Colin still on the case…
That rasping sound you hear is the cumulative grinding of teeth from Boeing and its supporters in the wake of yesterdays announcement of a rebid on the tanker contract.
They are worried and we all know we grind our teeth when were worried because the Pentagons basic criteria for the plane apparently will not change when the new request for proposal is issued. The clearest expression of Boeings unhappiness came late yesterday from that bellwether of Boeing sentiment, Rep. Norm Dicks (D-Wash.), who has and will fight relentlessly for the company to get at least some part of the KC-X tanker money.
The press release Dicks put out yesterday said he “has serious doubts about the ability of the Defense Department to conduct a renewed competition that is fair and open and that meets the ‘real world’ requirements of refueling U.S. military aircraft.”
Dicks spoke yesterday morning with John Young, undersecretary of Defense for acquisition, technology and logistics, and was told that the criteria for the new tanker will favor a larger tanker from the outset, assigning additional credit to a bigger plane. That is a no-no for Boeing supporters, who say that the requirement for a larger plane unfairly skews the competition in Northrop Grummans favor.
“Last month the GAO issued a report that was unusually critical of the tanker selection process conducted by the Air Force for unfairly favoring a tanker that was larger than needed, most costly to maintain and that would require substantial amounts of construction money for new facilities,” Dicks said in the press release. “In its harshly-worded report, the GAO said that the Air Force failed to evaluate proposals based on its stated requirements and it demonstrated favorable treatment toward the EADS/Northrop Grumman A-330 tanker over Boeings KC-767.”
[Read more of Colin’s analysis at DoD Buzz.]
– Christian
{ 85 comments… read them below or add one }
Glad you noticed as well. It’s why I sat out yesterday’s comments session. Sweet eh? PITA we have to go through this, but it is fascinating to watch just to see how far Boeing and its minions will go to corrupt the whole system. If you have a chance, read the complete press conference transcript. There’s some nuggets in there.
Which way do you think the relative risk element score has gone since initial contract award, seeing as the KC-45′s boom testing has moved right along and the second ariframe is now built?
It is fascinating to watch just to see how far NG/EADS & its minions will go to corrupt the whole system.
To pfcem:
So by corrupting the test you mean they went to the Department of Defense, made sure the requirements were exactly the same, laughed and went home considering that the KC-767 didn’t win with those criteria last time?
Face it, there has been little good news for Boeing in the contract as of late and you know it. Most of their wins have come from aircraft originally built by companies they have swallowed up or partnered with. Perhaps they need to wake themselves up and produce a better aircraft. They have the know-how to do so, the question is why haven’t they put out a plane that blows NG-EADS out of the park? The answer? It would lower their bottom line.
I am not a fan of EADS, I am a fan of Boeing, but here, they are the losers in the whole fight. I have had it with Boeing and their allies. Especially after watching Boeing continue to work on the newest radio system that is still many times overbudget and behind schedule. Tell Boeing to pull their head out of their fourht point of contact and design the better plane, otherwise suck it up and get the 787 out and produced.
Department of Defense Briefing Transcript
http://www.scribd.com/doc/3880961/DoD-Tanker-Rebid-Brief-9-July
Only one way to solve this.
Monkey knife fight.
This link has some good info on Boeing’s complaints :
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/kc-x-protest.htm
Ed,
What are you talking about? What TEST? Have you even read what the GOA has said – that had it not been for the errors made Boeing COULD HAVE WON?
The KC-767AT DOES blow the KC-30 out of the park when you eveluate the two honestly based on REAL WORLD USAF tanker operations. The KC-767AT is/was tailor made for USAF tanker operations. The KC-767AT had 98 positive discriminators & only one weakness vs only 30 positive discriminators & five weakness for the KC-30. The KC-767AT met or exceeded all Key Performance Parameters (incuding every requirement for aireal refueling & airlift capability). Do I really need to go on & on & on with all the advatages the KC-767AT has over the KC-30? Don’t forget that when the USAF corrected for mathematical errors that were made the most probable life-cycle cost for the KC-767AT was LOWER than that for the KC-30 (if corrected for the flawed methodology, the relative cost of the KC-767AT would be even lower vs the KC-30).
You do realize tha overbudget and behind schedule is the NORM nowadays & not unique to Boeing don’t you?
I understand the commonality, spare parts availability argument and all, BUT I just fail to understand why Boeing doesn’t just throw a trip-7 variant up? It would win hands down on all categories.
Have you even read what the GOA has said – that had it not been for the errors made Boeing COULD HAVE WON?
PFCEM, It does not say that Boeing would’ve won, get your facts straight. It’s funny how the EADS tanker is outselling the Boeing tanker in the international Market. The UK, Australia, Saudi Arabia, and UAE seem to think that the EADS tanker is superior to Boeing’s. I think the AIR FORCE knows what it needs to best equip the warfighter, not congress.
I got to hand it to Boeing’s PR machine, they’ve manage to make everyone believe that an aircraft built in Mobile, AL with General Electric engines is foriegn. How stupid is congress? really.
> Have you even read what the GOA has said – that had it not been for the errors made Boeing COULD HAVE WON?
and?
if those errors are fixed NG/EADS COULD WIN AGAIN!
> The KC-767AT DOES blow the KC-30 out of the park when you eveluate the two honestly based on REAL WORLD USAF tanker operations.
which is why the USAF courageously resisted all political pressure to choose the CLEARLY superior KC-30
> The KC-767AT is/was tailor made for USAF tanker operations.
it was an extreme last-ditch effort to keep the 767 within striking distance of the KC-30
> The KC-767AT met or exceeded all Key Performance Parameters (incuding every requirement for aireal refueling & airlift capability).
we don’t know that
sure Boeing CLAIMS they did, but until their bid is subjected to the same GAO scrutiny as the NG/EADS bid, we just don’t know
> Do I really need to go on & on & on with all the advatages the KC-767AT has over the KC-30?
yes, because honestly, there aren’t any worthwhile one
in the core refuelling mission the KC-30 is clearly superior
in the secondary cargo mission the KC-30 is far far superior
all other ‘discriminators’ are minor after those two
> Don’t forget that when the USAF corrected for mathematical errors that were made the most probable life-cycle cost for the KC-767AT was LOWER than that for the KC-30
and if they HONESTLY looked at the big picture to account for the savings of not having to use piggish C-17s for everything, they would find the KC-30 once again on top for overall cost savings
C-Low,
Boeing didn’t offer a “KC-777″ because a KC-767 is a better tanker to replace the KC-135s. Now if (as it has been speculated) that the KC-Y program may be intended to replace the KC-10s then a KC-777 would be a wise choice indeed (although there is a lot of “talk” that the preferred platform would be a BWB).
***
Chris, I didn’t say the GAO said Boeing WOULD have won, I said the GAO said Boeing COULD have won – slight difference. :)
Its funny how people who know NOTHING about USAF tanker operations & requirements bring up the UK, Australia, Saudi Arabia & UAE. The UK, Australia, Saudi Arabia & UAE are not the USAF & they have significantly different operational requirements from the USAF – PLUS, if they get it wrong (not saying they did), they can still reply of the good old USAF to cover them (assuming of course that the US doesn’t get it wrong too). Want to place any bets on how “fair & transparent” any of their selection processes were? ;)
Yes the USAF DOES know what it needs to best equip the warfighter better than ANY outside infuences (including Congress) & that is why it chose the KC-767 the 1st time around.
I got to hand it to EADS’s PR machine, they’ve managed to fool far to many people that an Airbus PRODUCED A330-200 transformed into a tanker during FINAL ASSEMBLY in Mobile, AL with General Electric engines isn’t foriegn. Note I am just demonstrating the absurdity of your comment by switching it around. The fact that you made such a statement demonstrates that you do not understand the complexity of the situation.
> Yes we do know that the KC-767AT met or exceeded all Key Performance Parameters (KPP), the Agency [KC-X source selection evaluation team] said so
they said the same thing about the NG/EADS bid
> Proposal Risk: call it a tie
NG/EADS is going to move ahead in a rebid with more time to prove their boom
> Cost/Price: KC-767AT CLEARLY superior Most Probable Life Cycle Cost (MPLCC)
clearly superior?
1. the difference was miniscule. if you’re going to call proposal risk a tie, you have to call this a tie too
2. in the real world, the KC-30 would offload more work from the fuel-pig knows as the C-17 and result in more REAL WORLD savings
> [major alterations to the model had to be made just in order for the KC-30 to be competative]
no, the model was designed with the KC-135 in mind and thus alterations had to be made to accomodate the different size of the KC-30. there is nothing wrong with this
NOTE THE GAO FOUND NO ISSUE WITH THIS
> Tailor making a tanker for USAF tanker operations was NOT an extreme last-ditch effort it is what one is SUPPOSED to do (& shows a much greater willingness to give the customer what it wants rather than what the offerer wants to give the customer).
for some reason they felt no need to do what they were SUPPOSED to do or give the customer what it wanted UNTIL they were forced into a REAL competition with the KC-30
when they felt guaranteed the sweetheart lease deal, they were perfectly content to shovel crap down the AF’s throat
when they realized they would actually have to COMPETE in a REAL contest, it was blatantly obvious the KC-767 was never going to even be on the same tier as the KC-30 unless they completely redid it
which is what they did (at least on the drawing board anyways)
if nothing else, the American people should be grateful to NG/EADS for forcing Boeing to get off their lazy butts and actually produce a better tanker
> If the KC-767 lease deal had gone through, Boeing & the USAF would have continued to develope the platform which could very well have resulted in something VERY similar to the KC-767AT
not a chance in hell
once they had the contract there is no way they would have gone through the risk and expense of developing an entirely new model
sure they may have fiddled with the avionics or something, but the airframe would have been locked in
> The KC-767AT Boeing offered for the KC-X program is not a fundamentally different aircraft from what it offered for the tanker lease program
::jawdrop::
um, yes, yes it is. completely new model, far better capabilities, fundamentally different
> In the PRIMARY refuelling mission the KC-767AT is clearly superior when evaluated under REAL WORLD consitions & operations.
where ‘real world’ = ‘your imagination’
> In the SECONDARY cargo mission the KC-767AT met or exceeded all requirements (the KC-30 did not)
which requirements did the KC-30 not meet?
