Our good friend Winslow Wheeler and his colleagues at the Center for Defense Information have just released a new book examining the jacked up policies that govern the Pentagon’s spending plans and proposing new alternatives to the current array of programs and strategic concepts.
I haven’t even gotten close to decoding the work, but our boy Steve Trimble over at the DEW Line blog pulled this gem from the tome.
Pierre Sprey — father of the A-10, co-father of the F-16 and ardent F-22/F-35 critic — has teamed up with ex-Vietnam fighter jock Col Robert Dilger to propose a fascinating vision for an “effectiveness-based” airpower fleet. (Read more here, pp 159–162)
I’ll take a closer look at the work today and get back with some more of my own takeaways. Also, feel free to mention some of your own and I’ll feature them here.
– Christian
The A-10 is a beautiful aircraft, especially if you see it flying overhead while your pounding your boots on the ground. One of the most unappreciated weapons ever put to the air by the airforce.
Cheap, simple and kicks major ass…we need more weapons like that.
Also, agreed we need more FAC planes. Its been a long neglected area of operation. Having a FAC controller to zero those A-10’s and attack helo’s can be a real force multiplier for the guys on the ground especially in urban terrain.
Now that looks like a plan I could stand behind. A few hundred over the top aircraft for first day air combat and knocking out radar, SAM, etc. Then hundreds and hundreds of smaller faster fighter/bombers able to defend themselves in the air and strike targets we need hit, followed by over a thosand ground attack air craft cleaning everything that moves off the battlefield. Meanwhile hundreds and hundreds of transport aircraft are landing on dirt roads off loading thosands of troops and and Megatons in equipment.
Obviously there is some specialty stuff that needs to be maintained that is missing here, but most if not all that stuff is already in stock we just have to keep them on the books.
Holy Hell…4,000 A-10s, now that’s “thinking outside the box”!
Good luck, the Air Force is enamored with fighter aircraft.…they tried to wash their hands of the A-10.…such an incredible aircraft and yet they treat it like a bastard stepchild.…..the fighter mafia lives.…
Wouldn’t clean F-16’s dedicated to air superiority with AESA radars knock down most anything else flying? Wondering.
Where are the UAV’s?
The lack of them in that list just furthers my suspicion that this is just a couple of old men saying “boy, if I were in charge things would be different!“
There are good points, however, but the force they want is ridiculous. The F-35 is much more capable and survivable than a “smaller, faster F-16″. 500 F-35’s would be superior to the 1,000 mini-vipers they want at anything heavier than what we’re facing now, and would be devastated if terrorists ever got smart enough to buy MANPADS.
I think Sprey and Dilger are nostalgic for the squadron life of their youth with thousands of Sabres and Thunderstreaks across the US and Europe. Going back to a large low-tech organization would be contrary to every technical trend in the western world over the past 60 years. Do you see auto companies bringing back armies of welders to replace robots on their assembly lines? Or legions of postal employees replacing sorting robots at postal plants? No, because technology is an amazing force multiplier, and the manpower needed to return to that system or operate a fleet of thousands of aircraft is no longer possible.
These people need to be commited to a mental institution. They had some great ideas 3–4 DECADES ago but now they are sad, old & senile people who have not kept up with the times.
Just look how wrong they have proven to be concerning the flight performance of the F-22 (& WILL be so concerning the F-35 as well)…
The most disturbing part of this BS is even with a good as the F-22 is, 183 of them are not enough to provide air cover for all these dedicated ground attack units (which stand no change vs any kind of modern enemy airpower ground-based air defenses). Don’t give me any BS that the 1,100 ‘smaller, faster F-16s’ can provide air cover. And 200 ‘A-35′ are not enough true strike aircraft…
Their “ideas” are quite simply a step BACKWORDS. Akin to fighting Desert Storm with a Vietnam-era force &/or fighting Vietnam with a WWII-era force.
This is the kind of thinking I can agree with. I have never supported the idea that every tactical aircraft the US military puts in the air has to be a stealthy penetrator — meaning F-35s for everyone…it is a stupid and expensive “plan”.
From the brief description of the book given, I can appreciate the logic — the authors recognize that air wars are fought in stages much more discrete than ground combat. Your first day strikers need all the “fixens” — they are your F-22s and F-35s…but after that, you can fly 4th Gen (or earlier) all over the place for cheap and still get the job done, and have the depth of aircraft to support losses without each downed aircraft becoming a strategic disaster.
