From a pro-Boeing source:
The Boeing Company protested the award of a contract to Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation under solicitation No. FA8625-07-R-6470, issued by the Department of the Air Force, for KC-X aerial refueling tankers to begin replacing its aging tanker fleet. Boeing challenged the Air Forces technical and cost evaluations, conduct of discussions, and source selection decision.
Our Office sustained Boeings protest on June 18, 2008. The 69-page decision was issued under a protective order, because the decision contains proprietary and source selection sensitive information. We have directed counsel for the parties to promptly identify information that cannot be publicly released so that we can expeditiously prepare and release, as soon as possible, a public version of the decision.
Although the Air Force intends to ultimately procure up to 179 KC-X aircraft, the solicitation provided for an initial contract for system development and demonstration of the KC-X aircraft and procurement of up to 80 aircraft. The solicitation provided that award of the contract would be on a best value basis, and stated a detailed evaluation scheme that identified technical and cost factors and their relative weights. With respect to the cost factor, the solicitation provided that the Air Force would calculate a most probable life cycle cost estimate for each offeror, including military construction costs. In addition, the solicitation provided a detailed system requirements document that identified minimum requirements (called key performance parameter thresholds) that offerors must satisfy to receive award. The solicitation also identified desired features and performance characteristics of the aircraft (which the solicitation identified as requirements, or in certain cases, as objectives) that offerors were encouraged, but were not required, to provide.
The agency received proposals and conducted numerous rounds of negotiations with Boeing and Northrop Grumman. The Air Force selected Northrop Grummans proposal for award on February 29, 2008, and Boeing filed its protest with our Office on March 11, supplementing it numerous times thereafter. In accordance with our Bid Protest Regulations, we obtained a report from the agency and comments on that report from Boeing and Northrop Grumman. The documentary record produced by the Air Force in this protest is voluminous and complex. Our Office also conducted a hearing, at which testimony was received from a number of Air Force witnesses to complete and explain the record. Following the hearing, we received further comments from the parties, addressing the hearing testimony as well as other aspects of the record.
Our decision should not be read to reflect a view as to the merits of the firms respective aircraft. Judgments about which offeror will most successfully meet governmental needs are largely reserved for the procuring agencies, subject only to such statutory and regulatory requirements as full and open competition and fairness to potential offerors. Our bid protest process examines whether procuring agencies have complied with those requirements.
Our review of the record led us to conclude that the Air Force had made a number of significant errors that could have affected the outcome of what was a close competition between Boeing and Northrop Grumman. We therefore sustained Boeings protest. We also denied a number of Boeings challenges to the award to Northrop Grumman, because we found that the record did not provide us with a basis to conclude that the agency had violated the legal requirements with respect to those challenges.
Specifically, we sustained the protest for the following reasons:
1. The Air Force, in making the award decision, did not assess the relative merits of the proposals in accordance with the evaluation criteria identified in the solicitation, which provided for a relative order of importance for the various technical requirements. The agency also did not take into account the fact that Boeing offered to satisfy more non-mandatory technical requirements than Northrop Grumman, even though the solicitation expressly requested offerors to satisfy as many of these technical requirements as possible.
2. The Air Forces use as a key discriminator that Northrop Grumman proposed to exceed a key performance parameter objective relating to aerial refueling to a greater degree than Boeing violated the solicitations evaluation provision that no consideration will be provided for exceeding [key performance parameter] objectives.
3. The protest record did not demonstrate the reasonableness of the Air Forces determination that Northrop Grummans proposed aerial refueling tanker could refuel all current Air Force fixed-wing tanker-compatible receiver aircraft in accordance with current Air Force procedures, as required by the solicitation.
4. The Air Force conducted misleading and unequal discussions with Boeing, by informing Boeing that it had fully satisfied a key performance parameter objective relating to operational utility, but later determined that Boeing had only partially met this objective, without advising Boeing of this change in the agencys assessment and while continuing to conduct discussions with Northrop Grumman relating to its satisfaction of the same key performance parameter objective.
5. The Air Force unreasonably determined that Northrop Grummans refusal to agree to a specific solicitation requirement that it plan and support the agency to achieve initial organic depot-level maintenance within 2 years after delivery of the first full-rate production aircraft was an administrative oversight, and improperly made award, despite this clear exception to a material solicitation requirement.
