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Archive for December, 2008

The H&K IAR Revealed

Tuesday, December 30th, 2008

H&K-IAR-web.jpg

I just got some infor­ma­tion on the Heckler and Koch bid for the Marine Corps Infantry Automatic Rifle.

You can see the pic­ture here and below, check out the stats:
IAR specs

To me, it basi­cally looks like a 416 with a longer bar­rel and more robust butt stock. I will say that troops love the H&K box mag­a­zines for their lack of hangups in when feed­ing on burst fire.

Thing is, I hope the deck isn’t stacked against FN and H&K because of Colt’s sub­mis­sion of two weapons. I have absolutely noth­ing against Colt or its IAR vari­ants (though for some rea­son they declined to pro­vide me with any details of their weapons for DT or Military​.com), I just for once want to see a free and fair com­pe­ti­tion for the Corps’ new ver­sion of the BAR (though in 5.56, much to many’s chagrin)…Without any ole boy net­work­ing or bias.

We’ll see though, huh?

– Christian

The Little Bot that Could

Tuesday, December 30th, 2008

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Here’s a pretty inter­est­ing piece of defense tech sent over by DT reader Travis the other day about an inno­v­a­tive mast sys­tem that can be used in unmanned ground vehi­cles that allows the diminu­tive bots to see over high walls.

The so called Situational Awareness Mast uses a patented inter­lock sys­tem that dif­fer­en­ti­ates it from tele­scop­ing masts that take up a lot of room and weight when stowed, thereby lim­it­ing their exten­sion height.

Here’s what Hizook blog said about it…

The Situational Awareness Mast (SAM, also known as a Zipper Mast) from Geosystems Inc. is a tele­scop­ing lin­ear actu­a­tor that has a unique prop­erty — it’s stroke length is an order of mag­ni­tude greater than its nom­i­nal height! For exam­ple, the SAM8 is a 10 lb device with a stroke length (8ft) that is 24 times it’s nom­i­nal height (4 inches)! This can be used to ver­ti­cally trans­late a robot’s sen­sor suite for bet­ter vis­i­bil­ity while still allow­ing for a low pro­file. Read on for infor­ma­tion on the dif­fer­ent Zipper Mast vari­ants, the patent describ­ing the sys­tem, and an exclu­sive video of a Zipper Mast on an iRo­bot Packbot!

Be sure to check out Hizook for more details on how Geosystems accom­plishes the low-​​profile boom. They’ve got pics from the patent and other schemat­ics. As with UAVs, UGVs are begin­ning to come into their own and I know from per­sonal expe­ri­ence they’re a poten­tial life­saver on a bat­tle­field strewn with IEDs, mines and other boo­bie traps.

And here’s a video of the sys­tem that best explains how it works.

Geosystems Situational Awareness Mast (aka Zippermast) from Travis on Vimeo

– Christian

Keeping Marines Off the Beach

Monday, December 29th, 2008

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As the new admin­is­tra­tion takes office, the defense bud­get will come under exten­sive scrutiny. A recent edi­to­r­ial in The New York Times enti­tled “How to Pay for a 21st-​​Century Military” calls for a halt to the F-​​22 Raptor fighter, the DDG 1000 Zumwalt–class destroyer, SSN 688 Virginia–class sub­marines, and MV-​​22 Osprey pro­grams, among others. 

Some “big dol­lar” pro­grams could be cut, in part to demon­strate the seri­ous­ness of the Obama admin­is­tra­tion to reform the U.S. mil­i­tary establishment. But there will be many pro­grams at risk that have less vis­i­bil­ity. One of the lead­ing can­di­dates for can­cel­la­tion is the long-​​gestating Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV), the advanced “amtrac” that has been under devel­op­ment for almost two decades. 

The Marine Corps now has ten of the EFVs — that des­ig­na­tion being assigned in 2003 to replace the more pro­saic but use­ful AAAV — Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle, which in turn replaced the LVT — Landing vehi­cle Tracked — des­ig­na­tion in 1982. 

The EFV can carry 17 Marines on land or sea, at a speed up to 45 mph on land and about 25 knots at sea.  The EFVs range is 325 miles on land and 65 nau­ti­cal miles at sea. 