This concept would only break if the US isn’t able to achieve safe corridors for flight within a timely fashion with those “first day strikers”. (Meaning the F-22s and F-35s can’t clean out swathes of airsprace that are safe for the F-16s/SuperHornets/F-15s/A-10s/Bird Dogs that will prosecute the bulk of the air war.)
This also falls apart if the honest-to-God prices of the F-35 are really as cheap (both purchase and operations costs) as the supporters rant about. I don’t see that happening, not in this universe anyway.
“Where are the UAV’s?“
UAVs are not survivable in medium to high threat environments. Nice weather machines. Only useful against ragtag militias.
The small A-10 proposal is the equivalent to an UAV fleet.
“Wouldn’t clean F-16’s dedicated to air superiority with AESA radars knock down most anything else flying? Wondering.“
No, even USAF propaganda doesn’t make such claims. F-16’s are no match for Su-27 and better hardware unless you trust very much in pilot or ammunition/component superiority.
“I read the book excerpt. It’s a bunch of academic drivel no better than the drivel that they accuse the Pentagon of practicing.
I’m intellectually honest enough that I’ll say upfront, I don’t know squat about the military, I’ve never served or had association with the military. But as an outside observer, I can say this:“
Those authors have a combined 350 years experience in military affairs, several of them were colonels and all of them kept their brains busy for years about these problems.
“Also, agreed we need more FAC planes.“
FAC is also only for low-treat environments.
RE: Criticism of the authors for various reasons:
I am far from thinking these guys are messiahs — some of their earlier ideas have been hogwash. However, in this particular case, I think they are on the right track.
As an example consider the B-1 against the B-52: We’ve got that ancient B-52 still performing cheaper and more reliably than the whizbang penetrator that is far its junior. High tech has proven to be far more costly, and unreliable, on the back end than most folks will honestly admit…that has real consequences in war time.
If you can theoretically penetrate the most dense IAD on Earth, but can’t get off the ground at GO time because of maintenance issues, you are worthless. Or if you CAN get off the ground but every flight hour costs twice as much as your older brother, yet both can accomplish the mission, you are wasteful.
So, with our tactical air power, lets not put all our eggs, in every damn service no less, into ONE new, unproven, bleeding edge aircraft (F-35). Let the Air Force run first string penetration and air to air…but recognize that is only to enable the rest of the war to get started. The “rest of the war” is then prosecuted with upgraded, but proven, aircraft that are cheaper to buy and cheaper to operate. That means USAF F-16s, A-10s, (F-15s ?), Marine and Navy Super Hornets, and UAVs galore for the ground commanders.
I like it.
I have to go along with Mr. Skinner. While I like the A-10 and worked on the RF-4C sentimentality has no place in war planning.
Mentioned in passing by Skinner is that that many aircraft require manning tables to support them that will never happen in my lifetime (and I’m quite a way from dead). The cost of new aircraft is minor in caparison to that required to pay for those folks needed to fly and maintain them.
Wishful thinking that a few modern aircraft will take care of the initial strike needs for all the rest of the low, slow, low tech stuff will get a lot of our folks dead, both on the ground and in the air. I see too many folks looking back to the last war (Iraq, Afghanistan) and not to the uncertain future.
This is a great read with very approriate out of the box thinking. I forwarded it to my sons. One in Korea. One at the Homeland Security Center and One an officer on a Minesweeper in Bahrain. They are the ones that will have to be the boots on the ground and the developers of new approaches to combat in the next 20 years. I, being a retired ground-pounder and a student of history think there are many practical solutions addressed in this paper. Need to take the brass from technitisns and engineers to warriors. No officer or enlisted should ever be able to work for a defense company or lobby group. They should become teachers and instructers developing future warrior citizens not expensive weapons…
Ed Caum
USA (Ret)
Overall I like the plan, but I think we should at least build 250 F-22’s and have a similiar number of F-15’s so that we can still maintain adequate air superiority. Also, I think scrapping the F-35 for more F-15E’s wouldn’t be a bad idea either.
“Wishful thinking that a few modern aircraft will take care of the initial strike needs for all the rest of the low, slow, low tech stuff will get a lot of our folks dead, both on the ground and in the air. I see too many folks looking back to the last war (Iraq, Afghanistan) and not to the uncertain future“
Its not looking back, its common sense. The F-22 has shown it can be a very effective force multiplier for older 4th gen aircraft, which makes a high-low mix extremely effective against any possible enemy in the forseeable future.
