with the M1A1 tank. Hard to buy this technology and the USMC is finding that out.
One of the biggest problems is that it is tough keeping the requirements in sync with what is actually possible. This is a general issue in design of increasingly complex systems, and not specific to the DoD at all. In software, it’s practically killing the industry. Again, this is not a DoD specific problem. The DoD is just much larger than anyone else (an order of magnitude larger than Microsoft, for example), and feels these problems more accutely than anyone else.
The problem is in forward-thinking programs, where you contract out work to be done to fill a specific need (or projected need).
Instead of companies doing the traditional thing like tweaking their products and then trying to sell them to customers, we (DOD, taxpayer, etc) do an aristocratic sponsorship of an idea which then becomes exorbitantly expensive. We tell them what we want, instead of shopping for the best as is.
We DO get premium equipment, but we have to pay for it.
If they want to end the cost bloat, STOP the procurement process (‘Hey, we need tanks!’ — Pentagon; ‘We got ‘em!’ — Contractors for Abrahms, Leopard II, etc; ‘Let’s see what ya have!’ –Pentagon; ‘I like it, Mommy can I have it?’ –Pentagon; ‘Okay, just do good in skool.’ — Congress).
You have to weigh out the strong qualitative advantage by sponsoring and developing new technologies, versus quantity and cost. You probably cannot have all of them at the same time (maybe).
I am in sales these days and whenever I am asked by a customer whether something is possible my response is always “absolutely, just sign here and we will get started on that solution right away.” So what do you think GD did when they were asked those same questions?
That is what struck me the most on this article and it is something that is present throughout our DoD procurement system. We are letting the foxes into the hen house with this design based procurement. Of course it slims down those government employees, but at what expense?
The best and the brightest people of this nation should want to work for the government. That way our government works the way it should. Instead we have to deal with inept people getting paid very little while subcontractors get paid rediculous amounts of money.
There was a time when we had civilians working for the government that took care of maintenance for government buildings. It is now sucontracted to the lowest minority bidder and we have Fort Bragg happening every day.
DC2
I have been an engineer for the USAF and some defense contractors. I also graduated from the USAF Acquisition professional level 1 course as taught at Hill AFB. So my view of what is going on is probably a bit different from most. Please bare with me, I’ve suffered a brain injury, so this isn’t exactly easy for me to get out.
One. There are two major sources for escalating costs: Requirements Creep and Congress. DoD can fix the former but is powerless to address the later.
Requirements Creep
There are several reasons for this occurring, some good most not. From observation I will try to identify these sources.
First: People rotate in and out of these programs. Almost all are eager to rise in their respective organizations. The question becomes how are they to do this? Torise means that they must be visable to their superiors, to be seen adding value to the project they are working on. This is true regardless of which side of the process their are on. So they get together and come up with a series of “small” conceptual changes to the program. And because the impact is “small” they can sell it to those superiors, who are also trying to rise,… etc. Unfortuneately, most of these “small” changes require massive efforts on the part of the engineers. Now these folks generally don’t have the power to say “NO” so they are stuck with attempting to impelment them, all of which takes time, money, and effort. But who pays? Why the customer of course!
Second: The engineers are not immune to this causal factor either. But most of their suggestions aren’t implemented, it would make their managers look bad, unless of course the manager can take credit for it.
Third: What engineers tend to call “OBE” or overcome by events. Some times the real world situation changes. Unfortuneately, this forces reinforces the need for the program, reguires that it be refocoused, or dropped. Now who would want to just drop something they have spent considerable time and effort on? So these programs start looking for new problems where their product just might be usable. By its very being, this necessitates new requirements. Oh, oh! Can anyone see rising costs here? Unfortuneately, these new requirements are sold as being cheaper than starting over. The trouble is you mostly end up with something that is neither fish nor fowl. In other words, a less than optimal solution for the new problem as well as a less than optimal solution for what it was originally designed for.
Those were the major problems systemic in the formal process. Now I would like to address the problem of Congress. Please forgive me if I seem just a bit strident, for actually they PISS me OFF. I would like to use a defunct aircraft program as an illistration, the F-14. It suffered all of the above problems, but it wasn’t doomed till Congress got into the act.
