Today marks the 66 anniversary of the battle of Midway Island, a key engagement that, if it had gone the other way, would have potentially crippled the U.S. naval capability for good. I know you guys are more into looking at the future of defense, but sometimes I think it’s good to step back and remember how we got where we are.
From the Navy history center:
The Battle of Midway, fought over and near the tiny U.S. mid-Pacific base at Midway atoll, represents the strategic high water mark of Japan’s Pacific Ocean war. Prior to this action, Japan possessed general naval superiority over the United States and could usually choose where and when to attack. After Midway, the two opposing fleets were essentially equals, and the United States soon took the offensive.
Japanese Combined Fleet commander Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto moved on Midway in an effort to draw out and destroy the U.S. Pacific Fleet’s aircraft carrier striking forces, which had embarrassed the Japanese Navy in the mid-April Doolittle Raid on Japan’s home islands and at the Battle of Coral Sea in early May. He planned to quickly knock down Midway’s defenses, follow up with an invasion of the atoll’s two small islands and establish a Japanese air base there. He expected the U.S. carriers to come out and fight, but to arrive too late to save Midway and in insufficient strength to avoid defeat by his own well-tested carrier air power.
Yamamoto’s intended surprise was thwarted by superior American communications intelligence, which deduced his scheme well before battle was joined. This allowed Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, the U.S. Pacific Fleet commander, to establish an ambush by having his carriers ready and waiting for the Japanese. On 4 June 1942, in the second of the Pacific War’s great carrier battles, the trap was sprung. The perseverance, sacrifice and skill of U.S. Navy aviators, plus a great deal of good luck on the American side, cost Japan four irreplaceable fleet carriers, while only one of the three U.S. carriers present was lost. The base at Midway, though damaged by Japanese air attack, remained operational and later became a vital component in the American trans-Pacific offensive.
This brings up an excellent point, though. My good friend Bob Dudney, the editor of Air Force magazine, recently wrote an editorial cautioning against Gates’ rhetorical punch at the services’ obsession with future technological developments — or “next war-itis” as he put it.
Are Pentagon leaders really serious about this? Is Gates himself serious about it? He has embraced a stylized image of a future world landscape dominated by shadowy, lightly armed enemies sallying forth from remote redoubts and engaging in nonstop urban warfare. In case Mr. Gates has forgotten, it was not that long ago that the US had to use main conventional forcesprincipally air forcesto win the 1991 Gulf War. More recently, high-end forces were needed to fight in Bosnia, Serbia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. None of these operations would have been possible without advanced, front-line weapons.
Gates wants to cure the services of “next-war-itis,” but he would only weaken the patients.
Neither Gates nor anyone else can safely predict the likelihood of major conventional war. Surely the Pentagon leader is aware of the huge buildup of fighters, warships, and other modern arms in China and Russia, as well as regional threats posed by the likes of North Korea and Iran. If it is true that the eruption of a major clash of conventional arms is not likely, it is because US air, sea, and land forces are strong enough to deter any aggressive moves. That is hardly a reason for turning away to deal with lesser problems.
While I see Gates’ point, I also think it’s important to hedge against future “full spectrum” threats. You can easily modify training to accommodate new battlefield problems, but developing and fielding equipment — something as big as a fighter jet or an aircraft carrier — for such an unseen eventuality could prove fatal.
So take some time today to consider how things could have been if the battle of Midway had gone the other way, and how differently that desperate time might have unfolded had the U.S. truly prepared itself for resurgent powers with full-spectrum threats in the interwar years.
(Thanks to NC for the Dudney gouge)
– Christian
I appreciate the remembrance article and congrulate DT on posting it. However, the tie in with Gates didn’t connect.
Here’s the loose connection: “…that desperate time might have unfolded had the US truly prepared itself for resurgent power with full-spectrum threats in the interwar years.”
While the statement itself is true in regards to the WWI to WWII interwar years, it doesn’t work with today’s reality and with Gate’s comments.
We are IN a war right now, and Gate’s remarks were trying to direct everyone to focus on that reality. We are not in “inter-war years” right now, but “war years”.
During WWII the US geared up and fought WWII. Gate’s (and others) are merely asking that we actually do the same now, for the current war we are actually fighting today.
Big difference.
Good point Krag…maybe it was a bad tie in but it sort of got me thinking about the issue a bit more…glad I could get you fired up on it.
OTOH, the USAF’s obsession with radar stealth could easily be self limiting…
a) Multipath and other radar technologies defeat scattering-based stealth technologies. So it is an open question whether, with the continued development of radars and signal processing, whether the F22 remains stealthy.
b) You’re the chinese: which would you rather defend against, 180 F-22s or almost 1800 F-16s?
The argument about thinking too hard about the next war reminds me at the beginning of the Korean Conflict; the US Air force sent their latest and best aircraft to Europe. (I think it was the Saber…)
Why? Because they thought the “real” war was going to be fought in Europe, not Korea.
