The Obama administration, looking for potential budget cuts, may take aim at the trouble-plagued Navy surface ship programs. As well documented, the San Antonio (LPD 17) amphibious ships and littoral combat ships (LCS) are far behind schedule and over cost. Indeed, the San Antonio herself took almost three years from when the Navy placed her in commission until she was ready to undertake her first overseas deployment — probably a record for Navy surface ships.
Meanwhile, after some ten years and many millions of dollars in development, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Gary Roughead has truncated the Zumwalt (DDG 1000) advanced destroyer program — and undoubtedly wishes to cancel even the three ships already funded by Congress. Rather, Roughead wants to restart construction of the Arleigh Burke (DDG 51) class destroyers — a design that dates to 1979. Significantly, the two previous CNOs both strongly supported the DDG 1000 while saying that the Navy did not need any DDG 51s beyond the 62 ships built and under construction.
Similarly, the Navy has periodically announced plans to cease further construction of LPD 17 amphibious ships, knowing that Congress would still fund the ships because of Marine Corps support for them.
These machinations have led Missouri Representative Ike Skelton, the Democratic chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, earlier this month to say that the Navy must make a final decision this year about how many and what kind of surface ships it wants to build. Skelton told the American Shipbuilding Association that he did not know yet what the administration’s Fiscal Year 2010 shipbuilding request would include, but that the Navy could not afford to wait longer before settling on a course for what warships it wants to build.
“The debate about the future surface Navy needs to end this year. A decision needs to be made. After a decision is made that both the Department [of the Navy] and the Congress can support, we need to fund the surface construction program at the level necessary to restore our fleet,” Skelton said. “Whether that number is 313 ships or 340 ships, we need to get there.”
Meanwhile, the carrier and submarine shipbuilding programs are relatively settled — and eating up large chunks of the relatively finite shipbuilding budget. With an estimated FY 2010 budget of $10 to $12 billion — at most — the Navy is now building two attack submarines (SSN) per year for a total cost of almost $5 billion in today’s dollars. The next nuclear-propelled aircraft carrier, the Gerald Ford (CVN 78), is expected by non-Navy sources to cost some $10 to $12 billion. Although the “flattop” is being funded over several years, such high-cost programs will leave minimal funding for surface combatants — cruisers, destroyers, and the littoral combat ships plus amphibious ships and fleet auxiliaries.
Today the Navy has some 280 ships in service against an oft-stated requirement of a minimum of 313 ships. To build up to 313 ships the Navy should be building some 10 to 12 ships per year — at an annual cost of more than $20 billion, clearly a “cost too far.”
Addressing the problem, Representative Skelton said, “We would like the Navy to do what the Navy keeps saying makes the most sense: build affordable ships which leverage on commonality with other ship programs, and build them in numbers that allow for economies of purchase and investment in infrastructure.”
U.S. sea power today is “on a bad glide slope,” he added.
The Obama administration is looking at a military establishment that is fighting difficult and, in realty, open-ended conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Although the president has said that he plans to withdraw all U.S. “combat troops” from Iraq in a little over a year, that will leave some 40,000 or (more likely) more “support and security” troops in country. Add in the U.S. training, advisory, and counter-insurgency operations in Africa and other areas, and the perceived “strategic” threats from China, North Korea, Iran, and Russia, conventional naval forces appear to have a very limited role in the future. (The more significant exception would be the planned ballistic missile defense ships — now designated CG(X) or, with nuclear propulsion, CG(X)N.)
But looking into the future, with the continued loss of overseas bases, naval ships take on increased significance. This was evident when, without nearby bases, aircraft carriers and amphibious ships were the means of providing tactical support for the initial operations in Afghanistan. Similarly, the inability to fly most combat sorties from Saudi bases in the spring of 2003 again saw the need for naval forces for the invasion of Iraq.
If the United States does have a future confrontation — not conflict — with China it will most likely be over resources in Africa and South America. Similarly, Russian support for Venezuela’s regime and interests in other areas for political and economic reasons add to the probability of crises in remote areas. And, it will be ships, carrying aircraft and embarking Marines and other troops, which will provide the U.S. president with political and military options in those areas.
The Navy’s leadership — military and civilian — must develop a reasonable and affordable program that will be saleable to Congress. As important, the program must be articulated properly so that all “players” understand the future importance of naval forces in this uncertain era.
“From Preponderance to Partnership: American Maritime Power in the 21st Century” by the Center for a New American Security is a good read and provides some possible options for the Navy.
https://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/11776
dude have to agree scrap the LCS figure out a better cheaper desgin that can be mass produced.
DDG has some good some bad points power systems sound promising and such…but as a program cut it figure out a way to upgrade the DDG 51s that are going to be produced.
Subs we need em bad hell do we even have othere anti sub platforms now that the vikingsare gone?
damnit there where some ships the navy gave to the CG before 911 then found out they needed would those with maybe the support of a small surface ship be sufficent to stop pirate threats?
Frankely, the biggest issue in defense procurement is the lack of talent in project management. This lack has allowed constant meddling in design and construction phases that should have been locked down, resulting in incredible delays and cost overruns. The people currently in the procurement chain appear to simply be incapable of allowing a ship or system to proceed without stopping dozens of times during construction to demand expensive, time consuming and often IRRELEVANT changes.