A small bit of self disclosure first. I never worked on or in anyway had anything to do with the F-14. I was a crew member of the USS Enterprise CVN-65 and joined the ship when they were deployed aboard on VF-1 and VF-2’s second WESTPAC with them. And yes I did love the “Tomcat”.
My tale begins when Congress began looking for cheaper alternatives to the F-14 and F-15. So they, in their wisdom, forced the Air Force to field a light-weight fighter competition. This led directly to the development of the F-16 and F-17. As we all know the Air Force needed a complement for the F-15, just to make up for the numbers of Soviet aircraft. The Air Force selected the F-16 and all was good.
But there existed a minority within the Navy that saw potential in the F-17 and wanted to develop it, for the Nave had several aircraft that were growing old. They were sold on the concept that one airframe could, just possibly, do it all. So they entered a contract with Northrop to develop the F-18 from the ashes of the F-17 program. Wait! What aircraft did the Nave seek to replace? Why they were purpose built attack aircraft as well as the aging F-4 Phamtom. To be specific the Aircraft it replaced were the A-4, a small light attack bird; the A-7, the A-4 replacement on the large deck carriers; and the F-4 of course.
Now where was I? Oh yes. But, you see, the F-18 didn’t have the range or the payload of those other aircraft, and it COST!! You could buy 2to 3 A-7’s for the price of the Horent. And, oh by the way, each A-7 could fly twice as far with twice the payload as the Hornet. But what they could not do was survive air to air combat, they weren’t fighters. They weren’t designed for it. But, ah ha! the Navy had an answer! The Hornet was designed as a fighter that could drop bombs as well. THEY could escort themselves!! Can anyone see what is happening? Anyone?
But all was not well in Hornet land. There were several problems with this self-escort problem and they cost too much compared to the aircraft they were to replace! The first problem was solved though an advertizing effort to Congress. All the F-18 had to do if confronted by enemy fighters was to push a button to reconfigure the bird form air to ground to air to air combat. Never mind that it would have to drop all the air to ground ordinance they hauled in from the sea. They could fight their way in. Just what they were to do when they reached the target was never addressed. But that second Problem. That was the KILLER. It could doom the program!! Oh NO!! sounded through out the program management and then into the halls of Congress. What to do? What to do? And Congress was filled with smart people. They knew they couldn’t sell this new fighter on its merits. Oh how could they make it appear to be the choice solution to their woes? And then they saw the light. To make the new fighter was to make yesterdays look bad, couldn’t, or make it look like it was much more expensive than it would otherwise be. But these folk in Congress were smart. they had learned from the past that the way to drive up prices was to slow, really sslloowwww, down production of items currently being supplied to the government. After all prices increase over the years and since they were on a cost plus contract, of course the delayed aircraft would cost more. But what about the improvements to the older aircraft. Well, that is easy, we still have to pay for all the contractors R&D, so we will just buy fewer of them so that their per unit cost has to go up. But wait the more rational voices cried, It can do the same thing as the new one, too. No, it can’t came the Congressional decree. And so the F-14 died. But remember this when you send in your tax return, the current Hornet, as good as it is, still costs more than that old bird, the TOMCAT! And the newest Hornet still cannot match the old Tom either in price or performane!!
The Tomcat is gone, woe to us, and cannot be reserrected, Congress saw to that as well, by ordering the machinery necessary for its production destroyed. But why bother, why worry if Iran could get F-14 parts unless … of course, they know, they know its death was premature.
I hope this illustrates most of the reasons for rising military acquisition costs. There are many, many reasons for it. The solutions? I would suggest a requirements freeze a the Critical Design review. Any new capabilities, new technologies, or new ideas be incorperated into the follow-up models rather than delaying the initial production in hopes of finding something better. You cannot really fight today with weapons that won’t come off the production lines for years. You cannot fly a plane, sail a ship, or shoot a rifle that has yet to be built.
But what about todays conflicts? We are forced by circomstance to fight them with what we have, regardless of when built. But I, for one, would feel better if I had something developed since the last century. I might not be the best of the best, but it sure beats “vaporware.” Shouldn’t our troops have the best availible? HELL YES!! But it should be the best of what is availible today, not ten years from now!