Even though that line of thought has validity, it ignores the fact that we had people fighting and dying in Korea…
And that was the war….
what these idiots dont understand is that everytime the US has fought a gorilla war after it was over they conveniently forgot about it. the reality is that insurgency warfare is here to stay and WE DONT GET TO PICK THE TYPE OF WARS WE FIGHT. so naturally there is going to be a battle for monies between the conventional and counter insurgency parts in the dod. the air force wants to forget about counter insurgency and spend money on tech toys. even huge parts of the army want the same. we need a counter insurgency corps or maybe put it in the hands of SOCOM. but the reality is that counter insurgency warfare is here to say and we are more likely to fight insurgents then conventional armys in the future.
Nice article Christian, but this Cav officer is going to take a big swing and say wtf are you talking about, the air force won Desert Storm?! We destroyed more of the Iraqi army in 3 days than the air force did in 3 weeks. I’m not saying the air force wasn’t important in the war, but saying we won in 1991 with “principly air forces” is beyond a stretch.
Nicholas,
If I were China, I’d want to battle F-16’s. Hell, why don’t we just build 50 million armed cessna 150’s. Quantity over quality, right?
@TB – the ignorant remarks about air power winning everything since the airplane was invented didn’t come from Christian but somebody named Bob Dudney, editor of…an Air Force rag. Big surprise.
KragCulloden,
Sorry but the US does not have to “gear up” for the current war we are actually fighting today (which we are WINNING). Our current forces can MORE than haddle it. Yes there are changes which can be made to fight the current war better but we are certainly not going to lose this war because we are not “geared” for it. One thing that IS needed is better intel, which IS one of the things which had been neglected.
What Gates & other misguided fools like him want us to do is to not adequitely prepare for possible (some will say likely if not inevitable) major conflicts in the future & “GRAR DOWN” for the current war we are actually fighting today.
As to the tie-in between Midway & Gates, it didn’t connect because the US DIDN’T neglect its navy prior to WWII. What would have been a more accurate tie-in to Gates would be “how differently that desperate time might have unfolded had a ‘then-Gates’ convinced the U.S. to neglect its navy (like it did its army) in the interwar years & the USS Enterprise, USS Yorktown & USS Hornet &/or the F4F Wildcat, SBD Dauntless & TBD Devastator which made up their air groups at the time not been built…”
If you want a modern-day tie-in for Midway, look at the political cover provided for the torpedo construction facility on Goat Island. Powerful Congressional delegates from Rhode Island prevented other states from building torpedo facilities while theirs slowly turned out hand-made duds.
After the Japanese destroyed several hundred torpedos stockpiled in the Philipines a terrible shortage ensued. Oh, and did I mention they were all duds?
The Pentagon is still a bureaucracy, with all the waste and over-spending that entails. The different branches don’t appear to come from different countries as much as different planets. Everyone has their little pet projects and home-state pork, which explains why we get 100 copies of something we don’t need while we risk life and limb waiting for stuff we need desperately.
On the occasion of the anniversary I would ask the services, and our major political parties, to remember we’re all Americans. Your alliance is there first – everything else is fluff.
To the brave men of Torpedo 8 and all the young guys who died delivering duds into the teeth of the Japanese Armada, I raise my glass.
Thanks to you, we’re still here!!
Midway is not a battle that would best support a next war-itis, this was already into the war for us when we were trying to catch up to Japanese military superiority and this was our turning point in gaining an advantage and we focused on more important weapons systems, such as aircraft and aircraft carriers. A better comparison would be the Japanese attack of Pearl Harbor, where our Navy was still focused on Battleships and other surface ships and not as much on the aircraft carriers and aircraft that were so vital in the Pacific. Prior to Pearl Harbor, the US Navy never fully embraced the new advantage an aircraft group would have over a battleship group in the large expanse of the Pacific or more carriers would have been made. Likely we had enough foresight in the Navy to keep our carriers anyway from Pearl Harbor just in case. That would be a better battle to promote next war-itis.
My thought on next war-itis is we should try to plan for every conceivable event we may face and make sure we promote weapons systems that can be adaptable in the future, like a carrier is as compared to a battleship. But we have to make sure we can support what is going on now to the best of our resources and ability. How would you feel if you were a soldier in Iraq and you just was hit by an IED, which by the way you could have detected before hand but not all your vehicle had the equipment that was available now, because some money was used to develop a new stealth bomber that can hit targets dead in enemy territory that will be available in 2020. And then your attack from a building but you don’t have the firepower to fight back and you can’t call for air support because no assets are available, manned or unmanned, because the Airforce is spending money on stealth fighters to handle future dogfights. And when you need a medivac, since your firefight is so intense, nothing is available or the slow current helicopters will take twice as long as a new Osprey would. With the level of technology we have, there should be no excuse to not have the resources to fully support our combat units, whether on the ground, in the air above and below the sea or, God help we never have to, in space.
