The Army and senior OSD leadership are debating whether to eliminate all but one of the eight FCS vehicles, a Hill source says. The sole surviving vehicle would be, not surprisingly, the Non Line of Sight Cannon.
But the plan being considered would save a relatively paltry $500 million in 2010. As the Hill source noted, the FCS network and software comprise “most” of the R and D money.
Also, an industry source pointed out that as the number of vehicles in the program shrinks, so does the viability of the network. The development of the FCS network is linked to the development of FCS Manned Ground Vehicles. Each MGV acts as a node in the ground based aspect of the network. So cutting MGVs reduces the viability of the network, the industry source said.
But because so much of the FCS program depends on economies of scale from building vehicles on a common chassis, the Army would be hard pressed to save a great deal. The Hill source noted that half of the research and development costs are for the chassis and you would still be developing and building the chassis, no matter how many vehicles you killed.
The Army wanted had a very different plan to restructure the Future Combat System in the out years, but the OSD said no to it because it saved almost nothing in the short term. Now the Army is wrestling with those notorious meanies at PA and E over the programs very future.
Of course, building NLOS would help remove one very prominent irritant, from the Pentagons point of view. Sen. James Inhofe (R-Okla.) has prodded and pushed the Army for years to build NLOS and to build as many of them as possible. He wants to protect jobs at Fort Sill, the Armys artillery center.
[Editor’s note: Inhofe has each year pushed language in the fiscal year defense authorization bill that specifically protects the NLOS cannon and launch system from cancellation if FCS as a program faces cuts…Read the rest of Colin’s story, and keep up with the steady trickle of ’10 DoD Budget leaks at DoD Buzz.]
– Colin Clark
{ 22 comments… read them below or add one }
Good Afternoon Folks,
The FCS program as a whole should be canceled and the each individual piece looked at as a stand alone system. In a nut shell the problem with the FCS manned vehicles is that they no longer are needed.
The NLOS Canon is really not that technologically advanced from the M-109A6. The self loader is still suspect, the propellant is still a solid charge instead of blending two inert gases and the radiator that was to be on the barrel never appeared. So why replace the 60 year old M-109?
The big change that has happened is that we simply don’t need these vehicles. With bringing the Abrams and Bradleys to zero hours the U.S. has the world best heavy force. The medium Division that the FCS vehicles were to staff is no longer a consideration, our light Divisions have gain so much fire/combat power that a medium Division as conceptualized in the FCS has no mission.
ALLONS,
Byron Skinner
>The FCS program as a whole should be canceled and the each individual piece looked at as a stand alone system.
No this leads to piecemeal cuts and economizing.
What is needed is to keep the program together as much as possible. Only then will the contractors be able to make victory profits.
Defense contractors made well above the S&P during the last 10 years, it needs to built upon so that their returns are unassailable.
A medium division isn’t about firepower, but about the capability to attack mounted, to move quickly through a contested battlefield in order to devastate the enemy army’s intestines.
A heavy division is able to do the same, but it requires more logistical support and more forgiving terrain.
I don’t think we need to do this “for” the defense contractors, even though I do feel that we need to make sure they don’t fold for national security reasons. The Abrams and Bradley are good at what they do, but they are both fuel hogs, and very heavy. The Stryker is good at what it does, but does not have the heavy firepower it needs when it runs into enemy armor. We won’t always be fighting guerrillas, so we need medium weight vehicles that can take the fight to the enemy, and still be able to ease the burden on the logistics tail. I don’t know about the whole “modular” chassis thing, but the network is very important. Look at how the incidence of blue on blue is down from desert storm. I would like to see changes made to the procurement process, and to see contractor’s feet held to the fire when they don’t deliver on time and under budget. I say if you work procurement on any weapons system, you may not work for that company, or consult for that company after you retire.
Good Morning Mr. Ortmann,
I agree with you statement that the medium division was intended to be a great deal of combat power that can be rapidly deployed with in hours and days in any theatre in the world. Great concept but the Air Force didn’t cooperate.
The Air Force is standing pat at only 187 C17′s no more then 220. The reason of course is the make mo’ money available for buying F-22′s. Sad to say Seven but that piddling number of C-17′s is insufficient to move a ready battalion of the 82ed Air Born Division in a single life let alone a Medium Combat Brigade. Without a sufficient number of C-17′s the goal of a Medium Strike Brigade is simply and Army dream.
At an estimated contract value of over $220 billion the Medium Division is simply an expensive unusable toy that the Army can ill afford. Meanwhile combat over the past seven years in Afghanistan and Iraq has dramatically increase the Combat/fire power of the U.S. Light Divisions/Brigades (10th., 25th., 82ed AB, the 101st. Air Assault and the 173ed AB Brigade), or in short while Boeing and SAIC were collecting their dod checks and dragging their feet in development of the FCS the Army in fact evolved beyond their thinking.