> EVERYTHING that the KC-30 would transport (troops, pallets or medical patients) can be transported by KC-767AT
true (more or less)
> the VAST MAJORITY of the time, the KC-767AT would have sufficient capacity to meet the need
false
the AF has an insatiable appetite for pallet haulers
you provide the capacity and the AF will stuff it full
having more capacity results in greater fuel efficiency and fewer crew required (only have to fly 2 missions instead of 3)
> Tankers make for less than 2% of total airlift & even if you were to increase that FIVE FOLD it would still be less than 10%
maybe in weight, but transports often cube out before they hit weight limits, let us examine the current fleet
‘strategic’ transports (ie not C-130/C-27J)
C-5: 36 pallets * 111 = 3996 pallet spots
C-17: 18 pallets * 190 = 3420 pallet spots
KC-10: 27 pallets * 59 = 413 pallet spots
KC-767: 19 pallets * 179 = 3401 pallet spots
KC-30: 32 pallets * 179 = 5728 pallet spots
KC-135: 6 pallets, but i’m not going to include it because apparently its cargo handling system is so atrocious they never use it except in dire emergencies
notional kc-30 win: 13557 total pallet spots, 5728/13557 = 42% of all pallet spots
notional kc-767 win: 11230 total pallet spots, 3401/11230 = 30% of all pallet spots
whatever wins KC-X will make up a very substantial fraction of the airforce’s airlift capability
BTW the difference of 2327 pallet spots is equivalent to 122 C-17s
having another 122 C-17s worth of capacity for basically the same price is a big deal
yes i realize they aren’t exactly equivalent to the C-17, but every C-17 it can free up from pallet hauling is another C-17 available for heavy/bulky equipment that can’t be shipped otherwise
and every C-17 pallet run it can eliminate reduces the wear on the C-17 fleet
plus it’s a huge advantage in fuel savings
a mission that would have taken 2 C-17s plus 2 tankers can now be accomplished with a single plane with no tanker support
that sort of savings isn’t even counted in the RFP, but it should be
> Boeing didn’t offer a “KC-777″ because a KC-767 is a better tanker to replace the KC-135s
boeing didn’t offer the KC-777 for numerous reasons
1. they wanted to keep the obsolete 767 line going
2. they had plenty of commercial customers for the 777 and didn’t want to displace them to make room for military production
3. it wouldn’t have been ready in time to meet the deadlines specified in the RFP
4. its risk rating would have shot through the roof since they have done no work on a tanker variant of the 777 unlike all the previous work they have done for the 767
5. while cost isn’t a huge deal to the airforce, it’s cost would be SUBSTANTIALLY higher than the KC-767, which already costs more than the KC-30
6. it’s questionable if it could have met the takeoff requirements
> Yes the USAF DOES know what it needs to best equip the warfighter better than ANY outside infuences
i’m glad you support their decision to select the KC-30
> that is why it chose the KC-767 the 1st time around.
no, they said they chose the KC-767 the first time because congress told them to
when they actually got to run a competition, they chose the KC-30, despite all the political pressure from President on down
that should tell you something
> fool far to many people that an Airbus PRODUCED A330-200 transformed into a tanker during FINAL ASSEMBLY in Mobile, AL with General Electric engines isn’t foriegn
when 60% of the value stays in America, you can’t call it foreign
call it ‘assembly’ or whatever you want, but the bottom line is the money stays here
PFCEM says Yes the USAF DOES know what it needs to best equip the warfighter better than ANY outside infuences (including Congress) & that is why it chose the KC-767 the 1st time around.
-this guy just keeps making an A-$-$ out of himself. Northrup/EADS DID NOT BID the first time around (what a moron)
I am just demonstrating the absurdity of your comment by switching it around. The fact that you made such a statement demonstrates that you do not understand the complexity of the situation.
-You sound just as desperate as Boeing does, I have no connection to Boeing or Northrup either way, If Boeing put out a better Tanker I would be all for it. You are just as blind to the facts (which you prove over and over again in your silly post). You obviously seem like someone who has no concept of this tanker competition, I understand not everyone does, it’s okay, But when you come on here acting like you really know what you are saying , well, you just make a fool out of yourself. Just about everyone on here looks it this pretty objectively., you on the other hand come off like a biased Boeing homer.
pfcem you need to cool off buddy, go have a cold drink of water just don’t let the seat hit you on the back of the head again
Only one small comment, the US Air Force may know what it needs for the US Air Force the best, but let’s not throw the all encompassing “warfighter” term into the fray. War-fighters is a term that encompasses all military forces and thank goodness the Air Farce doesn’t make decisions for the Marine Corps, because it doesn’t have a clue what the Marine Corps, Navy, or Army needs.
[QUOTE]Northrup/EADS DID NOT BID the first time around (what a moron)[/QUOTE]
There is no U in Northrop, only the Grumman part. Before you call people “moron” maybe you should ensure that all YOUR facts are exact..also resorting to name calling to make a point is quite JUVENILE.
One thing is sure: the KC135 will still fly in a lot of years…
Transcript of July 10th House Armed Services Committee hearing.
http://www.scribd.com/doc/3906515/HASC-HEARING-TRANSCRIPT-10-July-08
I have only had time to do a quick readthough. Some very telling stuff & some very pathetic & concerning stuff as well.
irtusk,
The Agency [KC-X source selection evaluation team] had concerns about the KC-30 &/or the NG/EADS team meeting some requirements but “gave them a pass” & the GOA ruled that the Agency did not provide sufficent justification for doing so.
There is A LOT more “proposal risk” than just those related to the NG/EADS boom.
Yes the KC-767AT MPLCC is clearly superior. Even without the Agency correcting its flawed methodoligy, the KC-767AT was less costly when the calculations were corrected. IF you use proper methodology (& numbers) the MPLCC difference is TENS OF BILLIONS OF DOLLARS.
In the real world, the KC-30 would offload NO more work from the C-17 then the KC-767AT – you have ZERO understanding of what role tankers play in airlift.
NO, the the model was NOT designed with the KC-135 (OR ANY SPECIFIC PLATFORM) in mind. It was designed with REAL WORLD conditions in mind. Alterations had to be made to accomodate the different size of the KC-30 becuase under REAL WORLD condition large tankers like the KC-30 are non-copetative. That is why the TRS-05 & MRS-05 determined that the USAF needed x number of KC-135R equivalent rather than KC-10A equivalent tankers. Large tankers have their purposes – SUPPLIMENTING small/medium tankers in specific roles (such as an air bridge) NOT replacing them as the primary in theater operations tankers.
You lack of understanding of the proces is truly pathetic. We were going to get something similar to the KC-767AT from Boeing EVENTUALLY (likely sooner than under the KC-X program) but at the time of the tanker lease such an aircraft would not be much of a possibility withing the time & cost constraints of the tanker lease.
The KC-30 failed to meet all elements of the KPP#4 THRESHOLD.
Amazingly enough the USAF has had enough cargo capacilty with the KC-135 but thanke for once agaisnt demonstating that you do not understand REAL WORLD operations. :)
Whatever wins KC-X will make up a very SMALL fraction (single digit %) of the US’s airlift operations.
The problem is that ignorant people like yourself looik at the numbers wihtout an understanding of what the numbers actually mean & how they actually relate to operations. The KC-767AT carries as many 463L pallets (19 vs 18) and roughly TWICE as many troops (197 vs 102) &/or patient litters (97 vs 48) as the C-17 for gods sake. The KC-X is SUPPOSED to be a TANKER 1st & an airlifter 2nd. So why the HELL does ANYBODY think the KC-X has to be more of a troops, pallets &/or patient litters airlifter than the C-17!
RE: Boeing’s swing-and-a-miss “They have the know-how to do so, the question is why haven’t they put out a plane that blows NG-EADS out of the park?”
Ahhhhhh.. That’s the REAL question isn’t it? The short answer is they didn’t think they had to do so. The slightly longer answer is if you look at competing product lines, the B767-A330 niche is about the ONLY place where Boeing’s lineup doesn’t kick EADS butt, and Boeing made a deliberate business decision to stretch the 767 to fill it instead of shrinking a 777. Their reasons made perfect business sense for the commercial market. Along comes this competition, and suddenly, the cabin/cargo volume and fuel tank equation for a military cargo/tanker customer swings the advantage well over to the A330 column.
Enough already, Boeing you lost get over it. The whole military-government contract procedure is a joke.
and thank you pfecm, for confirming that all your whining basically comes down to “it’s not fair the KC-30 received extra credit for being better”
my prediction: the RFP will get redone to more explicitly give extra credit for what the AF feels is worthy of extra credit
Boeing will protest saying “That’s not fair, because those extra credit provisions pre-ordain the obviously superior KC-30 as the winner”
and they will get slapped down with “well submit the 777 if you dare”
SMSgt Mac,
A bit of a mischaracterization there. Airbus saw a growing need for something larger than the 767 but smaller than the 777. Yes it was a VERY good business decision as Airbus had thus far (at the time – no 747-X vs A380 at that time) not done well trying to go head-to-head with Boeing. And as it turned out that particular larger than 767 but smaller than 777 niche grew tremedously. Airbus SHOULD be commented for seeing & seazing on that.
Your correlation between commercial (free market) airline industry & military operations is incorrect. The military does not get profits from its operations. No significant “market segment” exists in the US military for a tanker which is larger than the KC-10 yet carries only 21.8% more fuel than the KC-135R & only 69.1% of the fuel as the KC-10. Compared to the KC-767, the KC-30 carries the same 21.8% greater fuel compared to the KC-135R yet requires a >25% greater take-off weight to do so. Hell if a KC-30 were to take-off with the same fuel load as a KC-767 (because the airfield could not support greater weight or because the mission required a specific load) it would STILL have a greater take-off weight (~23% with 100,000 lbs of fuel to ~17% with 200,000 lbs of fuel).