The only way someone can argue we need every a/c to be bleeding edge stealth is if you envision a WWII-style attrition air war that lasts years. Even then, the argument falls apart because ease of production and maintenance, and numbers, proves crucial in wars in industry/attrition, not the highest tech possible.
Back to reality though, we don’t have a threat in the forseeable future that requires EVERY tactical aircraft to be stealthy and bleeding edge. Besides that, we can’t afford it. Every other service has to make choices of economy, so does the USAF.
(No all-EFV amphib fleet for the USMC now, instead its a high-low mix of EFVs and upgraded AAV7s. No all super destroyers, super cruisers for the Navy, but high-low mix of bleeding edgers and upgraded Ticos and Spruances. No all Seawolf SSN fleet, but an updgraded 688i in the form of the Virginia class. See the pattern?.…)
No officer or enlisted should ever be able to work for a defense company or lobby group. They should become teachers and instructers developing future warrior citizens not expensive weapons…
————–
Edd i think it might be a good idea to get men with the know how and experience to chip in on designing weapons that will one day be used by men for the same or similar purposes. just sayin, nice point but..
Anyways A-10 is AWSOME(nough said)but when it comes down to it its an attack aircraft.…like it was designed to be..one reason its so good is they didnt decide they wanted it to do 2mil jobs and make it just OK. best attack aircraft in history.period
F22 is awsome but retardedly expensive to buiy and operate. It is the greatest fighter ever built up to this point and is impossible to realy build a fleet of them.Also it relys overly on stealth which is overhiped ask the pilot of the f117 shot down.
F35 again overly stealth obsessed. Great idea though i would keep the unions off them or production will stop every 20 days till they cost as much as a f22.
Anyways just saying its a good read…but its not the ANSWER the answer wont be told to you, youll have to find it its not one idea or another its alot and its not gonna be easy not everyone will be happy.
though i have to say the idea of just alot of small cargo aircraft is bad id say stupid. It goes along with the idea any future ground force must be small and light weight therefore reducing the options available to transport.
as stuoid as it sounds still think large airships powered by a pebblebead nuke are the way to go. sounds like science fiction or fantasy but then again so was travel to the moon the nucleur sub and lasers now?
To Ed Caum:
Which minesweeper? I have a nephew that crews the Dextrous when they rotate over. He’s back in Ingleside now, done two floats on the Dextrous to date.
Summary:
Sprey’s cost estimates seem to be much too far afield to make this worthwhile. He is budgeting $154B to attack aircraft, when realistically, that figure is closer to US$FY07 207-217B. That’s the equivalent of a fleet of 1,656‑1736 F-35As, even if they’re purchased at an exorbitantly high price tag.
The USAF maintains a fleet of 1,857 ground attack aircraft, and this proposal would swell that to 5,300. The additional costs to crew, train, maintain, fuel, and upgrade this nearly three-fold expansion isn’t touched upon.
A better question; do we need more airframes than we currently have, or do we need a different focus for the USAF? Right now we are planning on cutting our air-to-air fleet from 660 to ~200. Could we cut our AtG fleet from 1,857 to 1,153? Reducing the F-35 buy to 800 airframes to replace all our Vipers and Strike Eagles on a 2-for-1 basis costs less than half as much as the plan sketched out above. And that gives us 48 5th Gen ground attack aircraft and 22 A-10 in every Expeditionary Air Wing, with plenty of additional airframes coded for training/test/BAI/AR. If we switched to the the F-35B for the USAF, we could have an air arm that provides CAS/strike abilities no one could match with radically reduced procurement costs, and operational costs reduced by an order of magnitude or more. Do we really need more airpower than that?
Boring details:
Sprey’s A-10 numbers are based on a unit cost of $US 15M. The A-10 was built for US$FY98 13M, so inflation alone would yield a US$FY07 17M plane. The costs associated with restarting production 30+ years later (redeveloping for currently available components, reconstructing tooling, outfitting a production line) aren’t inconsiderable. The most generous comparison I could find (the redesign of the F-16 into the F-2 for the JASDF) would be US$04 3.5B. That would assume the F-2 had the same unit cost as the F-16I ($70M.) Contemporaneous accounts don’t provide unit costs, but indicate that Block 5X F-16 were comparable. If so, that would mean that the program cost was US$04 8B. So we can look at US$FY07 3.8-9B as good conservative numbers with which to start estimating program design costs. The A-10 program he proposes can’t be expected to cost less than US$FY07 72B — 77B. This figure does not look at the costs of developing the production line itself, scope creep, going over budget, and DoD procurement SNAFUs.
