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Archive for July, 2008

NATO AWACS to Afghanistan?

Thursday, July 31st, 2008

This arti­cle first appeared on Aviation Week’s Ares weblog.

The German gov­ern­ment is appar­ently start­ing dis­cus­sions on whether to polit­i­cally back a one-​​year deploy­ment of NATO E-​​3 Airborne Warning and Control System air­craft to sup­port the NATO mis­sion in Afghanistan.

But there’s con­cern the issue could cause polit­i­cal waves. According to the German weekly news mag­a­zine, Der Spiegel, the gov­ern­ment is try­ing to defer such a fight past the sum­mer recess by not tak­ing up the issue until September.

German gov­ern­ment offi­cials con­firm that senior NATO mil­i­tary lead­ers have expressed inter­est in the AWACS deploy­ment. But, they add, the request hasn’t for­mally been blessed by the alliance’s mil­i­tary com­mit­tee.

The AWACS would be used largely to man­age the large amount of NATO air traf­fic in Afghanistan, rang­ing from com­bat air­craft pro­vid­ing fire sup­port to ground troops, to logis­tics flights, to heli­copter operations.

Read the rest of this story, check out some killer Reaper pics, a sneaky read about a VTOL UAV and take a look at White Knight 2 from our Aviation Week friends at Military​.com.

– Christian

Stand By for More Counterinsurgencies

Thursday, July 31st, 2008

New National Defense Strategy posted by the Pentagon.

The BTDTs on the SCAR

Thursday, July 31st, 2008

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Well, the snake eaters have come out from their hides and begun to com­ment on yesterday’s arti­cle about a test shoot I par­tic­i­pated in with some SF Soldiers who demoed the SCAR.

Aside from the inevitable impli­ca­tion that some­how I was endors­ing the weapon myself, the gist of the upcom­ing debate seems to be lean­ing toward the idea that the oper­a­tors I inter­viewed haven’t spent enough time with the weapon and don’t know what they’re talk­ing about.

In all can­dor, I would agree. No one is going to make a defin­i­tive judg­ment on a weapon’s capa­bil­ity from one day of fir­ing. But first impres­sions are impor­tant — espe­cially if they’re the impres­sions of Soldiers who will actu­ally use the equip­ment — and that’s why I included them in an arti­cle for DT readers.

Here’s an inter­est­ing response from “CDRODA396” on the Professional Soldiers web forum:

The SCAR was orig­i­nally a SEAL require­ment, specif­i­cally they wanted a weapon that would fire imme­di­ately upon break­ing the sur­face of water, as stated above it can do.

The main impe­tus behind the SCAR has not been USASOC, which they have not helped, but the main push has been SOCOM all along. Specifically an Infantry COL who is the PM down at Tampa. More recently, the Dpty G8, USASOC (18A) has been push­ing it, going so far as to mak­ing the state­ment, “We are ready to accept the SCAR right now, and turn in our M-4’s to get it,” at the last SOCOM Weapons Integrated Product Team (IPT) meeting.

This is NOT the posi­tion held at USASFC, which is more fix its prob­lems, prove it works and then we’ll move for­ward. MG Csrnko, CG, USASFC was briefed on the SCAR about two weeks ago. The VTC included all the Groups, USASFC, USASOC and USSOCOM, mainly rep­re­sented by the O-​​6 PM.

At that meet­ing the recur­ring prob­lems, like the butt-​​stock break­ing, iden­ti­fied over three years ago as an issue, and again found most recently in April (I think it was April, maybe May) at the last User Assessment, were highlighted.

MG Csrnko asked some good ques­tions, includ­ing, and prob­a­bly most impor­tantly, has the thing really been tested in any­thing other than a “ster­ile range” envi­ron­ment, which the answer was no.

So, it has been requested by USASFC that the cur­rent “issues” get addressed, for good, and it get tested in a FTX, CTC type envi­ron­ment, being used, “like we are going to use it.” Until then, we are keep­ing the M-​​4A1.

And that’s what I know about that. 

Let’s keep track of what these guys are say­ing. I’m inter­ested to take a look at how oth­ers who’ve spent more time with the weapon feel about it. One com­menter said: “start post­ing on this thread your issues with the won­der­ful SCAR that’s about to be force fed to you in large doses…It’s time to take the SCAR to task.”