And another thing the anti-Boeing/KC-767 pro-EADS/KC-30 crowed fail to realize is that while a tanker airlift capacity is useful at specific times & for specific reasons (AS LONG AS THEY DO NOT INTERFER WITH THE PRIMARY MISSION OF AERIAL REFUELING) is just how much of an airlift capacity. The KC-767AT carries as many 463L pallets (19 vs 18) and roughly TWICE as many troops (197 vs 102) &/or patient litters (97 vs 48) as the C-17 for gods sake. Thats right, for the type of cargo tankers are even ever used for the KC-767AT has GREATER capacity than the C-17. So why would ANYONE think you would need more?
> yet requires a >25% greater take-off weight to do so
there isn’t a direct relationship between weight and fuel efficiency
the KC-30 has more efficient aerodynamics (one of the advantages of being a newer design), thus even though it may weight 25% more, the difference in fuel economy is closer to 10%
> So why would ANYONE think you would need more?
because the AF has an insatiable demand for pallet haulers?
because carrying more pallets in one flight is more efficient than using multiple flights?
because this results in REAL WORLD savings?
because the difference in capacity between the KC-30 and the KC-767 over 179 planes is equivalent to 122 C-17s?
seriously, if someone offered another 122 C-17s worth of capacity for free, why wouldn’t you take it?
> In the case of the KC-30 vs the KC-767AT, the disadvantages of being bigger FAR outway the advantages
nope
> and if it is, how often under real-world operations do the conditions occur where the additional capacity is needed or of significant benefit
pretty much everyday as we’re constantly flying C-17s across the Atlantic loaded with pallets, which is a massive, massive waste of both fuel and precious C-17 airframe life
> Unfortunately for that type of mission the KC-30 falls WAY short of the KC-10
1. the KC-X isn’t replacing the KC-10, it’s replacing the KC-135
2. there are only 59 KC-10s in service vs 179 KC-X, they can’t be everywhere
> extra CAPACITY DOES NOT NECESSARILY translate to SUPERIORITY for the USAF
not necessarily, but in this case it does
> But it IS against the rules of the solicitation as the RFP was written
which i’m sure they’ll correct for the new RFP ;)
> as even Mr. Young points out you have to BALANCE capacity against/with the other requirements & against/with the costs (& not just ecomomic costs) you pay for the additional/extra capacity.
sure, but when the KC-30 actually has a LOWER flyaway cost and it is so much more capable on the cargo front, it becomes the hands-down winner
I hereby proclaim ‘pfcem’ “King of the Strawman-building Do-loopers”
RE: “Airbus saw a growing need for something larger than the 767 but smaller than the 777. Yes it was a VERY good business decision as Airbus had thus far (at the time – no 747-X vs A380 at that time) not done well trying to go head-to-head with Boeing. And as it turned out that particular larger than 767 but smaller than 777 niche grew tremedously. Airbus SHOULD be commented for seeing & seazing on that.”
You miss the point [again]. I think Airbus’ decision was a no-brainer. It was Boeing’s decision that was smart. Airbus was in a completely reactive, not pro-active mode. VERY early in the 757-767-777 family development, the 777 was conceived to be a four-engine concept because of perceived restrictions on two engine aircraft for overwater operations. Boeing brilliantly changed the game by for all practical purposes creating the ETOPS paradigm and dragging the FAA et al along for the ride. This caused EADS to howl vis a vis over the edge the twin engine 777 had over their A340. The A330 was conceived with a high fuselage volume because it was designed to sharing the fuselage structure of the larger A340. It did poorly in sales until the shortened A330-200 hit a market sweetspot.
RE: “Your correlation between commercial (free market) airline industry & military operations is incorrect. The military does not get profits from its operations. No significant “market segment” exists in the US military for a tanker which is larger than the KC-10 yet carries only 21.8% more fuel than the KC-135R & only 69.1% of the fuel as the KC-10.”
Stop putting words in people’s mouths. The AF is looking for ‘capability’ to replace the KC-135. The A330 has the short-field performance with higher gross weights than the B767. The A330′s greater cabin and fuselage volume allow more of everything the AF needs to haul than the the B767 out of those same short fields.
I have noticed that you are playing fast and loose with the numbers. Your repeated regurgitations of the 463L pallet numbers is a clumsy attempt to gloss over the “unconvienient truth” that while the KC767 will carry one more 463L pallet, the KC45 will carry 14 other pallets of a different type. D’ya think maybe,just maybe, those 14 other pallets might represent just a teensy bit more cargo-capability than one lousy 463L?
In a search for originality, I also see that you set up another strawman, now bringing in the C-17 as a factor to be considered and compared against. I won’t pick you apart on your poor argument at this time except to quote you: “So why would ANYONE think you would need more?”. That one statement there highlights your unfathomable depths of ignorance on all things logistical more than any other.
you also expose yourself as an irrational B767 fanboy by your selective use of the GAO findings when it suits your purpose, and dismissing the GAO concurrence with the AF when it doesn’t, by simply calling it “a lie”.
Remember I told you when it happened to enjoy the ‘GAO punt’ while you could. Hope you did, because that warm feeling may not be coming back.
Wasn’t it Sen. Tom Dashel’s wife who screwed the pooch back in 2000 when her lobbying group tried to push that overpriced lease agreement between boeing and the AF? And then the contract got out of hand and the price sky rocketed?
Remember too that the 767 can also operate from smaller airfield than the Airbus. I’m talking about the footprint not length of runway. I see both sides in this dispute.
1) From Human Events.com:
Let
From United States House of Representatives, House Armed Services Committee
Hearing Informmation 2007 – 2008
Thursday, July 10, 2008 – 2:00 pm – 2118 Rayburn – Open
The Air and Land Forces Subcommittee will meet to hear testimony on the source selection and path forward regarding the Air Force KC-(X) Program.
- Subcommittee Chairman Abercrombie
pfcem: I’ll type slow so you can keep up.
You had written: Your correlation between commercial (free market) airline industry & military operations is incorrect. The military does not get profits from its operations. No significant “market segment” exists in the US military for a tanker which is blah blah blah…
And in response I did not set up a market ‘corrolary’. I drew a CONTRAST between a commercial market need and what the military need might be, pointing out the extra volume and lifting capability of the A330 was a benefit that the military could capitalize on more than a commercial PAX enterprise.
Your repeated regurgitation of Boeing’s ‘medium’ claim is STILL Boeing nonsense.
As to who knows what about tanker operations, I’m guessing I’m the only one between the two of us to have ever been actually paid a salary to look at the question of tanker demand based upon receiving aircraft performance and basing. YOU reveal your manifest ignorance when you start spouting off wingspan x length dimensions, when it has been clearly established that ramp space is NOT the limiting factor in the basing options. And even the GAO’s pathetic PUNT intimated the only thing they really had a problem with on basing was how the AF handled the storage of the PAX seats, which if the AF had to could put in a portable shelter fer cryin’ out loud. Here’s a tip for you: look at wheelbase, track, and psi as the limiting aspects of the ramp footprint.
Because your grotesqely simplistic characterization of the relationship between airfield suitability and aircraft gross weight is getting pretty tiresome, I’m going to help you out here. Get a copy of AF pamphlet 76-2 if you can find one and read it. I don’t know if it is still in effect, but the methodology in it is still valid. Every aircraft gets a Load Classification Number, and weight is only PART of the equation. I’m certain if there was a problem with the KC-45 LCN with respect to available airfields, we would have been hearing a lot more about it.
Quote all of the Boeing chorus girls you want, their song is still off-key. It isn’t even in harmony with the GAO report.
XML: Gee, anyone can cut and paste. Here’s something for you I got from an NG friend. Didn’t think it all that interesting, until you felt compelled to repeat Handy’s latest.
“In my humble opinion, the greatest need is a little more strategic-capable aircraft…I’m saying that the need is more in the KC-10-like aircraft.– General Handy, 3 August 2005, Aerospace Daily and Defense.
Want More? How about:
‘The August, 2005 Aerospace Daily and Defense Report story noted that Handy believed the best way forward with new tankers was “supplementing its large-tanker fleet” because each of those aircraft “carries almost twice as much fuel as a KC-135,” the tanker that the Air Force is looking to replace.’
So which Handy do we believe? The retired one we hear now, or the one who in 2005 was “Commander of the U.S. Transportation Command and the Air Force’s Air Mobility Command” and thus responsible for the tanker force?
Just askin’
I have an idea, why don’t we all agree to argue from this day forward until the next actual development in the story only on things directly related to those points that the GAO had a beef with the AF on? That way we can cut down on all the Boeing misdirection and keep to the meat of the matter.
To all of those who think the ability to carry 100+ medical litters is something that is truly important and should be something that the bidders should be rated on, please name ONE time in the entire history of the United States Air Force where it needed that capacity. I’m not talking about a planned usage, I’m talking about actual litters that needed to be air transported at one time on one plane. Guess what – it has never happened. And if it ever does, the Air Force has plenty of C-17s that can handle the job. And if the C-17s cannot handle the job, the Air Force paid plenty of money to civilian carriers to modify their aircraft as litter carriers for inclusion into the Civilian Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF). Guess which aircraft the CRAF relies on the most for litter carrying – the Boeing 767…
As for passenger/cargo carrying, another waste. The number of missions a refueler will be carrying passengers or cargo pales in comparison to the real mission – refueling aircraft. You are not going to divert a tanker to go pick up pax or cargo weh there is refueling to be done.
Amount of fuel available to offload – another red herring. How many times does a KC-135 off-load its entire load of available fuel (excluding its own reserves)? Again – very rarely does it happen. So, why have a bigger plane waste more fuel flying around fuel that is not needed?
Arby, as a groundpower advocate, I can see a major advantage in downloading fuel from a KC-45 to a C-17 that lands on a 3,000′ runway to offload fuel to large tanker trucks and fuel bladders.
Add to that the KC-45′s ability to be refueled from another KC-45, and you could have one refueler and one C-17 on station performing the continuous fuel resupply mission while other KC-45s ferried fuel to the aircraft on station. I read that the KC-45 can remain on station nearly indefinitely by getting fuel from other aircraft, but even a shorter 18 hour stint with one or two C-17s would be sufficient to replenish the needs of early air-deploying ground forces.
