As the new administration takes office, the defense budget will come under extensive scrutiny. A recent editorial in The New York Times entitled “How to Pay for a 21st-Century Military” calls for a halt to the F-22 Raptor fighter, the DDG 1000 Zumwalt–class destroyer, SSN 688 Virginia–class submarines, and MV-22 Osprey programs, among others.
Some “big dollar” programs could be cut, in part to demonstrate the seriousness of the Obama administration to reform the U.S. military establishment. But there will be many programs at risk that have less visibility. One of the leading candidates for cancellation is the long-gestating Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV), the advanced “amtrac” that has been under development for almost two decades.
The Marine Corps now has ten of the EFVs — that designation being assigned in 2003 to replace the more prosaic but useful AAAV — Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle, which in turn replaced the LVT — Landing vehicle Tracked — designation in 1982.
The EFV can carry 17 Marines on land or sea, at a speed up to 45 mph on land and about 25 knots at sea. The EFVs range is 325 miles on land and 65 nautical miles at sea.
But those specifications are the “rub.” How does the EFV fit into the Marines Corps concept of Operational Maneuver From The Sea (OMFTS)? That concept calls for launching an assault from 25 to 100 nautical miles from the objective — which may be an inland location, such as an airfield, capital, or military base. Recent studies by the Defense Science Board (DSB) and Naval Research Advisory Committee (NRAC) call for amphibious ships to stand offshore at least 50 miles because of the threat of land-launched cruise missiles (as struck the Israeli frigate Hanit operating off the Lebanese coast in 2006).
Thus, launching an assault from 25 or more nautical miles offshore would see the assault troops flown in by MV-22 tilt-rotor STOVL aircraft and CH-46E and CH-53E helicopters, the former at more than 300 mph and the helicopters at more than 100 mph. And, of course, they could land troops on an inland objective.
Follow-up equipment that was not air landed would be brought ashore by Air Cushion Landing Craft (ACLC), with a new design being developed, and the few remaining LCU landing craft.
Where does the EFV fit in? It cannot be launched from more than about 30 miles offshore because of its limited waterborne range if it is to return to the launching ship; it could be launched farther out if it is to then climb ashore and operate as a personnel carrier. And, even at 30 miles the transit time would be more than an hour, or longer if the seas are rough. If too rough, of course, the EFVs could not be employed.
After the EFVs “hit the beach” they must then travel to the objective. At that point the troops will have been “in the box” for at least an hour. Once ashore, an EFV operating as a personnel carrier has the benefit of a relatively heavy gun armament — a 30-mm cannon and 7.62-mm machine gun. But it will lack support from armored vehicles — tanks or even the Marines valued LAV (Light Armored Vehicle) — making the EFV particularly vulnerable to the widely proliferated anti-tank weapons found in the Third World.
The official cost of the EFV is $10 million per vehicle, with several hundred planned to replace the existing AAV-7 series. The total EFV force will not be fielded until at least 2020.
With some “bugs” still to be worked out after two decades of development and the high cost per vehicle, coupled with the operational limitations or at least questions about how the EFV fits into the OMFTS concept, the EFV must be considered a highly visible target for administration budget cutters.
I suppose it would have been better to design a pair of vehicles: one purpose-made transport made to fit the EFV, and the EFV to fight on land. I mean, once you hit the beach you’re not likely to need the EFV to go back out into the ocean. But it’s too late now.
Also, isn’t that picture an AAAV-7?
The EFV is uninspired junk. Killing it should be an easy decision.
http://www.google.com/search?client=safari&rls=en-us&q=EFV+marine+problems&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8
“I suppose it would have been better to design a pair of vehicles: one purpose-made transport made to fit the EFV, and the EFV to fight on land.“
I agree. What is the puropse of a high-speed amphibious armored vehicle when you can shuttle better vehicles ashore faster by hovercraft?