Some of the FAC is good stuff like the NLOS PS rocket launcher. Although the concept is not new, the idea appeared in Pop. Mechanics in the 1970′s, it is a sound concept that can also be used by the Navy in the LCS program. The broadband communications of the FCS is worth keeping simply because it appears to be almost ready even though Harris had to reinvent the wheel instead of using off the shelf technology. The vehicles though are simply not enough of a leap in technology or in combat power to justify their costs.
ALLONS,
Byron Skinner
Byron, with 12 C-17 sorties per night…an amount equal to what deployed non-mobile elements of the 173rd Airborne Brigade into Northern Iraq each night in 2003, you could deploy:
10 Mounted Combat Systems with 120mm guns
14 Infantry Carrier vehicles carrying 9-man dismounted squads
4 NLOS-Cannons with 155mm GPS Excalibur rounds
2 C2 Vehicles
Multiple NLOS-Launch System container launch units
and a few HEMTT tankers in 2 C-17s pulling ammo traliers that could actually supply those vehicles for quite a few days.
Please enlighten me on the firepower advances you believe that airborne, air assault, and light divisions have made in the past few years that would begin to equal in light BCT-size…the firepower, protection, and mobility just described in less than FCS battalion size.
Now deploy 5 such small FCS task forces along an international border or in safer enemy territory….in one night…with 60 C-17 sorties.
Good Evening Cole,
Your two questions.
The Air lift capacity is based on the 82ed’s. ready battalion that is our 9/11 or as the guys say a speed bump force. DoD says that this force can be put down any place in the world in 24 hours. When they say put down a force it’s assumed that that force has the combat staying power to last 72 hours before being reenforced and resupplied. According to an AF report in 2007 at the time of the surge the AF didn’t have the air lift to do this.
Bases on that information the entire 82ed. along with the Division Headquarters’s. was deployed for the first time since WWII for the Iraqi surge. Since both events happened at about the same time with no feather explanation their connection is only an assumption of course, but I think a safe one.
What has the light Division gained. I will cite two change in it’s TO&E. First the weaponization of the HUMVEE and it’s dissemination down to the rifle squad level. With two HUMVEES working with a squad it increases their combat range, improves their communication with platoon, company and battalion and provides them with platforms for two crew served weapons. This is a huge increase in mobility, communication and fire power for the rifle squad.
The second is Predator. This unmanned reconnaissance/weapons platform has been provided with a platoon per battalion, and that will increase to a full company, when the 98 Predator C’s , Warrior Class, now on order become operational. In fact as we write the Army is standing up a new MOS/Officer career Group called: Electronic warfare”, based on FM 3-36 at Ft. Sill Ok. The units first CO is Colonel Laurie Buckhout and it will start with 1,660 officers, warrant officers and enlisted. It’s designation will be the 14th. Signal Regiment. From here on out the rest is classified.
The new warrior series predator will come with broad spectrum IR, small aperture radar and BIR along with a 1000 lb. weapons load. According to a three star General in Afghanistan we have the ability to put a Red Dot on anyones head in the world and follow their every movement and take the out when we want to. We can follow tracks that the eye can’t see, we can see inside buildings, we can see who is in each room and target only that room that has the males and weapons. We did this yesterday in Iraq, killed four insurgents, with out any non combatant deaths in the same structure.
The Medium Division was to come into the battle during the early COIN period till the early stabilization period where they would be relieved by light units. With it’s increased combat powers and reconnaissance capabilities what we were looking for with a new Medium Division we now have with our Light Division. Why duplicate what you already have?
ALLONS,
Byron Skinner
Good Morning Cole,
It seems that we have come to the point of more agreement then disagreement on this.
I only use the reference of Division vs. that of BCT because that is what was used but the DoA in referring to the FCS, I agree BCT is a more applicable term now.
If you window is deploying to the mid east from Ft. Brag in 24 hours you only get one lift. For an Infantry battalion to take up a position and sustain itself for 72 hours it does require all the equipment and supplies that is in the package.
The effectiveness of the light or even medium units against armor is not really an issue here because their usage was never intended to be against a heavy armored force, that’s what we have our heavy forces like the 3ID for. The only weapon proposed for the FCS Division/BCT is a light weight 120mm gun with an auto loader. This weapon like the Stryker 105mm fire support modular is very flawed, recoil damage to fire control systems and to the physical vehicle are severe. We do agree on Stryker, it worthless for any combat mission.
You mentioned the TOW, the new variant the TOW-W (the wire is gone) which is a remarkable weapon with a range of 3750 meters and with a half dozen warheads that are interchangeable with a universal motor it can be mission oriented. It also can be fired over water and this should open up some new opportunities with the Marines and Navy and best of all it relatively cheap at about $6,000.00 a missile vs. $80,000.00 for the Javelin.