I have been an engineer for the USAF and some defense contractors. I also graduated from the USAF Acquisition professional level 1 course as taught at Hill AFB. So my view of what is going on is probably a bit different from most. Please bare with me, I’ve suffered a brain injury, so this isn’t exactly easy for me to get out.
One. There are two major sources for escalating costs: Requirements Creep and Congress. DoD can fix the former but is powerless to address the later.
Requirements Creep
There are several reasons for this occurring, some good most not. From observation I will try to identify these sources.
First: People rotate in and out of these programs. Almost all are eager to rise in their respective organizations. The question becomes how are they to do this? Torise means that they must be visable to their superiors, to be seen adding value to the project they are working on. This is true regardless of which side of the process their are on. So they get together and come up with a series of “small” conceptual changes to the program. And because the impact is “small” they can sell it to those superiors, who are also trying to rise,… etc. Unfortuneately, most of these “small” changes require massive efforts on the part of the engineers. Now these folks generally don’t have the power to say “NO” so they are stuck with attempting to impelment them, all of which takes time, money, and effort. But who pays? Why the customer of course!
Second: The engineers are not immune to this causal factor either. But most of their suggestions aren’t implemented, it would make their managers look bad, unless of course the manager can take credit for it.
Third: What engineers tend to call “OBE” or overcome by events. Some times the real world situation changes. Unfortuneately, this forces reinforces the need for the program, reguires that it be refocoused, or dropped. Now who would want to just drop something they have spent considerable time and effort on? So these programs start looking for new problems where their product just might be usable. By its very being, this necessitates new requirements. Oh, oh! Can anyone see rising costs here? Unfortuneately, these new requirements are sold as being cheaper than starting over. The trouble is you mostly end up with something that is neither fish nor fowl. In other words, a less than optimal solution for the new problem as well as a less than optimal solution for what it was originally designed for.
Those were the major problems systemic in the formal process. Now I would like to address the problem of Congress. Please forgive me if I seem just a bit strident, for actually they PISS me OFF. I would like to use a defunct aircraft program as an illistration, the F-14. It suffered all of the above problems, but it wasn’t doomed till Congress got into the act.
A small bit of self disclosure first. I never worked on or in anyway had anything to do with the F-14. I was a crew member of the USS Enterprise CVN-65 and joined the ship when they were deployed aboard on VF-1 and VF-2’s second WESTPAC with them. And yes I did love the “Tomcat”.
My tale begins when Congress began looking for cheaper alternatives to the F-14 and F-15. So they, in their wisdom, forced the Air Force to field a light-weight fighter competition. This led directly to the development of the F-16 and F-17. As we all know the Air Force needed a complement for the F-15, just to make up for the numbers of Soviet aircraft. The Air Force selected the F-16 and all was good.
But there existed a minority within the Navy that saw potential in the F-17 and wanted to develop it, for the Nave had several aircraft that were growing old. They were sold on the concept that one airframe could, just possibly, do it all. So they entered a contract with Northrop to develop the F-18 from the ashes of the F-17 program. Wait! What aircraft did the Nave seek to replace? Why they were purpose built attack aircraft as well as the aging F-4 Phamtom. To be specific the Aircraft it replaced were the A-4, a small light attack bird; the A-7, the A-4 replacement on the large deck carriers; and the F-4 of course.
Now where was I? Oh yes. But, you see, the F-18 didn’t have the range or the payload of those other aircraft, and it COST!! You could buy 2to 3 A-7’s for the price of the Horent. And, oh by the way, each A-7 could fly twice as far with twice the payload as the Hornet. But what they could not do was survive air to air combat, they weren’t fighters. They weren’t designed for it. But, ah ha! the Navy had an answer! The Hornet was designed as a fighter that could drop bombs as well. THEY could escort themselves!! Can anyone see what is happening? Anyone?