Bring back the old LVT-4 designed Amtrack,But replace the Hull with Balistic aluminum material instead of rolled steel to lighten it but give it stenght, beef up the track system and engine, Strap 3 badazz Yamaha 350 HP Monster Outboards on the back ramp (with a quick release mechinism and floatation devices for retreival)Mount a 25mm Bushmaster gun on it (Like the LAVs have for Logistical and Mechanical compatibility, Charge a 1/4 of what the EFV cost and be done with it.
It may look ugly as hell but probably get the job done.
“I suppose it would have been better to design a pair of vehicles: one purpose-made transport made to fit the EFV, and the EFV to fight on land.“
I agree. The motion is carried!
A few moths ago I read about the MPC, Marine Personnel Carrier program. It was to provide the Corps with a wheeled APC for inland operations, and would have replaced the LAV. I don’t know the current status of the program, but the Patria AMV was a leading contender, due to its advanced armor and mine survivability.
http://contracting.tacom.army.mil/majorsys/mpc/mpc.htm
The ole AAV7A1 has been a good tool for the Marine Corps and with modifications has served well, but at an age of 35 years, it’s a little long in the tooth. EFV (was AAAV) will provide the Marine Corps with better agility, firepower and an up to date platform to accomplish the mission with minimul loses. Even at a cost of $10M it is a bargin to be able to hit the beach and continue as a mechanized force. With airborne assault your afoot! How many EFVs can be purchased for the cost of ONE F-22A or One DDG-1000?
Seems time and technology are against landing on a beach. The Airborne no longer uses gliders, why do the marines need amtracs?
If the thing doesn’t work after two decades of development, it’s time to scrap the program.
We can make F-22s, nuclear aircraft carriers, trips to the moon, airborne lasers, and BluRay DVD players in less than two decades. There’s no reason we can’t make a damn boat that can drive on land. If the program isn’t working by now, it’s not the technology, it’s the leadership.
I have often thought that the following would be an interested mix for a 21st century Marine Force:
The Combat Boat 90 (CB90) for Littoral Ops, Amphibious Raids, Anti-Piracy work and
A vehicle such as the Bronco All Terrain Tracked Carrier (ATTC) for Troop Carrier, Logistics, & Fire Support. It’s Amphibious, comes in
a number of variants, and can be air and/or sea lifted. Seem like a good fit for expeditionary operations.
With the basic operations plan for marines being defined that way it does seem box them into the idea of canceling the EFV. I think the better alternative would be to have destroyers equipped to shoot down cruise missiles to provide close support to landing operations. It strikes me as a bad idea to give up the military power necessary for seizing beach head and harbors needed for establishing supply lines.
The notion that the marines be used for land locked operations are a bit ridiculous, the fact that they have a specific purpose is the reason they struggle to adapt to current battlefields. The simple fact is as a specialized force they really shouldn’t be fighting that sort of mission. It makes the marines more like the army, creating an unnecessary redundancy that costs more.
The aerial-centric approach has its advantages in avoiding certain logistical needs but it has its short comings too. For example they will end up needing more light vehicles capable of being air lifted in to provide that necessary support. Something the 82nd Airborne has been asking for awhile. Money is going to be spent somewhere, its a matter of where and how, just cutting a project won’t eliminate the need the project attempted to fulfill.
Should the EFV go into production? I think not — nor will it probably be allowed to. However, to think of it as a failure is also not quite correct. I have watched this program closely over the past 10 years and in that time GD has striven to adapt its design to the Marines ever changing mission and requirements. It became less of a new vehicle and more of a sort of Apollo program for military ground vehicle development. Almost every component of the vehicle has gone through multiple radical redesigns. As a result of these changes, the Marines have gained significant technology advances in military vehicle development.
The program has yielded valuable technology spinoffs at every level. Its highly accurate stabilized turret is being adapted for all sorts of applications. Its controls and displays technology will probably find its way into many future ground vehicles. Even some of its more humble components will find their way into future systems. For example its embedded training component has capabilities that are too good to die, and in fact have already been incorporated into the turrets that are destined for other platforms.
There is little doubt that the Marines and GD know that this program will be shut down. The Marines have shuffled off portions of the development responsibilities to what are essentially government mothball groups. GD in turn has re-targeted portions of its development staff to other endeavors. What would be tragic, both for the Marines and GD, would be for this program to die instead of using this as an opportunity to capitalize on the technology advances this program has achieved.