6. The Air Forces evaluation of military construction costs in calculating the offerors most probable life cycle costs for their proposed aircraft was unreasonable, where the agency during the protest conceded that it made a number of errors in evaluation that, when corrected, result in Boeing displacing Northrop Grumman as the offeror with the lowest most probable life cycle cost; where the evaluation did not account for the offerors specific proposals; and where the calculation of military construction costs based on a notional (hypothetical) plan was not reasonably supported.
7. The Air Force improperly increased Boeings estimated non-recurring engineering costs in calculating that firms most probable life cycle costs to account for risk associated with Boeings failure to satisfactorily explain the basis for how it priced this cost element, where the agency had not found that the proposed costs for that element were unrealistically low. In addition, the Air Forces use of a simulation model to determine Boeings probable non-recurring engineering costs was unreasonable, because the Air Force used as data inputs in the model the percentage of cost growth associated with weapons systems at an overall program level and there was no indication that these inputs would be a reliable predictor of anticipated growth in Boeings non-recurring engineering costs.
We recommended that the Air Force reopen discussions with the offerors, obtain revised proposals, re-evaluate the revised proposals, and make a new source selection decision, consistent with our decision. We further recommended that, if the Air Force believed that the solicitation, as reasonably interpreted, does not adequately state its needs, the agency should amend the solicitation prior to conducting further discussions with the offerors. We also recommended that if Boeings proposal is ultimately selected for award, the Air Force should terminate the contract awarded to Northrop Grumman. We also recommended that the Air Force reimburse Boeing the costs of filing and pursuing the protest, including reasonable attorneys fees.
By statute, the Air Force is given 60 days to inform our Office of the Air Forces actions in response to our recommendations.
– Christian
So the Airforce now has to wait another 60 days to even decide what they are going to do, further extending the timeframe our older KC-135s must continue to fly and further stress the fleet. I think somehow the GAO bent to pressure from pro-Boeing lawmakers on this one.
Wheee!
1. Boeing gets a reprieve from its allies.
2. The details are being held out of public eye.
3. We are now in the purely political realm of making defense sausage.
It’s an “A ticket” ride for everyone…except those who need a tanker now.
I want to see the data from the government, NOT see it leaked out slowly by the partisan camps. Nice punt on the part of the cowardly GAO.
This kind of crap is why my Dad moved into civil aerospace in the early 70’s.
great screw the taxpayer with boeing’s inability to deliver on time. even more and now the airforce will have to wait longer for tanker. whats it going to take a kc135 fall out of the sky?
The GAO decision is based on factual information that accurately addresses AF errors committed during the source selection. AF Acquisition leadership lacks rigor and its acquisition system is broken. The lack of a true, personified, single manager for source selections and program management is the Air Force’s weak link. Too many cooks spoil the stew–continually.
i got a idea why even make a plane at all lets just give the money directly to the senators and house reps. because that is all this is.
Good Morning Folks,
Once again money and political corruption triumphs and our military will not get the best weapons system available and the tax payer gets ripped off. Again.
How many Air Force Generals and bureaucrats did Boeing have to buy off to get this one?
ALLONS,
Byron Skinner
Good work Boeing! Good job alienating the European market. The consequences of this will be far reaching. Those fat a-$-$-es in Congress are making this country a laughing stock in the Defense Market. Boeing cried their way back into this and they’ve made their biggest customer (the Airforce) look silly in the process. What a desperate sorry company. They reason this happened is because of all the congress people supporting those sorry A-$-$ unions in Washington and Kansas. This is a sad day for American Defense companies, The reprocutions will be far reaching, European Countries are going to think twice about dealing with us. It’s funny how $ outher European Countries chose the KC-45 over Boeing’s Tanker 4! yet it’s not the right tanker for us. Truely a sad day for America
obviously the AF is going to have to recompete the contract, which is going to take over a year
and then the KC-30 will win again and Boeing will protest again, so a minimum of 2 more years of this drama
Bob bats .500!
The AF acquisition system needs to be more like the Navy, and less ‘consensus’ based.
Of course, if it were like the Navy, the only people with a vote would have been the same people who like the KC-45 best — the users.
How I’d like to see things play out:
1. AF says “sorry GAO, we’re going forward“
2. Boeing’s minions in Congress move to stop the process.
3. NG supporters in Congress force the facts to come out in stopping Boeing’s minions.
It is the only way to get the real facts into the light of day. Unfortunately, it will require the AF to expend political capital and that will require cahones. Do they still have any?
BTW: the use of terms ‘minions’ and ‘supporters’ is calculated. Minions do the heavy lifting for their masters. Supporters merely provide support to those doing the heavy lifting. Feel free to disagree, but in this observer’s eyes it is clear that in this battle Boeing’s minions have worked harder than Boeing in getting this contract.
