The Army, unhappy that the House Armed Services Committee plans to cut $200 million from its top modernization program, plans a June 11 assault on the House side of the Capitol using elements of its Future Combat System. Relax! Its a joke.
But the Army really does want to show the Hill just how effective FCS can be and how much it is beginning to produce capabilities soldiers use in Iraq now or in the near future. And it does plan a June 11 demonstration on the Hill.
Lt. Gen. Stephen M. Speakes, the Armys deputy chief of staff for programs, spoke Thursday afternoon with reporters and one of his first points was that the Army does have a vision when it comes to FCS. I asked Gen. Speakes how the Army is answering the HASC, which made a fairly compelling argument. Rep. Neil Abercrombie (D-Hawaii), chairman of the House Armed Service airland subcommittee, said he cut 5.5 percent of program funding to reduce concurrency of network and manned ground vehicle development and reduce program management costs. On top of that, the subcommittee shifted $33 million from long-term portions of the program to near-term elements that have a chance of being fielded by 2011. Abercrombie made it clear that technical reasons werent the only justification for the reduction. FCS, he said, continues to operate in violation of many major Department of Defense acquisition policies, including the basic and long-standing policy requiring full and adequate testing of equipment before production begins. If that sounds to you like the Democratic complaints about the Missile Defense Agencys approach to acquisition, you win a Kewpie doll.
Gen. Speakes very respectfully offered this justification when I asked him how the Army is answering the House criticisms: This is an integrated program. You cant break it apart and still deliver the capabilities. Also, Speakes said the service plans to show lawmakers just how much FCS is influencing the fight, citing the FRAG kit 5 armor used on Humvees, which he said is the precursor for FCS armor. The first version of the crucial FCS network, progress on which has been criticized by the Government Accountability Office in recent reports, is being tested at Fort Bliss. Most of all, Speakes said, the pressure in on us to deliver and to make the capabilities we are talking about and make them real. We think we are answering that test.
Speakes approach on all this may have been influenced by Rep. Jim Saxton (R-NJ), ranking member of the airland subcommittee. In a recent blog about FCS, Saxton said the Army needs to spend less time trying to save the FCS program; and more time explaining how soldiers want and need the capabilities that FCS brings to the fight.
Speakes also addressed the challenge in Defense Secretary Robert Gatess May 13 speech in Colorado, when he said the military must beware of planning to fight the next war and find itself unready for the current one.
He said that FCS, which he saw in action at Fort Bliss, must continue to demonstrate its value for the types of irregular challenges we will face, as well as for full-spectrum warfare. Speakes said FCS will be able to go anywhere and handle any fight. It is, for example, being modified to better cope with the threat from IEDs, he said.
Well see whether the House Democrats and Gates buy in. Reminder the Senate Armed Services Committee fully funded the administrations $3.6 billion request for FCS.
– Colin Clark
{ 18 comments… read them below or add one }
so steel plate and ballistic windows are the next gen fcs armor? looks like someone is trying to get another star by lying.
I rolled out with Frag 5 all last year. Its just heavier Frag 2-4.
I propose that Congress passes a law mandating that in the event that the army tries a coup d’etat, they have to exclusively use FCS systems. This should ensure the safety of the US government for at least 100 years.
There is an inherent conflict between fielding systems for the current war and the need for full testing before production begins. Full testing requires a deep understanding of most features, functions, and failure scenarios. But the current wars are against a highly adaptive and fluid enemy in a changing geo-political context.
It is similar to the changes in the software development profession as reliance on the phase-based Systems Development Life Cycle (SDLC) gives way to rapid or spiral development methodologies.
What is needed is a way to rapidly develop, interatively test, and spin out useful and immediate capabilities in a rapid fashion. In order to do that, whole cloth changes to training, procurement and maintenance strategies will be needed.
You simply can’t solve today’s problems with yesterday’s solutions. The legacy defense acquisition process is inherently unable to meet these needs.
bill these concept exist already in the computer sector. with modularity incorporated within systems as long as you have a robust base you can add on parts. i think the army can learn from navy lcs except for the costs. with a mulit threat environment its important to be able to adapt equipment on the fly according to mission.
A “vision” = vaporware.
The fundamental problem with the FCS is that it is too ambitious. Deepwater and FCS have both shown the problems involved with biting off more than you can chew.
Why not, e.g., build an NLOS cannon and then defer other ground vehicles which are supposed to share the platform for later? Why not simply adopt some design principals that would allow integration capabilities to be added by upgrade later, rather than insisting that they be present on day one?
It is hard enough to develop a single technologically ambitious program, as illustrated by the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle or the Osprey. Building dozens of technologically ambitious programs at once is just plain stupid.