The F-16 numbers are based on a $40M unit cost, which doesn’t seem too far out of line with a Block 5X airframe. However, I can’t imagine he’s arguing for a less capable mission package than the one the UAE purchased. That was a US$FY00 8B expense for 80 aircraft, $3B of which was development costs. Assuming there was no additional development costs, and no change to the hardware, that’s a US$FY07 74M aircraft. Again, a realistic cost assessment for that US$ 44B line item is US$FY07 85-90B.
His stated cost for the F-35 is US$ 250M, but the current unit flyaway projections are US$FY07 83M. His numbers require that you use the first LRIP cost as the average cost for all the airframes, and add US$ 50-100M for the increased costs of a reduced buy. I do not believe this to be a realistic assessment of cost and risk, and i challenge anyone to defend it on the facts. Of course, I can’t defend the USAF and LM on their cost estimates, so lets use US$FY07 125M as our ‘worst case scenario’ for F-35 costs. That’s a 50% cost growth over current projections for 5 years out, and only a 50% reduction in costs from LRIP to production.
With regard to references to the CV-22 in the piece…CDI gets it wrong (as ussual). The CV-22 has more of a place in AFSOC/SOF than the MV-22 does in USMC assualt support. This would be apparent to CDI if they had any of the following 1) A clue about SOF aviation and SOF support 2) A clue about USMC assault support 3) A clue about the true capabilies of the V-22 beyond that of the events prior to 2000.
A quick caveat to the first sentence of my previous post…BOTH services need/want and most importantly, BENIFIT from the V-22 being a part of their mission. The biggest impact however, is seen in its application in the SOF arena.
More agile than the A-10? I’ve seen it do air shows demos and unless the replacement can stop, do a tree point turn and go back the way it came i don’t see how much more agile it could be.
Didn’t the Air Force try to pawn the the A-10 off on the army at some point? What ever happened with that?
Christian,
Bring back that video of the Red Flag pilot talking about the F-22 and the SU-30MKI and its pilots from India. He makes a relevant reference to needing the F-16 Block 50’s and F-15’s that are now being produced. Bears repeating.
Eric,
Re: A10
Just the opposite. Right after Desert Storm the Air Force wanted to ditch the A-10 completely and only after the Army offered to pick it up did the Air Force keep it. This is a constant battle between the two services.
The Army has helicopters, UAVs, and transport planes — all toys the Air Force believes it should be the sole possessor of. The moment the Air Force gives a fixed wing attack jet to the Army the Air Force will cease to exist.
“4,000 smaller, more agile A-10s = $60 billion“
—you mean, like attack helicopters?
“2,500 turboprops as forward air controllers = $3 billion“
—So the air controller can be a sitting duck at 500 feet instead of camaflouged guy with radio at ground level
“100 new tankers = $28 billion“
—So we can bankrupt ourselves refueling his 4000 A10s
“1,000 dirt-strip C-123-like airlifters = $30 billion“
—For landing ground pounders with nothing but their rifle and their socks. Who needs armored vehicles?
“1,100 smaller, faster F-16s = $44 billion“
—Fodder, so the Russian-associates can shoot more of our planes down and feel better
“183 F-22s already purchased“
—So that we can have zero reserves against a real enemy
“200 F-35s redesignated as A-35s “to meet commitments to allies” = $50 billion“
—To serve as reminder that Spierre is always right.
This guy is worse than a dinosaur. At least they have the good graces to stay extinct.
4,000 smaller, more agile A-10s = $60 billion
who says all these have to be piloted?
This might be a nieve question, but why do/did we need the F-22? Was the F-15 realy all that antiquated? I seem to remember the AF playing with a Modified F-15 called the F-15 “active” which sported forward canards and vectered thrust. If memory serves me right, this plane could easily fly circles around almost anything out there, and there is NO way they would have cost us more than the F-22! Just a thought =)
RE: “B-52 maintenance data is gamed.“
Ah, so everyone it wrong and the B-1 is actually cheaper to operate and has higher readiness rates than the B-52…right. Again, not in this universe.