But those spec­i­fi­ca­tions are the “rub.” How does the EFV fit into the Marines Corps con­cept of Operational Maneuver From The Sea (OMFTS)? That con­cept calls for launch­ing an assault from 25 to 100 nau­ti­cal miles from the objec­tive — which may be an inland loca­tion, such as an air­field, cap­i­tal, or mil­i­tary base. Recent stud­ies by the Defense Science Board (DSB) and Naval Research Advisory Committee (NRAC) call for amphibi­ous ships to stand off­shore at least 50 miles because of the threat of land-​​launched cruise mis­siles (as struck the Israeli frigate Hanit oper­at­ing off the Lebanese coast in 2006). 

Thus, launch­ing an assault from 25 or more nau­ti­cal miles off­shore would see the assault troops flown in by MV-​​22 tilt-​​rotor STOVL air­craft and CH-​​46E and CH-​​53E heli­copters, the for­mer at more than 300 mph and the heli­copters at more than 100 mph. And, of course, they could land troops on an inland objective. 

Follow-​​up equip­ment that was not air landed would be brought ashore by Air Cushion Landing Craft (ACLC), with a new design being devel­oped, and the few remain­ing LCU land­ing craft. 

Where does the EFV fit in? It can­not be launched from more than about 30 miles off­shore because of its lim­ited water­borne range if it is to return to the launch­ing ship; it could be launched far­ther out if it is to then climb ashore and oper­ate as a per­son­nel car­rier. And, even at 30 miles the tran­sit time would be more than an hour, or longer if the seas are rough. If too rough, of course, the EFVs could not be employed.

(more…)

The Rule of Thumbs

Monday, December 29th, 2008

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No one would dis­pute how con­ve­nient thumb dri­ves are, or how theyve made the trans­fer of files form one machine to another so easy. These dri­ves offer numer­ous advan­tages over other portable stor­age devices. They are more com­pact, and oper­ate much faster. The new thumb dri­ves using USB 2.0 oper­ate faster than an opti­cal disc drive, while stor­ing a larger amount of data in a much smaller space.

They also have no mov­ing parts, mak­ing them more robust than mechan­i­cal hard dri­ves. These types of dri­ves use the USB mass stor­age stan­dard, sup­ported by mod­ern oper­at­ing sys­tems such as Windows, Mac OS X, Linux, and other Unix-​​like sys­tems. However, that con­ve­nience comes with risk.

FACT: The flash-​​memory mar­ket was until recently one of the fastest-​​growing seg­ments of the global semi­con­duc­tor indus­try. The total world­wide rev­enue of the mar­ket in 2008 is esti­mated to be about $12 billion.

The recent news of this sig­nif­i­cant cyber inci­dent at the Pentagon has called into ques­tion the use of thumb dri­ves. According to one report, senior mil­i­tary lead­ers said the mal­ware infec­tion inci­dent affected the U.S. Central Command net­works. This inci­dent included sys­tems both in the head­quar­ters and in the com­bat zones. Thumb dri­ves are report­edly banned within the U.S. Department of Defense. The ban comes after they were iden­ti­fied as the most likely point of com­pro­mise that trans­ferred what has been termed a global virus accord­ing to Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman. Inside sources leaked a mes­sage dis­trib­uted to employ­ees say­ing that all flash dri­ves, whether pur­chased or pro­vided by the Department of Defense, would be confiscated.

This is a prob­lem not just for DoD, but for all com­puter users, so tell us about your use of thumb dri­ves.

Kevin Coleman

More Drilling Down on the NYT

Wednesday, December 24th, 2008

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This was for­warded to us by our friend Winslow Wheeler who writes:

With a Comptroller, William Lynn, who out­did all of his pre­de­ces­sors and suc­ces­sors with the most pop­u­lous and pre­pos­ter­ous bud­get gim­micks post-​​Cold War Pentagon spend­ing has seen, with a level of spend­ing that out-​​did the plan left on the table by that penny-​​pincher Defense Secretary Richard Cheney, and a level of shrunken, aging forces unready to fight, the Clinton era was the absolute low for post-​​World War II Pentagon man­age­ment, up to then. That it was out­done by the man­gling of the Bush years — even today — is no rea­son to think that a return to the pre­cepts of Clinton-​​esque defense think­ing is a good idea.