Do one at a time thing, require only capabilities that you need rather than merely want, innovate technologically only where absolutely necessary to give the system a mission critical capability, don’t ignore cost, and do it right.
Amphibious assaults,just like airborne & air mobile assaults,are still relevant.Nobody stupidly puts their men into a heavily protected target,you launch the above mentioned assaults into weakened,undefended areas,it only makes sense.
One of the major problems with FCS is that you have to still secure the airports that you expect the C-17s carrying the FCS vehicles to land.That means an amphibious,airborne,&/or air mobile strike.
This will step on toes,but it can be argued that the Swedish Archer FH77 BW L52 SP Howitzer System can do exactly what the “experimental” FCS NLOS claims to be able to do.The Archer is also ready to be fielded today,while the FCS NLOS is at the least 2 years away from being fielded.
The FCS also needs to prove that it can operate in the mountains(I don’t mean little hills either) of Korea,Afghanistan,Pakistan(?),AND Iran.We also need the lift capabilities of helicopters to carry them into the mountains to fight.I think that the FCS system vehicles are just a little too heavy for CH-47 Chinooks to carry.We don’t seem to have any serious heavy lift helicopter development planned to do this.
We have a serious gap in armored vehicles light enough to be carried into rough terrain like mountainsides,soft desert sand,swamps,jungles,or in heavy winter conditions(like Germany’s Wiesel 1 or 2 vehicles or Sweden’s Bv206 vehicles,or even France’s CAESAR 155mm SP Howitzer system).The 10th Mountain Division is “mountain” in name only.they have no equipment to help them operate in mountain conditions.None of our divisions have arctic equipment to help them operate in winter conditions.We are so lacking in these areas.I guess we are depending on our NATO allies who do have these capabilities.
Also,a closed mortar system like the Finnish Patria Advanced Mortar System(AMOS),New Mortar System(NEMO,& BAE Systems/GDLS Armored Mortar System(AMS II) would be better than what we have now.I know that the FCS plans a closed mortar system,but how long will it be until it’s available?
Roy said: “This will step on toes,but it can be argued that the Swedish Archer FH77 BW L52 SP Howitzer System can do exactly what the “experimental” FCS NLOS claims to be able to do.The Archer is also ready to be fielded today,while the FCS NLOS is at the least 2 years away from being fielded.”
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Roy, the Archer is 45′ long meaning a greater deployment challenge, has wheels for poor off road mobility (may not keep up with medium tanks/infantry carriers), is lightweight so does not offer all around protection of FCS active protection and armor against counterfire, has a crew of 4 versus 2 for FCS, does not have a hybrid electric drive to power FCS systems…and most important is not part of the family of vehicles that help reduce logistics/maintenance and bring down the cost per vehicle.
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Also,a closed mortar system like the Finnish Patria Advanced Mortar System(AMOS),New Mortar System(NEMO,& BAE Systems/GDLS Armored Mortar System(AMS II) would be better than what we have now.I know that the FCS plans a closed mortar system,but how long will it be until it’s available?
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Ohwileke says we should delay the family of manned ground vehicles even longer and you are saying that 2015 isn’t soon enough?
Roy said:”Amphibious assaults,just like airborne & air mobile assaults,are still relevant. Nobody stupidly puts their men into a heavily protected target,you launch the above mentioned assaults into weakened,undefended areas,it only makes sense.
One of the major problems with FCS is that you have to still secure the airports that you expect the C-17s carrying the FCS vehicles to land.That means an amphibious,airborne,&/or air mobile strike. This could step on toes.”
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Roy, if you don’t plan to assault a defended beach (we didn’t in Kuwait), why does the EFV need to swim? Put smaller FCS vehicles on a LCAC variant and airlift others off the deck, or plucked off of LCACs. It’s dumb to spend so much and complicate a system for the brief time required to get to shore…when 99.9% of the employment time will be spent on land.
Just as you pick a lightly defended area to get to shore, you find a friendly nation near the threat border to accept your air deployment. Because they are often threatened by their neighbor, they often welcome the help/deterrent.
If you must seize an airhead, in large threat countries you find allies(like the Kurds, Pakistan, and Afghan tribes)and less defended areas for Airborne/V-22/Air Assault and subsequent airland insertion. Few countries can stand up to our airpower’s overwatch of airhead seizure. Once a FCS Combined Arms Battalion is on the ground in a matter of days, few countries can threaten it or the airhead, even with large armored forces.
Air insertion also offers the option of multiple points of entry along a threat international border to complicate threat decision-making on how to spread its defenses. It gives the U.S. multiple options for simultaneous deployment by land and sea, and eventually, simultaneous attack from different directions.
