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	<title>Comments on: Hybrid Enemies — A Primer</title>
	<atom:link href="http://defensetech.org/2009/02/05/hybrid-enemies-a-primer/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://defensetech.org/2009/02/05/hybrid-enemies-a-primer/</link>
	<description>The Future of the Military, Law Enforcement and National Security</description>
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		<title>By: Tu</title>
		<link>http://defensetech.org/2009/02/05/hybrid-enemies-a-primer/#comment-96505</link>
		<dc:creator>Tu</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 10 Feb 2009 07:56:56 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://deftech.usmilblog.com/?p=4326#comment-96505</guid>
		<description>Gee, thanks. That was completely useful.
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		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Gee, thanks. That was completely useful.</p>
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		<title>By: freefallingbomb</title>
		<link>http://defensetech.org/2009/02/05/hybrid-enemies-a-primer/#comment-96504</link>
		<dc:creator>freefallingbomb</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 09 Feb 2009 01:07:29 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://deftech.usmilblog.com/?p=4326#comment-96504</guid>
		<description>To the poster &quot;Greg&quot;:
You wrote: &quot;If you like the russians so much better go tell them. How about you try staying on topic for once.&quot;
Do you need extra help from other readers to understand whom this phrase in the article refers to:
&quot;With  RARE  EXCEPTION , the exercises which hone officers&#039; skills in these areas are focused on the conventional Fulda gap-style battle...&quot; ?
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		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>To the poster “Greg”:<br />
You wrote: “If you like the russians so much better go tell them. How about you try staying on topic for once.“<br />
Do you need extra help from other readers to understand whom this phrase in the article refers to:<br />
“With  RARE  EXCEPTION , the exercises which hone officers’ skills in these areas are focused on the conventional Fulda gap-style battle…” ?</p>
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		<title>By: Greg</title>
		<link>http://defensetech.org/2009/02/05/hybrid-enemies-a-primer/#comment-81359</link>
		<dc:creator>Greg</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 08 Feb 2009 19:25:06 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://deftech.usmilblog.com/?p=4326#comment-81359</guid>
		<description>@ Freefallingbomb
What are you blabbering about.  You are always posting long winded nonsense.  If you like the russians so much better go tell them.  How about you try staying on topic for once.
</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>@ Freefallingbomb<br />
What are you blabbering about.  You are always posting long winded nonsense.  If you like the russians so much better go tell them.  How about you try staying on topic for once.</p>
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		<title>By: freefallingbomb</title>
		<link>http://defensetech.org/2009/02/05/hybrid-enemies-a-primer/#comment-96503</link>
		<dc:creator>freefallingbomb</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 08 Feb 2009 04:01:24 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://deftech.usmilblog.com/?p=4326#comment-96503</guid>
		<description>To the poster &quot;Tu&quot;:
You wrote: &quot;Even though we&#039;re not seeing threats in the conventional warfare arena, isn&#039;t that because we&#039;ve maintained such a dominance in that arena? If we shift away from that to focus on irregular warfare, wouldn&#039;t we then weaken our ability to fight conventional wars?&quot;
Crying about &quot;foul play&quot; from the hybrids?
Back in the Cold War, when the masses of the U.S. Armed Forces lined up in front of the masses of the Warsaw Pact, as you probably still prefer, you U.S. Americans would have had to resort to  NUKES  (for example to neutron bombs) to even survive!!!
And didn&#039;t you HEROES  threaten to use nukes against Saddam Hussein and against Iran too, for example if they sank a single U.S. aircraft carrier?!
Say: Which kind of warfare are you really good at?!
What happens for example when a 100 % conventional enemy Armed Force visits Pearl Harbour?