Bob
so you are telling me now that the GAO IS GOING TO TELL THE AIR FORCE WHAT THEY NEED TO BUY?
haha what a joke like the gao knows what the air force needs for its mission.
Corruption.…
Lets hope those armed guards are experienced when they get to farnborough airshow
I’m in utter shock reading the comments on here. You know very well Boeing has some valid points. And that the ‘head in the cloud’ goofballs that decide the winner in contests like this made mistakes. What they should just do now is say, “my bad” and award the contract 50/50.
If the AF wants to fix acquisition they should put the source selection authority and program management authority under the using command’s commander and not in AFMC. AFMC “experts” should be matrixed to the warfighting commander for both source selection and program management. All source selection decisions should have a more rigorous oversight before the decision is announced & validated. Had the AF review system had vigor, these upheld protest issues would have been discussed and re-looked—before the GAO came in. AF can wait for a new tanker while this process goes forward…the 135s are not going to fall out of the sky…they look and fly pretty darn good, especially the R-models. We should be getting the best bang for the tax-payer buck.
Once again an American company cries foul when their inferior product isn’t chosen over a superior foreign product.
Everyone knows that the A330 is superior to the 767. But Boeing wants us tax payers to buy the outdated 767 just because it’s owned by an American company.
Makes me proud to be an American
L
The AF acquisition system sucks. I have been dealing with them for twelve years now. Bob has the right idea. Just let me add one thing. AFMC has cut blue suit asnd civil servant positions, but added contract labor. This makes it look like there are less people in the AiR Force. The problem with this approach is that now you have contract labor people who are many times not neutral. Many times these contractor folks work indirectly (subsidary relationship)for the prime contractors. The AF has a problem with requiring one thing then selecting another. If they would follow a systems engineering approach to requirements this would not happen.
Just for this alone:
>The Air Force conducted misleading and unequal
>discussions with Boeing, by informing Boeing
>that it had fully satisfied a key performance
>parameter objective relating to operational
>utility, but later determined that Boeing had
>only partially met this objective, without
>advising Boeing of this change in the agency
This sucks for everybody associated with the Northrop-EADS team, but it does sound like the Air Force managed to screw up the competition. The Air Force writes the requirements, so all they had to do was provide a level playing field. If they didn’t want to buy a 30-year old airframe, all they had to do was stipulate that in the requirements. If exceeding requirements was to lead to additional points, ditto.
The irony of this latest foul-up is that the whole tanker program is costing substantially more than the initial lease deal, which would have had the planes in service by now!
If anyone is in ‘utter shock’ it would have to be from previously consuming hazardous levels of Boeing’s tripe. Everything out on this (very little so far) reeks of Boeing’s political machinations.
I’d like to see the AF bring back Systems Command, with program offices led by experienced users. Material Command came about because Logistics Command folks thought buying a complex system should be the same as buying a parts for the system like a bolt or washer. (slight over-simlification *grin*)
YEAHOOO!! Justice reigns at the GAO. Finally, we can begin the process of getting rid of the Eurotrash tanker and supply the American warfighter with a SUPERIOR American tanker, what we should have done in the first place. EADS can go screw itself, and Northrop Grumman should be ASHAMED of teaming up with a company that wants to outsource American jobs to Europe and destroy our defense-industrial base. Go Boeing! Go KC-767 (or maybe KC-777)!!
767 is an airframe at the end of its life.
No sense to buy an aircraft based on it.
Can the GAO change this reality?
Can the GAO understand mission requirements better than the AF?
This is just political pressure…
Giovanni,
You are a Grade A JACK A-$-$. Every defense company outsources components of their product (with me so far you slack jawed yokel) Boeing believe it or not outsources to Italy and China (I know it’s hurts wheen that mouse is spinning that rusty wheel in your dome) The major assembly will be done in Alabama, the Engines in Ohio(that’s in the United States) Don’t worry about outsourcing jobs the 7–11 you work in will not be relocated to France anytime soon.…
this is not about supporting our fighting men and women at all, which makes sense because this doesn’t. this is pure political pandering and protectionism at its ugliest. assuming this continues to go wrong, the world will know that the USA won’t buy any non-american aircraft. hell, we’ll even make it illegal to buy anything but american companies. but by all means please continue buying all the airplanes the USA wants to sell to the rest of the world, ok?
of note, the GAO found bad things on both sides, so this could still turn out right. for the future of our economy, let’s all hope it does.