Once the initial deployment air bridge is well underway, it’s easy to envision hundreds of KC-45s carrying 363L pallets overseas, perhaps with a mix of fuel and pallets. Every KC-45 carrying pallets means a C-17 that can carry outsized and oversized cargo/equipment/vehicles and land on smaller airstrips.
Finally, when I read about KC-X replacing KC-135Es now through 2024, and KC-Y replacing 59 KC-10s and more 135Es through 2036, something strikes me as odd:
179 KC-X KC-767s + 195 KC-Y 767s tankers = 74,800 lbs of fuel capacity
Current 315 KC-135E and 59 KC-10 have 84,000 lbs of fuel capacity.
So clearly, with a KC-767 purchase, KC-Y must be a bigger unknown aircraft just to break even with current capability. That means two future aircraft types…which is one argument being used against a split buy, due to parts/training, etc.
If we bought a 60/40 split buy for both KC-X and KC-Y and it ended up being half KC-767 and half KC-45, those 374 tankers would have over 83K lbs of fuel capacity to nearly equal today’s total. Add an additional KC-767/KC-45 mix of KC-Z tankers, and we surpass today’s total…with just two aircraft types….both produced in the U.S. The economies of scale, manufacturing infrastructure, and part supplier constancy of two aircraft from the get go, vs. one medium and one larger, more costlier aircraft would in the long run likely compensate for fewer aircraft built annually by each manufacturer.
Of course if you bought all KC-45s we would be well over today’s capacity, but what are the political chances of that happening?? ;)
The fuel totals below need to be multiplied by one thousand. Orginally I scribbled “K” after the calculations but didn’t transcribe it.
RE: Parking & ramp space/weight IS the limiting factor in the basing options.
Your gyros are drifting. At SOME airfields ramp space/weight are limiting factors. It doesn’t make them THE limiting factors, because the network of airfields has to be viewed as a system. Just because Tanker 1 may be too heavy for Airfield A, it may not have an operational impact if Tanker 1 can use Airfield B instead. Differences between KC767 and KC-45 capabilities means ramp space in particular is relatively trivial compared to LCN. And weight plays a larger role in LCN than ramp weight for most airfields.
RE: General Handy DID NOT say we need to replace our KC-135 fleet with a “KC-10-like aircraft”
Is it physically impossible for you to write WITHOUT creating a Strawman? NO ONEsaid he did!
I openly quoted a quote, and now you helpfully (a first!) looked up an Av Week article that also had essentially (maybe exactly) same story. As a former long-time subscriber of both Av Week and Defense Daily, I know the same story does not always gets edited the same way in both publications. But that is only material to highlighting your misplaced smugness, so lets move beyond this point. Reading both my quote of a quote and the source at your link I find no discontinuity.
Certainly, as a “KC-45 is too big” club member, you have to admit that the KC-45 is MORE “KC-10 like” than the KC767?
Handy’s comments then and now are incompatible unless he fears a more capable aircraft like the KC-45 might threaten procurement of an even larger tanker later. But the only way that can happen is if the capability is substantial enough to make the larger tanker moot. So what’s the reason for the disconnect? I find his ‘tactical vs strategic’ comparison between the -135 and -10 most unfortunate. I’ll bet he wishes he could take it back.
You are right in one aspect, context is important – maybe you didn’t quote this part:
“RAND’s report is due to be released sometime in August, and Handy said his “best guess” is that the study will call for the Air Force to acquire a commercial-derivative tanker. Tanker variants of the Boeing 767 and Airbus A330 airliners have been touted as potential competitors to replace the KC-135.”
..just to keep under the rules of fair use?
A cynic might think you didn’t want anyone looking at the referenced Rand Study. Interesting conclusions in that study. Boeing must hate it.
SMSgt Mac,
Ok so you admit that ramp space/weight are limiting factors as SOME airfields. :)
But since you are SO dense I will explain it again. There are a number of airfields which the KC-767 can operate from that the KC-30 can not. There are a number of airfields which the the KC-30 can only operate from at significantly reduced take-off weights. There are a number of airfields which while the KC-30 can operate from even at MTOW the number that can be operated is significantly limited. And the limiting factor at MOST of these bases is limited parking & ramp/taxiway space &/or weight.
Aircraft Classification Numbers
https://transportation.wes.army.mil/acnpcn/Default.aspx
BOEING 767-300ER (MTOW = KC-767AT)
Flexible Pavement ACN
Category A: 51.9
Category B: 57.4
Category C: 70.6
Category D: 92.1
Rigid Pavement ACN
Category A: 46.8
Category B: 56.3
Category C: 66.9
Category D: 76.2
AIRBUS A330-200
Flexible Pavement ACN
Category A: 61.5
Category B: 66.7
Category C: 77.7
Category D: 105.1
Rigid Pavement ACN
Category A: 52.2
Category B: 61.1
Category C: 72.4
Category D: 83.6
ACN also found here
http://www.eddh.de/x-files/dl_files/acn-tables.pdf
YES the network of airfields has to be viewed as a system! When you do, the system contains MORE usuable airfields for the KC-767 & a larger number of KC-767 which can operate from each airfield in the system. AND even when operating from the same airfield carrying the same amount of offloadable fuel the KC-30 burns more fuel than the KC-767. Guess what happens to the amount of fuel burned by the KC-30 when it has to operate from a base farther away…
You took a quote by General Handy out of context with the intent to IMPLY that the KC-X should be a “KC-10-like aircraft” and that General Handy is inconsisted when he stated that the KC-30 is the wrong choice for the KC-X.
Handy’s comments then and now are NOT incompatible when you put then into the proper context which they were stated as I demonstrated. This is a recurring theme with the anti-Boeing/KC-767 pro-EADS/KC-30 Kool-Aid drinkers. They take things out of context in order to make the KC-30 look better but when you put things into the proper context & look at what they REALLY mean & how they relate to the WHOLE the KC-30′s appearant superiority dissapears & even become inferiority.
Yes the KC-30 is more “KC-10 like” than the KC-767 but it is not “KC-10 like” enough to make for a good large tanker for the USAF (which is what General Handy was talking about). Sorry, but 246,000 lbs fuel load being ONLY 44,000 lbs more than the KC-135R & 110,000 LESS than the KC-10 (note that fuel offload vs range is actually more important than max fuel load – in which case the KC-30 is STILL closer to the KC-135R than the KC-10) is not very “KC-10 like”. ;)
I posted a link to the article for anyone who wished to read the whole thing you idiot!
“RAND’s report is due to be released sometime in August, and Handy said his “best guess” is that the study will call for the Air Force to acquire a commercial-derivative tanker. Tanker variants of the Boeing 767 and Airbus A330 airliners have been touted as potential competitors to replace the KC-135.” says NOTHING to what General Handy feels is the right choice & which is absolutely the wrong choice (which he has made perfectly clear & indicated his primary reasons why).
pfcem, you are funny.
Sluggo knocks one out of the park implying that ramp space and ACN are not that critical and there are workarounds. He points out that fuel must be brought in to even major facilities to fill up the tankers, and only major facilities have the kind of ground storage and ground/sea lines of communication required to get fuel to the airfield.
The point you apparently are missing is that these are aircraft, not fuel trucks. We DON”T WANT THEM ON THE GROUND close to the fight. They pick up fuel from major facilities far from the fight. They fly for hours. They refuel themselves to stay up even longer. They return to facilities far from the fight….which frankly may not be that far because they must standoff anyway to avoid S-400/S-300PMU, ballistic missiles, and enemy fighters.
The KC-45A does not need to carry as much as a KC-10 because there will be many more of them than the 59 KC-10s.
Use the C-17 and KC-130 to get lots of fuel to the ground if you must get fuel closer to the fight for ground forces, helicopters, and F-35Bs. C-17s conveniently carry almost exactly the same quantity of fuel as the KC-45A.
It was funny to see Boeing talking about not wanting a split buy back when it thought it was in the catbird seat. Now you better HOPE for a split buy, buddy and Boeing. Did you read DoDBuzz which indicates that the $35 billion difference in fuel use over 40 years is fiction?
Next thing you will be arguing that the KC-767 has better cupholders…
First,
Based upon Sluggo’s contribution, and to make sure another strawman doesn’t get built by evil gnomes while I’m not looking, let me clarify a previous comment. When I speak of LCN as the dominant system driver I was basing that upon a couple of different studies, and they were for ALL aircraft and NOT tanker specific, and assumed airfields were ‘as is’ and would not be upgraded to handle higher landing stresses.
Aaaaannnnd….ACNs are good GUIDES for planning parking ramp and taxiway use, but STILL do not directly corrolate to LCNs. Even an idiot (like me I guess!) knows that two aircraft at the same gross weight will potentially have different LCNs based upon differences in landing gear configuration (lots of sub-variables there), descent rates, touchdown speeds, etc.
BTW, we’re beating a dead (and bloated) horse big time (of course) right now. Expect Boeing to re-protest if the DoD insists on shaping the rebid around what the AF actually wants…as the word on the street now indicates.(See Cole’s reference)
Sluggo,
LCN is an OPERATIONS tempo limiting factor. It DOES NOT limit what airfields a particular aircraft CAN operate from. As I said, size/weight (ACN) is the limiting factor to what airfields & how many aircraft per airfield you CAN operate from. LCN would be used to determine where best to operate from WITHIN THE LIMITS OF WHERE YOU CAN OPERATE FROM.
Where do you put the aircraft you DISPLACE with KC-30 because you can’t place them where the tankers currently operate from? And you do know of course that the KC-30 is LARGER (12′ longer & 32.4′ greater wingspan) than the KC-10.
Cole,
You have it exactly BACKWORD from what the tanker Generals say. They WANT the tankers as close to the operations as realistically possible – allowing for the best efficiency & the highest operations tempo (within their LCN limits of course).
With the exception of the tankers themselves, MOST aircraft take off with the max fuel they can carry & still comfortably take-off. Where the hell do you think they get THAT fuel?