</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>To the poster “Tu”:<br />
You wrote: “Even though we’re not seeing threats in the conventional warfare arena, isn’t that because we’ve maintained such a dominance in that arena? If we shift away from that to focus on irregular warfare, wouldn’t we then weaken our ability to fight conventional wars?“<br />
Crying about “foul play” from the hybrids?<br />
Back in the Cold War, when the masses of the U.S. Armed Forces lined up in front of the masses of the Warsaw Pact, as you probably still prefer, you U.S. Americans would have had to resort to  NUKES  (for example to neutron bombs) to even survive!!!<br />
And didn’t you HEROES  threaten to use nukes against Saddam Hussein and against Iran too, for example if they sank a single U.S. aircraft carrier?!<br />
Say: Which kind of warfare are you really good at?!<br />
What happens for example when a 100 % conventional enemy Armed Force visits Pearl Harbour?</p>
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		<title>By: Tu</title>
		<link>http://defensetech.org/2009/02/05/hybrid-enemies-a-primer/#comment-96502</link>
		<dc:creator>Tu</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 08 Feb 2009 01:40:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://deftech.usmilblog.com/?p=4326#comment-96502</guid>
		<description>I think I&#039;m missing something here. Even though we&#039;re not seeing threats in the conventional warfare arena, isn&#039;t that because we&#039;ve maintained such a dominance in that arena? If we shift away from that to focus on irregular warfare, wouldn&#039;t we then weaken our ability to fight conventional wars?
I always thought that it&#039;s potential opponents like China or Russia that could pose an existential threat to us and our allies, not the likes of Al Qaeda or insurgents Iraq. The reason the latter have to fight irregular wars is because they&#039;re too weak to fight in a conventional war with us.
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		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I think I’m missing something here. Even though we’re not seeing threats in the conventional warfare arena, isn’t that because we’ve maintained such a dominance in that arena? If we shift away from that to focus on irregular warfare, wouldn’t we then weaken our ability to fight conventional wars?<br />
I always thought that it’s potential opponents like China or Russia that could pose an existential threat to us and our allies, not the likes of Al Qaeda or insurgents Iraq. The reason the latter have to fight irregular wars is because they’re too weak to fight in a conventional war with us.</p>
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		<title>By: freefallingbomb</title>
		<link>http://defensetech.org/2009/02/05/hybrid-enemies-a-primer/#comment-96501</link>
		<dc:creator>freefallingbomb</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 07 Feb 2009 19:24:12 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://deftech.usmilblog.com/?p=4326#comment-96501</guid>
		<description>I disagree with this author&#039;s opinion that the Hezbollahs became the first hybrid fighters in the World, back in 2006 (he described them as the &quot;hybrid archetype&quot;).
In my not so humble opinion the Chechnyans in Grozny were that, in the two wars that lasted from 1994 to ~ 2004.
The first results of that can already be recognized in some construction details of the latest Russian tank models, rather layed out for asymmetrical warfare (&quot;M.O.U.T.&quot; = &quot;Military Operations in Urban Terrain&quot;) instead of for the old, classical tank duels in the Fulda Gap:
1) Narrow frontal silhouette.
2) Stronger all-around armour, including on the roof, engine exhaust and at the rear, instead of optimizing only the frontal armour for tank-to-tank horn-locking, even ignoring all previous weight limitations for air transport. This goes not only for their (and the &quot;Israeli&quot;) most recent battle-tanks, but also for their latest armoured personnell carriers too (as well as for the later U.S. American &quot;Stryker&quot; = an armoured wheeled vehicle for urban combats and a large replacement of the Humvees)
3) Better all-round visibility for the drivers and tank commanders.
4) Better protection against mines, I.E.D.&#039;s and R.P.G.&#039;s.
5) The main armament consists less of a heavy anti-tank gun but is a broad mix of guided weapons, medium calibre machine-cannons, grenade-throwers and heavy machine-guns.
