<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/" > <channel><title>Comments on: The Rule of Thumbs</title> <atom:link href="http://defensetech.org/2008/12/29/the-rule-of-thumbs/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" /><link>http://defensetech.org/2008/12/29/the-rule-of-thumbs/</link> <description>The Future of the Military, Law Enforcement and National Security</description> <lastBuildDate>Fri, 10 Feb 2012 04:44:53 +0000</lastBuildDate> <sy:updatePeriod>hourly</sy:updatePeriod> <sy:updateFrequency>1</sy:updateFrequency> <generator>http://wordpress.org/?v=3.3.1</generator> <item><title>By: Ross D</title><link>http://defensetech.org/2008/12/29/the-rule-of-thumbs/#comment-80146</link> <dc:creator>Ross D</dc:creator> <pubDate>Mon, 05 Jan 2009 21:17:28 +0000</pubDate> <guid isPermaLink="false">http://deftech.usmilblog.com/?p=4261#comment-80146</guid> <description>Problem is that folks use thumb drives to transfer files from unclassified computers to classified computers (against the rules but folks do it anyway) and they carry virus upstream with the files.  Until scanners can be modifed to scan USB devices before allowing a connection they will be a hazard. </description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Problem is that folks use thumb drives to transfer files from unclassified computers to classified computers (against the rules but folks do it anyway) and they carry virus upstream with the files.  Until scanners can be modifed to scan USB devices before allowing a connection they will be a hazard.</p> ]]></content:encoded> </item> <item><title>By: clyde ward</title><link>http://defensetech.org/2008/12/29/the-rule-of-thumbs/#comment-95305</link> <dc:creator>clyde ward</dc:creator> <pubDate>Sat, 03 Jan 2009 07:33:49 +0000</pubDate> <guid isPermaLink="false">http://deftech.usmilblog.com/?p=4261#comment-95305</guid> <description>So, Russian or Chinese hackers manage to breach the Pentagon and so they ban thumbdrives for all DoD? Ever occur tothem, that their firewalls just ain&#039;t that good? </description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>So, Russian or Chinese hackers manage to breach the Pentagon and so they ban thumbdrives for all DoD? Ever occur tothem, that their firewalls just ain’t that good?</p> ]]></content:encoded> </item> <item><title>By: clyde ward</title><link>http://defensetech.org/2008/12/29/the-rule-of-thumbs/#comment-95304</link> <dc:creator>clyde ward</dc:creator> <pubDate>Sat, 03 Jan 2009 07:19:45 +0000</pubDate> <guid isPermaLink="false">http://deftech.usmilblog.com/?p=4261#comment-95304</guid> <description>How about banning pencils and pens, so we can only compromise security to the point that we can remember anything? This is the same organization that had bunches of us making paper airplanes in order to show us how an assembly line worked (no kidding-Lean Sigma 6-right?) and has an Acquisitions Course that starts out teaching arithametic (&quot;what does the &quot;+&quot; sign mean?-no kiddding) The only solution is for the DoD to get a little bit smart or just go back to technology they are comfortable with-like the flintlock musket.  And why, to begin with, are all teh DoD systems hooked into one system? Why can&#039;t we have local cell networks that handle low security traffic without al the BS? If that gets breched, so what? By the time we find out about it, the Russians will find out about it, too-&quot;Who cares about this?&#039; sort of thing. Let teh Top Secret boys have their own network and ban anything they want from it. </description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>How about banning pencils and pens, so we can only compromise security to the point that we can remember anything? This is the same organization that had bunches of us making paper airplanes in order to show us how an assembly line worked (no kidding-Lean Sigma 6-right?) and has an Acquisitions Course that starts out teaching arithametic (“what does the “+” sign mean?-no kiddding) The only solution is for the DoD to get a little bit smart or just go back to technology they are comfortable with-like the flintlock musket.  And why, to begin with, are all teh DoD systems hooked into one system? Why can’t we have local cell networks that handle low security traffic without al the BS? If that gets breched, so what? By the time we find out about it, the Russians will find out about it, too-“Who cares about this?’ sort of thing. Let teh Top Secret boys have their own network and ban anything they want from it.