Yes I read the article at DoDBuzz which I am sure fooled ignorant people like yourself. It is sad the BS the DOD has to come up with to justify the KC-30 choice. Without getting into the meat of the article as I suspect some version of it will eventually be posted here, THE biggest issues with the article are that the “mission profile” they describe does not fit what was asked for in the RFP & is the opposite of what the Generals want. Now if sombody can show me where the USAF announced that it had changed its KC-X/KC-Y/KC-Z tanker acquisition & operations strategy BEFORE Jan 2007 when the final KC-X RFP was released…Otherwise they are simply changing the tanker acquisition & operations strategy to suit the KC-30 because the KC-30 doesn’t fit the tanker acquisition & operations strategy.
But specifically to the difference in fuel use over 40 years. First of all the study calculated ~$30 billion ($29,775,463,505 based on a crude oil base price of $125 per barrel). The basics of the fuel study are correct but they did make mistakes. Using fuel burn at MTOW when the truth is neither the KC-767AT nor the KC-30 would operate at MTOW very often – even at max fuel load NEITHER are at their MTOW. Using an equal 750 hrs/year for both when the KC-30 (as a fleet) would actually fly greater distances (aka more hours) to complete the same missions as the KC-767 – although the KC-30 would make some of that distance/time up on those rare occasions where it actually offloaded a greater amount of fuel.
The KC-30 DOES burn more fuel than the KC-767AT EVEN WHEN CARRYING THE SAME LOAD (much less a heavier load). The question of course being what will the “average normal take-off weight” actually be. Once you have that, then you would have to figure out what the fuel burn difference between the KC-767AT & the KC-30 would be at those wieghts. You also have to figure out what the actual “average” hours per year which would probably be the most difficult thing to do since every theater/scenario would be different it would be impossible to accurately predict how much each theater/scenarios would be used. And of course there is a significant difference between peacetime operations & wartime (both “minor” & “major”) operations.
So you want to use the tankers as transports & the transports as tankers. Yeah, that makes a lot of sence. :)
SMSgt Mac,
You are misrepresenting what I have said & the facts. Hard to say if it is because you KNOW I am right & are trying to spin the discussion to something else to cover your ass or because you really are that ignorant.
Expect NG/EADS to protest if the DoD shapes the rebid around what the tanker guys actually want (since the KC-30 would CLEARLY be noncompetative). But the DOD is more likely to shape the rebid around what IT wants, which could result in the USAF & Boeing protesting.
pfcem, you make good points occasionally and clearly are a smart guy…but you throw credibility out the window every time you call someone an idiot or ignorant. Can’t you see that?
But let’s assume for a moment that although the $35 billion over 40 years is incorrect, there is some lesser differential between the two aircraft fuel burn rates. That is largely irrelevant because I can illustrate real world situations where fewer KC-45A can substitute for more KC-767s.
Example: Using an internet version of AFPAM 1-1403, Air Mobility Planning Factors(which may be outdated listed as 17 June 97) it gives the following formula for computing fuel offload requirements:
(Distance from T/O to landing/True airspeed x fuel flow) – total fuel + destination reserve
OK, I’m a dumb former-Army guy but can still do basic math (hope this is computerized by now). Let’s examine a mission involving 4 C-17s each carrying 166,500 lbs of payload, traveling to the Middle East via the Azores where they will refuel on the ground, I calculate:
(3500NM/450 knots x 21,440 lbs/hr C-17 fuel burn)- 136,000 lbs fuel at T/O – 7,000 lbs for a 20 minute reserve…..which equals 37,755.6 lbs of fuel that each C-17 will require to make it from the U.S. east coast to the Azores with its payload of 3 FCS manned ground vehicles and troops.
So looking at fuel offload available from the KC-767 after flying 1000 NM with the C-17s to allow them to burn off nearly 38,000 lbs of fuel, it looks like the KC-767 will have 117,000 lbs of fuel remaining that it can offload. Looks like the 4 C-17s will need TWO KC-767s to get them to the Azores because one plane can only support 3 of the 4 C-17s.
Now lets look at the KC-45A which still has 153,000 lbs of fuel it can offload at 1000NM. Four C-17s each needing nearly 38,000 lbs of fuel still fit the fuel offload capability of ONE KC-45A.
So who do you suspect is burning more fuel…the single KC-45A or the two KC-767s. But beyond that with only two aerial refueling aircraft available because others are tied up with other missions, maintenance etc., the two KC-45s could support 8 deploying C-17s traveling via the Azores while two KC-767s only suppport 6 C-17s.
Sounds like a no-brainer to me.
BTW, here is an interesting chart comparing the two aircraft:
http://blog.al.com/pr/2007/07/kc30_comparison_chart.html
Cole said:
“So looking at fuel offload available from the KC-767 after flying 1000 NM with the C-17s ”
Why would the KC’s have to fly with the C-17′s? The tankers fly from different bases and as such their fuel off loads are not restricted as you indicate. AMC and other commands have tanker allocation tools that match up tanker and reciver in the most efficent way possible. Most times tankers do not fly specifically with their recivers, its just not efficent that way.
Also, from my Google earth, its only about 2800 NM from the east coast of the US to the Azores.
Cole,
Nobody ever said the KC-30 wasn’t a better air bridge tanker than the KC-767AT but that is primarily the KC-10′s (which is expected to be replaced by the KC-Y) job which it does WAY better than the KC-30. Based on the KC-X RFP, air bridge is/was obviously not the highest priority mission for the KC-X.
OK, now lest get something clear. The KC-30 DOES have more basing/airfield limitations than the KC-767AT. There are two fundaments reasons for this, the size of the KC-30 & the weight of the KC-30.
Weight:
Whether you use the outdated LCN or the newer more precise ACN/PCN method for load/impact (note that airlines started replacing LCN with ACN/PCN in the 1980′s & NATO officially switched in 2001) the KC-30 is more restricted in which bases/airfields it can operate from at MTOW. And if you reduce the KC-30 take-off weight in order to utilize additional bases/airfields, you reduce its capacity. Unfortunately for the KC-30 if a KC-30 & a KC-767AT both take off at the same take-off weight, the KC-767AT is actually carrying MORE payload because the KC-30 weighs ~75,000 lbs more empty than an empty KC-767AT.
Size:
Like weight, size SHOULD be self explanitory but some people just can’t seem to get their head around the fact that size DOES matter when it pertains to what airfields a particular aircraft can operate from & how many of said aircraft can operate from each base/airfield.
When it comes to both size & weight, there are two fundamental problems for the KC-30. One being the performance THRESHOLD of the KC-X be capable of operating from a 7,000 ft dry, hard-surface runway at sea level using FAA ground rules & the OBJECTIVE to do so at maximum weight for takeoff implise a desire to operate from relatively small bases/airfields. The other being that so much of the current infrastructure being built around the KC-135.
***
Now the KC-X/KC-Y/KC-Z tanker acquisition & operations strategy it to replace the existing tanker fleet with 600 KC-135R equivalent tankers in three phases with each representing 1/3 of the fleet (200 KC-135R equvalent). The strategy has already been changed that the KC-10 will be replaced by the KC-Y rather than the KC-Z with the KC-Z then replacing the last KC-135Rs. Note that it is 200 KC-135R equivalent, rather than 200 new aircraft. That is why the KC-X is for “up to” 179 (175 production & 4 system development and demonstration) aircraft. Note that this is based on the TRS-05/MRS-05 model & not the IFARA model (in the TRS-05/MRS-05 model the KC-30 does not look so good). Also note that it is initially for 80 aircraft with an option for 99 more or alternatively, stopping KC-X procurement at 80 & moving on with the KC-Y.
RE: OK, now lest get something clear. The KC-30 DOES have more basing/airfield limitations than the KC-767AT.
The real question was/is: are any differences sufficient to adversely impact the KC-45
SMSgt Mac,
ABSOLUTELY the differences in basing/airfield limitations are sufficient to adversely impact the KC-45
> Don’t confuse those in the DOD/USAF on the KC-X source selection team with the end users (that would be the USAF AMC tanker generals & operators) want & KNOW what is the right & wrong choice due to ACTUAL EXPERIENCE.
i’m glad you’re the self-appointed ambassador for all tanker generals and operators and know what every single one of them thinks
Can I ask a few questions…both rhetorical and real?
1) If KZ-Y is a larger tanker to replace the KC-10, and production is supposed to be around 15 A/C a year for 13 or so years starting around 2024, that means 195 aircraft, correct? Why is a larger KC-Y aircraft in greater numbers not problematic while a larger KC-45A is?
2) If KC-X is around $35 billion, and KC-Y is a bigger aircraft in greater numbers, won’t that mean considerably more than $45 billion for that all new larger aircraft…that will also use more fuel than the KC-767 or KC-45A?
3)If KC-Z is supposed to replace the remaining KC-135R starting around 2036, how will they restart a closed KC-X production line if KC-Y is a larger new aircraft?
4) Wouldn’t a split buy of BOTH KC-X candidate aircraft be cheaper than one medium and one larger aircraft…and then back to medium? Doesn’t that a risk the possibility of having 3 different types of refuelers…around the time when gas is the most expensive and rapidly running dry?
5) pfcem, doesn’t a stated strategy of refueling fighter aircraft immediately after take-off to allow a larger load of munitions (since we can’t aerial rearm)make sense, and doesn’t the larger aircraft with faster fuel flow to the receiver do that better?
Cole,
1) The projected production for the KC-Y was based on it being another KC-135 replacement likley based on the KC-X platform. Again, the overal plan/idea being for the KC-X to be a “basic A-spec medium tanker” to replace the KC-135E & some KC-135R with the KC-Y being a development of the KC-X platform with additional capabilities added (or a new platform if the desired additional capabilities could not be provided by an imporved KC-X platform) to replace most of the KC-135R & the KC-Z replacing the KC-10 & the last KC-135R.
But the plan was changed because there is/was a desire for more large KC-10-like tankers & becasue many KC-135R are believed to have more life left in them than the KC-10s.
2) Yes, the KC-Y (now that it is expected to replace the KC-10) will be a larger more expensive aircraft that burns more fuel. BUT presumably being a KC-10 replacement it should have a max fuel capacity of 350,000+ lbs of fuel. Note that Boeing has said that a possible KC-777 could have a fuel capacity of >400,000 lbs.