And
6) an Active Protection System (= a  RUSSIAN  invention </description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I disagree with this author’s opinion that the Hezbollahs became the first hybrid fighters in the World, back in 2006 (he described them as the “hybrid archetype”).<br />
In my not so humble opinion the Chechnyans in Grozny were that, in the two wars that lasted from 1994 to ~ 2004.<br />
The first results of that can already be recognized in some construction details of the latest Russian tank models, rather layed out for asymmetrical warfare (“M.O.U.T.” = “Military Operations in Urban Terrain”) instead of for the old, classical tank duels in the Fulda Gap:<br />
1) Narrow frontal silhouette.<br />
2) Stronger all-around armour, including on the roof, engine exhaust and at the rear, instead of optimizing only the frontal armour for tank-to-tank horn-locking, even ignoring all previous weight limitations for air transport. This goes not only for their (and the “Israeli”) most recent battle-tanks, but also for their latest armoured personnell carriers too (as well as for the later U.S. American “Stryker” = an armoured wheeled vehicle for urban combats and a large replacement of the Humvees)<br />
3) Better all-round visibility for the drivers and tank commanders.<br />
4) Better protection against mines, I.E.D.‘s and R.P.G.‘s.<br />
5) The main armament consists less of a heavy anti-tank gun but is a broad mix of guided weapons, medium calibre machine-cannons, grenade-throwers and heavy machine-guns.<br />
And<br />
6) an Active Protection System (= a  RUSSIAN  invention</p>
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		<title>By: HS</title>
		<link>http://defensetech.org/2009/02/05/hybrid-enemies-a-primer/#comment-96500</link>
		<dc:creator>HS</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 06 Feb 2009 11:03:20 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://deftech.usmilblog.com/?p=4326#comment-96500</guid>
		<description>This &quot;Primer&quot; article is about how future enemies of the US who use guerilla tactics will be able to cut into the technology advantage currently enjoyed by the US in Iraq &amp; Afghanistan.  It&#039;s not about the concept of 4th generation warfare.
Apologize for going off on a tangent, but:
1st generation warfare: Direct fire directed at military forces - 19th century
2nd generation warfare: Indirect fire directed at military forces - WW1
3rd generation warfare: Indirect fire directed at civilian &amp; military means of production - WW2
4th generation warfare: Any means available directed at the political will to participate in a conflict - Vietnam
A strategy that is based on 2nd, 3rd or 4th generation warfare can &amp; probably will include activity that is described as 1 or more of the earlier generations.
</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This “Primer” article is about how future enemies of the US who use guerilla tactics will be able to cut into the technology advantage currently enjoyed by the US in Iraq &amp; Afghanistan.  It’s not about the concept of 4th generation warfare.<br />
Apologize for going off on a tangent, but:<br />
1st generation warfare: Direct fire directed at military forces — 19th century<br />
2nd generation warfare: Indirect fire directed at military forces — WW1<br />
3rd generation warfare: Indirect fire directed at civilian &amp; military means of production — WW2<br />
4th generation warfare: Any means available directed at the political will to participate in a conflict — Vietnam<br />
A strategy that is based on 2nd, 3rd or 4th generation warfare can &amp; probably will include activity that is described as 1 or more of the earlier generations.</p>
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		<title>By: TB</title>
		<link>http://defensetech.org/2009/02/05/hybrid-enemies-a-primer/#comment-96499</link>
		<dc:creator>TB</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 06 Feb 2009 04:49:23 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://deftech.usmilblog.com/?p=4326#comment-96499</guid>
		<description>Just to fix a few ground rules to the discussion. I think we need to clear up a few definitions:
1st Gen warfare: linear tactics and close order drill (19th century firing lines)
2nd Gen warfare: combined arms, but more concerned with firepower than manuever. Also marked by centralized control of forces (WWI French, WWII-modern US forces)
3rd Gen warfare: combined arms maneuver warfare that relies on speed and surprise rather than breaking the enemy&#039;s toys. Nearly all tactical decisions are decentralized. Orders from above are mission oriented; more concerned with the result and not the how-to. (WWI &amp; WWII Germany).