But all was not well in Hornet land. There were several problems with this self-escort problem and they cost too much compared to the aircraft they were to replace! The first problem was solved though an advertizing effort to Congress. All the F-18 had to do if confronted by enemy fighters was to push a button to reconfigure the bird form air to ground to air to air combat. Never mind that it would have to drop all the air to ground ordinance they hauled in from the sea. They could fight their way in. Just what they were to do when they reached the target was never addressed. But that second Problem. That was the KILLER. It could doom the program!! Oh NO!! sounded through out the program management and then into the halls of Congress. What to do? What to do? And Congress was filled with smart people. They knew they couldn’t sell this new fighter on its merits. Oh how could they make it appear to be the choice solution to their woes? And then they saw the light. To make the new fighter was to make yesterdays look bad, couldn’t, or make it look like it was much more expensive than it would otherwise be. But these folk in Congress were smart. they had learned from the past that the way to drive up prices was to slow, really sslloowwww, down production of items currently being supplied to the government. After all prices increase over the years and since they were on a cost plus contract, of course the delayed aircraft would cost more. But what about the improvements to the older aircraft. Well, that is easy, we still have to pay for all the contractors R&D, so we will just buy fewer of them so that their per unit cost has to go up. But wait the more rational voices cried, It can do the same thing as the new one, too. No, it can’t came the Congressional decree. And so the F-14 died. But remember this when you send in your tax return, the current Hornet, as good as it is, still costs more than that old bird, the TOMCAT! And the newest Hornet still cannot match the old Tom either in price or performane!!
The Tomcat is gone, woe to us, and cannot be reserrected, Congress saw to that as well, by ordering the machinery necessary for its production destroyed. But why bother, why worry if Iran could get F-14 parts unless … of course, they know, they know its death was premature.
I hope this illustrates most of the reasons for rising military acquisition costs. There are many, many reasons for it. The solutions? I would suggest a requirements freeze a the Critical Design review. Any new capabilities, new technologies, or new ideas be incorperated into the follow-up models rather than delaying the initial production in hopes of finding something better. You cannot really fight today with weapons that won’t come off the production lines for years. You cannot fly a plane, sail a ship, or shoot a rifle that has yet to be built.
But what about todays conflicts? We are forced by circomstance to fight them with what we have, regardless of when built. But I, for one, would feel better if I had something developed since the last century. I might not be the best of the best, but it sure beats “vaporware.” Shouldn’t our troops have the best availible? HELL YES!! But it should be the best of what is availible today, not ten years from now!
To all, I apologize. I should not have said inept, because that is not true. However, they are not the best and the brightest with regards to national labs and most other job positions. I would definitely say that they are overwhelmed.
DC2
It just amazes me.
If any of these vehicles were heavy equipment, which were to be bought by a construction company and used to do a job, the manufacturer would end up going out of business with a yard full of returned equipment.
But since they are selling to Uncle Sam, and they have a couple Congressmen paid off, it is all swept under the rug, billions lost, with the age old excuse that they are “creating jobs”.
With aircraft, I can see them at least having an excuse. Very complex.
But transports?
Dump BAE and get CAT to build one. Do this once or twice and we will see a real change in how things are made
DC2, the best and the brightest shouldn’t work for the government, because the government is a stultifying monolithic entity which can hardly tie its own shoes. They should work for industry, where they can make money and build things.
And you said it yourself; the game is they put out a huge government contract (and the contract could well be in err of the true needs, see V-22 needing NBC protection, a goal that was quickly dropped) based on a contingent achievement of goals. It is a bad business model.
Government should be a normal consumer, not a technological venture capitalist. At least, if you want to keep costs down (and that is a debatable public good weighed against technological superiority).
As a retired member of the Air Force and Air Force Reserve I have been working for a military contractor for over 15 I can feel the frustration every day at work. Most people in Operations work very hard to deliver product on time to the DOD but we are constantly tearing down product for design changes, Engineering Change Orders, additional test requirements, and a paper trail that is unbelivealbe while at the same time conforming to Contract Specifications, Internal and External Audits, Federal, State, and local regulations on hazardous material, and on and on. I appreciate Robert Pettis lengthy comments and insights and on his field of expertise. In the meantime we in the defense industry are doing more outsourcing of product (COTS) commericial off the shelf and becoming more independent on others instead of developing and controlling our own systems from nuts to bolts. I cannot see this changing in the future and I fear that our Military Systems will become more inferior as time goes on.
Good Morning Folks,
Like many other weapon systems the basic question is not being asked and that is do we need it?