Posted by: SMSgt Mac at June 18, 2008 04:35 PM
“The irony of this latest foul-up is that the whole tanker program is costing substantially more than the initial lease deal, which would have had the planes in service by now! “
one of the reasons the first deal was overturned was because we would be substantially over-paying for those tankers. many people were fired, and some went to jail over it. it was a sweetheart deal for boeing, not for the US taxpayers.
The GAO has set the bar of perfection up at the level of the OJ Simpson trial; if the LAPD deviated from absolute perfection in any way in the handling of evidence, then OJ was innocent. They did, and OJ walked out free– and later wrote a book called “if I did it”. So now, any variance at all is adequate claim to kill a selection.
Does anyone notice how minor and insignificant the variances cited by the GAO are? Number seven on the list is pretty clearly contrived.
We now have to choose:
1– the USAF needs to run only flawless complex acquisitions, or
2– we need to let Congress buy the stuff directly, listening to the loudest constituents, or
3– stop pretending to run competitions; just buy everything sole source. Even fair competitions are inherently “unfair” because the loser always feels it was unfair, and can now protest and perpetually delay any program).
It’s a sad day for the United States.
Gee… the EADS crowd chimes in.
I’m glad Boeing (an American company) won the protest. The AF f’d up.
“One of the reasons the first deal was overturned was because we would be substantially over-paying for those tankers. many people were fired, and some went to jail over it. it was a sweetheart deal for boeing, not for the US taxpayers.“
And there’s the irony: in the time since that deal was cancelled, prices have spiralled upwards due to increasing demand for airliners, materials and labor. There’s also the added cost of running 1–2 additional competitions, and the lost savings imposed by having to run the older fleet longer. The first deal was overturned because it wasn’t a good deal for taxpayers at the time, but in the long run it would have saved money! Not to say that the end justifies the means, but the notion that corruption could’ve led to a better deal is wonderfully ironic and cynical at the same time.
The Navy better start thinking GAS, ’cause they’re screwed.
When you realize that,according to whatdoesitmean.com.,we(the U.S.) & China are attacking each other with weather machines that are causing the tornadoes & flooding in the Midwest here & earthquakes & flooding in central China(with India suffering collateral damage from our weather machine wars causing their early monsoon season),buying a air tanker for the Air force just seems so insignificant,don’t you think?
Hey,just adding a little levity to this discussion.
Back on topic,the end result from this whole tanker debate is that we have NO TANKER AT ALL.The same goes with the CSAR-X helicopter.
In a time of war,shouldn’t we be doing everything we could to be putting new equipment in the field instead of having pissing contests & shooting ourselves in the foot? Instead of protesting,why couldn’t Boeing & EADS(& the American company “fronting” them) work together to put out a tanker in a timely manner? Again,the same goes with the CSAR-X,there are so many logical choices for the CSAR,but NOBODY wants to see it.
Byron Skinner,
You are confused…
It was money and political corruption triumphing and our military which forced the USAF cancel the deal which benefitted it & change its criterea in order to be “fair” to the competion which in reality WAS not competative pushing it to not get the best weapons system available and the tax payer is STILL getting ripped off.
How many Air Force Generals and bureaucrats did NG/EADS (& everyone else who wanted the KC-30) have to buy off to so change the USAF in the 1st place.
Note that the GOA is an entirely (& supposedly non-partisan) entity.
SMSgt Mac,
Sorry it CAN’T happen they way you want it.
The USAF is fully aware that the GOA is correct. (And as I have speculated, WANTED the GOA to do what it has done & exposed the BS that was the whole KC-X selection so that it COULD move forward with the KC-767 like it has ALWAYS wanted & can tell all the KC-30 supporters that FORCED it into this ridiculus position that we tried it your way but it couln’ld be done).
By the way to all you ignorents out there, don;t confure what the KC-X selection chose with what the USAF wants. The USAF arleady chose what it wanted but was FORCED to alter what it “wanted” in order to be “fair” to a NONCOMPETATIVE competitor to what they want.
len,
No, everyone who knows much about REAL WORLD USAF tanker operations & requirements knows the KC-767AT is the better tanker to replace our KC-135s.
Boeing “cried” fould becsaue the USAF (more spesifically the KC-X selection team) f..ed up & the GOA agrees thus UPHOLDING the protest.
hank,
Yes leasing tankers was going to cost a bit more than buying them (check the projected cost of the lease deals vs the projected cost of the KC-X) BUT we lease thing ALL THE TIME & leasing them allowed the USAF to get NEW tankers ASAP & it didn’t have to reach into its procurement bugdet to get them! The was NO “substantial over-paying” the value basis of the lease payed was based of ar fair market value for the tankers to be leased.
