Two distinct groups are emerging in the Army with quite different views on the nature of future wars the U.S. is likely to fight and the decisions the service should make about future force structure and weapons. The first group is the Title 10 side that urges the Army to embrace the troubled Future Combat Systems program and new operational concepts built around dominant battlefield intelligence. The other side is represented by officers returning from Iraq and Afghanistan who think future wars will resemble the messy reality of the current ones.
In a new paper, Army Col. H.R. McMaster, definitely a member of the messy war group, calls for abandoning so-called transformation, which is intellectually rooted in the idea of a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). McMaster, of 73 Easting and Tal Afar fame, is a highly influential soldier-scholar who is currently putting together a brain trust for Gen. David Petraeus to review U.S. policy towards Afghanistan and Pakistan.
McMaster says the widely held vision of a revolution in warfare, of light, agile high-tech forces destroying an adversary with pin-point precision weapons fired from stand-off distances, ran headlong into reality in Iraq and Afghanistan. It would be a superlative stretch of reality to describe the brutal fighting in those wars as anything remotely revolutionary. Both have featured much less high-tech and much more high-firepower in fierce firefights, not at the stand off ranges preferred by U.S. soldiers but in engagements where combatants were separated by only a few feet.
He says the U.S. will fight future wars against armed groups that employ tactics and strategies similar to those it is facing in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Armys legacy formations have figured prominently in the current fight and will again in future wars. He criticizes analysts and officers — calling out Air Force Maj. Gen. Charles Dunlap and Lt. Gen. David Deptula — who advocate a return to 1990s thinking where high-tech surveillance, air power and precision weaponry deliver effects against the enemy from long range in an effort to avoid costly and protracted boots on the ground efforts. Those who have bought into the RMA orthodoxy make the mistake of defining future conflict as we might prefer it to be, McMaster says.
McMaster really lets it fly at both Air Force leaders who have been very vocal in pushing the notion that airpower is Americas true asymmetric advantage. Deptula and Dunlap fail to consider the enemys ability to react and adopt countermeasures that complicate our ability to remotely deliver effects. One wonders what kind of remotely delivered capability might secure people from terrorists living in their midst, reconstitute a police force, or interdict concealed vehicle bombs aimed at crowded marketplaces. Moreover, McMaster says, future adversaries, such as China, are developing weapons designed specifically to take out U.S. surveillance and IT assets
McMaster takes a big swipe at his own service and the $200 billion Future Combat Systems program that was originally intended to supply the Army with a new family of lightweight armored vehicles but has since dissolved into a collection of some promising and many not so promising technologies. McMaster says recent combat experience shows, we should reject the notion that lightness, ease of deployment, and reduced logistical infrastructure are virtues in and of themselves. What a force is expected to achieve once it is deployed is far more important than how quickly it can be moved and how easily it can be sustained.
The FCS program likes to show a briefing slide that illustrates the long line of fuel tankers required to support the gas guzzling Abrams tank and the much fewer needed to support the future FCS vehicle. McMaster points out the weakness of that pitch. Sure, a 30 ton FCS vehicle with new, more efficient engine technologies will cut down on the logistical tail compared to Abrams tanks. But what do you get at the end of that long line of fuel tankers? With the Abrams, arguably the worlds best main battle tank with an impenetrable frontal arc and unmatched firepower. With FCS, you get a vehicle, with armor no thicker than that of a Bradley, that depends on situational awareness to survive an engagement.
McMaster says that despite six years of combat experience, the Army continues to embrace the flawed doctrinal concepts and a continued fixation on futuristic experiments that say FCS equipped soldiers will have near perfect situational awareness and will be able to promptly dispatch enemies without engaging in close combat. Thats a dangerous road to go down, he warns, that could end up costing soldiers lives. The gulf between the Armys new warfighting concepts and the lessons coming out of Iraq and Afghanistan demands a thorough review of Army organization.
McMaster says theory continues to triumph over practice because of the tangled web of relationships between defense contractors, the DoD, Congress, and think tanks that often lend legitimacy to flawed concepts. He says the military should stop outsourcing its intellectual responsibilities, and defense contractors should not produce and test operational concepts that can later be used to justify the purchase of their systems or products.