You are correct the armed Predator was not used in the 03 invasion of Iraq, it became operational later. The air campaign was called “Shock and Awe” as I recall and had little of either. It’s only speculation but if the current technology currently being used in Afghanistan was available then that Saddam nor his sons wouldn’t have made it out of Baghdad.
And lastly I’m not an aviator but just a former Infantryman/Cavalryman, who has a CIB, is a member of the Order of the Spur.
ALLONS,
Byron Skinner
Good Evening Cole,
I’m glad that Christian saw fit to let us keep going, I’m enjoying this dialog.
I think we have drifted away from the FCS a bit. The air lift issue I can see a legitimate difference of opinion on either enough or not. Since the last tactical air lift into a combat zone was the first Gulf War in 1990, and it was not a glowing success the whole situation had changed and I’m afraid not for the good.
On the MCS 120mm gun unit, if I recall it had already been taken off the table because of problems with it’s recoil on the rangefinder and gun carriage. As NLOS 155mm Canon is in, it has to much political support to be bumped although I think it is still not enough technology for the buck.
AS for the other pieces of the FCS the NLOS-C is already in the pipeline, UAV’s have gone way beyond the scope of FCS as have the SUV-V, small unmanned ground vehicles. The broadband communications is going to happen it’s just as usual with communication, nobody know how or when. Which leaves the ICV, Infantry Carrier and the C2V Command, Communications and Control vehicle, I guess.
Although the FCS ICV is more robust combat platform the the Bradley because it has a 30mm Bushmaster Gun rather the the 25mm there is no reason the Bradley can’t be fitted with this main gun or the even better 35mm or the new 35/50mm Bushmaster, the Bradley turret is balanced enough for any of these weapons. In fact several foreign buyers have made these changes with out any problems. All that I can think for not changing the Bradley’s guns was misplaced economics.
The C2V appears to be a good replacement for the aging (60 year old) M-557 Command Vehicle for all mechanized battalions.
I still can’t see any justification for the ICV, it’s Bradley light and we already own 7K Bradley’s. The Bradley has many faults to be sure and from what I’ve seen of the ICv some still have not been corrected. Both vehicles are to lightly armored to survive in a full heavy armored slug out. As for the 82ed. adapting the ICV, I don’t much think so, they would rather have the M-8 Buford if you please.
In short the FCS was a product of the thinking of the 1990′s, when our light divisions were seen as nothing more then constabulary units for peace keeping operations like the Bosina, Hati and other hot spots. These Division had little combat power, the units moved around in thin skinned HUMVEES, some with canvas doors and most artillery and armor units had been stripped away from the TO&E. Under those conditions the medium Division seemed like a real good idea. The problem is that those light Divisions are not so light anymore and the political landscape has changed.
The big problem with the FCS as well as Comanche, and Crusader was they took to long to mature and by the time they came around their need was no longer. Who’s fault, well surly the Army, they change Generals every two years so no one is around long enough to see a program to completion, the publics demand for a peace dividend, and the defense contractors who saw twenty years of checks for development as show and tells and couldn’t see why they should stop.
If this is our last on this topic Cole I must say I rather enjoyed the back and forth. I don’t think either of us changed the others mind but the people following out posts I think have a better sense of the issues involved and if they are among the decision makers they I think they have more insights. I hope we can square off again.
ALLONS,
Byron Skinner
Good Afternoon Cole,
A rather interesting response. To clear up the easy ones: Stryker has 14mm armor side plate, it won’t stop a 12.7mm round, see Army tests in 2004. The Humvees have much heavier side armor and will stop a 12.7mm round. Either one is lunch for most RPG rounds. In my opinion the best use for Stryker is to become paet of a fish reef off South Florida.
I’m am somewhat surprised that you would use the 173ed’s jump into Norther Iraq in 03 as an example to support the need for Medium Divisions. It was quite atypical which I guess is typical. First off only three rifle Companies got off the ground before the Italian government put up diplomatic objections. Once on the ground they had to quickly hook up with the Spec. Ops in the area for food and ammo supply and their first combat was to take an air strip so that they could be resupplied for Kuwait. I believe the next sortie into Norther Iraq was an armored company from the 1ID in Germany that brought along 10 M1A1′s. Thus the myth that heavy can’t be airlifted.
Witch get to your statement regarding the use of light or med units to hold off heavy’s till the U.S. could get it’s heavy division in place. Quite frankly a concept I hadn’t heard before. The 82ed. went into Saudi Arabia in 90 mostly as symbolic reassurance to the Saudis that we were with them, with the air power in the region even Saddam could see that if he set foot over the line his Army would be buried in the desert.
As for the 120mm LOS gun, It appears that you have better information then I do on this and I’m sure it would be welcomed into any infantry battalion especially with the M1028 Canister round, a favorite of all ground pounders.
The size of the infantry Squad varies in WWI it was 20 men, in WWII through Vietnam it was 13 men now bother the Army and marines are turning to a 5-6 man Squad. Warfare is a not static situation but a process of dynamic change. Weapons, communications as well as the enemy are force multipliers. Vehicle have little if anything to do with the size of the basic rifle squad.