RE: “Institutionally, the Army is clueless about airpower. Has been since the last Air Men left. That’s OK, because its not their job. The problem is the institutional blind spot they have about their ignorance.“
Sheesh. Air Force arrogance at its finest. The USAFs “Big Problem” in a nutshell, right there. They know it all and everyone else is a moron that doesn’t deserve airplanes. The hubris is appalling.
This is the attitude that makes everyone else wish the USAF would go down in flames, soon. The USAF is not irreplaceable. Far from it. Nor does the USAF have the “grand secret” to air power that no one else can understand. Its leadership typically consists of a bunch of spoiled, pampered, and tech-obsessed plane-envying blue suits with waaay too much time on their hands.
Personally, I hope Gates neuters the hole damn service. Take away *all* their purchasing power, require OSD to approve every single dollar they spend, and have the JCS draw up every USAF plans, policy, and position paper rather than letting the blue suits spit out the tired airpower crap again and again.
>Figure out how to put something on a fighter to
>eliminate that threat and you may have an
>argument for more aircraft. But ground
>Patriots/MEADS/Aegis Standard Missile and all
>the high tech theater air missile defense is
>already trying to cover that threat…and some
>take out enemy aircraft as well along with
>ground AMRAAM and Stingers.
There is a USAF missile in development to dojust that. It is called the NCADE, the
You wonder why the Airforce has such bad strategic thinking? Its because they have to contend with this sort of intellectual opposition.
The writers of this piece have one overriding motive, iconoclasm. They ignore any aircraft besides the mythical, in their minds, A-10 and F-16. Its as if they’ve never left the early 80s and the fighter battles of that time. Their plan will substitute ability with sheer numbers, numbers that will be extraordinary expensive and nearly impossible to deploy. Seriously, how many airfields will an army commander need to capture to allow all those A-10s to operate?
The writers ignore such new threats like SAMs, think that a few fighters will be enough to eliminate every single threat in the conflict zone. Notice, only 400 aircraft in that force structure will be able to operate in a high threat environment. The F-16, with its notable low observation characteristics (sarcasm) will find it difficult to operate in a medium threat environment.
The writers of this piece blindingly ignore the threat of low level MANPADs, when they put so many eggs into the A-10 basket.
This warplane structure will only work against low technology opponents in regions where the US will have copious and safe airbases. If the airbases are too far away from the front line, than the combat ability will drastically drop, they are not any B-1, B-52 bomb trucks that can carry large numbers of GPS guided bombs. And, don’t even begin to comtemplate how this force structure will operate in a Pacific conflict, because it can’t.
The author’s plan is to literally turn the airforce back about 50 years to the pre Doolittle days, it is hardly worth serious consideration.
With such romantic and nostalgic opponents as this, no wonder the Air Force doesn’t feel the need to actually develop a coherent airpower strategy.
What really should be the question for the airforce is: what are the future threats. Once the airforce answers that question, than they can actually decide what force structure to use. Right now there is too much fighting between the opposing camps of traditional warfare vs asymetrical warfare. The airforce is in its hole because there is no agreed upon future scenario.
The developers of this report have basically ignored recent advances in airplane technology and have also ignored the need to maintain a opposition to near peer competitors, for that reason alone, they should be basically ignored.
Krag — Uniformed men test and provide input to the development and implimentation of weapons systems. They don’t need to be lobbyists and Pentagon Cling-ons. You do know whay a cling-on is right.
Ahzee — Deployments are classified.
Ed — There’s nothing in my post that isn’t or wasn’t publicly available. Nor is there anything regarding deployments.
RE: “Krag — Uniformed men test and provide input to the development and implimentation of weapons systems. They don’t need to be lobbyists and Pentagon Cling-ons. You do know whay a cling-on is right.“
What the heck is that about? I think you got the wrong guy.
To those who think this is hogwash. Just look at the effectiveness of bombing campaigns that the authors list and you can see that they make some very good points. Also, I see comments here saying the A10 is “fodder” in the modern warfare environment — why has that turned out not to be the case? You wouldn’t send A10’s against the latest and greatest Russian fighters, that’s why the authors want a solid set of fighters. On the other hand, those fast fighters are almost useless in the attack role as the authors show in case after case.
If “Ed” == “Ed Caum” then I get it. Ed, you are replying to the wrong posters. The author is listed at the bottom of each message, not the top.
*I* asked which minesweeper your son is on — that has nothing to do with deployments. The minesweepers in Bahrain are *permanently* deployed to Bahrain. The crews from Ingleside fly over to Bahrain and take over an MCM, then fly back home and a different crew takes over the ship. Those crew rotations are not secret, the Fifth Fleet website publicizes them, along with all the change of commands for ships and commands as well (http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/articles/index.html).