– Greg Grant
Holy crap this guy is right on. Specialy about the Abrams!! and tanks in gerneral.The airfore and a strong number of navy thinkers seem to veiw stealth systems as a god weapon never mind that they,ve shot down f-117s before in the balkans. And like he said look at how everyone is working on ASAT capability. Also cyber threats.
Face it if your on the battlefield and see a 72 ton monster screaming at you your gonna crap yourself alittle. also has anyone thought about making a vehicle based off the abrams thats specificaly desighned to counter fast attack craft and infantry? hell why not use a system like we have on the stryker gun system for the abrams so guys dont have to pop there heads out to fire?
The moment the first ied went off in iraq the idea of a whole army full of fast light tanks should have died.
All in all if you want to fix the bradleys problems figure out a way to make a more efficent but still powerful engine, a better way to get fuel to the front and a better way to make use of airpower
OMG finally someone with a brain in the army. let me guess they top brass is going to sideline this guys so quick cause you know they have to get their jobs from the guys that are making FCS. go mcmasters tell it like it is dont let the aristo-generals make the decision for the guys who do the real fighting on the ground.
Sintax,
Funny you should mention sidelining McMaster. He was passed over twice for Brigadier General (even after his successes in Tal Afar and work on the Counterinsurgency manual). It took GEN Petraeus going to D.C. last summer and sitting on the promotion board for him to be chosen.
McMaster’s Tal Afar XO wrote an article blasting most of the Generals for being old and slow thinkers. It seems he trains men to think and act.
The people who continue to push the idea of stand-off fights with high tech toys keep making the same mistake the OEF and OIF planners made — the enemy still gets a vote. After the ass kicking we gave the Iraqi Army in 1991 and the success the Iraqis and Taliban have had against us in recent years, how would you pick a fight with the US?
Even GEN Speakes, the guy who’s in charge of buying the army’s toys, isn’t fully convinced FCS is the end all be all. He suggested at a conference a while back that if the FCS systems can’t improve how we’re doing in Iraq and Afghanistan then we probably don’t need them.
Leave it to a cavalryman to apply a little clarity.
FCS has become a marketing paradigm.
i understand the appeal of an “agile” force, but from a design perspective it’s a reactionary solution requiring absolute situational knowledge. granted this is well above my pay-grade, but i think that the goal should be a “robust” force.
I think there is room for both visions in many respects.
Why not have a brigade or two with light tanks which can get to the war faster than everything else?
In the first Desert Storm we had a bunch of infantry in Green camo with their ass hanging out because it took so long to get the big guns into theater.
The idea that we would “transform” most of the army and get rid of our Abrams is foolish.…We still need the heavy stuff when things go really wrong and we end up in a fight with someone really nasty.…
But the idea that new technologies, which center on situational awareness and flexibility, is a good one. If everyone knows where everyone else is on the battlefield , this can only help.….
It is never a bad idea to fund new technology development.
@dennis
briefly, from my cogsci soapbox: there’s a step between sensing and awareness called integration. on this step we haven’t reached the tech development stage and we have barely broached the research phase. send money.
These ‘either or’ arguments get so old… Having a range of capabilities both heavy and light, both standoff/precision and up-in-your-face dirty is the key. Warfare has always proven largely unpredictable/unforeseeable. I liked Rummy’s ‘capabilities-based’ strategy to weapon-system acquisition. In an ever-tighter budgetary environment it seems these ‘either or’ arguments get louder when the best answer remains IMO: range of capabilities as above, just less of everything if that’s all we can afford.
I AGREE WITH THE CAVALRY COMMENT.