4th Gen warfare: nonstate actors vs states (AQ, Hezbollah, drug lords, mafia, gangs)
The US military is still stuck in 2nd Gen warfare for the most part. Before we can hope to do well fighting a 4th Gen opponent, we have to move into the 3rd Generation. Which means more reliance on leadership, training, and decentralized decision making rather than putting warheads on foreheads. You don&#039;t bomb your way out of a 4th Gen war and how many kills you score isn&#039;t a concern of a 3rd Gen army - results are.
</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Just to fix a few ground rules to the discussion. I think we need to clear up a few definitions:<br />
1st Gen warfare: linear tactics and close order drill (19th century firing lines)<br />
2nd Gen warfare: combined arms, but more concerned with firepower than manuever. Also marked by centralized control of forces (WWI French, WWII-modern US forces)<br />
3rd Gen warfare: combined arms maneuver warfare that relies on speed and surprise rather than breaking the enemy’s toys. Nearly all tactical decisions are decentralized. Orders from above are mission oriented; more concerned with the result and not the how-to. (WWI &amp; WWII Germany).<br />
4th Gen warfare: nonstate actors vs states (AQ, Hezbollah, drug lords, mafia, gangs)<br />
The US military is still stuck in 2nd Gen warfare for the most part. Before we can hope to do well fighting a 4th Gen opponent, we have to move into the 3rd Generation. Which means more reliance on leadership, training, and decentralized decision making rather than putting warheads on foreheads. You don’t bomb your way out of a 4th Gen war and how many kills you score isn’t a concern of a 3rd Gen army — results are.</p>
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		<title>By: bilbo</title>
		<link>http://defensetech.org/2009/02/05/hybrid-enemies-a-primer/#comment-96496</link>
		<dc:creator>bilbo</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 05 Feb 2009 20:30:36 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://deftech.usmilblog.com/?p=4326#comment-96496</guid>
		<description>CR, I agree that talking about territory is linear battlefield thinking - but my broader point is that &quot;hybrid&quot; tactics are defensive and tied to insurgencies.  No state is going to seize and hold southern Florida using only irregulars with shiny new anti-tank weapons, just like no state can seize and hold a desert country with loads of M1A1s but an army with no constabulary aptitude.
As I see it, the bigger issue is how to adjust forces to combat heavily armed hybrid forces - either accept much higher rates of casualties or risk diluting the military&#039;s force posture or develop a constabulary force adept at these policing/special forces duties.
</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>CR, I agree that talking about territory is linear battlefield thinking — but my broader point is that “hybrid” tactics are defensive and tied to insurgencies.  No state is going to seize and hold southern Florida using only irregulars with shiny new anti-tank weapons, just like no state can seize and hold a desert country with loads of M1A1s but an army with no constabulary aptitude.<br />
As I see it, the bigger issue is how to adjust forces to combat heavily armed hybrid forces — either accept much higher rates of casualties or risk diluting the military’s force posture or develop a constabulary force adept at these policing/special forces duties.</p>
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		<title>By: CR</title>
		<link>http://defensetech.org/2009/02/05/hybrid-enemies-a-primer/#comment-96495</link>
		<dc:creator>CR</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 05 Feb 2009 19:21:28 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://deftech.usmilblog.com/?p=4326#comment-96495</guid>
		<description>Good points but again we face a new reality....
What hapens when cyber attacks and electronic intrusion attacks are the opening salvo....how do we define an act of war then? How do we even know if we are at war?
Think of it....if no bombs are being dropped but the enemy compromises our networks and we end up downing our own aircraft....and it can&#039;t be traced with 100% confidence what do you do?
</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Good points but again we face a new reality.…<br />
What hapens when cyber attacks and electronic intrusion attacks are the opening salvo.…how do we define an act of war then? How do we even know if we are at war?<br />
Think of it.…if no bombs are being dropped but the enemy compromises our networks and we end up downing our own aircraft.…and it can’t be traced with 100% confidence what do you do?</p>
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