Besides that, I didn’t ask any time frame, nor give any regarding my nephew. I simply asked which of the four MCMs in Bahrain your son is usually crewing when he goes over — which you brought up in the first place. Sheesh.
Krag
I would like to know where they get their pilots for all these aircraft. This would almost certainly mean the reinstitution of the Warrant Officer program for fixed wing aircraft. Which I would consider a good thing.
But I agree with others that I don’t think Pierre Sprey, who I do agree with on several things, has studied the air defenses of modern or future enemies. I don’t see why we can’t just continue F-22 production at a low rate of 10–20 a year. In ten years, when we might face a viable threat in the air, that would be an extra 100–200 F-22’s we could realistically commit (with a total of 283 to 383, approx).
I think the F-35 is vital, I just think they need to trim it down to be the F-16 type replacement it should be. They’re gold-plating the crap out of the thing, and just need to get control of themselves.
Good comments SMSgtMac and also thanks Trent T.
There’s no doubt that bombers have been effective. But when our potential foes know our bombing capabilities with all kinds of airpower, they turn to things like mobile tactical ballistic missiles, decoys, and hidden combat systems. Then you have B-2s running around with 80 small diameter bombs looking for targets. That leads to the node attack of stationary fixed targets per effects-based operations.
That has some effect to be sure. But without the Special Ops guy in OEF and the JTAC protected by ground forces in OIF, you are still not as effective at finding and prosecuting targets. Ground forces drive hidden enemies from cover to enhance target attack. Republican Guards don’t move for JSTARS to see if no ground force is threatening Baghdad.
Then we come to the final reality that despite bombing effectiveness, if that was all we had done, then Saddam would still be in charge and the Taliban would have infiltrated back into Afghanistan even sooner and in greater numbers than they have. Only ground power can win the long war and conduct stability operations.
50 or so next generation bombers would not be a fate worse than death. And they probably would be more effective than more A-10s and F-35s against nations like China and Russian aggression in East Europe.
Cole,
Consider the tactical and strategic implications of American heavy bombers with racked and stacked NCADE (Network Centric Airborne Defense Element) missiles in the bomb bays stooging over the battlefield with AWACS or other ASEA platform radar support.
This is what someone on one of my e-mail lists said when he heard of it:
“Heh. Couple these (NCADE) with a B-1 bombbay (hell, B-52) reconfigured to hold missiles and any Chinese/NK/Whatever fighters that try to close the AWACS/tanker cluster is going to get a very sore score. ‘Who needs fighters to protect the AWACS? Let ‘em get forward in the furballs where they belong.‘
Okay: China’s going for Taiwan. First part of the assault is a bazillion missiles.
Ten B-52s. A bazillion and one of these guys.
Next?“
NCADE shifts all the calculations of ATBM defense when mounted on a air-to-air refuled, long endurance, high ammunition count, aerial platform.
A situation where you need air superiority to use your ATBM’s makes the F-22 and our other Marine and Army power projection forces far more valuable.
For those who think Sprey and the other “are not up on currect aircraft”; well, I don’t think the man is infallible, but give him some credit here. He is prolly more “up” on things than you are, or do you all work in the Defence industry full-time? Or are you just part-time tyros and hobbyists like me? I don’t agree with all his conclusions either, but at least he is idea-driven, not profit– or career– driven, like those currently in charge of military aquisitions.
Ok, links, quoting and italics don’t work in comments. All but the first two paragraphs of my last comment are quoted from this report:
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/special/iraq/ipp.pdf
beginning on page 125.
If a headquarters or bridge ahead of me needs to be bombed, sure an F-16 works. When I need CAS against a moving target, I need a plane that can stick around for awhile, has lots of missiles, rockets, and guns, can see me and the enemy, and isn’t afraid to take a few hits. The A-10 fits the bill almost perfectly. The F-35 does not. I can’t rely solely on Apaches for CAS since a) the Army really doesn’t train for it, and b) Apaches are rugged, but not nearly enough.
“A-10s are fodder in anything other than a permissive environment“
Mac, I’m curious how you define a permissive environment. A-10s in Desert Storm got shot up plenty, did their jobs, and flew back to base. Name another fixed-wing aircraft that can get shot a hundred times and continue to fly. The A-10 strafes for a living with devastating and accurate fire. The F-16 strafes and the pilot flys too fast and crashes.