What is war? There is only one strategy. To win. How do we do that? Depends on the battle field. But the concept is the same. The size of your tank will not prevent the occasional disaster but in force it’s utility is the most provocative. In force, a highly adept and connected lighter force can have the same impact. But to a point. Battles are dynamic, if we allow them to be. If the enemy has time to combine, than we have to head to their maneuver. Today, we allow them to hide amongst populations. For FCS to work, we have to master population strategies and killing amongst it. Until we do this, FCS will fail. Russia showed that enmass works still today in a today environment. Fact is, we have realize when it’s time for war it means any casualty on enemy ground is a casualty of the enemy. Countries have citizens that are just as loyal their armies. We aren’t alone in this. Mass attack w/heavy weapons wins it every time and we can’t give back what we take. If we don’t wish to call another us territory, than we need to stay out of it in most cases.
The enemy gets a vote in more ways than one. What happens when our adversaries start getting a Sensor Fuzed Weapon type capability, or when ATGMs become even more lethal than they are today?
The future battle field will continue to become more lethal for heavy armor, as it does, some of the FCS capabilities like network centric intelligence collection, massing of fire power from dispersed platforms, and active defenses will become key to survival on the battlefield, even for heavy armor.
I agree with some of the previous posters: we need a range of capabilities to deal with diverse threats in a flexible way.
Once again, Donald Rumsfeld’s futuristic brain-fart runs into trouble with the real world. Big surprise.
I guess all those “old-line” Army guys who protested the attempt to eliminate heavy armored vehicles in favor of 20-ton coffins on wheels weren’t so stupid after all.
I’ve been saying the same stuff here for some time, the only difference is I take crap for it.
A few things:
Absolute situational awareness is a joke: The fog of war has been with us since the atlatal, and it will be with us for all eternity. Planning to win a war based on knowing everything about your enemy and their actions is planning to lose.
Armor doesn’t fail when your sensor net goes out.
That being said, the networked combat idea does have a lot of merits in COINOPS, as Blueforce tracker is proving in Iraq.
Let the Air Force and Navy win the war, and let the Marines and Army win the peace.
Ehh. The more correct title would have been “ONE Top Army Brain:…” The Army has quite a few of them, and I’m sure Col McMaster would agree.
One smart guy. One well-reasoned opinion. Time will tell if it is the best-reasoned opinion.
I would only caution (once again– because it bears repeating) that basing your future force planning on what is happening now seems to always mean you will be accused of fighting the last war the next time around. Combatant Command commanders only care (rightly) about what they have on their plate in the future they can see. It gives them no guarantee of insight into what might be on their plate tomorrow.
A rational person would care very much about what Col McMasters had to say about the WOT in CENTCOM. About other things, not so much.
Good Morning Folks,
It appears that few if any of the respondants to this article have bothered to read Col. H.R. McMaster’s book: “Dereliction of Duty”, a book that is on the reading lists at both Carisle and Ft. Levenworth.
In “Dereliction of Duty” Col. McMaster follows the paths of bad decisions and unsuborinated egos in both the military andin the civilian political arenas that got the U.S. involved in Vietnam. The strikling silularities with Vietnam in the decision making with Iraq is more then a coincidence. The young officers of the Army who have served in Afghanistan and Iraq feel betrayed by their superiors and the political estlabishment and are determined to see that this doesn’t happen again.
There are no big enemies out their to fight any more. The much vaulted Chinese Air Firce has less the 400 combat aircraft, the USN alone has 636 F-18’s alone. The USAF can place a nuclear weapon any place in the world at anytime, if they can locate the ordiance. The Russians are now dependant on India for their military industrial base as there economy melt down (already down 70%+).
Meanwhile the USN can’t seem to get the hang of fighting Pirates off Africa, even to the Admirals a $1.8 billion Burke Destroyer is to risky to have another USS Cole inicident. Meanwhile the French are arresting Pirates off Africa.
Thse youg offices realize that future military involments will be in the land locked former Soviet “…stans” of Central Asia and in Africa. The just released “Stabilization Manual” released a couple of weeks ago is a starting point.
In short mothers Navy and Air Force along with mother Army must change or parish. Their missions are over, their wars are history and it’s time to face the new challenges of the 21st. Century.