AS for the NLOS Cannon, most likely it will be the end on the line for the cannon as a part of the ground combat element. The MLRS M270 firing M30 and M31 guided ordnance is a more economical and efficient form of in direct fire support. The reports coming from the battle zones give these missiles rave reviews.
Warfare is changing and concern for collateral damage and preventing friendly casualties is the first consideration of a commander.
Finally I would like to address you concern for enemies that posess heavy armor units. I’ll use numbers her and fell free to disagree. The U.S. has currently around 7K each of Abrams and Bradley’s that are cpmbat ready. Both have the vehicles have are still currently in production on reopened lines.
As for as I can see of the 79 countries that have an armored force only three are considered a “peer” to the Americans. The Chinese, Russians and Indians. Secondary armored powers such as pakistan, Iran, North Korea all have fewer then 1K tanks and heavy armor and are not really a threat.
Russia although they have over 10K Tanks in storage most of these are series from T34 to T62, in Afghanistan we saw the quality of the T62 they sent, enough said. Of the more current T64 to T90 series, all the same vehicle expect for engines and turrets. all have the same 125mm main and secondary weapons the Russian have about 3.5K in all state of readiness. The Chines have about 2.9K of mostly their Type 88 and a hand full of their Type 90 Tanks nearly all in and around Beijing. I would appear that domestic considerations are of more concern to the Chinese the the U.S.
The shoddy performance of the Russians in Georgia this past Summer shows the state of affairs in the Russian Federations Army. Putin should be quite embarrassed by what the world saw and he said that they were his “best”.
In short the Medium Division and the FCS might have been state of the art thinking in the 1990′s but today the world has moved on.
ALLONS,
Byron Skinner
Howdy Byron,
You said: “To clear up the easy ones: Stryker has 14mm armor side plate, it won’t stop a 12.7mm round, see Army tests in 2004. The Humvees have much heavier side armor and will stop a 12.7mm round. Either one is lunch for most RPG rounds. In my opinion the best use for Stryker is to become paet of a fish reef off South Florida.”
Well guess your response wasn’t so easy or accurate after all. According to an Army website, the Stryker has 14.5mm protection and of course RPG protection with slat armor. It is ideal for counterinsurgency and urban warfare due to its road speed. It is combat proven and soon en route to Afghanistan where Canadians were already using it in LAV III form.
http://www.army.mil/factfiles/equipment/wheeled/stryker.html
Of course with the added armor or slat armor, the Stryker is no longer C-130 deployable, either.
Also check out Global Security.org for additional confirmation on armor and the Stryker’s ability to carry a 9-man dismounted element. You know that was one of the Infantry Center’s problem’s with the Bradley from day one. FCS rectifies the dismount problem with more firepower and protection than a Stryker…and similar fuel consumption.
Howdy Byron,
You said: “I’m am somewhat surprised that you would use the 173ed’s jump into Norther Iraq in 03 as an example to support the need for Medium Divisions….Once on the ground they had to quickly hook up with the Spec. Ops in the area for food and ammo supply and their first combat was to take an air strip so that they could be resupplied for Kuwait. I believe the next sortie into Norther Iraq was an armored company from the 1ID in Germany that brought along 10 M1A1′s. Thus the myth that heavy can’t be airlifted.”
=========================================
Check out the link below and you will note it was 5 Abrams, 5 Bradleys and a company of M113s. There were 17 C-17 aircraft the first night and 12 the other nights over 5 days. They missed the drop zone and ended up in the mud on night one. Of course special ops and Kurds were already on the ground so a true forcible entry was not required.
For the same aircraft that airlanded 5 M1s/5 M2s you could have airlanded:
- 15 Mounted Combat Systems with 120mm guns and 8+km munitions
- 9 Infantry Carrier vehicles with 9 man squads and 30mm cannons
So twice the ground armor would have been on the ground versus the legacy heavy force. Of course the M113s were even less useful than a HMMWV or Stryker would have been against the Republican Guard.
Interestingly enough they had airlanded about 250 aircraft…many C-130s included in just a few days…and other FCS trucks, supplies, and equipment could easily transport by C-130. They also transitioned to Irbil airport 30 miles south after a while to be closer to the ground force. That’s the kind of flexibility to resupply that air-deployment of a small but capable force brings.
A mix of FCS and light forces would be ideal during initial deployment sorties.
http://www3.ausa.org/webpub/DeptArmyMagazine.nsf/byid/CCRN-6CCS8Y
Good Evening Cole,
Ah let see where to start.