Roy said:”The FCS also needs to prove that it can operate in the mountains(I don’t mean little hills either) of Korea,Afghanistan,Pakistan(?),AND Iran.We also need the lift capabilities of helicopters to carry them into the mountains to fight.I think that the FCS system vehicles are just a little too heavy for CH-47 Chinooks to carry.We don’t seem to have any serious heavy lift helicopter development planned to do this.”
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Roy, a Chinook or even a CH-53K cannot begin to lift a FCS Manned Ground Vehicle any more than a C-130 can. We eventually need a joint future tactical aircraft for that job….but than can wait. We flew plenty of C-130s into Afghanistan in OEF and C-17s would have fared just as well into Bagram and Kandahar.
A V-22 would be hard pressed to lift much via sling load in Afghanistan. Only the Chinook and CH-53 have that kind of power. Even a future heavy lift rotorcraft would have great difficulty lifting large vehicles in Afghanistan. You still need light forces for that terrain. No vehicle can traverse some of those mountains. Armored vehicles can provide direct fire overwatch of mountainsides from the valley below, as well as local artillery coverage however.
Retired Infantry LTC and Apache CW4 coworkers would greatly disagree with you that we have no capability to fight in cold weather, since both served in Alaska. Seems like our entire Army spent 60 years on the plains of Germany which is plenty cold in the winter. Tracks work in snow and yes there is specialized snow equipment in Alaska.
There is a reason we have armored humvees, MRAPs and Strykers in Iraq, instead of FCS vehicles. There is a reason that we have modified Navy Phalanx guns in the field in the point defense mission, instead of laser guns in development to do the same thing.
A military system that never actually gets produced isn’t very useful to anybody. The problem with FCS is that it is never going to get built.
The notion of “good enough” is anethma to the FCS program, but in real life it useful. We took out tanks in the early days of the Iraq War with A-10s. A plurality of all ordinance dropped in Iraq and Afghanistan has fallen from B-52s. When military communications equipment failed, soldiers whipped out their personal cell phones and commercial satellite phones. New isn’t necessarily better.
Also traits like “hardware fixes to solve multiple common problems simultaneously” and “software fixes to solve multiple common problems simultaneously” aren’t features, they are faults. The preferred way of dealing with problems is to use one system until all the bugs are out, before designing a variant of that system.
You don’t ever want to have to fix “multiple common problems simultaneously.” This is a recipe for losing a war, because problems are historically not discovered until you go to war with a piece of equipment. You will be dead before you can fix it. This is the droid Army in Star Wars I: Phantom Menace. This is the entire B-2 bomber or F-15 fleet grounded until they figure out what is wrong with it.
If you must have multiple problems at all (and multiple new platforms virtually guarantees that you will have them), you want them to be multiple idiosyncratic, non-simultaneous ones.
Launching multiple new vehicle systems at once gives you Chrysler corporation circa 2007, with massive recalls in almost every single vehicle you sell at the same time that destroys your credibility for reliability.
Getting “common supply parts and supply systems” can be achieved by standardizing around whatever worked in the model you released first. Historically, this is how the private sector has worked. Yes, it did give us querty keyboards, but there was a reason for that at the time.
If you want to be able to upgrade something, you should have a modular design, you don’t need to launch every design that accepts a module at once. Also, notably, many new technologies, like advanced avionics in fighter jets, have proved relatively easy to import as upgrades to older systems. Some, like a Linux based answer to Aegis in pre-Aegis ships, are arguably better than the originals, because they take advantage of software based solutions to problems that were solved with hardware when Aegis was invented.
There is no reason that personnel reductions in BCTs need to happen all at once. If, for example, each unit of each new system reduces combat personnel needs by 5 soldiers, then BCTs can be downsized 5 soldiers at a time.
Is there synergistic benefit in having multiple new systems. Sure, if those multiple new systems ever get built.
We should not spend billions in ambitious development to build:
- hybrid electric drive
- active protection systems
- extremely capable sensors
- artificial intelligence to aid sensors
- state-of-the-art communications
- networked fires and fires systems
- robotics, both ground and air
- lightweight effective armor
- millions of lines of software
Instead, we should billions to build and field a vehicle with hybrid electric drive that lacks next generation sensors, communications, software and robotics.
Then, a few years later, we should try retrofitting something we already have, like a Stryker or an M1 tank with an active protection system.
Then, when we have it down, maybe we should try putting some new sensors on an old Predator drone, or MRAP.
Then, a few years later, we should upgrade some of our existing vehicles to have state of the art communications.
We may never get a system with all of these cool new features. Maybe cheap guided missiles, or easily generated EMPs will make them all obsolete before we reach that point. So what? In 2028, when we have many of these technologies down to the point that they are no longer state of the art, then we can build some new military vehicle that incorporates all of them.