ALLONS,
Byron Skinner
Ok i dont want anyone to think all i think is needed are massive tanks and apc…no but we need a ballanced force that doesnt lean to much toward heavy or to much toward light units alluminum also sucks as armor.anything that turns into a horribly poisinus gas when it gets hit sucks…
as for active defenses love the idea. IDF has a system that at present can stop ATM, RPG, and other weapons and soon hopefuly will be able to feild a unit that can stop cannon rounds( not sure if this includes AP(depleted uranium, tungston etc) because of the high speed they travel. Also not sure how hard there workin on it (havent seen to many palies with t-72s though sence weve so far this year given them nearly a billion dollars i wouldnt count the state department out yet)though i expect they atleast wont cancel(no mader how much of the libs cool-aid theyve drunk) it considering how many enemies they have.
As for a fast reactions force isnt that part of the reason we have airborne, marines, etc?
I have to say a couple things about FCS I love are the UMVs both ground and air (mule and its armed counter part are awsome).And land warrior kicks a$$
In short mothers Navy and Air Force along with mother Army must change or parish. Their missions are over, their wars are history and it’s time to face the new challenges of the 21st. Century.
ALLONS,
Byron Skinner
Posted by: Byron Skinner at October 25, 2008 01:48 PM
They had that same opinion right after WW1,WW2, and korea.…soooo…
And what happens if the “much vaulted chinese airforce’ army, and navy just provide tech and support for a force like say Iran? or hell who knows what might come up next.
Individualy Nazi Germany could have taken any power around but it didnt happen that way did it?
And what happens if the supreme force the airforce suddenly finds its stealth counts for shit and it cant penetrate a enemies air defenses?
Thats the point byron YOU DONT KNOW!!!
you are a prime example of a know it all the fact that you could be wrong is impossible to you.
Valcan Try reading a history book sometime. I want you to find a full-scale superpower conflict.
cheers for the book recommendation, byron. i will put in on the list.
“The enemy gets a vote in more ways than one. What happens when our adversaries start getting a Sensor Fuzed Weapon type capability, or when ATGMs become even more lethal than they are today?
The future battle field will continue to become more lethal for heavy armor, as it does, some of the FCS capabilities like network centric intelligence collection, massing of fire power from dispersed platforms, and active defenses will become key to survival on the battlefield, even for heavy armor.
I agree with some of the previous posters: we need a range of capabilities to deal with diverse threats in a flexible way.“
I want to add another point to my earlier comments. H. R. McMaster is a Colonel strategizing about the tactical and operational level of warfare. The title X’s behind FCS need to contend with the acquisition system and associated political processes.
Hence, in their view, a desire for certain key capabilities, such as joint tactical radios and new self-propelled artillery, may have to be packaged into a larger and higher profile program, the FCS, in order to survive the acquisition process and become fielded. Later, aspects of FCS that prove less than useful or undesirable, can be traded away to protect aspects that are.
Thus, FCS is, very possibly, a political maneuver to protect key modernization programs, as it is a vision of how combat will be conducted in the future.
After losing Commanche, Crusader, and practically every other major modernization program from the Cold War era, the Army has been able to keep a remarkable number of small programs in tact since the advent of the FCS, which has given them political mass that none would have as individual programs. That political dimension, is one that someone in McMaster’s position may not fully appreciate, or like.
@citanon
i agree with you on the political necessities. all the same i wonder if it’s the right move in the current climate (post-Deepwater, election year). i can see how the bundling could make program cuts seem easy.
Posted by: Steve at October 25, 2008 04:08 PM
Hmmm.…lets see within the last 100yrs i can name a few…
before that hundreds
but i believe your refering to nucleur super powers well considering theyve only been here 60yrs thats kinda hard
ok tell me why it wont ever ever possibly happen?
if you can give me proff it would never happen i might say your right
Vilefather (is that you Roy?),
I liked your list of desired capabilities, but wonder if you realize that FCS accomplishes nearly all your items.
BTW, the Skyhook did not carry anywhere near 40 tons, nor does the CH-53K. Thirty tons would be all that was required and we are still a long ways from lifting that. A Chinook realistically with any kind of range only carries about 10 tons…which is still over 5 tons more than a V-22 in similar conditions.