The M-113 is a good place. If you check the TO&E of the 173ed, ABB you will find a unit of M-113A3. They have been deployed to both Afghanistan and Iraq. The configuration they use is the ACAV which is a superior machine gun platform to the Stryker and would suspect to an ICV. Don’t sell the M-113 short on armor from experience I know that anything less the a chicom 57mm recoilless round will not breach it. With the A3 the major fault of the M-113 was addressed with moving the fuel tanks to the exterior. In fact an interesting test might be to do a live fire test between the ICV and an M-113A3.
The basing of troops is a political decision and since this is defense tech I really don’t think its relative. One thing we both agree is that any armored vehicle in the inventory can be air transported including the Abrams Tank. All you need is the air lift.
So using logic that you endorse the solution to mobility would be to increase air life, which I’m fully in support of and scrap another class of AFV’s.
Taiwan. What you are suggesting is a hypothetical situation for military involvement that I just don’t see from a lot of reasons. With in the current political context I don’t see the United States moving ground troops in to protect Taiwan from a Chinese in the unlikely event that that would happen.
As for Russia and China neither have the military power, the political will or the ability to engage any country beyond their own borders. In effect they are boxed in contained. I know Georgia, but so what. This was a domestic power flex for Russia and don’t believe for a moment that anything happened before Putin has assurances from Bush that the U.s. would not interfere.
In closing I will take some offense to your statement about retire military taking a part in the modernization of the military. Considering that of the flag officers in the military few if any had any combat experience was junior officer in combat and that is where you learn the trade. It saddens many of us that the same lessons that we hard learned in Vietnam have had to be relearned again because the institutional knowledge had left the military.
You and other have mentioned the use of Stryker and the IFV as a battlefield ambulance, thats just dumb, if a wounded soldier can still fight he/she does if they are hit so bad where they can’t fight, every effort is made to get a Dust Off. Many who are clueless about the military confuse the sight of body bags and the slightly wounded on the back decks of armored vehicles as an indication that there is a lack of transport for battle field wounded. This is not so, there is a tradition among armored units to take out their own dead and wounded.
Civilian contractors who decide to design and build military hardware might try consulting those who have risked their lives using the stuff instead a career minded officers, looking for a cushy retirement jobs, who have never see the elephant.
The argument about fuel economy is a civilian thing a field commander only cares that he has enough POL and that his vehicle don’t break down. I would suggest the large batteries that are part of the hybrid system would create a hazard in a fire fight. I don’t think vehicle crews would stay on board very long when the sh** started coming down. I saw this happen in Nam with gasser M-113′s.
The FCS is a uber expensive program that is trying to find a mission and I just don’t see it. Double the number of C-17′s to where who units can be transported in a lift and you also have a system that can serve in humanitarian missions and during a domestic crisis.
ALLONS,
Byron Skinner
Howdy Byron,
You said: “You and other have mentioned the use of Stryker and the IFV as a battlefield ambulance, thats just dumb, if a wounded soldier can still fight he/she does if they are hit so bad where they can’t fight, every effort is made to get a Dust Off. Many who are clueless about the military confuse the sight of body bags and the slightly wounded on the back decks of armored vehicles as an indication that there is a lack of transport for battle field wounded. This is not so, there is a tradition among armored units to take out their own dead and wounded.”
===========================================
The Army has used M113 ambulances for years. The plan was to create FCS manned ground vehicle evacuation and treatment vehicles. This would maximize parts/maintenance commonality….but suspect it would have been far too easy to confuse an ambulance with an infantry carrier vehicle, etc.
If manned ground vehicles must be cut, those and the recovery vehicle are three logical choices to preclude the enemy from claiming that they were confused when they shot an evacuation vehicle. If soft terrain is a problem, tracked FCS vehicles can easily rendevous with the already developed Stryker ambulance on a nearby road (my opinion). Air ambulances will attempt to land as far forward as possible and do so in Iraq and Afghanistan. But don’t assume that you can land an air ambulance anywhere on the modern battlefield as was done in Vietnam.
You’ve heard of the Golden Hour. You don’t stay within that hour by carrying casualties around in your combat vehicle diverting attention from battlefield functions at hand. With multiple FCS vehicles having two-man crews, the chances of casualties are reduced versus a 4-man tank or a 5-man Paladin.
You said: “The M-113 is a good place. If you check the TO&E of the 173ed, ABB you will find a unit of M-113A3. They have been deployed to both Afghanistan and Iraq. The configuration they use is the ACAV which is a superior machine gun platform to the Stryker and would suspect to an ICV.”
=========================================
I’ve looked and found no reference to M113 in the current 173rd Airborne. I see lots of references to it in Vietnam. Remember the unit was reborn in its entirety just days before the invasion in 2003.
I know 173rd has been to Iraq and Afghanistan. They were involved in the famous Afghan battle of Wanat. I would be very interested if you could show me a link that has M113s in the current brigade because it is a good concept, that would be made even better if it had FCS vehicles. The M113s that went into Bashur in 2003 were part of an expeditionary unit out of Germany.