BUT presumably with each of the KC-X/KC-Y/KC-Z supposed to be roughly equal to 200 KC-135R one would excect the KC-Y to be ~100 or so aircraft.
3) KC-Z will now probably NOT be based on the same platform as the KC-X. Even by 2024 when the KC-Y is/was to start, technology will likely have advanced such that it will be an unmanned flying wing or BWB platform. But that is one of the issues with changing the order that will have to be addressed. I mean if the KC-Z still ends up not starting until 2036, even the Boeing 787 & Airbus A350 may be at or past the end of their commercial production.
4) No, a split buy of BOTH KC-X candidate aircraft be the most expensive rout to take. Besides that does not solve the fundamental problem the KC-30 has – that it is too big & too heavy (larger & with a greater empty weight than the KC-10 – the KC-10′s greater MTOW is due to being able to carry a heavier payload) to be a “medium” tanker & lacks the capacity to be a good “large” tanker. Note that that does not mean that the KC-30 is not right for other nations (for them an “intermediate” tanker may very well be the ticket – although I would feel a lot better for them if it had closer to a 300,000 lb max fuel load [the ~275,000 lbs/41,000 gal of the A340-200 would do nicely] given just how BIG & HEAVY the KC-30 is) but it is absolutely WRONG for the US.
5) Sure refueling fighter aircraft immediately after take-off mskes sense to some degree as it would allow aircraft to take off at lighter weights but there is no need to do so to increase weapons payload since weapons payload are getting SMALLER [each BRU-61/A rack holds four SDB weapons, the rack weighs 320 pounds (145 kg) empty, and 1,460 pounds (664 kg) loaded with four 285 pound (130 kg) bombs - that makes for 8 bombs for LESS THAT 3,000 lbs including the launch racks]. AND if you intend to refuel aircraft immediately after take-off would it not be better for the tankers to then operate as close to the fighters as possible…Besides that kind of defeats the purpose of aeriel refueling anyway which is the greatly extend the range of aircraft – that means refueling the fighter somwhere BETWEEN their base of operations & their targets.
The “benifit” of the KC-30′s greater fuel flow is a red hearing & in the real world the actual fuel flow the VAST majority of the time. First there are few platforms (IIRC just 4 in the current inventory & the KC-10 often refuels them & at a greater rate than the KC-30) in which can receive fuel at a rate greater than the KC-767AT can deliver & second even those that can, can not do so during the entire time it is being refueld because of the need to slow the transfer rate between receive aircraft tanks & to maintain balance. Just ANOTHER example of how when you really look into the details of the realities of tanker operations, the “greater” numbers of the KC-30 do not translate to that much of a real world benefit over the KC-767AT.
I’ve noticed for quite some time that as pfcem’s posts get longer, he fills them up with more and more unsupported opinions masquerading as fact.
I WAS going to smack pfcem around a little more over his last lame comeback to me, but his last post shows he’s about “done to a turn”. Is there a chance we can now move some of the discussion into into the next level?
From what I can tell, there’s not one paragraph PFCEM just posted that isn’t distorted, incorrect, possibly made up, or simply a matter of his (or rather his delusional adaptation of someone else’s) unsupportable, or at the very least ‘arguable’, opinion.
SO….Does anyone else (other than PFCEM or me of course) see anything that doesn’t meet that criteria? Anyone? Pick a paragraph, and please state your reason why it doesn’t meet the above criteria. Let’s deal with them all if we have to- but please, let’s deal with them one at a time to stop scattering the buckshot.
Cole,
1) The “panic” is/was over the KC-135E, which dropped below mandated Mission Capability Rates & is/was getting AWEFULLY expensive to maintain.
Also note that we will only be getting new tankers at 12-15 per year. At that rate it will take 35-45 years to replace the entire tanker fleet.
With the KC-Y now intended to replace the KC-10, it is unlikley we will get 195 of them (how many will ultimately depend on the decided proportion of medium “KC-135-like” tankers to large “KC-10′like” tankers). DIFFERNET aircraft for DIFFERENT missions. The idea is to have the majority of the tanker fleet be medium “KC-135-like” tankers that can operate close to the fight for intertheater operations with a smaller number of large “KC-10′like” tankers (although a greater proportion than the current KC-135/KC-10 fleet) for air bridge type operations.
2) YES having the KC-Y replace the KC-10s instead of the rest of the KC-135Rs makes for problems with the KC-Z BUT as I said, the technology will have progessed such that by the time the KC-Z comes around it will not likely be based on any aircraft flying today.
3) No a split by for the KC-X would result in 4 platforms, 2 KC-X, 1 KC-Y & 1 KC-Z = 4. The KC-30 does not have the capacity to adequitely act as a KC-10 replacement.
4) Yes, there are other benefits from having another U.S. manufacturer producing aircraft but that is a lame excuse for procuring the WRONG aircraft.
5) NO, the KC-30 will not necessarily have more fuel for more aircraft. The KC-767AT can operate with a greater fuel load than the KC-30 at airfields that the KC-30 can not operate at less then ~450,000 lbs from. More KC-767AT can operate from each airfield meaning that as the bases closer are filled, more & more KC-30 will have to operate from airfields farther away. PLUS, as historical operations show, often the number of booms in the air is of greater importance than how much fuel each tanker can transfer.
The KC-135 “needs” to (eventually – but at the rate we will replace them we should start sooner rather than later) be replaced not becuase it lacks the required capacity (we often don’t even use the full capacity of the KC-135) but because the KC-135 can not fly forever & (in the case of the KC-135E) getting to be unacceptably expensive to maintain & are unable to maintain the required mission capability rate.
You are thinking too simply (at too small a scale). It is not what ONE KC-30 can do vs what ONE KC-767AT can do but how well a fleet of dozens or a hundred or more fulfill the need/requirement of the ENTIRE operation. And not only how well each fulfill peak demand for any one operation/scenario but how well each fulfills the cycling demand for ALL operations/scenarios.
> The “panic” is/was over the KC-135E, which dropped below mandated Mission Capability Rates & is/was getting AWEFULLY expensive to maintain.
and who is responsible for killing an upgrade program that would have extended their life?
> The KC-767AT can operate with a greater fuel load than the KC-30 at airfields that the KC-30 can not operate at less then ~450,000 lbs from
please identify which current tanker airfields a KC-30 will be limited from and a KC-767 will not
show all your work
irtusk,
The USAF decided it was better to start recapitalizing the tanker fleet sooner & save BILLIONS of dollars on upgrade & maintanence costs for the KC-135E that even under the previous recapitalization roadmap were going to start being replaced in 2012.
BOEING 767-300ER (MTOW = KC-767AT)
Flexible Pavement ACN
Category A: 51.9
Category B: 57.4
Category C: 70.6
Category D: 92.1
Rigid Pavement ACN
Category A: 46.8
Category B: 56.3
Category C: 66.9
Category D: 76.2
AIRBUS A330-200
Flexible Pavement ACN
Category A: 61.5
Category B: 66.7
Category C: 77.7
Category D: 105.1
Rigid Pavement ACN
Category A: 52.2
Category B: 61.1
Category C: 72.4
Category D: 83.6
So as you SHOULD be able to see, all airfields with a Flexible PCN of >51.9 but 46.8 but <52.2 (say ~49.5) or less. PLUS there are of course those airfields which may have sufficient PCN but do not have sufficient space. Have fun trying to find them all, because it is a lot.
Now I know that you automatically reject it but…according to Boeing studies of the 1643 airfields worldwide that can accommodate tanker operations, the KC-767AT can operate (unrestricted) from 811 while the KC-30 can from only 408.
> So as you SHOULD be able to see, all airfields with a Flexible PCN of >51.9 but 46.8 but but…according to Boeing studies
and did they release those studies and how they came to those conclusions?
> The USAF decided it was better to start recapitalizing the tanker fleet sooner & save BILLIONS of dollars on upgrade & maintanence costs for the KC-135E
uh huh, and the fact that Boeing was waving money under Druyun’s nose to kill the very cheap upgrades had ABSOLUTELY nothing to do with it
sorry, messed up the previous post
> So as you SHOULD be able to see, all airfields with a Flexible PCN of >51.9 but 46.8 but <52.2 (say ~49.5) or less
and which tanker airfields fit such narrow criteria?
Boeing has its claims. NG/EAD claims the opposite at 838 airfields for the KC-45A vs. only 465 for the KC-767…at an identical 200,000 lbs of fuel per aircraft on a 7,000 foot runway.
http://www.eadstankerupdate.com/2007/issue_23.htm
But beyond that, how many of those airfields realistically have ample fuel storage and ground transportation access to bring fuel by truck/rail to the airfield.
pfcem, if these aircraft are so critical and in short supply, why are you constantly hoping to sideline them all on the ground on smaller airfield ramps where they would quickly drain the fuel supply…instead of larger fields where the difference in size is irrelevant? Ever think you might want to park 1 or 2 on the ground for maintenance/crew rest while another 1 or 2 fly their 12 hour shift with fuel ferried in from elsewhere to aerial refuel the refuelers?
And the missing parts of this ‘numbers of fields’ discussion are:
WHERE are the ‘limiting’ fields?
HOW much do their locations adversely impact aircraft mission performance and in what way (if at all)?
IF the field locations and limitations do impact the aircraft mission performance, what is the net impact on overall mission objectives? Are the missions that are performed without restriction higher priority than those that are constrained? Are the advantages greater in impact and number than disadvantages?
There are a few other considerations (net impact on MPLCC comes to mind), but you get the point. Without knowing the real impact on the mission, numbers of airfields are irrelevant.
Cole, the airfield number claims ‘disconnect’ between Boeing and NG/EADS appears to be Boeing’s uses the ‘without restriction’ caveat and NG’s use of ’200,000 lbs of fuel’ criteria. Boeing’s comparison (if it can be believed since their plane isn’t built yet) means that if the KC-45 has to leave with anything less than a full load, the airfield is ‘restricted’.
On a lighter note: It would be a fun Google Earth project to ID every field that is currently handling A330-200 and heavier traffic just to get a good idea of the distributon and availability of airfields. I suspect it would reveal a ‘so what’ answer: one that would show there’s enough fields everywhere that we’re interested.
irtusk,
Boeing released the results of the study & they did explain how they came to those conclusions.