Large tank-sized IFVs and Merkavas did not help Israel much in 2006.
Merkava is a good tank but is very slow has a poor power to weight ratio.
Byrons first sorry i snapped earlier but been havin a bad day i know thats no excuss but whatever.
I cant agree whith you on the idea that two or more super powers will never go against each other again. I stand by the statment that no one knows the future.
FCS is a bad program in many ways a good one in many ways also.
We need a better way to get armored units into battle. I favor the airships idea myself use a nuke reactor and rigid hull make it have a lifting body wings etc and you should get quite a large amount of lift add some missle defense and you could have a way to deploy farther forward with more troops equipment than before9and not have to worry about crossing threw other countries). It would be slower than a airlift with C-17s but it could be better just sayin.
Also not saying we cant replace the Abrams( god dont try to kill me i cry at the idea to) but at least try to develope a faster lighter tank with about the same protection and firepower.
Also stryker rocks but i think the armys kidding itself with the 105mm guns its to damn big switch to a 30mm
Hmmm.‘Deriliction of Duty’ is a good Reader’s Digest summary of the history. Most helpful as a quick reference or crib in recalling primary source information. ‘DoD’ was preceded by (IMHO) a better book of broader scope by about a decade: “Four Stars : The Inside Story of the Forty-Year Battle Between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and America’s Civilian Leaders”. As the long title indicates, it shows how the conflict between civilian and military leadership is nothing new, but was just made more tragic by the two biggest turds in the Vietnam punchbowl: Johnson and McNamara.
But lets not fall into the ‘Vietnam’ as a reference point trap here. There’s a S*itload of history before and quite a bit since then to ponder without responding with the knee-jerk tendency to relate everything to Vietnam! Vietnam! News Flash: Vietnam is only one data point in a long, long history of warfare. Get over it.
I let the slighting of LtGen Deptula slide in the article, but the laughable:
“In short mothers Navy and Air Force along with mother Army must change or parish. Their missions are over, their wars are history and it’s time to face the new challenges of the 21st. Century”…
is just too much. Did someone leave the lock off the liquor cabinet?
I would call on a Col McMaster if I had to clean out a city-size den of vermin-if there was no other way than by moving house-to-house. But if his a** was “Airpower” McMaster, like the rest of the Army couldn’t find it with both hands (and rightfully so).
But as pathetic and useless as I find most of the AF’s General Officer corps these days, Gen Deptula is a bright and shining exception to the rule. And it deserves to be mentioned that he was running a DECISIVE air campaign that probably saved thousands of soldier’s lives in the same war McMaster was a leading a Calvary Troop, and has he has been stellar ever since.
Two scholars. Two specialties. To each his own, But it seems McMaster needs to think a little more ‘joint’ as well as a little more grand-strategic– a luxury he cannot afford in his current work.
Since we seem to be signing off around here these days:
IYAAYAS!
Once again Cole shows the disingenuousness of FCS supporters. Using some BS ONE BATALLION operation as if it somehow justifies 15 FCS BRIGADES (many of which are to REPLACE current heavy forces BRIGADES). Current US heavy forces were NEVER intended to be utilized in such a way — THAT is the job of AIRBORNE INFANTRY!
The Unit of Action (UOA) is a FULLY EQUIPPED BRIGADE, not a unsupported Combined Arms Battalion (CAB). And with all the vehicles & equipment that goes with a FULLY EQUIPPED BRIGADE, the difference between what is needed to deploy a “traditional heavy Brigade” vs a FCS Brigade is not anywhere near as significant as FCS supports would have you believe.
A FCS Maneuver Brigade consists of 320+ FCS MGVs, 550+ trucks, 180+ towed vehicles & 180+
Valcan: My point is that we have yet to see a major war in the last 50 plus years. Yet, we keep preparing for one while ignoring the fact that for the past 55 years or so we have had a limited war or police action almost once a decade since then. We never seem to prepare for those.