You said:”The basing of troops is a political decision and since this is defense tech I really don’t think its relative. One thing we both agree is that any armored vehicle in the inventory can be air transported including the Abrams Tank. All you need is the air lift.”
“So using logic that you endorse the solution to mobility would be to increase air life, which I’m fully in support of and scrap another class of AFV’s.”
===============================================
The decision to base almost all Army forces in the U.S. has already been made. It is part of the argument that some use to say the Army cannot afford all the things it needs to do in the near term, such as refit, add force structure numbers, rebuild bases for forces returning stateside, and modernize via FCS, etc.
In effect, the Army is being punished with the threat of insufficient funds because of its years of service in both Iraq and Afghanistan that has worn out equipment and Soldier lives, and because we are bringing forces stateside.
Four C-17s cost about a billion dollars. For the cost of 24 C-17s you can build an FCS BCT to modernize an Army brigade. 10 FCS BCTs would cost about the same as 240 C-17s. Even at more than twice the current numbers of C-17s, there are mobility on the ground issues, Air Force force structure and base issues, Operation and Support costs and of course 10 less Army brigades being modernized. The Air Force would rather have their force structure flying fighters and other aircraft. Even with 400 C-17s, you still lack sufficient aircraft to airlift a full heavy BCT which requires over 420 Sorties. If you keep about 200+ C-17s, modernize with the C-5M, and C-130J you can airlift an FCS brigade and still modernize 10 FCS BCTs to fit the ARFORGEN rotation…leaving 3 brigades ready to deploy at any given time.
Keep the current 200 or so C-17 airlifters and modernize 10 Army brigades with FCS…or buy twice the number of C-17s and don’t modernize a single Army brigade. Seems like a no-brainer to me. C-17s are great assets, but they don’t kill or deter the enemy, win a counterinsurgency, hold ground, or save Soldier lives.
You said:”Taiwan. What you are suggesting is a hypothetical situation for military involvement that I just don’t see from a lot of reasons. With in the current political context I don’t see the United States moving ground troops in to protect Taiwan from a Chinese in the unlikely event that that would happen.”
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There is a mountain range down the middle of Taiwan. With advance notice we could safely airlift at least an FCS combined arms battalion into the east side of Taiwan using C-17s and C-130s before ANY or substantial Peoples Republic of China force invaded the west side.
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You said: “As for Russia and China neither have the military power, the political will or the ability to engage any country beyond their own borders. In effect they are boxed in contained. I know Georgia, but so what. This was a domestic power flex for Russia and don’t believe for a moment that anything happened before Putin has assurances from Bush that the U.s. would not interfere.”
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Your last sentence has me wondering if you think Israel was behind 9/11 or other such conspiracies.
We already see Russia flexing its muscles with natural gas flow to Europe through the Ukraine. We see their interference in Kyrgyzstan, probably because of our efforts with the northern alliance in the 80s and the recent recognition of Kosovo. They not only resent us befriending former Eastern bloc countries, but are dangerously close to our remaining major sources of oil. Now they show signs that they believe arctic oil is theirs.
As the price of oil rises,a poor China may find it difficult to afford the bill. It is already flexing muscles concerning nearby islands in international waters that are potential oil sources.
The bottom line, is that an FCS force provides overwhelming force and deterrence against lesser enemies whether they have sea port access or are landlocked/far from the sea. It supports counterinsurgencies in a more affordable and survivable manner. The fact that FCS also has a feasible role against the two largest Chinese/Russian threats is just a bonus.
You said: “The argument about fuel economy is a civilian thing a field commander only cares that he has enough POL and that his vehicle don’t break down. I would suggest the large batteries that are part of the hybrid system would create a hazard in a fire fight. I don’t think vehicle crews would stay on board very long when the sh** started coming down. I saw this happen in Nam with gasser M-113′s.”
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Surely you are not oblivious to the fact that oil sources are depleting as oil demand increases in 3rd world nations and in places like India and China.
No, it is not a civilian thing. It is a strategic reality facing us in the next 30-40 years. It will both cause wars, and make them difficult to prosecute from the air or at 2 gallons per mile using the Abrams. It already caused “tactical pauses” and potential threats to supply lines in OIF and that was essentially a single Army mechanized division.
There is no comparison between the flammability threat of a gasoline-powered M113 of yesteryear and battery/JP8 powered FCS manned ground vehicles. There is far greater reason to be concerned about being hit in an M113 than in a FCS manned ground vehicle. If it is struck, I would certainly expect the infantryman in the back of an FCS infantry carrier vehicle to be more likely to survive than one in an M113 or Bradley.
I’m assuming you served in Cavalry and Infantry units in Germany, and are not just basing your assessment of mechanized force needs on Vietnam. Everyone with any brains respects what you did in Vietnam…but it is atypical of most future warfare scenarios…if we avoid the land war in Asia warnings that we should have paid heed to 45 years ago. A land war on Taiwan is far different than a land war on mainland China which I will acknowledge would be idiotic. That is a naval blockade war.