Still getting the timeline wrong I see…Druyun didn’t even enter the picture until AFTER her bosses ordered her to work with Boeing on a tanker lease.
The criteria isn’t narrow. But somehow part of the post is missing. Airfields with a Flexible PCN of >51.9 but <61.5 (say ~56.7) or a Rigid PCN of 46.8 but <52.2 (say ~49.5) OR LESS.
Cole,
At least Beoing explained how it got its results…
The reason tankers are/have been in short supply is due to low mission capability rates. With mission capability rates of new tankers expected to be 90+% that SHOULD not be as much of an issue.
Operating tankers at airfields close to the fight DOESN’T sideline them. ALL airfields have fuel supplies that have to be maintained in order to maintain a given level/tempo of operations. Operatling just from large airfields farther away is going to drain your theater wide fuel supplies faster than operating from smaller airfields closer to the operations – PARTICULARLY in the opening stages of combat operations when the operations tempo is likely to be at its highest.
An airfield capable of tanker operations isn’t exactly small. But there are PLENTY of them that are not HUGE. There are a comparatively small number of airfields where the difference in size between the KC-767AT & KC-30 it is not AS BIG A DEAL as most but there are no airfields where is irrelevant.
Of course you want to have your tanker fleet operating on a rotational basis (that matches your operations schedule/tempo). Otherwise you are likely to not have enough operating at a critical time because you had too many operating at a time when not nearly as many were needed. That makes the number of tankers you can operate at each airfield that much MORE important.
I guess you missed that the KC-767AT (even the KC-767A) can be refueled in the air…besides, what do you use to aerial refuel a refueler? ;)
Why won’t you listen to the tanker operators & the generals that have commanded them? They know more than you could ever hope to.
SMSgt Mac,
The limiting fields are closer to (& sometimes ARE) the airfileds the fighter & attack aircraft operate from…
MPLCC is MUCH more adversely affected by the KC-30 than the KC-767AT.
The impact on the missions is such that when the USAF tried the KC-30 using the TRS-05/MRS-05 model (aka using real world data rather than the IFARA made up so the KC-30 could compete data) that it COULD NOT COMPLETE SOME OF THE MISSIONS!
Go ahead knock yourself out with your Google Earth project. But I can save you an awful lot of time. What you will find is that, for the most part, there are “hubs” in which the large/heavy airliners operate that have a number of smaller (satellite fields if you will) where the smaller/lighter airliners operate. PLUS there are major (major as in size, not population density) areas where the large “hub” airfields simply do not exist. Also keep in mind that Google Earth will not tell you if the A330-200 you find are operating at 400,000 lbs or 450,000 lbs or 500,000 lbs…
> Boeing released the results of the study
releasing the RESULTS of the study != releasing the STUDY
without the actual study, there is no way to determine the validity or what they were really comparing
> they did explain how they came to those conclusions.
and as usual, you offer ZERO evidence to back up your claim
i really, really hope their ‘explanation’ is something a wee bit more in depth than “we considered the size of the planes and this is what we came up with”
> The reason tankers are/have been in short supply is due to low mission capability rates.
1. how many hours a year are tankers used?
2. who’s fault is that a simple upgrade that would have extended their life and improved mission capability rates didn’t happen?
> Why won’t you listen to the tanker operators & the generals that have commanded them? They know more than you could ever hope to.
you mean the generals that selected the KC-30?
or do you mean only the generals that agree with you?
> (aka using real world data rather than the IFARA made up so the KC-30 could compete data)
that’s the Boeing talking point, but you know what?
the GAO REJECTED that argument
in other words, the IFARA formula DOES reflect real life
of course Boeing HAS to deny this, because it shows how much more effective the KC-30 is in REAL WORLD refuelling operations
pfcem said: “Operating tankers at airfields close to the fight DOESN’T sideline them. ALL airfields have fuel supplies that have to be maintained in order to maintain a given level/tempo of operations. Operatling just from large airfields farther away is going to drain your theater wide fuel supplies faster than operating from smaller airfields closer to the operations – PARTICULARLY in the opening stages of combat operations when the operations tempo is likely to be at its highest.”
Reply: Just how close due you envision getting with those tankers. I can imagine a huge fireball and leaked fuel after a rocket/missile/RPG/mortar attack takes out a tanker spreading to other expensive aircraft.
So what you are looking at is Patriot missile batteries, Air Force security, at least a battalion of Army/Marine ground troops protecting the site…plus all the logistics forces required. Do you possibly want to preserve much of that airfield fuel for aircraft refueling on the ground and bring in other fuel from farther away for the aerial refueling mission????
pfcem: “I guess you missed that the KC-767AT (even the KC-767A) can be refueled in the air…besides, what do you use to aerial refuel a refueler? ;)”
Point I just made below is that with limited Patriots, Air Force security and early deploying combat troops…just how many airfields due you envision supporting with aerial refuelers ON THE GROUND. They can support the airfield with relatively few aircraft parked there or elsewhere, with fuel brough in and transferred to other aerial refuelers in flight.
That is one of the elephants in the room you are ignoring. The Air Force has just 114 KC-135E, so we could retire them all tomorrow and probably not miss much….if you can talk local Representatives out of losing their constituent’s aircraft.
Their will not be 750 F-15s anymore or as many F-16s in the future. The aerial refueling capability of KC-X, which is very limited on only a few KC-135R, is an EXPONENTIAL improvement in capability because you can transfer fuel to already airborne aircraft instead of repeatedly returning to base and landing to fill up.
The high cost of fuel and its diminishing supply, coupled with the disappearance of the Cold War threat, and inability of future foes to afford a large modern Air Force, means FEWER BUT MORE CAPABLE planes for the Air Force. That includes aerial refueling aircraft.
pfcem said: “Why won’t you listen to the tanker operators & the generals that have commanded them? They know more than you could ever hope to.”
Reply: Sluggo sounded like he has been there and done that. What about General Norton Schwartz and General Michael Moseley…
“General Norton A. Schwartz, Commander, US Transportation Command, is on record stating his need for tanker flexibility:
The point of the quotes below, is to illustrate that although both aircraft are dual-purpose and free other airlifters from many airlift duties…the greater capability of the KC-45A, will free far more C-17 sorties.
While you factor in the assumed cost of extra fuel for KC-45A using non-real world assumptions of always taking off at maximum gross weight (when carrying less saves fuel), why not factor in how many missions the KC-45A could substitute for C-17s or more 767s for any given mission. My bet is THAT cost savings would surpass that of claimed 767 vs 45A fuel savings.
BTW, believe you should give up on the 767 arguments and start making better split-buy points than I know to make. That is you best chance of serving your master.;)
irtusk,
Boeing provided MORE to explain how it got its numbers than NG/EADS so go cry to you Kool-Aid supplyer for not giving you enough Kool-Aid. If you HALF as informed as you think you are you would know that already but since there is not valid substance to your opinion the best you can do is try to discreded the facts presented by the opposing view.
1. The KC-X is intended to fly an average of 750 hrs/year.
2. Nobodies fault. The USAF determined that obtaining new tanker to replace them a few (6 actually) years earlier than previously intended was the better way to go.
The USAF AMC Generals DIDN’T choose the the KC-30, they chose the KC-767 back around 2000-2001 but that coice was taken away from them. PLEASE show us the USAF AMC Generals & or tanker crewmen who think the KC-30 is the better choice.
You are cofusing what the USAF said about the TRS-05/MRS-05 model & the changes IT said it had to make in order for the KC-30 to be competative. Boeing just reminded people of that fact.
No, the GOA stated
”
Boeing also challenges the Air Force
Cole,
You are so nieve it is not even worth responding to you. NOBODY EVER SAID THE TANKERS WOULD OPERATE FROM BASES IN FRONT OF THE FIGHTER BASAES!!!
> Boeing provided MORE to explain how it got its numbers than NG/EADS
i’ve asked before and i’ll keep asking to you learn how to post
link?
> The USAF AMC Generals DIDN’T choose the the KC-30
who created the process that selected the KC-30?
the generals
who is ultimately responsible the KC-30 was selected?
the generals
who selected the KC-767?
congress
>There is no mention whatsoever as to the validity of the IFARA (as that was not the specifit point of protest that Boeing brought
that’s even worse for your position you realize
if boeing thought there was even the slightest chance they could get the protest upheld by complaining about IFARA they would have done it
by not protesting that they are admitting that it IS valid
realize that there are over 100 protest items that were rejected and the Boeing thought an IFARA protest was even LESS LIKELY to succeed than those
they protested all sorts of purely frivolous things and yet did not find the IFARA issue substantial to protest
that should tell you something
> THe IFARA DOES NOT represent the real world but a made up one where the KC-30 could complete the missions in order to be competative.
Boeing apparently disagrees with you
(or doesn’t have enough evidence to prove it, same thing)
pfcem said: “Operating just from large airfields farther away is going to drain your theater wide fuel supplies faster than operating from smaller airfields closer to the operations -PARTICULARLY in the opening stages of combat operations when the operations tempo is likely to be at its highest.”
———————
Reply: In the opening stages of deployment, your aerial refueling requirement for fighters is not as great because you generally are not attacking anything yet. That tells me that the KC-45A could bring in 50,000 lbs of 463L pallets while still bringing as much fuel to theater as a KC-767.
pfcem: “You are so nieve it is not even worth responding to you. NOBODY EVER SAID THE TANKERS WOULD OPERATE FROM BASES IN FRONT OF THE FIGHTER BASAES!!!”
—————————-
Posting while intoxicated? That’s Ok, I was typing so fast that I failed to proofread by due/do and their/there…but nieve is a knew/new one to me.;)
You continue to imply that the USAF is going to use this multitude of airfields for tankers – all parked on the ground instead of in flight – and all able to fill up from abundant fuel storage that you postulate is available. And oh, BTW, you imply that we have enough logisticians,security, and air missile defense forces to protect this multitude of forward airfields you foresee as housing aerial refuelers/fighters.