In the case of the EFV is when was the last time a major amphibious assualt over a hostle beech occured, was it Inchon in 1950?
If that’s the case then this is a legacy capacity of the Marines that seem to no longer be needed, 58 years is a long time.
ALLONS,
Byron Skinner
P.S. for logistical support,the Marines could also use M548 Cargo Carriers converted by A.R.I.S. into the amphibious ARK system.
But then again,someone has to be able to “get rich” off of this & bribes have to be paid.So another bright idea gets shot down because the usual graft wasn’t paid,the right fingers weren’t greased.The “earmarks” didn’t go to the right districts.
Brad,
I’ve got news for you, every large company essentially functions just like our government. They are slow and inept with everyone looking to keep their head down so that it doesn’t get shot off. I worked for one of the largest companies in the world and it was a complete nightmare. These commercials we see on television show a totally correct picture of what is going on. Dilbert does too BTW.
I firmly believe that the best people in this country should be directly serving the government. That goes from the maintenance man in your local government building to the POTUS (and you cannot deny that one).
Otherwise you get errors and faults within the one entity that holds the very fabric of our country together.
Whatever happened to the days when service to your country was something to be proud of. I’m all for capitalism but not at the expense of exploiting the government and our national security.
If we don’t refocus on this, then we will continue to have these issues within our government procurement system. I mean come on, all 72 of the weapons systems reviewed were screwed up.
For a further case, look at what we have done to become oil independent (one of the roots to our economic turmoil right now). And this isn’t something new, we went through this same issue 30 years ago. Yet nothing has changed. What are the best and the brightest of this country doing to solve this problem and how is our government organizing all of this brainpower and capability?
DC2
“I’ve got news for you, every large company essentially functions just like our government. “
Heh. You cannot — without an act of God — fire government employees. Compare public schools to private schools; huge culture shock. And when was the last time a major government agency folded like Bear Stearns?
Government is EXACTLY like business, except for the (pronounced) differences.
My point that I left out of my previous post was that in addition to what Robert mentioned (engineers and managers seeking career advancement over the good of the project) is extremely poor project planning and System Engineering practices which also lead to inflated costs etc.
It may be that the best way to address that problem is to have career US government employees overseeing the project directly, instead of just being in the building and commenting on what the company is doing. My own experience is that (at least on the Crusader project) private businesses do a poor job in managing large projects like Army vehicles because the people doing the work are not there for the long haul, and something that requires long-term attention requires someone that will be there for the long haul too. People moving into and out of a long-term project are a huge cost inflater because of the learning curve of the new guys.
I must respectfully disagree with MAX. He seems to have his vision reversed. The constant rotation of people on projects is not done at the contractor but rather is a government dilemma. I am a Program Manager and work many projects for the defense department, my team stays in place, but I get a new government PM or COTR, etc, about every 2–4 years. It is inherent in the government process to promote good managers out of their current positions. It is inherent in the government to PCS people all the time. I am also retired Air Force and know a thing or two about being PCS’d all the time whether I wanted to go or not.
We contractors keep our team in place and no one leaves the project unless they retire, die or quit.
Sorry Max, you are confused. It is the government that causes most of the issues with acquisition contracts. Changing requirements, changing managers, etc, etc…
So.. basic question in the acquisition process…
IF the major contractors were forced to spin-off their R&D units into completely separate (smaller, more focused and nimble) design companies, so that the best DESIGN could be selected from competing options, and THEN produced by ANY manufacturer who could win the contract RATHER than the current monolithic format.. would that perhaps fix some of this ?
the country was better off for having both the P47 and P51 as fighters… as well as the B17 and B24 as strategic bombers and B25 and B26 as medium bombers… I’m sure that there are a lot of ‘didnt make it’ designs… but having the redundancy to say ‘that project is a bust.. build more of THESE was something they were thinking of..
yes it seems redundant.. yes it puts a logistics strain on the system.. but perhaps that redundancy in terms of keeping design bureaus competing in top form and being sure we have the best tool handy would STILL be more efficient than our current ‘winner takes all’ system.
This is a problem that will never ever be solved. Pointing fingers and shouting blame will solve nothing. Most of the “solutions” I’ve seen suggested are just the cause of bigger problems.