The F-35 has a gun with almost no ammo, and in order to mount enough weapons to provide any kind of CAS it has to mount them externally and lose its expensive stealth.
As far as the Army being clueless about airpower — we know what we want out of airpower. The Air Force keeps trying to perpetuate the myth that bombers alone can win wars. When has that ever happened? For that matter, when has the Air Force ever delivered what it has advertised? As for Andy’s comment about “shock and awe” being disinformation — its pretty bad when the Air Force’s theory of mass bombing is only useful as a psyops tool since it can’t actually deliver the goods.
I read the entire book cover to cover and got to meet all the authors last night. Some of their ideas are out of left field, but they know their business and care deeply about what they write. I don’t agree with everything Sprey proposed (such as thousands of manned planes) but he brought up good points that deserve attention. For his age he’s sharp as a tack too. He was a protege of John Boyd, did testing of aircraft and rifles in the 1960s and 1970s, and seems to know his stuff when it comes to the theory and science of flying. Much of it went over my head, but the Harrier pilots sitting next to me were entranced.
TB,
Without getting bogged down in philosopht TOO much, here are some comments and replies to your
post.
RE: If a headquarters or bridge ahead of me needs to be bombed, sure an F-16 works. When I need CAS against a moving target, I need a plane that can stick around for awhile, has lots of missiles, rockets, and guns, can see me and the enemy, and isn’t afraid to take a few hits.
I’m with you until the last sentence. If I may, what you NEED is a persistent and lethal air support presence. In a perfect world every close combat warrior would carry an ‘Easy’ button that would rain deliverance from evil when pushed. Since it is not a perfect world, the ‘Easy’ button has call waiting. The A-10 is popular with the ground guys because they can see it, hear it, and always know when one is around. A B-1 orbiting at 25-30K ft is invisible to the foot soldier until it makes its presence known. The biggest difference between the two forms of air support is that while the A-10 is like a security blanket and makes those under it feel better, a platform like the B-1 can be overhead far longer, and support far more taskings from different groups of those on the ground. Yes, there are still many situations where one might want an A-10, but they do not obviate the fact that there are many times a better weapons systems for a job. As the sensor-to-shooter chain gets more rapid and robust, the need to fly in the dirt to find the bad guys becomes less likely.
The references to ‘what is in front of me’ tells me you are probably a real deal Army man. The best description I ever read of how the army views the battlefield was a John Warden quote where Warden said the Army tends to view the battlefield as a ‘bowling alley’ where a commander has to go from here to there. This quote was part of a discussion about how airpower was decimating the Iraqis in depth leading up to the ground combat phase and all the Army commanders were whining about what was right in front of them. There are several accounts of how the field commanders wanted to divvy up airpower to make sure their AOR got what they wanted and Schwarzkopf had to remind them that it was HIS airpower.
RE: I’m curious how you define a permissive environment. A-10s in Desert Storm got shot up plenty, did their jobs, and flew back to base.
A permissive environment for an A-10 is:
1. No air threat with a look-down shoot-down capability.
2. Paucity of MANPADS
3. Paucity of heavy-caliber ballistic weapons.
4. Boots on the ground. Just like Armor-Infantry, CAS with a nap-of-the-dirt plane is a combined arms operation.
RE: The F-35 has a gun with almost no ammo, and in order to mount enough weapons to provide any kind of CAS it has to mount them externally and lose its expensive stealth.
The F-35 gun, on variants with an internal weapon, is there to meet a specification. The spec is for a certain lethality under certain conditions. Carrying external guns on the F-35 makes certain people in certain quarters to feel better and alay their fears about not having a gun. More likely, the preferred external stores on an F-35 would be drop or launch weapons that would be used from outside the envelope of cheap, low-tech threats and that would be after the Day One (or Two or Three) threats have been rendered relatively impotent. More importantly, when discussing the F-35, you have to talk about it as part of a larger networked system.
RE: As far as the Army being clueless about airpower– we know what we want out of airpower.
True, the Army wants a fast “support arms” capability. they could care less if it flew, crawled or tunneled. the AF is concerned about exploiting the aerospace medium in projecting force and national will. CAS is only a part of that bigger picture.
RE: The Air Force keeps trying to perpetuate the myth that bombers alone can win wars. When has that ever happened?
AF WIN: 1999 Kosovo/Serbia.