Good Evening Cole,
It’s time to wind this up, since I suspect that Christian will move on tomorrow. Although you have brought up many interesting topics that I’ve very much enjoyed debating, you have failed to make a case of what we need the armored vehicle in the FCS.
We both agree that the U.S. heavy forces of the Abrams/Bradley team are the best both in experienced Soldiers and Marines and have the best fight vehicles in the world and as it stands right now the U.S. has the ONLY combat tested Army in the world.
We agree that either the existing U.S. light Divisions or the proposed Medium Division based on FCS vehicle would be unsuited to engage a heavily armored opponent such as the Russians or Chinese.
We agree that U.S. airlift can lift any piece of equipment in the Army’s inventory. This was demonstrated by the 1ID during the current Iraqi War. The question thus is not that it can’t be done but how much air life is needed.
So if we agree on all this and that given enough air lift capacity a heavy Army unit can be placed any place in the world with the same speed as either a light or a medium size unit of the same size. The question begs why is there any need what so ever for the $200 billion+ FCS. The only conclusion is of course there is none.
Item that we didn’t talked about are the prepositions ships around the world that contain all the equipment, ammo, supplies to support a heavy battalion for 30 days of sustained combat. The number and the where about of these ships is of course classified but I think in view of the current world crisis that they are near likely hot spots. SEcondly not even mentioned is the marines and the MEG’s that are at sea all the time.
The United States is well ready to respond to any threat around the world, we could use more air lift, that would make the job easier and perhaps go faster, but a new level of ground fighting force is simple not needed for the current demands of combat or fore the near or medium future, After that all of this will become ancient history.
ALLONS,
Byron Skinner
Enjoyed it as well Byron, but I’m disappointed in your flawed conclusions.
You said: “We both agree that the U.S. heavy forces of the Abrams/Bradley team are the best both in experienced Soldiers and Marines and have the best fighting vehicles in the world and as it stands right now, the U.S. has the ONLY combat tested Army in the world.”
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They are impressive once they arrive. The U.S. Army was very good once it arrived on D-Day. How many millions died in the interim. The Americans were very good once they arrived in Korea. What happened to the earliest task force? Desert Storm was very good once we arrived. The Kuwaitis suffered in the interim, the 82nd was in danger, and the Shiites suffered after we left and could not rapidly return.
Kosovars suffered while we bombed for 78 days. The Russians figured out that landing a force in Serbia after the bombing gave them a voice even though they had not previously contributed…except to the other side. The U.S. did not have adequate force on the ground during and after OIF because heavy forces were en route from Turkey. What happens after we leave Iraq and problems commence?
Never embrace good enough and can’t be better. There are many ways to get there firstest with the mostest. If firstest is an all light force, all Stryker force, all FCS force, or an all heavy force…guess which one has the mostest in terms of overall firepower, protection, mobility, and sustainability for any given number of sorties until the sea-deployment “firstest” arrives 30 days later…assuming there is a port for that force to arrive at.
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You incorrectly said:”We agree that either the existing U.S. light Divisions or the proposed Medium Division based on FCS vehicle would be unsuited to engage a heavily armored opponent such as the Russians or Chinese.”
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No, we agree that light divisions and Stryker BCTs would be unsuited to engage a heavily armored opponent. The FCS force would do extraordinarily well. Because Marines are primarily equipped with LAV III, or light infantry, we must share a similar belief that Marines are not the answer either. We have not discussed the EFV, but that seems to be an extremely vulnerable platform as well given the number of Marines on board, the lack of armor protection, and the flat bottom.
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You said: “We agree that U.S. airlift can lift any piece of equipment in the Army’s inventory. This was demonstrated by the 1ID during the current Iraqi War. The question thus is not that it can’t be done but how much air lift is needed.”
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We may agree that the Air Force can lift any U.S. heavy BCT equipment. But, if you do the math, you would have to agree that the same airlift could transport nearly twice the FCS combat vehicles early in the conflict…and those FCS vehicles would be far more easily supported by air than a heavy force in which half the combat vehicles use 2 gallons of fuel per mile.
If it is a dollar trade-off choice between funding:
- 440 C-17s and no Army modernization and no spin outs to light and heavy BCTs
or
- Army modernization of at least 10 BCTs and other spin outs with the current approximately 200 C-17s (which is all the USAF wants and can man/afford to fly)
If you would choose the airlift instead of Army modernization then I would question your math skills and suspect early senility which I highly doubt to be the case.
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You said: “So if we agree on all this and that given enough air lift capacity a heavy Army unit can be placed any place in the world with the same speed as either a light or a medium size unit of the same size. The question begs why is there any need what so ever for the $200 billion+ FCS.”