What are the roots of the issue?
1) We are dealing with an incredibly narrow market, one that has only one buyer: the US government. As such, a normal capitalist model will never function. The only way to change that is to buy “off the shelf” weapons systems that are available on the open market. This is absolutely in conflict with the second key issue:
2) We need systems that are superior to anything fielded by any potential opponent. This means we cannot buy off the shelf systems, but must develop our own. Weapons development costs lots of money.
No sane person can criticize the overall performance of our equipment in the field. In terms of killing power, in terms of protection, in terms of speed, our equipment is the best in the world. It costs a whole lot of money, yes, but ultimately, we have a huge advantage over any other armed force on the planet. No one can stand and fight against the US military and hope to survive, much less win. So the end result is not in question. The only true argument is, are we spending too much for this technological overmatch?
It is a balance. Accept less advanced systems for lower cost, or spend more money and get better weapons. There is no other choice.
The inflexibility of almost everyone involved and demands for higher standards than are needed to do the job cost more, take longer and are nearly always late.
No better example can be found than the AK 47. The choice worldwide for and assault rifle. It is generally the choice of the US soldier when he is in a place it doesn’t draw friendly fire. Parts of Afghanistan, with the Kurds in Iraq and the first part of Viet Nam. Instead we use a caliber more suited to rabbits than men in a rifle that requires constant maintenance in the sand.
While the AK 47 and the 5.56mm NATO have equal muzzle energy the 5.56mm NATO has less the the AK 47 for ever foot it gets from the muzzle than the 7 mm bullet.
Making one fighter plane to fit every need is insane. It can’t help but be over weight, under power and compromised for every mission.
And so it goes.
Gordon
Software and Hardware designer
Ok Bill, point taken. Thanks for the respectful disagreement.
You would double over laughing at the tales of absolute incompetence in software management that I observed there, especially when I first came on board in 1998.
I only know what I observed on that particular project over that 3 1/2 years, and it wasn’t a pretty sight. Back in those heady days of software engineer “nirvana”, a good engineer could quit his job almost anytime, and find another that paid a large bonus or higher salary with no problem, so constant rotation of contractors was a huge problem. Perhaps today with the incredible difficulty of finding work in software, that is not such a problem anymore. The employees of UD were pretty steady, although their salaries were a lot less than the contractors.
I will, however, stick with my previous point of criticizing the overzealousness of some managers in always trying to constantly change the software development plan to “keep up with the Booches”. That was such a stupid thing to do. Everyone knew it, seemingly, but the one person I refer to. He was a very good Engineer in most things, but not this one. Once a large project gets started (especially one that has already been down the road for a couple of years), trying to change course mid-stream is a terrible idea.
I wasn’t talking about the higher level project managers outside of the Software Team; the people/person I refer to are within the Software/Systems Engineering Team itself. The Corporate managers are pretty much clueless about the internal workings of the project anyway; they only care about timelines, money and such.
Per George Skinner’s comment at the start of this thread, I disagree in that UD’s problem at bottom was they had little or no formal processes at the start of the Crusader project, and that created chaos. And I mean CHAOS
Cut Pentagon bureaucracy & get these weapons developed.
CUT costs, combine, merge & scrap Projects.
CUT Regulations alone & ask the GIs in the Field first.
ALL GIs in Service aside veterans.
Guess I don’t see any overwhelming requirement for amphibious assault. The Marines have gone the V-22 and CH-53K route for dismounts and the LAV. Why not go the rest of the way with a joint heavy lift rotorcraft carrying FCS Infantry Carrier Vehicles.
Two such vehicles would carry the same number of infantry as the EFV with double the firepower and sensor capability and better protection and dispersal of Marines. 2700 hp to move EFV in the water? Best of all, two FCS Infantry Carriers would cost less than one EFV, would be more reliable, and probably would use less fuel on land.
Heck, scrap the CH-53K and buy fewer joint heavy lift rotorcraft and pay about the same as the CH-53K program with far greater lift. Then scrap the LAV and buy more Strykers for Marines. No reason to have different combat vehicles in the ground component.
Defy anyone to show me that amphibious assault is less risky than aerial assault which also offers more options for shore entry location and movement inland.