It is one thing to say that you would prefer that we pay more upfront (from the already tight USAF procurment budget) in order to save some overall in the long run, it is something else to outright LIE & misrepresent the facts of the tanker lease.
Not that many people got fierd & only a few went to jail.
It was a sweetheart deal for the USAF, not for Boeing. And the US taxpayers would have never felt the difference except for NOT feeling the pressure to come up greater up-front costs of an outright purchase.
Now that I have responded to some of the NONSENSE others have posted…
“
Our decision should not be read to reflect a view as to the merits of the firms
Those of you that are saying the Air Force will have to wait longer are ignoring the fact that all the necessary kc-767 infrastructure is already in place and airframes are already being pumped out. Kc-45 factories haven’t even been built yet.
Why don’t they just throw out the decision? They did it before… As for the 767, Boeing should use the 777 instead.
First of all, for all those hammering solely on the Air Force, and for all those claiming the other services could do a better job at acquiring major weapons systems, let’s get one thing straight. The current procurement mess the military is currently in is not an Air Force only problem. Nearly every new weapons system being procurred today is behind schedule and over budget. The Navy’s LCS and the Army’s FCS are prime examples. This is a military-wide problem and the entire acquisition system is broken, and don’t ask me how to fix it ’cause I have no ideas.
Secondly, I think there’s been a lot of hypocytical criticism towards Boeing and the Air Force. I mean, when I look at comments about the CSAR-X competition, I hear TONS of people ranting about how the AIr Force chose a “heavy” lift helicopter for a “medium” lift requiremnet. But when I look at posts about the KC-X debate, I see TONS of people rant about how the KC-30 is obviously the best pick, even though it was selected to replace a tanker nearly half its size. Alot of the people on these posts seem to eat up Northrup’s arguments and regurgetate them on these posts, and at the same time summarily dismiss Boeing’s arguments as just propoganda. And in the F-22 debate, I’ve again heard TONS of people argue that the Air Force should buy new build F-16s and F-15s, and those are 30 year old airframes, and yeat I hear TONS of people on the KC-X debate criticize the KC-767 as “being based on a 30 year old airframe”.
I’m not saying I agree or disagree with the arguments I’ve mentioned above, or that the same people saying one thing about the F-22 or CSAR-X are saying the oppposite thing about the KC-X, but it just strikes me that a majority of the arguments against the CSAR-X selection and F-22 are fundementally oppposite the arguments being used by a majority of people on the KC-X debate. That just doesn’t make sense to me.
Okay, now I’m all confused. GAO, at the request of the AF, reviewed the bid procedure when it was put out and said it was good.
NG won the competition in an environment that Boeing said was “fair and open”.
Now GAO and Boeing say the process was flawed.
????????
>Now GAO and Boeing say the process was flawed.
GP,
Read paragraph #4 in the Government Accounting Office (GAO) report closely.
The USAF changed the tanker requirements in the middle of the bid process, they told Northrup-Grumman, BUT DID NOT TELL BOEING that it did so.
In the bidding process, the USAF originally wanted to use as much of the existing KC-135 infrastructure as possible. That is why Boeing was bidding the 767-AT rather than the 777 which could not use the same hangers and shorter air fields that the KC-135 could.
The USAF decided mid-competition that fewer, bigger, tanker planes was better for the USAF procurement budget, and went for the KC-30.
That is why the GAO upheld Boeing’s protest.
I strongly suspect the reason both bids blew up on the USAF was the Fighter Pilot General’s insistence to maximize F-22s buys in the USAF’s limited procurment budget. The USAF brass involved with the bidding process were trying to free more of the procurement budget to buy fighters.
Any infrastructure cost hits for switching to the larger KC-30 mid-bid over the KC-767 would come from either the operations or facilities budgets, hence the USAF could buy more F-22s with the KC-30 than the KC-767.
The original “Tanker leasing deal” was built around “using a different color of money” than what would be used to buy the F-22.
Leasing would be part of the USAF Operation budget. You cannot use it to buy new equipment. That is what the procurement budget is for.
There are far more Congressional financial and reporting controls placed on the DoD procurement budget than either the operations or facilities line items.
This “color of money” funding game is what attracted Sen McCain’s attention and uncovered the procurment fraud that senior USAF officials were involved in.
Boeing found all this out in their bidding out brief and here we are.
