Comments on: Top Army Brain: FCS, “Transformation” Wrong Path

By: mack

mack — Fri, 14 Nov 2008 00:23:44 +0000

I think that a lot of great points have been made here. The ones I most agree with have me sitting in the center of the argument.
FOR FCS: I think the FCS program provides some nice spiral technology that can play a key role in current and future conflicts. It allows us to improve and enhance our ability gather and provide information (not intelligence) rapidly across the battlefield. I think that we should continue to delvelop these aspects of the program.
AGAINST FCS: I would not trade the Abrams for any vehicle I have seen in the FCS program. I don’t think there are many vehicles on the ground that are as intimidating or survivable.
Ultimately I think we need balance (light, medium, heavy). I think we need to continue to develop technology, realizing we need to be able all forms of enemies.
MAJ Mack
ILE, FT Leavenworth

By: Rhyno2-327

Rhyno2-327 — Fri, 31 Oct 2008 13:34:21 +0000

Isn’t the Stryker MGS able to be airlifted into a combat zone? Isn’t the Airborne, Ranger and Air-Assault units quickly deployable, 18 hrs, wheels up and gone? The 2–327, 101st was 36 hrs, don’t we have enough of a mix now of light and Stryker brigades? No way would I part with our heavy armor. Isn’t there pre-positioning of heavy armor and artillery? I agree with Col. Mc Master, he’s been right way more than he’s been wrong. We have to watch where we put our defense money. The Comanche and Crusader are not needed, money should be spent on airlift capabilities-and a NEW carbine. Get rid of the direct gas system, it sux.

By: Will

Will — Wed, 29 Oct 2008 17:19:03 +0000

If anyone out there is still paying attention to this piece anymore…
The McMaster piece does not take a position for or against FCS vs the existing inventory of Abrams & Bradleys.
He does criticize the proposed organization of the Future Brigade Combat Teams & says that it is ignoring the experience of Modular Force brigades in Iraq & A-stan.
Although he does mention it by name, it is clear from the context that he disgrees that a Light Brigade, for example, includes 2 infantry battalions & a recon squadron rather than 3 infantry battalions.
The idea that McMaster is pushing is that it is you need firepower for the close in fight. Recon does not, in the real world, always enable you to outmaneuver the other side or destroy him with air power & artillery. Whether that firepower consists of lighter wheeled vehicles or heavier tracked vehicles is a separate issue.

By: Shane

Shane — Tue, 28 Oct 2008 14:35:41 +0000

The mistake being made is marrying one idea over another. Combat is not a one wrench fits all. We need pieces and parts of all the weapons systems and technology. They can me used like a buffet. Take what you need from all aspects of all weapons. Why throw out either one?

By: Cole

Cole — Tue, 28 Oct 2008 06:32:30 +0000

Type # Heavy BCT Type # FCS BCT
M1A2 60 70 tons MCS 60 27 tons
M2A3 80 37 tons Inf Car 102 27 tons
M113 En 53 15 tons n/a n/a n/a
Mortar 14 15 tons Mortar 24 27 tons
M109A6 16 33 tons Cannon 18 27 tons
M3A3 40 37 tons Scout 30 27 tons
C2V 44 15 tons C2V 49 27 tons
Medical ? 15 tons Medical 29 27 tons
Recovery 27 60 tons Recovery 10 27 tons
———————————————
Heavy BCT: 334 vehicles requiring 183 C-17s @ 69.66 average tons per sortie
FCS BCT: 322 vehicles requiring 108 C-17 @ 81 average tons per sortie
———————————————
Pfcem continues to cite a flawed CBO study that distorted deployment requirements and made inaccurate assumptions about airlift averages per BCT. The chart above illustrates the real numbers and types of vehicles in each BCT from that study.
Note that while the CBO ASSUMED an average lift per sortie of 60 tons for the heavy BCT and only 50–55 tons per sortie for the FCS unit to make them look similar…the reality is that armored vehicles for the FCS BCT have a higher, not lesser, tonnage per sortie than the heavy BCT.
Trucks for both BCTs should average about the same which means average tons per sortie for similar trucks should be nearly identical. BUT, the heavy BCT requires far more fuel trucks to air deploy due to higher fuel consumption.
That means that even airlifting

By: Steve

Steve — Tue, 28 Oct 2008 00:44:05 +0000

I used to wonder why two of these were rotting in New Bedford harbor when I was growing up. It looks like they would come in handy about now.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asheville_class_gunboat

By: unmannedanimal

unmannedanimal — Mon, 27 Oct 2008 23:35:22 +0000

i hear you, steve. thankfully (for us all!) i don’t make those decisions.
re: pirates
this is the navy’s asymmetric challenge. INSURV starts open sea trials with the Freedom at norfolk early enough in 2009 to accept the Independence in march. efforts to bring them out faster were disastrous. the lcs IS the navy’s response to the loss of the Cole — there is no need to repeat the loss of a missile-defense cruiser with the ship-building industry in its current state and the appropriate tool on our doorstep. the blue-water navy of the 90s relied on allies to cover the small stuff; now we have to do it ourselves.

By: Steve

Steve — Mon, 27 Oct 2008 19:56:59 +0000

Byron: Excellent point. I mean it’s great we have carriers and super high tech frigates, but, what’s the point of spending billions if we shy away from a bunch of dirtbags in an open boat? Are we really at the point now where we can’t deal with the simple stuff?
unmannedanimal: We could go back and forth on this one. While I like the Marines to remain amphibious. How many compromises were made to the EFV to get it to swim so fast? Would it be better to give it some amphib capability, but, to plan on getting it to shore via LCV or ACV most of the time? Wouldn’t it make more sense to focus on it’s mission when it gets to shore? I’m asking not telling. The Corps concerns me the most because traditionally they get crapped on when it comes to procurement funds.
It’s nice to see a General rock the boat a little.

By: Byron Skinner

Byron Skinner — Mon, 27 Oct 2008 18:49:50 +0000

Good Morning Folks,
I don’t know how many of you caught it but the USN on cue supported what Colonel McMasters is talking about.
In an earlier replay I brought up the “Cole” effect on the navy and the unwillingless to put at risk a $1.8 billion Burke Class Destroyer to fight Pirates. Well the Navy has acted and hired “Blackwater” to conduct anti-piracy operations off Africa.
A retired naval officer whom I see for lunch once in awhile puts it more bluntly. “The saliors of the USN don’t consider themslves as combatnats anymore, but rather technicians.” When ask about SEALS, a subject being a fromer ambhibious warfare officer, he knows a lot about, his replay is how many SEALS have been killed in the current war?
I guess the question that begs to be answered is, are we buying to any uber-expensive weaponssystems that are not to be put at risk execpt other weapon systems of equal value, which of course don’t exist.
ALLONS,
Byron
“Stewart’s Platoon”

By: pfcem

pfcem — Mon, 27 Oct 2008 06:02:28 +0000

Cole,
BECAUSE IT IS NOT JUST 320+ FCS MGVs!
It is 320+ FCS MGVs, 550+ trucks, 180+ towed vehicles & 180+