– Christian

Iran’s Natanz Tough Nut to Crack

Wednesday, July 30th, 2008

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Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak is in town this week to dis­cuss with White House and Pentagon offi­cials what to do about Irans nuclear pro­gram. Accompanying Barak is Israeli Transport Minister Shaul Mofaz; hes the for­mer IDF chief who set off a firestorm recently when he said an Israeli mil­i­tary strike against Iran is unavoid­able. Current IDF Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi was here last week and met with his Pentagon coun­ter­part, Admiral Michael Mullen. Ashkenazi report­edly said he favors a diplo­matic solu­tion, but also issued the stan­dard dec­la­ra­tion that all options must be pre­pared for stop­ping Irans nuclear program. 

There has been con­sid­er­able debate about whether Israel could even carry out an effec­tive air strike against Irans nuclear pro­gram. Analysts say there are too many fac­to­ries, labs and reac­tor sites dis­persed too widely across the coun­try. According to a 2006 paper pub­lished by two MIT doc­toral can­di­dates (one of the most thor­ough pieces of analy­sis avail­able), it would be impos­si­ble for Israel to knock out the entire Iranian nuclear pro­gram but the tar­get set could be nar­rowed to the most crit­i­cal facil­i­ties. They iden­tify the crit­i­cal nodes as: the Esfahan ura­nium con­ver­sion facil­ity, the gas cen­trifuges at the Natanz enrich­ment facil­ity and the heavy water plant and future plu­to­nium pro­duc­tion reac­tors at Arak. 

The MIT ana­lysts iden­tify Natanz as the most dif­fi­cult tar­get because much of the facil­ity is buried deep and cov­ered with lay­ers of con­crete. Israeli bombs would have to pen­e­trate the earth cov­er­ing, bore through the con­crete lay­ers and then dump enough bombs into the hole to gen­er­ate blast pres­sures that could dam­age or destroy the equip­ment inside. They fig­ure the strike pack­age would have to drop a com­bi­na­tion of roughly 24 BLU-​​109 2,000 lb. and BLU-​​113 5,000 lb. bunker busters on Natanz. The facil­i­ties at Esfahan are not buried and those at Arak are not hard­ened, so those tar­gets sets would be rel­a­tively sim­ple to destroy with no more than 24 2,000 pound GPS guided bombs. 

What does Israel have as far as deep strike weapons? The MIT folks count at least 25 F-​​15I (the Israeli ver­sion of the F-​​15E Strike Eagle) and 20–50 F-​​16I, both air­frames con­fig­ured specif­i­cally for deep strike mis­sions. Israel also has a large num­ber of F-​​16s that could be fit­ted as strike air­craft, Wild Weasel jam­ming air­craft and over 40 F-​​15A and C ver­sions to escort the bombers. Developments in pre­ci­sion tar­get­ing, specif­i­cally GPS guided bombs, means all Israeli air­craft carry bombs con­sid­er­ably more accu­rate than those used in the Osirak raid. They envi­sion a 50 plane strike pack­age evenly split between F-​​15I and F-​​16I aircraft. 

Then the ques­tion becomes how well can Iran defend its air­space. Iranian air­craft are a mix of the old and the very old. Irans most mod­ern fighter is the Mig-​​29, of which they have maybe 40. They also have a large num­ber of 1970s era F-​​4, F-​​14, F-​​5 and some newer Chinese built F-​​7M and F-​​6. Iranian fight­ers would be oper­at­ing over friendly ter­ri­tory, advan­ta­geous when they need to refuel or rearm. They could also draw on ground con­trol radar to guide them into favor­able attack posi­tions against IDF air­craft roam­ing Iranian air space. If the Iranian air­craft could get into fir­ing posi­tion against Israeli bombers, which is admit­tedly a big if, they have suf­fi­ciently mod­ern air-​​to-​​air mis­siles that they could prob­a­bly down a few. 

Its not Irans fighter jets that could pose the real chal­lenge, as the Iranian air force is more of an antique show, says David Ochmanek, an ana­lyst with RAND who directs an ongo­ing study for the U.S. Air Force that exam­ines future threats from Iran. The real threat to an attacker, he says, are Iranian surface-​​to-​​air mis­siles. There are reports that the Iranians field some of the newer Russian-​​built dou­ble digit SAMs, such as the SA-​​10, though not the newer and more potent SA-​​20 (the newer Russian des­ig­na­tion is S-​​300 and S-​​400). The S-​​300 is con­sid­ered by some accounts to be com­pa­ra­ble to the U.S.-built Patriot air defense missile.