I think MVC2K has a good point. Its often over looked that the accomplishments of later projects are really the accomplishments of “failed” projects. Especially when it comes to technology there is a lot of trial and error, to bring a piece of tech to fruition. The marines more than the other military branches have struggled to get funding and develop their next generation of equipment. With the EFV we happen to have a lot of little success that sadly don’t add up to a successful project. Can the project but use what’s been learned.
Use CV22 to keep Marines off beach or rethink EFV.
Use Soviet Ekranoplane Tech for new EFV
Dump the EFV– beach-party marines went out with Inchon. If we didn’t use beach landinds against the Vietnamese with all their coastline– we will never use it.
Oh– make about $100 billion dollars and sell Camp Pendleton — or at least the beach areas– that is some of the most valuable real-estate in the country. Time to give it up.
Dump the EFV– beach-party marines went out with Inchon. If we didn’t use beach landings against the Vietnamese with all their coastline– we will never use it.
Oh– make about $100 billion dollars and sell Camp Pendleton — or at least the beach areas– that is some of the most valuable real-estate in the country. Time to give it up.
One interesting possibility that the EFV could facilitate would be to deploy landing craft not by ship, but by seaplane.
A seaplane adapted C-130 or larger cargo plane (not unprecedented in U.S. military history, there is also a comparable plane in the Russian military), could land in a lake or off a coast, deploy the EFVs, and depart. Similarly, EFVs leaving a theater could seek out the closest open water lake or sea and be picked up there.
This would make possible an element of surprise. Cruise missile bearing opposition forces would not know the exact point of EFV deployment without inside information until moments before the EFVs were deployed, and then, only with sophisticated sensors aimed at all possible seaplane landing sites without interruption 24/7.
This would eliminate the need to parachute in an advance team of engineers to create a servicable field airstrip. It would have a longer range than an MV-22 or helicopter, less sophisticated systems to maintain and operate (possibly with combat damage) than an MV-22, and would allow the deployed Marines to have a system better armored and armed than a dune buggy or glorified jeep upon arrival– making the seaplane/EFV combination attractive for rescuing expatriots from hot spots (something Marines have done far more often than amphibious assaults and a situation where armor that can’t be brought in by helicopter or MV-22 is very helpful). Also, unlike paratroops, Marines deployed by seaplane/EFV would have an way out, which is useful in missions where immediately taking territory is not the objective.
The EFV would be superior to other systems in this role, because a landing craft and land vehicle are too heavy to fit both in scarce aircraft space, and existing systems are too slow in the water to get to shore from a reasonable distance out.
The EFV, deployed by seaplane and kept at sea, could also be used as an anti-piracy platform in lieu of a coast guard patrol boat sized vehicle, where there are no other local naval forces able to respond promptly, and as a fire support platform for forces in coastal or lakeside areas.
I’m also skeptical of a need to be 50 miles rather than 25–30 miles out. The issue is not weapon range, but target identification. The curvature of the Earth implies that the horizon is never more than about 25–30 miles out near ground level. If you can deploy from over the horizon, only very sophisticated opposition forces (with satellites, sea based radar, etc.) should be able to detect the deploying ship. Also, a ship can start 50 miles out, move in to 25 miles, deploy every single one of its EFVs in on go (rather than shuttling them with landing craft in several waves) and return to a position further out at sea, in a three hour window or so, chosen by the deploying ship. While this isn’t the half hour or so window that might be available to a seaplane deploying an EFV, it also isn’t a terrifically long time — and the 25–30 miles of breathing room probably make missile countermeasures more effective than they would be if the deploying ship is just 5 miles from shore. And, the benefits of being able to bring your entire force to bear all at once rather than doing it in multiple waves, are considerable. Even if sensors don’t catch the deploying ship the first time, the opposition forces will start paying more attention when they have a few armored vehicles on their beach, putting future deployment waves at greater risk.