Bill Nelson,
Your account of history is inaccurate. There were those in the USN who WERE fully appreciative of carrier airpower WELL before the Battle of Midway (even well before the attack on Pearl Harbor). Unfortunately there were international treaties which placed limits on the size (tonnage) of the USN & other navies. For the USN it was allowed 525,000 tons in battleships & only 135,000 tons in carriers. It does not take a genius to figure out what those limits mean in terms of the USN’s battleship vs carrier priorities.
Once said treaties had lapsed, Congress authorized an additional 40,000 tons. In order to save time the 1st carrier to be built with the new tonnage was the USS Hornet (CV-8), a virtual repeat of the USS Yorktown (CV-5) & USS Enterprise (CV-6) [note the gap taken up by the 15,000 ton USS Wasp (CV-7) which was build for the sole purpose of fully utilizing the tonnage allowed by treaty - otherwise Wasp would have most likely been a a virtual repeat of Yorktown & Enterprise] while the design of an “imporved Yorktown” & what eventually became the Essex class was formulated. The 1st three Essex class were authorized in June 1940, followed by a further TEN in July 1940. So no less than 14 carriers amounting to MORE THAN DOUBLE the tonnage previously allowed under treaty had been authorized PRIOR to the attack on Pearl Harbor.
As I said earlier, the USN was one military branch which was NOT neglected during the inter-war years. The PROPER next war-itis correlation with today is what would WWII have been like if during the WWI-WWII inter-war years someone had conviced the US that since there was no realistic possibility of another major war anytime soon that the USN should be neglected for other “more immediate” priorities.
And the flpiside to your “how would you feel if”…
How would you feel if your ENTIRE Platoon had just been wiped out because you & every soldier in it had been trained & equipped to fight insurgents instead of a REAL military force and you you couldn’t call for air support because the USAF didn’t have enough F-22s &/or F-35s to secure air-superiority over your operation & the money that was going to be used to develop a new stealth bomber which could have gotten through & saved your ass with a few well-placed SDB was used for all that “great” counter-insurgency equipment that while somewhat better at defeating insurgents than the equipment your father had “back in the day” didn’t offer the needed firepower against the REAL military force that just wiped out your ENTIRE Platoon…And because of the lack of air-superiority even the now well proven Osprey can’t come & medicav any in you Platoon who may still be alive.
What there should be no excuse for is to not have the resources to fully prepare our combat units for possible MAJOR combat against a REAL military threat, whether on the ground, in the air above and below the sea or, God help we never have to, in space.
@Bill Nelson – well said.
We seem to have two camps in this discussion now – the Army and Marines fighting the bad guys this very instant, and the AF and Navy fighing the boogeyman, which might exist, sometime in the future.
One camp wants the focus put on the bad guys of today, the other wants to focus on the boogeyman of the future. I fall in the former camp.
No one said anything about restructuring the entire US military to fight COIN only, or any other stupid exageration that has been stated on the board.
Its a matter of priorities with todays money and todays energy. What we need today (and needed last week) should get priority…the boogeyman stuff gets slowed down dramatically until the current war is over. Period. No radical change of warfighing capabilities, no idiotic blind eye to future threats, but a focus of manpower, money, and energy on the war of today.
That should extend not only to every element of DoD, but every executive branch agency currently shuffling papers and watching “American Idol” instead of working towards victory in Iraq and Afghanistan in their own respective spheres of expertise.
2 much emphisis on D Day Normandy NOT= time to Battle of Midway.
Both major WW2 events.
Must redress some how?
Ideas
Comments.
Have Anniv for D Day & Midway Battles Both estd!.
Long overdue.
@pfc – You are long-winded *and* unconvincing. Quite exagerating the counter-argument to make it easier to argue against.
Its just not that complex. Focus on the war of today, *economize* the resources to finish the current threat before wetting your pants about potential wars twenty years in the future.
Real simple.
As for the swipes at my grasp of history and future threats – laughable and extremely weak of you. Grow up.
KragCulloden,
In otherwords you don’t know what you are talking about & can’t support any of you incorrect/false statements because the FACTS indicate otherwise.
We are ALREADY focused on the war of today. AND we are WINNING the war today. We DO NOT need to put our ability to fight a MAJOR conflict against a REAL MILITARY threat in the future in order to do any better than we are already doing today against enemies which ARE NOT (never have been & never will be) a significant MILITARY threat.
Hell, we are spending more money buying MRAP vehicles (which more & more people are coming to realize are NOT all that & are of VERY limited utility except for the one thing they do well which isn’t even as much of a threat TODAY as it once was) then we are maintaining & upgrading our MBT fleet. We are not going to lose the current conflict if we don’t get 20,000+ MRAP vehices ASAP but we COULD lose (or at least have a MUCH more difficult time winning & thus suffer MUCH higher loses) a MAJOR conflict against a REAL MILITARY threat in the future if we do not keep our MBT fleet up to date.
Very exciting, I like it