</p> ]]></content:encoded> </item> <item><title>By: eTERNAL rEACH</title><link>http://defensetech.org/2008/12/29/the-rule-of-thumbs/#comment-80143</link> <dc:creator>eTERNAL rEACH</dc:creator> <pubDate>Fri, 02 Jan 2009 05:47:07 +0000</pubDate> <guid isPermaLink="false">http://deftech.usmilblog.com/?p=4261#comment-80143</guid> <description>Why can&#039;t we all just get along? </description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Why can’t we all just get along?</p> ]]></content:encoded> </item> <item><title>By: Kevin MW Hughes</title><link>http://defensetech.org/2008/12/29/the-rule-of-thumbs/#comment-95303</link> <dc:creator>Kevin MW Hughes</dc:creator> <pubDate>Thu, 01 Jan 2009 16:39:32 +0000</pubDate> <guid isPermaLink="false">http://deftech.usmilblog.com/?p=4261#comment-95303</guid> <description>Thumbdrives, by themeselves, should not be the point of focus here. It is the USB Port not being protected in having scan capability prior to the reading of the data device. Hardware data intake for all computer puposes in Government should have protection built into them. My recommendations are these: -Fix the USB Ports or add/hard connect another piece of hardware to these ports to plug the Thumb or other data storage into. This interface allows for scanning and encryption recognition of the Thumb or other pre-authorized date storage device. This interface iteself has a crptyic code only working for government computers by IM security and can be recoded as needed, so if lost or stolen it is not easily used with another computer system. -Thumb drives now come with some encryption capability. Government used thumbdrives should have a code identifier that can be tied to a password of the user. This same identifier would be ID&#039;d into the government computer system for that employees function/area. So, if the government employee tries to use it on a non-government computer it will not work, and if the employee looses it it cannot be opened on any other computer. The ID code is loaded into the interface mentioned above and the interface can also lock out the thumb drive should the employee be terminated or removed from authorization from that access area. -If necessary the USB/Thumb interface device can also be programmed to recognized unauthorized downlads from non-government sources to reduce piracy of copywrited materials. Overall, Government Computers should not be off-the-shelf models, but cusomized for security. We keep trying to use off-the-shelf and continue to have off-the-shelf problems. Establish a system of closed-house computers and have closed-house problems which enable security to identify faster the breaches and weaknesses of the system, allowing it to work faster and more secure. Kevin MW Hughes </description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Thumbdrives, by themeselves, should not be the point of focus here. It is the USB Port not being protected in having scan capability prior to the reading of the data device. Hardware data intake for all computer puposes in Government should have protection built into them.<br /> My recommendations are these:<br /> –Fix the USB Ports or add/hard connect another piece of hardware to these ports to plug the Thumb or other data storage into. This interface allows for scanning and encryption recognition of the Thumb or other pre-authorized date storage device. This interface iteself has a crptyic code only working for government computers by IM security and can be recoded as needed, so if lost or stolen it is not easily used with another computer system.<br /> –Thumb drives now come with some encryption capability. Government used thumbdrives should have a code identifier that can be tied to a password of the user. This same identifier would be ID’d into the government computer system for that employees function/area. So, if the government employee tries to use it on a non-government computer it will not work, and if the employee looses it it cannot be opened on any other computer. The ID code is loaded into the interface mentioned above and the interface can also lock out the thumb drive should the employee be terminated or removed from authorization from that access area.<br /> –If necessary the USB/Thumb interface device can also be programmed to recognized unauthorized downlads from non-government sources to reduce piracy of copywrited materials.<br /> Overall, Government Computers should not be off-the-shelf models, but cusomized for security. We keep trying to use off-the-shelf and continue to have off-the-shelf problems. Establish a system of closed-house computers and have closed-house problems which enable security to identify faster the breaches and weaknesses of the system, allowing it to work faster and more secure.