While the EFV would be expensive, it fills a more mission advancing niche than, for example, the Crusader self-propelled artillery system or the Comanche helicopter system did, and it is also worth noting that the Marines have been designing multiple new ships around the EFV that they have been expecting.
Here is another question. If the old Amtrack vehicles are to remain in service while EFVs are eliminated from the budget, how is that going to survive in the environment like Iraq? Of course there are MRAP-ATV to be in service, but will those be enough in quantities? What about brown water afairs like Vietnam War where there are lack of bridges forcing vehicles to cross or engage a cross river battle? I think EFV has other roles. One last question. If the Amtrack vehicles are no longer useful, what is the point of keeping those now? Why not trash them away now to save maintenance fees and just give M-2/M-3 to the Marines?
The Soviets looked into building submarines designed as landing ships a number of times. Project 621 and 748 were the most ambitious and would have carried a few hundred troops as well as two dozen vehicles (tanks, APCs, trucks, etc).
With the NY Times calling for a cancellation of the Virginia-class, those shipyards would have a lot of idle capacity.
Good Evening ohwilleke,
You have some workable ideas but I see a few problems. First off like all insurgents how do you separate the pirates from the fisherman. The only way that I can see is to board the suspected vessels and look, see. Traditional but effective in sorting the bad guys from the good guys. This would be difficult after an AH64 Apache attack. There would be little but floating fiberglass and blood on the water. Also the intelligence guys wouldn’t be all that happy either.
Secondly, we don’t have any LCS’s and at $400 million a copy I think we would run into the same problem we have with the Burkes, to expensive to risk, the pirates are a problem now. They are taking an average of four prizes a week in the Gulf of Aden and more yet off the East Coast of Africa now and it appears that their infrastructure for information and mission planning ability is getting better. If al Qaeda are not yet currently involved with this operation, and there is every indicator, that they are they soon will be. Pirates are better investment with a higher return then the stock market or oil futures.
Thirdly is cost, we already have the Tarawa’s and are retiring them with about 1/3 of there service life unused. What the Tarawa’s bring to the table is a tender, WWII concept, that can plant itself in open water and operate, no friendly port is required. The Tarawa’s come already equipped with a wet well that could hold and transport six open ocean patrol boats, barracks facilities for 400 Marines, Soldiers or Spec. Ops., a large brig, a 74 bed hospital with two operating theaters, flag facilities (you know this would require both a general and an Admiral), a robust air defense ( downstairs would be covered by SSN’s), and of course upstairs there is a flight deck with operating UH-1’s, AH1’s, SH-60 and CV-22’s and AV-8’s VTL’s everyday operations, If AH64’s, CH-47 or H-60 for a land operation were wanted, fly ‘em on board. Everything needed is right there.
ALLONS,
Byron Skinner
Open ocean fast patrol boats are currently being made by Northrop Grumman for other countries, they are an off the shelf item. The weapons package that I proposed again is off the shelf and would in effect make these patrol boats sea going AC-130’s.
Bring back those little Patrol, Coastal boats, and as someone said before assign them to tenders and such.
Always wondered why we couldn’t turn the FFGs into some sort of interim LCS…but that’s another thing for another time.
As for EFV it’s always nice to testbed techs; but if government knew nothing would come of it why put out?
Good Afternoon Charles,
You idea of using FFG’s (Perry Class) frigates as tenders has been done before by the Navy in the 90’s when the Hurricane Class Spec. Ops. boats were attached for support and refueling to FFG’s for deployments across the Pacific. It kinda worked and kinda didn’t. One of the issues was that the Hurricanes didn’t have any laundry facilities and they had to use the FFG’s which over loaded the system.
There are two problems with using the Perry’s as LCS at 4,200 gross tons. they are about 50% to big and they are being decommissioned because of age and lots of use. The Perry’s that are left are much in demand for drug operations on the west coast of South America and in the Gulf of Mexico. Now that the Gulf od Mexico is changing operational control from SOUTHCOM to NORTHCOM I would guess the demands on the FFG’s will increase.