The best way to contain costs and delays is to adhere to well-established proceedures that would freeze changes to a design until completion, then making any requested changes and upgrades AFTER the initial work had been completed, validated and delivered.
The navy and its ship acquisition problems have become an embarresment. What they need to do with write an initial requirement for what they are looking for and STOP altering the design during construction (or otherwise mid-stream).
This is essentially the same thing that we did during WW2…
I wonder why we are building the “21st century carrier” (Gerald Ford) before it’s 21st century escorts (frigates, destroyers, cruisers, etc?)
The way it looks now the carrier people are getting everything they want at the expense of the other surface combatants (and the submarine people…nobody leave out them submarines).
There are certain missions carriers are appropriate for, and then certain ones you need the smaller ships for. I mean, what’s the worst that can happen; we depend on other nations to interface modern destroyers and cruisers as long as we bring the airpower?
Posted by: Byron Skinner at March 20, 2009 12:54 PM
While i agree with you in some ways blaming it all on the idea of privitization is simply false. The system has reached its present destionation because of apathetic voters, corrupt senators and congressmen, a horrible ship building system, and many many other reasons. If we had followed the idea of capitalism simply letting those who could give use the best product for the cheapest amount within the areas we give them this problem would be much less likly. Instead the idea of cheap cheap cheap and payoffs to government officials has gotten us to our present state.
Its quite simple design a system that lets only the best and strongest survive and you get the best and strongest systems. Evolution.
Build more Flexships: mutirole ships vs solo role ships like CVs & SSNs.
Make the new DD1K a Multirole ship.
Same for LPD 17 types (minus ASW role).
& for DDGX.
Then see the Navy get funded.
& CUT Navy bureaucracy to fund the Surface Navy.
Cut DOD bureaucracy alone for Funding.
Stuff can be done.
Change program specs.
Change policies & regs.
Change vendors?
Sample ideal Flexships: US Destroyers WW2:
ASW
Gun Platform
AAW
Beachead support
Fire support
C3I
Early warning
ALL from US DD DE types.
Thats a Flexship & add to LPD 17 & DDG1K class alone.
Very doable.
LPD 17s do not do ASW.
Good Afternoon Folks,
A timely picture with this posting, a San Antonio Class amphibious warfare ship. One that is constructed so poorly that in a collision by the U.S.S. New Orleans with the con of the U.S. Hartford a couple of days ago resulted in a ruptured fuel cell and 25K gallons of diesel was dumped.
Would anybody want to speculate how much damage would have been done to the “war ship” if an attack like the U.S.S. Cole took place instead a a bump in the nigh with a thin skinned sub?
I’m sure the mighty American industrial can build a better war ship then the U.S.S. New Orleans. With the lives of American sailors and Marines at steak the American public and Congress should demand better, we are for sure paying for it.
ALLONS,
Byron Skinner
The idea of having a thin skinned ship for shore assualt is kinda stupid if i remember correctly the idea is to put it 50mils our from the beach…meaning we have to buy the efv or the marines are no longer marines in that they can storm beach heads.
Why cant the navy just build a ship capable of going in with good armor very good anti missles/air defenses, Able to support troops with alot of firepower and land troops ashore.….hell why not just combine the assualt ship and the shore bombardment role?
Good Afternoon VR,
First off thank you for your open response on this issue. There is much of what you said that is little more then standard Government boiler plate regarding small business and spreading the wealth. Sub contracts are assigned to companies in specific congressional districts that have perhaps shake congressional support for a project.
The issue I will address are poorly written specifications for a weapons program and the “dialogue” issue.
You are supporting my contention weapons projects originate not with the end user, the military, but with defense contractors who see an opening and lose cash and decide to exploit it. You button hole a flag officers do a sell job and he starts the ball rolling or if you can’t sell it to the brass, well you can always just “Cunningham” it with a member. After a successful program and the General/Admiral retires, ends up on s board and make sure that his/her replacement know what great guys all you are and that you look after folks who look after you.
The second issue is of course you statement regarding “dialogue” between contractors during the development and bidding process on a contract, it’s called collusion if I remember correctly. Of course I know, that you know this is illegal, and I’m surprised that you would even admit to it on a public board such as defense tech. This site is visited by many people who work in the Federal Government and I would be very surprised if you are unknown to them, be careful of what you say VR. But I do agree with you it happens, a lot.
Your comment about needing a steady flow of defense contracts to stay in business doesn’t wash. The United States has a capitalistic economy where firms are expected to sell in several arenas of the economy. Out side over defense contraction a manufacturing concern that has only a single customer won’t be in business very long.
ALLONS,
Byron Skinner
Since most military procurement is an exercise in pissing away as much money as humanly possible before someone demands that something actually be produced, the Navy has no one but itself to blame.
Ditto the Air Force. $30 billion in R&D, decades come and go — and all so they can pop out 100 copies of something before they move on to the next wonder weapon.
If you guys actually frigging produced something in a timely fashion, you’d have the weapons you claim to want before somebody thought to cancel them. But then the R&D gravy train would come to a halt, so we know why you drag your feet about everything.