<br /> Kevin MW Hughes</p> ]]></content:encoded> </item> <item><title>By: Chris Daguanno</title><link>http://defensetech.org/2008/12/29/the-rule-of-thumbs/#comment-95300</link> <dc:creator>Chris Daguanno</dc:creator> <pubDate>Thu, 01 Jan 2009 14:39:39 +0000</pubDate> <guid isPermaLink="false">http://deftech.usmilblog.com/?p=4261#comment-95300</guid> <description>Thumb drives are a no go yet external HDs are OK. This makes no sense and is just plain counterproductive for our DoD workforce. The Navy is crippled with NMCI which is in itself crippled by the most insecure operating system available: Windows. I&#039;ve sat in meetings with IT &quot;professionals&quot; who don&#039;t have any certifications, let alone a degree, who don&#039;t have the faintest clue as to the vulnerabilities that really ail our networks. Like many government organizations and policies, security is rooted in significantly inconveniencing those involved. See TSA. This is no different. </description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Thumb drives are a no go yet external HDs are OK. This makes no sense and is just plain counterproductive for our DoD workforce. The Navy is crippled with NMCI which is in itself crippled by the most insecure operating system available: Windows. I’ve sat in meetings with IT “professionals” who don’t have any certifications, let alone a degree, who don’t have the faintest clue as to the vulnerabilities that really ail our networks.<br /> Like many government organizations and policies, security is rooted in significantly inconveniencing those involved. See TSA. This is no different.</p> ]]></content:encoded> </item> <item><title>By: Jim</title><link>http://defensetech.org/2008/12/29/the-rule-of-thumbs/#comment-80138</link> <dc:creator>Jim</dc:creator> <pubDate>Thu, 01 Jan 2009 12:46:36 +0000</pubDate> <guid isPermaLink="false">http://deftech.usmilblog.com/?p=4261#comment-80138</guid> <description>Just get rid of all the computers.  Problem solved. </description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Just get rid of all the computers.  Problem solved.</p> ]]></content:encoded> </item> <item><title>By: Kalroy</title><link>http://defensetech.org/2008/12/29/the-rule-of-thumbs/#comment-95299</link> <dc:creator>Kalroy</dc:creator> <pubDate>Thu, 01 Jan 2009 05:29:42 +0000</pubDate> <guid isPermaLink="false">http://deftech.usmilblog.com/?p=4261#comment-95299</guid> <description>Our directive (USAF/Edwards AFB) is no removable media.  Period.  No iPods, no thumbdrives, no CDRs, no nothing. Unless it was government issued and scanned by IT. Essentially this means no thumbdrives for the peons. Kalroy </description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Our directive (USAF/Edwards AFB) is no removable media.  Period.  No iPods, no thumbdrives, no CDRs, no nothing.<br /> Unless it was government issued and scanned by IT. Essentially this means no thumbdrives for the peons.<br /> Kalroy</p> ]]></content:encoded> </item> <item><title>By: Matt Musson</title><link>http://defensetech.org/2008/12/29/the-rule-of-thumbs/#comment-95298</link> <dc:creator>Matt Musson</dc:creator> <pubDate>Wed, 31 Dec 2008 19:27:45 +0000</pubDate> <guid isPermaLink="false">http://deftech.usmilblog.com/?p=4261#comment-95298</guid> <description>We all know this is how agents will attack the Defense network when the real fighting starts. Or, just before. </description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>We all know this is how agents will attack the Defense network when the real fighting starts. Or, just before.</p> ]]></content:encoded> </item> <item><title>By: Getch</title><link>http://defensetech.org/2008/12/29/the-rule-of-thumbs/#comment-95297</link> <dc:creator>Getch</dc:creator> <pubDate>Wed, 31 Dec 2008 09:33:06 +0000</pubDate> <guid isPermaLink="false">http://deftech.usmilblog.com/?p=4261#comment-95297</guid> <description>To all out there with nothing to do but write your negative opinions about something as unchangable as the speed in which technology advances, shame on you. Get with the program. Some of you are actually writing ridiculous comments like the one by Mr.Dale Swanson. RIDICULOUS !! </description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>To all out there with nothing to do but write your negative opinions about something as unchangable as the speed in which technology advances, shame on you. Get with the program. Some of you are actually writing ridiculous comments like the one by Mr.Dale Swanson. RIDICULOUS !!</p> ]]></content:encoded> </item> </channel> </rss>
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