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Let’s return to the Bashur airlift into northern Iraq example:
- 5 Abrams and 5 Bradleys with 6-man squads
or
- 15 mounted combat systems with 120mm guns and 9 Infantry Carrier vehicles with 9-man squads
Add to these respective microcosm numbers the fact that the twice as large FCS force would use significantly LESS fuel than the cited legacy force for every mile traveled. What’s that old saying about studying tactics versus logistics?
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You said:”Item that we didn’t talked about are the prepositions ships around the world that contain all the equipment, ammo, supplies to support a heavy battalion for 30 days of sustained combat. The number and the where about of these ships is of course classified but I think in view of the current world crisis that they are near likely hot spots. Secondly not even mentioned is the marines and the MEG’s that are at sea all the time.”
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And those same prepositioning ships might well hold nearly twice as large an FCS unit and its supplies. The joint high speed vessel will carry up to 16 C-17 loads. Guess which force better utilizes its space/draft weight available? Roll-on/Roll-off? Fast sealift? See the CBO study which admitted a significant advantage to the FCS force while it used flawed assumptions to downplay the airlift advantage.
We already covered the fact that V-22 transported light Marine forces or LAV III/EFV equipped force and a few Marine Abrams do not make an anti-armor force of any consequence.
And of course this assumes the conflict has sea access. The Turks did not allow us to invade from the north with 4th ID. Why would they allow substantial sealift into the Black Sea where Georgia was attacked and Ukraine may be threatened?
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You opined: “The United States is well ready to respond to any threat around the world, we could use more air lift, that would make the job easier and perhaps go faster, but a new level of ground fighting force is simple not needed for the current demands of combat or fore the near or medium future, After that all of this will become ancient history.”
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With all due respect to your Vietnam service, that is 40 year old history, and I can find multiple Vietnam vets I have worked with who strongly believe in FCS. Yet, even as both your wars were closing, great armored battles were occuring in Israel (as was Operation Nickel Grass using C-5 airlift) and continue to this day using armor against terrorists. We used armor twice against Iraq, in Panama, and would have needed it against the Serbs had Milosevic not capitulated due to pressure of friends who did not like having their factories bombed. That was a rare occasion where we did not spend a small fortune rebuilding our own airpower-inflicted damage ala the Marshall Plan, Japan, and current Iraq.
Even in Afghanistan our allies and now ourselves are using armor. In counterinsurgency, armor has served well, and with the appearance of IEDs and continued use of RPGs, it is a primary requisite for survival.
We can agree to disagree on many things. We agree in several areas, but not as many as you claim. I’m disappointed that you would not want the Army to modernize 10 of its 40+ active BCTs and fund spin outs to the others because you believe that Tanks and APCs almost as old as Vietnam will still be equally relevant 80 years later. Would WWI tanks have been relevant in OIF? Heck, Cavalry was still on horseback in WWI.
A lot can happen in 80 years that few can foresee. Other things are easy to project like less and more expensive oil. Past deployment failings are so apparent that the old adage about “doomed to repeat it” comes to mind. A new adage that we are “doomed to run out of it” comes to mind with respect to oil and deployment time. We can either be prepared or unprepared for those scenarios.
It is troubling to see so many in our legacy Army willing to eat their young and sharpshoot the sole ground force with the potential to make our future Army an expeditionary-relevant and modern force. Meanwhile the Navy and USAF embrace innovation at every opportunity and get the corresponding funding lost to our coffers. It’s time for human dinosaurs to take their heads out of the same sand where their animal brethren have already been harvested for nearly all their worth.
Good Morning Cole,
I ended my part of the debate with my last post. I didn’t expect any agreement as none was offered. That’s good. Let the third parties decide what which premises are valid and which syllogisms work. This has bee a fun exercise for me and would very much look forward to going at it again. I perceive you to be a gentleman with in depth knowledge of the subject, I will always welcome a debate with you sir.
You are correct about on thing though when dicussing the military especially equipment, I revert back to my own combat experienses. A conbat soldier has a very short conception of the future, often only a few seconds sometimes and he/she certainly don’t consult a crystal ball, and I wouldn’t care to.
All this stuff is a matter of money and as all my post suggest I see no value in the FCS combat vehicles. I would much rather see some of these funds go into better combat rations with a tripling of the caloric content of the MRE with an honest accounting of how much food these really is in those rations and not count powdered drink mixes or condiments as calories. To many troopers of the 10th. Mountain and the 25ID who have been coming back from Afghanistan medically on the verge of starvation, some of this money could be better spent, more then a few have had to leave the Army.
I we have a quarter trillion dollar for a speculative FCS the at least we should have some money to see that the troops that are doing the fight have enough calories to sustain themselves and I’m sure that would consume on a fraction of that quarter trillion bucks. Unfortunately with the economy as it is now these things have become either or.
I hand the last post off to you Cole.
ALLONS,
Byron Skinner
All-
Submitted by: MAJ Beau
These views are solely mine and do not express the views of any military organization, service, or DOD.
The United States House of Representatives is scheduled to meet 01 APR 2009 on