The New York Times would seem to dis­agree. While it does not say so explic­itly, the Times’ edi­to­r­ial of December 21, “How to Pay for a 21st Century Military,” artic­u­lates all the shal­low, even gimmick-​​laden, think­ing about DOD man­age­ment that char­ac­ter­ized the Clinton era in the Pentagon in the 1990s. To some it will sound good, if you are unfa­mil­iar with the more detailed facts buried under piles of press releases from think-​​tanks, mem­bers of Congress, and man­u­fac­turer brochures, but what the NY Times is really advo­cat­ing is busi­ness as usual with a cos­metic veneer of reform.

This argu­ment is clearly and strongly artic­u­lated by a Pentagon insider who has seen it all before and who has demon­strated fre­quently the char­ac­ter and insight to call it as it is. Franklin (“Chuck”) Spinney wrote for “CounterPunch” an impor­tant and infor­ma­tive analy­sis of the NY Times’ vision of the past guised as Pentagon reform for the 21st Century. Here it is:

Hackneyed Thinking and the Status Quo

The New York Times Flames Out in Defense Dogfight

By CHUCK SPINNEY
Counterpunch (http://​www​.coun​ter​punch​.org/​s​p​i​n​n​e​y​1​2​2​3​2​0​0​8​.​h​tml)

The 21 Dec 2008 edi­to­r­ial in The New York Times, “How To Pay For A 21st-​​Century Military” pur­ports to advo­cate tough-​​minded prag­ma­tism to reform a Pentagon that is clearly out of con­trol. Yet its logic is really another exam­ple of the kind of hack­neyed think­ing that serves to pro­tect the sta­tus quo. It also sug­gests indi­rectly why the main­stream media are in such trouble.

The edi­tors of the Times present a cut list that includes ter­mi­nat­ing the F-​​22, the DDG-​​1000, the Virginia class attack sub­ma­rine, the V-​​22 Osprey, halt­ing pre­ma­ture deploy­ment (not R&D) on bal­lis­tic mis­sile defense, cut­ting nuclear weapons, de-​​alerting nuclear weapons, cut­ting two air wings from the active Air Force, and cut­ting one car­rier from the Navy. Some of these rec­om­men­da­tions make a lot of sense, but even if one assumes unre­al­is­ti­cally that there is no cost growth else­where and there are no con­tract ter­mi­na­tion costs or base clos­ing costs, the cut­backs would “save” $20 to $25 bil­lion. While $25 bil­lion may sound impres­sive, bear in mind, the upcom­ing Defense Department’s core bud­get could be as high as $580 bil­lion in Fiscal Year 2010, accord­ing to news reports.

Put another way, even if we believe in the van­ish­ingly small prob­a­bil­ity of a best case sce­nario with no cost growth or con­tract ter­mi­na­tion costs, these cuts would reduce the defense bud­get Mr. Obama is about to inherit by only a lit­tle over four per cent — and that would be a reduc­tion from a bud­get level that the edi­tors say is bloated, because the defense bud­get was increased reck­lessly by 40 per cent in inflation-​​adjusted terms since 2001 (not includ­ing the costs of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan).

Furthermore, the edi­tors at the Times do not even want to pass on this pid­dling amount to the tax­pay­ers or Mr. Obama’s infra­struc­ture pro­gram, because they say that the “sav­ings” should be plowed back into the Pentagon to increase the size of the Army and Marine ground forces, to buy the Navy’s lit­toral com­bat ship, and to resup­ply the National Guard and Reserve forces. But then they con­clude by observ­ing that the era of unlim­ited bud­gets is over and that Secretary Gates must make pro­cure­ment reform a priority.

This is very pecu­liar logic. And it is made even more bizarre by what the edi­tors of the Times did not say. Consider please just a few things they for­got to mention:

(more…)

President Bush Reflects

Wednesday, December 24th, 2008

From all of us here at Defense Tech, we’d like to wish you all a merry Christmas.