We do need a mixed force to be prepared for the future. However, Rummie and his whiz kids reminded me way too much of McNamara in the 60’s. When I saw the Land Warrior program start up, I had bad visions of staff officers telling enlisted soldiers in the heat of combat to turn their head or weapon so they can see better or babbling in their earpiece to distract them. I was relieved to hear that when deployed to Iraq, that only leaders lugged the full suite around. They have the Marines design a new amphibious IFV. Now, while it is cool that it can zip across the ocean at tens of knots, is this really worth the design complexity? Will a Marine IFV really need this capability often? Or should the Corps just focus on designing an IFV to fight on land and land via ACV or LCV?
This “transformation” theory seems flawed. Like others have pointed out it all depends on perfect situational awareness and complicated systems. What happens if the enemy jams the network? What if the network gets hacked? Air support is great, until something comes along to bone it, weather, smoke, or proximity to friendly troops.
I’d much rather see us take a lesson from the Roman Army. I’d like to see a force capable of deploying anywhere and being able to support itself. I’d like to see a military that can set up it’s own bases and feed itself instead of relying on contractors. That’s more of the transformation we need.
@steve
re: marine IFV
i think that the IFV is at once a poor example to explain your point and a great implementation of the planning you’re advocating.
the reasoning behind the IFV is to “threaten” a coastal area such that it suppresses militant activity. the design accomplishes this by being fast enough to stay far enough away from the coast that it doesn’t impact everyday activity but is lurking in wait to intercept terror “of opportunity”. it is a solution straight out of the police department bible — the sticking point was the crown vic wouldn’t stay afloat and they didn’t want to wait for backup. the IFV is not for storming the beaches, it’s for exactly the kind of conflict that, as you remark, we seem to encounter every decade.
contract creep? sure. did the program throw good money at bad work? maybe. is an amphibious vehicle burdensome tech for a war we’ve never fought? absolutely not.
i feel like the navy’s LCS is a stronger program than FCS in this context, but i’ll shut up now at the risk of stirring an off-topic pot.
Cole,
BECAUSE IT IS NOT JUST 320+ FCS MGVs!
It is 320+ FCS MGVs, 550+ trucks, 180+ towed vehicles & 180+
Good Morning Folks,
I don’t know how many of you caught it but the USN on cue supported what Colonel McMasters is talking about.
In an earlier replay I brought up the “Cole” effect on the navy and the unwillingless to put at risk a $1.8 billion Burke Class Destroyer to fight Pirates. Well the Navy has acted and hired “Blackwater” to conduct anti-piracy operations off Africa.
A retired naval officer whom I see for lunch once in awhile puts it more bluntly. “The saliors of the USN don’t consider themslves as combatnats anymore, but rather technicians.” When ask about SEALS, a subject being a fromer ambhibious warfare officer, he knows a lot about, his replay is how many SEALS have been killed in the current war?
I guess the question that begs to be answered is, are we buying to any uber-expensive weaponssystems that are not to be put at risk execpt other weapon systems of equal value, which of course don’t exist.
ALLONS,
Byron
“Stewart’s Platoon”
Byron: Excellent point. I mean it’s great we have carriers and super high tech frigates, but, what’s the point of spending billions if we shy away from a bunch of dirtbags in an open boat? Are we really at the point now where we can’t deal with the simple stuff?
unmannedanimal: We could go back and forth on this one. While I like the Marines to remain amphibious. How many compromises were made to the EFV to get it to swim so fast? Would it be better to give it some amphib capability, but, to plan on getting it to shore via LCV or ACV most of the time? Wouldn’t it make more sense to focus on it’s mission when it gets to shore? I’m asking not telling. The Corps concerns me the most because traditionally they get crapped on when it comes to procurement funds.
It’s nice to see a General rock the boat a little.
i hear you, steve. thankfully (for us all!) i don’t make those decisions.
re: pirates
this is the navy’s asymmetric challenge. INSURV starts open sea trials with the Freedom at norfolk early enough in 2009 to accept the Independence in march. efforts to bring them out faster were disastrous. the lcs IS the navy’s response to the loss of the Cole — there is no need to repeat the loss of a missile-defense cruiser with the ship-building industry in its current state and the appropriate tool on our doorstep. the blue-water navy of the 90s relied on allies to cover the small stuff; now we have to do it ourselves.