Cole,
air assault isn’t risky from an infiltration standpoint. It is more risky from a logistical standpoint. You got them in, now how do you resupply them?
I personally believe the EFV is a failed program simply because the specifications cannot be met by any vehicle design, period. Maybe what we should have focused on are beach clearing machines that are only designed to go up to the beach and maybe a little further. I don’t know. But it seems smaller hovercraft in support of Stryker/FCS carying LCACs would seem more realistic.
But the problem is all of these programs is there aren’t enough skilled people within the government that can determine whether designs and specifications are actually able to work. And with our broken system of pay the company for their flaws is the problem. But what is the alternative? Boeing misses one line of code and the subsequent revisions to the systems causes the company to go bankrupt?
That is why the government accepts the monetary risks of developing equipment that has only been created in vaporware. Look at the hypersonic article as a perfect example.
DC2
Cole,
Haven’t you heard? The Marines ARE planning to replace their LAVs with.….TaaDaa.….the FINNISH Patria Armored Modular Vehicle(not the GDLS/MOWAG Piranha Stryker vehicles,although that would make more sense).Hell,the British are considering the Piranha GEN V(Piranha Evolution) for their Future Rapid Effects System Vehicle(Stryker is GEN III,but I’m not sure if it’s GEN IIIC or IIIH,& MOWAG is already offering GEN IV).Lockheed Martin is joining with Patria for the “Marine Personnel Carrier.” While I’m intrigued,still it’s a waste when we do have the GDLS/MOWAG Piranha Stryker vehicles.I guess we can only hope that “mission creep” & the greed of men will f**k up this deal too.
I have not seen a Comanchy Chopper flying in Irak or Afgan
I have not seen a Comanchy Chopper flying in Irak or Afgan
DC2,
Hear you on the logistics. Can’t you come back toward the shore from land to secure any beach more safely than trying to navigate through mines, underwater obstacles, and enemy fire while vulnerable in the water? The thought of an AAV or EFV going to the bottom with all hand on board is pretty terrifying. At least with air-cushioned, you would have time to bail out. And once on land, a vehicle that large with than many Marines on board is a lucrative target!
Just wonder if the billion dollar boats that carry all this stuff can handle large-scale sling loading? Get them in the water and pluck them out there? Pluck many off a air-cushioned vehicle to seize a sea entry via air-insertion and then bring the rest by air-cushioned vehicle?
Roy, had not heard anything about that Patria. Thanks. Sounds like the selection has not occurred yet, though?
So how much did this inquiry cost; that told us nothing new?
Half.
The USA is HALF of the worlds military spending.
Isn’t that a bit insane? Every country in the world combined equals our spending.
Guess that’s where our debt comes from
Cole,
A CH-53E can carry a slung LAV right now. I think that is the biggest it can take however. And this aircraft is obviously a part of the USMC insertion methodology. Of course I am a squid so my understading of maneuver warfare is far more limited than yours.
There have been many interesting tests using the LCACs over the years. A number of years ago they even put a GAU-8 cannon from an A-10 (nah Cheney never did away with those things he is pro military) on the deck of an LCAC to see if it could be used for breaching.
There are a number of nations that use small LCACs for troop insertion. We even used these vehicles during the Vietnam War in the Mekong Delta for troop insertion. It would seem that these aircraft are faster and more maneuverable than any other option and you don’t have to worry about mines/obstacles because LCACs go right over them.
My point with the Stryker option is that once the beach is secured you can bring in the larger LCACs to offload the big hitters and push further ashore.
A vehicle that is at home both at sea and on land I don’t think will ever be created as the EFV is envisioned. After all, they have been fooling around with this thing since I was in back in 1993.
DC2
Remember ALL US ARMY EQUIPMENT IS MADE BY LOWEST BIDDER simply put short cuts are taken to make highly advanced, and exspensive weapons cheaper. This means that vehicle, weapons don’t work the way tey are supposed to
This Country is hemorrhaging money at every conceivable opening, the majority of defense contractors are akin to pigs at the tax dollar trough.
On the other end of this spectrum, as a small contractor submitting ideas in a BBA, the contractor is required to jump through multiple hoops to prove a concept.