– Christian

SOCOM Pack Program Winners

Wednesday, December 24th, 2008

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While there still is no offi­cial announce­ment, Granite Gear and their part­ner Montgomery Marketing Inc have announced that they have cap­tured at least some of the SOCOM Pack pro­gram. Two packs were out for com­pe­ti­tion and they have won the Patrol Pack cat­e­gory with their 2400 cubic inch Raid pack and they will begin man­u­fac­tur­ing within 60 days.

Mystery Ranch, long thought to be the leader in the large Recce Ruck cat­e­gory has won and will be offer­ing a cus­tom design based on their inter­nal frame technology.

Congratulations to both Granite Tactical and Mystery Ranch!

The Granite Tactical Gear line is cur­rently avail­able from Extreme Outfitters. Mystery Ranch infor­ma­tion can be accessed here.

Picture from Extreme Outfitters.

Soldier Systems

Multicam on the Loose

Tuesday, December 23rd, 2008

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I just took a closer look at the pic­ture I used for the post on SOF surge in Afghanistan. Am I see­ing what I think I’m seeing?

Here’s the cap­tion that accom­pa­nied the pic­ture on the Army’s own Web site:

Detachment in Afghanistan

Photo by Sgt. David N. Gunn

December 15, 2008

Members of Operational Detachment Alpha 3336 of the 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne) recon the remote Shok Valley of Afghanistan where they fought an almost seven-​​hour bat­tle with ter­ror­ists in a remote moun­tain­side village.

Awesome!

– Christian

Commando Surge for The Stan

Tuesday, December 23rd, 2008

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My boy Gordon Lubold called me and told my his paper, the Christian Science Monitor, finally ran his story on a surge of SF for Afghanistan and the inter­nal debates going on within the com­mu­nity that the cur­rent com­mando force isn’t being used prop­erly, so why send more…

My take is that spe­cial oper­a­tions forces are the best way to mit­i­gate the impact of a “surge” in Afghanistan on the Afghan peo­ple. I’d rather have more cul­tur­ally astute com­man­dos rub­bing shoul­ders with xeno­pho­bic Afghans than some spe­cial­ist from the 10th Mountain Division.

Let’s see how Gordon reports it…

The Pentagon is likely to send up to 20 Special Forces teams to Afghanistan this spring, part of a new long-​​term strat­egy to boost the Afghan secu­rity forces’ abil­ity to counter the insur­gency there themselves.

The “surge” of elite Special Forces units would rep­re­sent a mul­ti­year effort aimed at strength­en­ing the Afghan National Army and police units that the US sees as key to build­ing up Afghanistan’s secu­rity inde­pen­dence, say defense offi­cials who asked to remain anony­mous because the con­tro­ver­sial deci­sion has not yet been announced. The US already plans to send thou­sands of addi­tional con­ven­tional forces to Afghanistan some­time next year. But it is ham­strung by lim­ited avail­abil­ity since so many of those forces are still in Iraq.

The deploy­ment of the Green Berets, the inde­pen­dent, mul­ti­fac­eted force skilled at train­ing indige­nous forces, could fill crit­i­cal gaps in Afghanistan almost imme­di­ately, defense offi­cials say.…

…However, the pro­posal is con­tro­ver­sial. The plan is being pushed by Lt. Gen. Doug Lute, the so-​​called war czar under President Bush, who is poised to release a set of rec­om­men­da­tions for how to reverse the dete­ri­o­rat­ing secu­rity sit­u­a­tion in Afghanistan in com­ing days. Defense offi­cials say General Lute believes the deploy­ment of the Green Berets could go a long way toward mak­ing up for a sig­nif­i­cant short­fall in the num­ber of troops needed in the region.

Yet many within the tightly knit Special Forces com­mu­nity say the Special Forces teams already in use in Afghanistan should be employed far more effec­tively before any new teams, which num­ber about a dozen men each, are deployed.

“I just don’t think it’s a very good use of the units if they are not going to be doing com­bat advis­ing in an effec­tive way,” says one Special Forces offi­cer with recent expe­ri­ence in Afghanistan. “I don’t know any Special Forces who think that’s really what we need over there.”