The failure of both bids lies at the feet of the Fighter Pilot Generals insistance of playing budget games to buy more F-22s.
RE:“I hear TONS of people ranting about how the AIr Force chose a “heavy” lift helicopter for a “medium” lift requiremnet. But when I look at posts about the KC-X debate, I see TONS of people rant about how the KC-30 is obviously the best pick, even though it was selected to replace a tanker nearly half its size.“
Easy. For one weapon system type, size is a detriment (sneaking in and out of bad places making as small a target out of yourself as possible)to the mission, and the other size has a benefit (carrying as much payload as far as possible for others to use)to the mission.
Your point about age of systems is very relevant. I wonder about that too. It seems to come down to a wistful desire to just maintain some kind of status quo as far as I can tell.
SMSgtMac — i think that anytime anyone gets fired or goes to jail over a defense contract, regardless of how many or few, that there is something very wrong with that contract. hindsight may make it look like a good deal, but at the time you can’t anticipate factors that may make a crooked deal look better someday.
the competition was for a new tanker, not a new KC-135. the plane did not have to be the same size, shape, color, etc. as the KC-135. it just had to meet the air force’s requirements. but it turns out it did have to be the same manufacturer, at least according to congress and boeing.
testing an html fix by closing the italics.
SMSgt Mac,
It is beyond the scope & authority the GAO to comment on the relative merit of the offers. But what it has done is confirmed that the competion WAS NOT fair &/or transparent & that erros the USAF made could have affected the outcome of what was a close competition.
***
gp,
You are confusing Boeing & the GOA believing the the USAF request & process LOOKED good before the selection was announced with them now KNOWING the USAF did not live up to its responsibilities for a fair & transparent competition.
***
hank,
Yes everyone knows there was unethical actions taken by individuals during the tanker lease deal BUT that DOES NOT in ANY WAY mean that the 767 was (& still is) not the RIGHT platform.
Yes the competition was for a new tanker, not a new KC-135. BUT it IS a competition for a new tanker to replace the KC-135. The KC-135 does not need to be replaced because it is not big enough or lacks the required capacity but because the KC-135 are getting to be to expensive to operate & are quickly reaching the end of their useful lives.
***
I would also like to address AGAIN the BS that the KC-767AT offered by Boeing is a 30 year old airframe.
The 1st 737–100 rolled out in 1967 yet the 737 (now in the –600, –700,-800 & –900 models) is STILL the “hottest” selling airliner year after year after year & has hardly anything in common with the 737–100 other than name & general fuselage cross section (higth & width). Are we to fault the P-8 for being a 40+ year old airframe?
It really is pathetic how people fault the KC-767AT for being based on a 30 year old design & at the same time fault it for being as yet unflown aircraft…
Well boys and girls,
I just spent the better part of the evening reviewing the redacted ‘post-hearing’ AF legal brief (courtesy of NG’s tanker website) and I have to say that unless some heretofore unknown information is released related to the GAO’s ‘findings’, that is above and beyond ‘press release’ stature, the GAO weak-a** findings are SOLELY calculated to get the issue off their cowardly plate. (Like I need yet another reason to find the GAO useless.)
Don’t take my word for it. Get yourself a copy: http://www.americasnewtanker.com/docs/Public_Redacted_Version_AF_Post_Hearing_Brief.pdf
JJ_BPK,
Comments quoted in your own post contradict your BS. “…the GAO report points to any need for delay, AS IT WAS A REVIEW OF THE PROCESS, not the Boeing and Northrop Grumman product offerings.” It was not the GOA’s job to state any views as to the merits of the firms’ respective aircraft (in fact it is BEYOND the scope & authority of the GOA to do so — read the GOA statements, they make that fact clear).
“We recommended that the Air Force REOPEN discussions with the offerors, obtain revised proposals, RE-EVALUATE the revised proposals, and MAKE A NEW source selection decision, consistent with our decision.” What part of that do you not understand?
I will refrain from commenting of the NG BS as the majority of it is disingenuous at best.
How true, pfcern! SSgtMac does not like the outcome and, like irtusk, cannot face or handle the truth. Resultantly, the truth bearers become misinformers, propgandists, and druggees in their own uncivil eyes. Now talk about slander by those who can’t face or handle the truth (and who are truly weak-kneed).…..
Can someone explain this stuff with smaller amt. of words for people like me
Hi. In the future I’m going to keep here links to their sites. But I do not worry about the sites where my link is removed. So if you do not want to see a mountain of links, simply delete this message. After 2 weeks, I will come back and check.