(more…)

SCAR Demo Video

Wednesday, July 30th, 2008

Operators Test New Commando Rifle

Wednesday, July 30th, 2008

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It’s a rifle designed specif­i­cally for the spe­cial oper­a­tions com­mu­nity. Modular bar­rels, ambidex­trous con­trols, a gas-​​piston oper­at­ing sys­tem, a host of adjust­ment options — but you already know that. 

So with all the slick mar­ket­ing lan­guage and eye-​​popping spec­i­fi­ca­tions of the SOCOM Combat Assault Rifle, it’s a given that oper­a­tors will embrace the thing whole­heart­edly, right? 

Well, let’s ask them. 

“This rifle is awe­some,” said one Special Forces oper­a­tor who, like the rest of the Green Berets in this inter­view, declined to be named for secu­rity rea­sons. “It’s spot on.“ 

Now you get an idea of how the men who’ll use the weapon in com­bat felt about it, not just some six-​​figure mar­ket­ing guru spew­ing crafty catch-​​phrases. But what’s most inter­est­ing is why they liked the rifle so much. 

In an exclu­sive, Military​.com joined a group of about a dozen spe­cial oper­a­tions Soldiers from around the coun­try who trav­eled to Northern Virginia this sum­mer to test fire the SCAR before their upcom­ing deploy­ment to the Middle East. Ground rules agreed to between the spe­cial oper­a­tors, the rifle man­u­fac­turer and Military​.com pre­cluded nam­ing the unit, its mem­bers or its deploy­ment destination. 

See the Military​.com SCAR Demo Slideshow

The SCAR, which comes in a 5.56mm ver­sion and a 7.62mm one, is near­ing the end of its field user assess­ment phase — the final stage before full-​​rate pro­duc­tion and field­ing to units under U.S. Special Operations Command, includ­ing SEALs, Green Berets and Air Force Special Tactics units. 

The entry of the SCAR into the spec ops com­mu­nity comes as the ser­vices, Congress and the Pentagon scuf­fle over whether or not to replace the cur­rent M4 rifle and address per­sis­tent com­plaints over the standard-​​issued carbine’s reported lack of “stop­ping power” and its need for con­stant main­te­nance and clean­ing to avoid jams.

(more…)

Has the Chinook met its FATE?

Tuesday, July 29th, 2008

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The first Boeing CH-​​47, a 33,000lb machine pow­ered by two 1,640shp Lycoming (now Honeywell) T55 engines, achieved first flight on Sept. 21, 1961. 

Nearly 47 years and seven major upgrades later, the CH-​​47F and MH-​​47G has dou­bled in weight to 50,000lb, while the engine shaft horse­power rat­ing has tripled with intro­duc­tion of the 4,868shp T55-​​GA-​​714 powerplant. 

With only 10% of the CH-​​47F deliv­ered, how­ever, Boeing is again propos­ing to rad­i­cally increase the size of the air­frame. The “growth Chinook” would be stretched and widened to accom­mo­date and up-​​armored HMMWV (Humvee) inside the cabin. This would increase max­i­mum take­off weight to around 70,000lbs and demand a much larger engine. Honeywell has already pro­posed a roughly 6,000shp T55-​​GA-​​715.

It’s still unclear what the army thinks about all this. After all, the army is plan­ning to buy another 400 CH-​​47Fs. It’s also still debat­ing how much it needs a Joint Heavy Lift rotor­craft that would be more than twice the size of the CH-​​47F.

On top of all this, the army has also started a pro­gram to replace the ven­er­a­ble T55 with an all new engine in the 6,000shp to 7,000shp range after 2018. Last week, I con­firmed that Honeywell, Pratt & Whitney and General Electric are each par­tic­i­pat­ing in the ear­li­est stages of the Future Affordable Turbine Engine (FATE) program.

(more…)

New PLA Armor and Mech. Infantry Brigade Structures

Tuesday, July 29th, 2008

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The Soviet Operational Manoeuvre Group in 1986 was look­ing at cre­at­ing a ‘Shock Division’ of three reg­i­ments, with each reg­i­ment con­tain­ing two tank and two mech­a­nised infantry bat­tal­ions. Armoured divi­sions are too unwieldy in com­plex ter­rain and an armoured bat­tle group (bat­tal­ion sized) is eas­ier to con­trol and exe­cute its mission. 

The Peoples Liberation Army, fol­low­ing on from their expe­ri­ence with the Operational Manoeuvre Group, can now deploy the new mech­a­nised infantry divi­sion and using mod­u­lar forces have cre­ated a com­pos­ite cav­alry brigade for use in com­plex terrain. 