All I’m saying is consider that tankers can support a forward airfield without parking numerous aircraft on that forward airfield.
If I were you, consider making an argument that continuous aerial refueling of the 767 from fuel supplies brought in from elsewhere would mean it is unlikely to run dry…and therefore it matches the KC-45A in real world refueling.
Enough already on this size of aircraft on the ground B.S. Read about Red Horse squadrons and all the construction they had to do at established airbases in past conflicts. It happened before, and it will happen again.
irtusk,
You are confusing your programs. The USAF was in control during the tanker lease & THE USAF AMC Generals chose the KC-767. The USAF indicated TO Congress that if Congress provided the appropriate language to indicate its support that the USAF could gett the KC-767 sooner rather than later through an operating lease. Congress/DOD was in control during the last go around (through overly abtrusive oversight) & unfortunately they are EVEN MORE in control in the third go as well.
NO, if the model used for IFARA represented reality then no other consideration would be necessary but since EVERYONE knew it did not accurately model reality & that an alteration of reality was neseccary in order for the KC-30 could be competative, the RFP indicated that other consideration would be given. Boeing did not see where the Agency (KC-X source selection team) properly evaluated insights and observations as it said it would do. But the agency was able to convince the GAO that it did. The problem for Boeing on this point is that considering evaluated major insights and observations does not mean that the consideration HAS to be factored into the final IFARA value.
Stop lieing. The GOA DID NOT reject over 100 protest items. The GAO is VERY limited on what it can & can not sustain a protest over. Also note that in ADDITION to the 8 specific points the GAO sustained the protest over, it indicated a number of other points which while it chose not to sustain the protest for SHOULD be looked at.re-evaluated.
Cole,
“opening stages of combat operations” ;)
NOBODY HAS EVER INDICATED OPERATING TANKERS FROM AIRFIELDS NOT ALREADY INTENDED TO BE UTILIZED! The USAF (the tanker generals & crewmen in particular) has indicated a desire to operate tankers from airfields closer to the fight (why do you think there was a requirement to be able to take-off from a 7,000′ runway).
You are confusing supporting forward airfields with operating from airfields closer to the fight.
I do not have to “consider making an argument that continuous aerial refueling of the 767 from fuel supplies brought in from elsewhere would mean it is unlikely to run dry…and therefore it matches the KC-45A in real world refueling”. YOU should consider that a fleet of KC-30 will use/burn up (not transfer, use/burn) more fuel faster than a fleet of KC-767AT & therefore be a GREATER burden on your logistic fuel supplies.
You realize of course that the same amount of construction NECESSARY to significantly increase the number of KC-30 airfields could support would significantly increase the number of KC-767AT airfields could support. ;) No matter what level of realistic infrastructure (including the current existing infrastructure), more KC-767AT can operate from more airfields than the KC-30. The KC-767AT is smaller than the B-52, C-17 & KC-10 (& actually only marginally larger than the E-3 & other C-135/707 platforms). The KC-30 is LARGER than the B-52, C-17 & KC-10.
Guess I’m having trouble believing Boeing’s sponsored study figures. How do you get 24% better fuel economy when one aircraft burns 15,000 lbs/hr and the other 12,000 lbs per hour carrying far less fuel?
If the KC-45A can offload 153K of 245K at 1000NM radius…does that mean it needs 92K of fuel for itself over about 6 hours at 15K per hour? But the 767 can offload just 117K at 1000NM radius…which means it burns 85K of the 202K it started out with to fly around for 6 hours. Hmmmm, 6 hours x 12,000 lbs/hr is just 72,000 lbs…not the 85K that the offload numbers imply. Is someone speaking with forked tongue on the fuel burn rates?
Why do commerical 767s burn more fuel than commerical A330s. Do you think that senior USAF leaders will allow EITHER aircraft to takeoff with max gross weight AND land at max gross weight (as if that could happen) as the study requires to reach its figures?
Final question. If a KC45A takes 177 billion gallons of fuel over 40 years…the Boeing isn’t looking like much of a bargain either at 142.5 billion gallons. Who cares about savings…methinks smart leaders will be saying we need fewer aerial refuelers flying fewer hours and carrying less fuel at take-off. Do the training in simulators and save that fuel for our fighter fleet and airlifters.
But a KC-45A carrying 32 463L pallets weighing just 53K lbs is certainly more fuel-efficient than trying to carry the same pallets with two C-17s. So suspect, that in addition to lots of simulator hours for KC pilots to practice aerial refueling missions, they will get a lot of hours flying cargo at far lower take-off and enroute weights than aerial refueling would require at max gross.
pfcem said:”YOU should consider that a fleet of KC-30 will use/burn up (not transfer, use/burn) more fuel faster than a fleet of KC-767AT & therefore be a GREATER burden on your logistic fuel supplies.”
BTW, my response below is reference your quote above.
Correction: The 177 and 142.5 figures below are DOLLARS not gallons as I incorrectly wrote. These are the figures from the July 8th, 2008 revised Conklin study update based on a starting figure of $150 a barrel. It is unclear whether that is the starting price or average inflation-adjusted price. Seems they used a rather large oil inflation figure of 5.69% annually based on the past 21 years?
In any event take the claimed $35 billion savings with a grain of salt because when you multiply the 56 million gallon/year difference by the $4.30 price at 150 a barrel, it comes to just $241 million per year in the first year which would be $9.64 billion over 40 years at the same annual rate…so the $35 billion sounds higher than it is because it is in inflated future dollars.
And once again, we should be more concerned about the total fuel cost of just 179 tankers…not the claimed savings!!
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PFCEM said; “LCN is an OPERATIONS tempo limiting factor. It DOES NOT limit what airfields a particular aircraft CAN operate from. As I said, size/weight (ACN) is the limiting factor to what airfields & how many aircraft per airfield you CAN operate from. LCN would be used to determine where best to operate from WITHIN THE LIMITS OF WHERE YOU CAN OPERATE FROM.” I ask how does this limit tempo? If the LCN limits operations, then why am I going there in the first place? There will not be any “tempo”! I would reject the airfield out of hand and move on to those which can support operations. That is a no-brainer. Your statement did not make any sense to me. Like I said before, there was a number of higher priority planning factors we had to look at first before we did a ramp/space/weight calculation. We had a ramp space calculator which would give us how many KC-135s/KC-10s we could put at an airfield. Some one with way to much time on their hands and mad-skills with Microsoft Excel built the calculator for all of the Middle East airfields. It gave us only a rough number though. But you still have to remember, other Combatant Commander’s areas of operations are going to factor in. The B-2s were going through four regional combatant commander’s areas of operations. We must consider command and control (“can we TALK” as Joan Rivers would say), flight times (which directly affected fuel offload… you should have seen the look on several fighter planners faces when we told them we can put tankers in Iraqi airspace but it will reduce your offloads…they didn’t understand we used the gas in all the tanks to fly to the anchors in Iraq… We were flying FARTHER), and as Sun Tzu so aptly states in chapter one of his book with his the five constants; two of which are “Heaven” (the weather) and “Earth”, the terrain. We had to reject some airfields because they would not support fuel offloads needed. We had to send all KC-135Es out of the theater by March as it was to hot. We could not put tankers at airfields with high pressure altitudes because of takeoff performance. Fuel storage and resupply was our number one issue at almost all bases. The governments of three nations told us no out-right for a couple of prime locations and we adapted… as the US Marines say: Semper Gumby… Always Flexible.
We knew even in the Middle East (and every where in the world you will operate tankers out of) we were only going to be able to operate from International airports (Jeddah would have been ideal with its “unlimited” fuel resupply… it has its own refinery south of the airfield and three runways) or a prepared MILITARY airfield like Prince Sultan Air Base. But even at Prince Sultan, we paid a lot of money to the Saudis to upgrade its infrastructure. We paid for it in other ways as there was a runway event at Prince Sultan’s SINGLE runway every 90 seconds (a landing or takeoff every 90 seconds… 24/7 through the entire war) We had 38 KC-135s, 7 KC-10s and 9 VC-10s on the ramp at Prince Sultan during Iraqi Freedom. Not to mention the whole host of other airplanes there. It was an aviation photographer’s dream comes true (I went through 138 rolls of 36 frames!)
PFCEM said:
A few more here…
PFCEM said: “Operating just from large airfields farther away is going to drain your theater wide fuel supplies faster than operating from smaller airfields closer to the operations -PARTICULARLY in the opening stages of combat operations when the operations tempo is likely to be at its highest.”
“Particularly in the opening stages”… Patently false. The opening shock and awe campaign was not creating the highest fuel offloads. Supporting the ground troops starting on about day 13-18 were our highest offloads. And will always be the highest. We did just a little less than 18 million pounds about two days before 3ID went through the Karbala Gap. Reason? Republican Guard repositioned in the sandstorm and were left out in the open when the sandstorm subsided. We offloaded more fuel during the time period the 3rd ID and I MEF were
engaged nearing Baghdad than at any other time.
“Farther…Faster” vs “Smaller…closer”. Your argument does not work as the smaller airfiled will also have the reduced fuel storage and if the strike assets are there then you trade space in fuel storage for weapons storage. A logistician would know he has trade offs depending on requirements. We worked closley with the J4 (Logistics) Colonel on fuel storage and resupply. We knew where the challenges were going to be and we planned for those. Bases father away were resupplied FASTER than bases close to the fight as they went through fuel faster. You stop to get gas when you needed it in your car… we do the same thing when applying logistics principles to warfare. Remember, smart men study tactics but brilliant men study logistics.
PFCEM said; “Where have General Norton Schwartz and General Michael Moseley stated they the KC-30 is the right choice? The only thing I have hear or read them comment about is the desire for greater airlift capability than the KC-135 (which the KC-767AT does).” Now that times have certainly changed, and General McNabb, the former USAF Vice Commander is the TRANSCOM commander, it would do us all well to watch the 29 Feb footage of the announcement from the DoD on the KC-X contract award. General McNabb was there and spoke as did Gen Lichte, the Air Mobility Command Commander. Some interesting words during that announcement. Look up both of their bios on the Air Force website (http://www.af.mil) to see what their credentials are.
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