Engineers do better with concrete problems that have well established context. Tell an engineer to build an active protection system for an M1 tank in urban combat, and he can do it. Tell an engineer to build an active protection system that incorporates advanced artificial intelligence sensors for a whole class of military vehicles and you might end up with an acid spewing expresso machine that flies for ten times the price.
Cole,
You do realize that it was the THREAT of an amphibious assault by US/coalition forces which kept the bulk of the Iraqi Army “pinned down” in Kuwait (which allowed us to “trap it & kill it”)…So even though we did not actually conduct a large-scale amphibious assault we sure DID use the possibility of one as a KEY to the overall battleplan.
ohwileke said: “There is a reason we have armored humvees, MRAPs and Strykers in Iraq, instead of FCS vehicles. There is a reason that we have modified Navy Phalanx guns in the field in the point defense mission, instead of laser guns in development to do the same thing.”
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In WWI, should we have said there is a reason we have trench warfare…and that’s good enough. In WWII should we have stuck with the tried and true horse cavalry and bi-plane?
We have armored HMMWVs because there is no Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV). We have MRAPs, again due to no JLTV, and because EFPs/IEDs are the major threat more than the plentiful anti-tank missiles, advanced RPGs, future armed UAVs, and main tank rounds that we would face in other conflicts.
Stryker will continue as a crucial part of the Army mix, but it is already growing in size for both air deployment by C-130 snd land use in tight confines due to slat armor. It also lacks the electrical power to add FCS comms, sensors and computing power, and active protection.
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ohwileke continues: “A military system that never actually gets produced isn’t very useful to anybody. The problem with FCS is that it is never going to get built.”
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Do you acknowledge that the NLOS-Cannon will get built…complete with the Crusader auto-loader and all the FCS research byproducts? If you have the research underbelt and prototypes being tested, you have the basis and testing mechanism for other manned ground vehicle production. That is where the common hardware and software fixes get made early on.
Should we instead start from scratch on whole new dissimilar infantry carriers, tanks, mortar vehicles, command and control vehicles, reconnaissance and surveillance vehicles, ambulances/treatment vehicles, and maintenance recovery vehicles? How much would THAT cost!! Won’t each of the those postulated wholly unrelated vehicles have problems of their own that need to be fixed independent of one another? Was it dumb to produce Stryker as a family of vehicles?
A military family of vehicles that never gets built when the common prototype is fielded is just stupid.
It’s generally a good idea to correctly spell the words you emphasize through capitalization: INFANTLY or INFINITELY ;)
Here is a recent Government Executive article that illustrates that the Marines may be less sure than you think about how to execute an amphibious assault in the 21st century when ships may need to stay 100 miles offshore…not 25 miles. Can you say Sunburn missile?
It would be a real bummer to run out of gas trying to drive an EFV to shore from 100 miles out….;)
Cole,
Thanks for the link – it proves my point!
Although it does go wrong at the end…
By the article’s own admission, any threat which is significant enough to force an assualt from beyond 25 miles is ALSO significant enough to make an assault from 100 miles all but impossible (& in fact MORE dangerous than an assault from 25 miles due to MUCH greater transit time)…But that is why you send in air strikes & littoral/mine warfare to soften up/neutralize the threat BEFORE you begin the assault.
Can you say ESSM & RAM (aka anti-Sunurn) missiles?
And note that the EFVs in the 2006 test had the equivalent of over 20 years service but DID NOT have the equivalent of 20 years of maintenance. While some of the problems experienced in the test were developemental issues, some were due to over-used/under-maintained vehicles.
pfcem,
Not sure you understand that the EFV can’t spend 4 hours skimming to shore from 100 miles out. Specs seem to imply only about a 65-75 mile range in the water. Even if it could make it to shore, it wouldn’t have much fuel left when it got there. It was originally supposed to assault from 25 miles.
So why not just land somewhere with no threat, so you can get closer to shore, and use LCAC and joint theater vessels, as well as RO/RO for other gear.
BTW, the Littoral Combat Ship uses FCS NLOS-Launch System as one of its weapons. Sure hope SeaRAM works as advertised….
Cole,
The EFV doesn’t have to spend 4 hours skimming to shore from 100 miles out. If the threat is such that you “can’t” assault from 25 miles out then it is such that you “can’t” assault from 100 miles out either.
Of coarse you WANT to make an unopposed landing when you can but sometimes you HAVE to assault a defended area but in those situations you send in air strikes & such to soften up/neutralize the threat BEFORE you begin the assault.
The USMC learned LONG ago (WWII) the value of amtracks. Just as the USMC amphibious assault doctrine as evolved, so has the amtrack AS PART OF IT – thus the EFV.