I used to wonder why two of these were rotting in New Bedford harbor when I was growing up. It looks like they would come in handy about now.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asheville_class_gunboat
Type # Heavy BCT Type # FCS BCT
M1A2 60 70 tons MCS 60 27 tons
M2A3 80 37 tons Inf Car 102 27 tons
M113 En 53 15 tons n/a n/a n/a
Mortar 14 15 tons Mortar 24 27 tons
M109A6 16 33 tons Cannon 18 27 tons
M3A3 40 37 tons Scout 30 27 tons
C2V 44 15 tons C2V 49 27 tons
Medical ? 15 tons Medical 29 27 tons
Recovery 27 60 tons Recovery 10 27 tons
———————————————
Heavy BCT: 334 vehicles requiring 183 C-17s @ 69.66 average tons per sortie
FCS BCT: 322 vehicles requiring 108 C-17 @ 81 average tons per sortie
———————————————
Pfcem continues to cite a flawed CBO study that distorted deployment requirements and made inaccurate assumptions about airlift averages per BCT. The chart above illustrates the real numbers and types of vehicles in each BCT from that study.
Note that while the CBO ASSUMED an average lift per sortie of 60 tons for the heavy BCT and only 50–55 tons per sortie for the FCS unit to make them look similar…the reality is that armored vehicles for the FCS BCT have a higher, not lesser, tonnage per sortie than the heavy BCT.
Trucks for both BCTs should average about the same which means average tons per sortie for similar trucks should be nearly identical. BUT, the heavy BCT requires far more fuel trucks to air deploy due to higher fuel consumption.
That means that even airlifting
The mistake being made is marrying one idea over another. Combat is not a one wrench fits all. We need pieces and parts of all the weapons systems and technology. They can me used like a buffet. Take what you need from all aspects of all weapons. Why throw out either one?
If anyone out there is still paying attention to this piece anymore…
The McMaster piece does not take a position for or against FCS vs the existing inventory of Abrams & Bradleys.
He does criticize the proposed organization of the Future Brigade Combat Teams & says that it is ignoring the experience of Modular Force brigades in Iraq & A-stan.
Although he does mention it by name, it is clear from the context that he disgrees that a Light Brigade, for example, includes 2 infantry battalions & a recon squadron rather than 3 infantry battalions.
The idea that McMaster is pushing is that it is you need firepower for the close in fight. Recon does not, in the real world, always enable you to outmaneuver the other side or destroy him with air power & artillery. Whether that firepower consists of lighter wheeled vehicles or heavier tracked vehicles is a separate issue.
Isn’t the Stryker MGS able to be airlifted into a combat zone? Isn’t the Airborne, Ranger and Air-Assault units quickly deployable, 18 hrs, wheels up and gone? The 2–327, 101st was 36 hrs, don’t we have enough of a mix now of light and Stryker brigades? No way would I part with our heavy armor. Isn’t there pre-positioning of heavy armor and artillery? I agree with Col. Mc Master, he’s been right way more than he’s been wrong. We have to watch where we put our defense money. The Comanche and Crusader are not needed, money should be spent on airlift capabilities-and a NEW carbine. Get rid of the direct gas system, it sux.
I think that a lot of great points have been made here. The ones I most agree with have me sitting in the center of the argument.
FOR FCS: I think the FCS program provides some nice spiral technology that can play a key role in current and future conflicts. It allows us to improve and enhance our ability gather and provide information (not intelligence) rapidly across the battlefield. I think that we should continue to delvelop these aspects of the program.
AGAINST FCS: I would not trade the Abrams for any vehicle I have seen in the FCS program. I don’t think there are many vehicles on the ground that are as intimidating or survivable.
Ultimately I think we need balance (light, medium, heavy). I think we need to continue to develop technology, realizing we need to be able all forms of enemies.
MAJ Mack
ILE, FT Leavenworth