The funniest thing about that whole operation was watching the Army try to come to terms with the fact that airpower (AF and NAVAIR and some NATO) stopped the Serbs cold. It would have been accomplished faster if Weasely Clark had let Gen Short bomb what needed to be bombed and the French and Russians played the game straight but that is another story. Now there is no doubt that the threat of a land operation was always present, but the fact remains the Serbs ran all over Kosovo until we started hurting them where it hurt the most with big bombs coming out of big bombers.
Of course, if owning the dirt is an imprtant objective you will ALWAYS need boots on the ground — filled by robots someday maybe but I doubt it.
And not pick nits, but the AF has never claimed airpower alone can win wars, it is however that airpower can be the DECISIVE element in winning them. The Army is still trying to wrap their heads around the fact that sometimes THEY are a supporting force.
RE: For that matter, when has the Air Force ever delivered what it has advertised?
1991, 1999, 2001, 2002-.
RE: “shock and awe” being disinformation — its pretty bad when the Air Force’s theory of mass bombing is only useful as a psyops tool since it can’t actually deliver the goods.
pffft. “Shock and Awe” never happened. to bad it was a cool soundbite that was perpetuated in the media. It never happened because Saddam and Co provided a target of opportunity before it could be launched and the opening gambit was changed.
SMSGT Mac & Andy:
Fair enough regarding deep attack on tactical targets. I will admit the Air Force has gotten better at it over the years. And yes, I own a copy of Cobra II, great book.
My rant about strategic bombing not living up was more directed at the Air Force’s performance in Desert Storm. The General’s War is a great one to read about Desert Storm. It takes Powell, Norman, and the component commanders to task for their performance. The Air Force back then said they could knock out 50% of the Iraqi army and more or less win the war on their own. In the 6 week war the final tally was something closer to 15% and they had enough C2 left standing for the entire Republican Guard corps to retreat at the same time.
Kosovo lasted 70 something days. I imagine that was 60 something days longer than everyone planned. Was that an Air Force, NATO, or White House screw up?
As far as the “bowling alley” comment, I hope you’re not calling me a whiner. I don’t expect the air force to destroy everything along my attack route, but I hate watching them miss. I’m in a joint staff school right now where everyone (even Marines) keeps defaulting to “air will take care of that” and not using any imagination in the ground plan.
I’ve noticed working alongside Marines at this school that the Army isn’t anywhere close to providing its own CAS like the Corps does. We treat apache battalions as another maneuver element often with their own missions. They’re great in the permissive urban fight, but I don’t think I could count on them full time in a full blown force on force.
RE: bowling alley. No, not calling anyone a whiner in this case. If you objective is to move from ‘a’ to ‘b’ you have to care about the ‘c’s in front of you.
Desert Storm and airpower results are still being debated, a good part of the controversey comes because of different peolpe looking at different sources. The Christians In Action always took the pessimistic view and the AF took the optimistic view. I’ll re-read my Gulf War Airpower survey volumes soon when I have the time, but that %success you cite seems awfully low. I believe the survey had tanks at 35+% or so and APCs, artillery and others at somewhat higher numbers. In any case, the numbers weren’t as important as the effectiveness of the units. Schwarzkoph switched away from counting games fairly early in the Air Campaign to gauging what the effectiveness of the units were. Strategic targetting and interdiction disrupted/stopped so much comm and logistics, the front line Iraqis were in general disarray and the RG was befuddled. The Iraqi army shrank through attrition and desertion (by far mostly the latter) between the kickoff of the air war and G-day that the ground forces faced an army that was 2/3 the size of the army that Saddam had when the first bombs started dropping. Everybody contributed, but the powers that be at the time declared that Airpower was the decisive instrument, not me.
As much as I loved “The General’s War”, I think Gordon lead Trainor down a partisan path with Cobra II. Cobra II works from a conclusion and makes the story fit the end. I did an in-depth multi-part dismemberment of it at my place a while back because I thought it was beyond the pale. Its so bad I’m wondering if I have to rethink what they wrote in their first book.
Housekeeping post:
That ‘Kowalski guy’ I was using too much has since been made provisional commander of the new Global Strike Command, a three star billet. If he doesn’t disappoint, expect him to pin on his second star, and be made permanent deputy first to groom him for the lead role later.
Greeting. Fresh clean sheets are one of life’s small joys.
. Bolton.
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Thanks
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, Rheann from Papua.