The tender concept worked well for the U.S. Navy during the Second World War in the Pacific where they served as mobile basing, refueling, rearming and resupply points for submarines, PT Boats and Seaplanes. As the war moved so could these vital facilities. The Pirates are mobile and in order to contain them we also have to be mobile. The problems faced in the South Pacific are not unlike what we are seeing today in the Gulf of Aden and off the East Coast of Africa.
ALLONS,
Byron Skinner
Lots of great ideas regarding combating pirates, etc. Still, it seems like the overall opinion is that the EFV needs to be scrapped. Performing well deck training and operations, I could see no way that we would actually conduct operations where the EFV would really come in use. The A dozen lightly armored traks from the back of a sitting duck (LSD/LPD) at $10 mil a piece seems like a waste of money. CIWS/RAM, etc are spray and pray, no matter how many you stick onboard.
This is one area where the Marines really need to rethink a core mission area. They are so flexible in other areas, this one really needs to be pushed. Sunk cost bias is one of the great failings with our current “peace-time” procurement system.
The $10 million a unit number is probably a realistic planning number for the EFV. It is high compared to a roughly comparable non-amphibious Stryker (a hair under $1 million each with inflation) plus the cost of a fleet of landing craft. But, you get increased functionality.
But, the $400 million per unit for the LCS is not only a first in class, but a first in ship concept price, which led to a lot of meddling in the procurement process. This is unlikely to be matched in subsequent units of the winner of the contest between the two currently contending models, particularly in light of the fact that LCS quantitites are contemplated to be in the several dozens. I suspect that something closer to $100 million to $200 million per unit is a likely mass production scale cost.
One good place to cut is the MV-22, which is a need, but is turning out to be a narrower niche than anticipated mostly because of its small payload. There are definitely MV-22 missions that aren’t equally well served by a helicopter or a C-27 (both of which have far lower acquisition costs per unit), but not enough to justify more than one or two of them per amphibious group.
Good Morning ohwilleke,
You rise some good points and I would like to address a couple of the. The EFV is not an AFV. A Navy survey of amphibious landing at Iwo Jima and Okinawa in WWII showed that most of the amphibious landing craft never made it off the beach. Those that did made it only a few hundred yards before being taken out. The Marines attempted in 2006 in the Anbur to use the AAAV7 with deadly results, dead Marines. None of these aluminum skinned vehicles are a match for PRG’s and that includes the Stryker, which has been a $3.5 billion loser for the Army. At $10 million a pop the EFV is just to expensive for the limited roll it would play in ay future amphibious assault.
The LCS. I have to disagree with you on the price. If past experience is a guide the $400 million is a base price. I of the impression that the size of this vessel is way to large for the “Green Water” mission the Navy has planned. Ships more the size of WWII Destroyers at 1,500–1,800 gt. and Escort Size Destroyers of less the 1,500 gt. performed the inside fight very well. This should be the gross tonnage that the Navy should be looking for.
What ever the decissions made the LCS is still way into the future. Even if a ship can be settled on and a price arrive at and production started it would be at least 2015 before the first LCS’s would be pt into the fleet. Like the CV-22 and the F-22 the LCS development program has taken to long. If I recall the Sea Shadow has been around for nearly 20 years now. We are at war now and need these systems 8 years ago, not 8 years for now.
ALLONS,
Byron Skinner
I read that the Marines expect the EFV to spend only 20% of its time at sea. To my way of thinking, the EFV is far too costly already and too much of that cost is for waterborne operations. The Marine have or will have good AFVs (MRAP lite or similar) which should be lifted from ship to shore in high speed lighterage, discharged to proceed as a land warfare vehicle. The speed of modern lighters should more than compensate for the supposed stealthiness of the EFV. I am not talking about LCACs or the follow-on hovercraft here. The French Navy is already testing at revolutionay hispd cat the L-Cat and there are much more capable hovercraft which could be used.
Hey. Do what you feel in your heart to be right — for you’ll be criticized anyway. You’ll be damned if you do, and damned if you don’t.
. Malina.
I am from Mauritius and , too, and now am writing in English, tell me right I wrote the following sentence: “Excessive sweating stop your sweating problem; today.“
Thank you very much