“Textbook” oper­a­tions for Special Forces dic­tates that the 12-​​man teams, known as Operational Detachment Alpha teams, or ODAs, should be paired with units of at least a few hun­dred Afghan secu­rity force soldiers.

But in many cases, the Green Berets are paired with much smaller groups of Afghan forces, some­times even one-​​on-​​one. In other cases, they are used to man check­points, say some Special Forces officers.

Critics worry that Lute’s plan is to sim­ply send more Special Forces units to Afghanistan with­out a coher­ent plan to sup­port them. “Don’t just throw ODAs out there as an answer,” says another senior offi­cer. “That’s just the easy, lazy answer out there.”

There are other gripes with the way the teams now deployed to Afghanistan are being used.

Too few of the Special Forces teams are part­nered with Afghan forces for longer than, say, a month at a time, cre­at­ing an unsus­tain­able and unpro­duc­tive train­ing rela­tion­ship that runs counter to Special Forces doctrine.

Special Forces offi­cers blame the prob­lems on a lack of a coher­ent strat­egy for using the Green Berets in Afghanistan. Others say some Special Forces teams oper­ate under NATO com­man­ders from other coun­tries and don’t know how to employ the teams properly.

Perhaps most sig­nif­i­cant, Special Forces offi­cers and experts say it would be a waste of time and resources to send addi­tional Special Forces teams to Afghanistan unless there is a “surge” of heli­copters, remote-​​controlled air­craft for sur­veilling the enemy, and other “enablers” to allow the teams that are there now to be more effective.

Roger Carstens, a retired Special Forces offi­cer who is now a senior fel­low at the Center for a New American Security, a think tank in Washington, vis­ited Afghanistan a cou­ple months ago and asked mem­bers of the Special Forces com­mu­nity what they thought about “surg­ing” Special Operations Forces.

“Everyone of them said ‘no SOF surge,’” he says. “What they need is an enabler surge and endur­ing part­ner­ships with Afghan mil­i­tary and police units,” he says.

Adm. Eric Olson, the senior com­man­der of US Special Operations Command, Tampa, Fla., is expected to con­vey the con­cerns of the spe­cial oper­a­tions com­mu­nity to Gen. David Petraeus, the new com­man­der of US Central Command.

The pro­posal would also include the cre­ation of a new Special Forces com­mand posi­tion, to be filled by a one-​​star gen­eral in Afghanistan this spring, whose job it will be to mar­shal resources to ensure the Special Forces units are employed properly.

The Afghan National Army, the pride of the country’s bud­ding national secu­rity appa­ra­tus, and the Afghan National Police, which is still seen as largely cor­rupt and weaker, need help to build up into a larger, more effec­tive force.

Ultimately, the US would like to see at least 134,000 sol­diers trained and ready to pro­vide for their own country’s security.

But train­ers have been hard to come by, and the mix of for­eign and US forces has muted the train­ing effort, US defense offi­cials say.

– Christian

Iraq Success

Tuesday, December 23rd, 2008

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Can we please now say that the “Cut and Run”-ers were dead wrong. That America could be suc­cess­ful in Iraq and that it wasn’t the Sunnis who did it; it was Americans who sup­ported an unpop­u­lar “surge” strat­egy that proved to be the real solu­tion to the secu­rity problem…

American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON — The num­ber of daily attacks in Iraq has dropped nearly 95 per­cent since last year, a U.S. mil­i­tary offi­cial said yesterday.

Iraq suf­fered an aver­age of 180 attacks per day this time last year. But over the past week, the aver­age num­ber was 10, Army Brig. Gen. David G. Perkins, a Multi-​​National Force Iraq spokesman, said.

“This is a dra­matic improve­ment of safety through­out the coun­try,” Perkins told reporters dur­ing a wide-​​ranging news con­fer­ence in Baghdad yesterday.

He added that the country’s mur­der rates have dropped below lev­els that existed before the start of American oper­a­tions in Iraq. In November, the ratio was 0.9 per 100,000 people. 

– Christian