Utilising the deep oper­a­tion the­ory, they can employ am air mech­a­nised and/​or fast wheeled force as a ‘lance’ fol­lowed up by the mobile force (tank heavy) to exploit the breach in an ene­mys defences fol­lowed by a hold­ing force (heavy mech­a­nised), that is the dozer blade. 

An arti­cle in the 1/​2008 issue of Tanke Zhuangjia Cheliang (Tank and Armoured Vehicle) is titled ‘News From Overseas– Chinese Built Many Light Type Mechanised Units.’ The arti­cle was writ­ten to cor­rect the mis­takes that appear in non-​​Chinese media about the struc­ture and equip­ment of these new light mech­a­nised units. 

The mech­a­nised infantry brigade has four mech­a­nised infantry bat­tal­ions, one armoured bat­tal­ion, one fire sup­port bat­tal­ion, one engi­neer bat­tal­ion and one com­mu­ni­ca­tion bat­tal­ion. Each mech­a­nised infantry bat­tal­ion has three mech­a­nised infantry com­pa­nies, each of three pla­toons with each com­pany hav­ing 13 infantry fight­ing vehi­cles; four in each pla­toon and one head­quar­ters vehicle. 

Each armoured brigade has four armoured bat­tal­ions for a total of 132 main bat­tle tanks, one mech­a­nised infantry bat­tal­ion, one artillery bat­tal­ion with 18 self-​​propelled guns and one air defence bat­tal­ion of 18 AAA guns. Each armoured bat­tal­ion has three armoured com­pa­nies, each of three pla­toons with each com­pany hav­ing 11 main bat­tle tanks; three in each pla­toon and two head­quar­ters vehi­cles. A com­plete brigade con­tains 4,000 soldiers.

(more…)

Polmar on Sinking the Zumwalt

Tuesday, July 29th, 2008

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While no “final” deci­sion has been revealed, the indi­ca­tions “inside the Beltway” are that the Navy’s long-​​gestating DDG 1000 Zumwalt–class destroyer pro­gram will end with only two ships.  Indeed, there are also rumors that even those two ships will not be constructed. 

Contracts have already been awarded for the first two destroy­ers — autho­rized in the fis­cal year 2007 bud­get — to General Dynamics/​Bath Iron Works (Maine) and to Northrop Grumman (Pascagoula, Mississippi). Originally the Navy planned a class of 32 of these DDGs, but, as pre­vi­ously reported here, last year the Navy cut the pro­gram to seven ships, although the 32-​​ship require­ment was still “on the books.”  

The Navy’s lead­er­ship, both uni­formed and civil­ian, has been lack­lus­ter in its sup­port of the DDG 1000 class. Indeed, the cur­rent Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Gary Roughead, when recently asked by Congress what he believed the new ships’ most impor­tant fea­ture would be, he told of the reduced man­ning for the ships. 

The new “destroy­ers” are to have a full-​​load dis­place­ment of almost 15,000 tons and an over­all length of 600 feet — the dimen­sions of a cruiser by most stan­dards. Armed with two 155-​​mm rapid-​​fire guns (with a range of more than 75 miles fir­ing guided pro­jec­tiles) and 80 Standard and Tomahawk mis­siles or their equiv­a­lent, and fit­ted with a large manned– and unmanned heli­copter facil­ity, the ships would be highly capa­ble, mul­ti­pur­pose units. 

The price has become a “deal breaker” for some involved in the ship­build­ing process. The Navy esti­mates that the first two ships will cost $3.3 bil­lion each, with follow-​​on ships to cost $2.5 bil­lion.  This com­pares to the last of the 62 Arleigh Burke (DDG 51) destroy­ers hav­ing a cost some $1.2 bil­lion each.

(more…)

What do you Think…?

Monday, July 28th, 2008

Over the past sev­eral months, this blog has car­ried a num­ber of posts on the efforts of the United States to pre­pare for and defend against a cyber attack or war. In addi­tion, we have posted pro­files of other nations and groups who are adver­saries of the U.S. and are build­ing cyber attack capa­bil­i­ties. In May, U.S. Strategic Command ref­er­enced one of our posts in its tes­ti­mony before Congress. The hear­ing was about the secu­rity and eco­nomic sit­u­a­tion as it relates to China.

All this is based on open source intel­li­gence cou­pled with input from con­tacts through­out the global secu­rity and intel­li­gence com­mu­ni­ties. Given the vast read­er­ship this blog has seen, we thought it pru­dent to assess your feel­ings on the state of readi­ness of the United States for a cyber con­flict. You will be able to view the results as you vote.

Kevin Coleman