I always sort of roll my eyes when I look at the defense authorization bill each year and see Sen. James Inhofe’s successful attempt to cordon off the Non-Line of Sight cannon developed by the Army’s FCS program from any budget cuts — kind of reminds me of the JSF alternative engine.
Instead of parochialism, it all really boils down to whether the Army needs a replacement for the Paladin mobile Howitzer gun. And I reluctantly come out on the side of “yes.”
I’m going to excerpt Greg Grant’s excellent story from DoD Buzz today and draw your attention to a comment made on the story — really a comment about a comment:
As we reported the other day, the Armys $200 billion Future Combat Systems modernization program looks likely to suffer some big hits when the defense budget is finally wrapped some time later this month. Rumors of FCS doom have its champions in Congress, chief among them being Sen. James Inhofe, R-Okla., vowing to fight for the perennially troubled program.
Dear to Inhofes heart, and his constituents, is the Non-Line Of Sight Cannon, originally part of FCS. It was given its own budget line by Inhofe in an effort to fence it off from possible cuts to the larger program. Why? Well, Oklahoma is home to Ft. Sill, the Armys artillery center for one thing and NLOS-C builder BAE Systems kindly said it would produce the cannon in Elgin, Okla. Inhofe has included language in past defense bills telling the Army to build a number of prototypes and rapidly move NLOS-C into full-scale production.
The NLOS-C is a continuation of the Armys Crusader mobile howitzer program that was unceremoniously cancelled by Defense Secretary Rumsfeld; many of the parts used in the NLOS-C were originally designed for Crusader. It is intended to replace the Paladin 155mm self-propelled howitzer, and is optimized for long range counter-battery fire on a conventional battlefield. In a statement released by his office this week, Inhofe said: To say that FCS and the NLOS-C are designed for a conventional war is narrow-minded and overlooks the reality that the systems that FCS will replace are being used on the battlefields today in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Over the past eight years, battles in Afghanistans road-less and mountainous terrain have certainly demonstrated the need for organic fire support to light infantry, but of the mortar variety, or perhaps a lightweight mountain cannon, not a large, tracked mobile howitzer. In Iraq, the Armys Paladins spend their tours of duty parked in the motor pool as the red legs go off to patrol as motorized infantry.
The Paladin is more than adequate to give the Armys maneuver formations mobile fire support if they square off against an enemy mechanized army any time in the near future. To counter insurgent mortar and rocket fire in Iraq, air strikes from fixed wing or attack helicopters have proven more responsive and accurate than artillery fire, if for no other reason than the air space must be cleared before artillery can fire, an often lengthy process.
And here’s what commenter Cole said:
To add to what Armywonk said, I will quote Stryker Radar from another post who apparently is an artilleryman with 3 Iraq tours and a strong belief in FCS:
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how is the NLOS-C worthless in todays fight? Can it sit on a FOB and fire in support of troops? Yep. Can it fire GPS guided projoes? Yep, has that one cover also. Can it fire counter-btry in support of C-RAM? Yep, got that one also.The real question is this: Can the Paladin do what the NLOS-C does? Load at any elevation? Auto-load from the on-board magazine by the push of a button from the Section Chief? Shoot a Zone 4 mission without dropping the spades? Drive around the battlefield on just battery power alone? Can the Paladin send a computer generated PTM to the AFATDS at the PLT/ BTRY FDC, BN FDC, and BDE FECC level saying whats wrong with it and what maintenance assets it needs?
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I will add that Mr Zaloga is not an engineer, but a history major. Considering that a far lighter M-777 somehow manages to fire 155mm rounds without beating itself to death, I question his credentials to claim the FCS NLOS-Cannon wont be up to task. Did you catch Stryker Radars mention about not putting the spades down and still being able to fire?Next, the primary mission is not counter-battery as Mr. Grant implied. It is a primary BCT-support indirect fire system. Indirect fire is historically the greatest killer on the battlefied and there is no reason to believe that trend will not continue in future warfare.
It exposes a two-man crew to far less danger than the 5-man crew in a Paladin. When equipped with all around active protection and future sloped underbody armor counter-IED kit the system will ensure cannoneers greater survivabilityand serve as a near-common basis for other manned ground vehicle systems essential for future warfare.
Finally, to add to what Armywonk mentioned on SOF forces, we continue to see heroic battles between extremely small SOF units and larger Taliban forces. Why do we feel the need to make our SOF fight so outnumbered and heroically while severely outnumbered. The Iraq surge showed, as will the Afghan one, that you need adequate force on the ground. SOF alone doesnt cut it.
I tend to agree with him. I think mobile, high powered organic fire support is the answer to greater distribution of operations. I fell in love with CAS back in the early Afghan war days, but have grown more bearish on it since I’ve seen it more and more in action and the ground and really question its accuracy and, particularly, its response.
But, and be sure to read the rest of Greg’s story, I do see what Zaloga is saying about weight, recoil and the physics of the problem. Does anyone remember the problems with the Stryker Mobile Gun System?
– Christian
{ 48 comments… read them below or add one }
For years the Navy and Air Force have been stricken with Next-War-itis. And for their whole history the Army and Marine Corp have had Last-War-itis. Isn’t it about time that the Army developed systems before the next war? NLOS-c is one system that we are going to need. The Paladin is a great system, but it is fast falling behind systems like the PZHB-2000, and England’s new system (forget the name of it right now). The Army has developed a lot of new systems in the past 6-7 years, and it’s all been because they found out that there was better gear available than what they were already fielding. Look at just the vehicles for instance. M-rap style vehicles, etc., have been out there forever, and have proven their survivability for years in South Africa, but we were so far behind the curve that guys were building their own armor for Hum-vees (a box is hardly the best shape to deflect a blast) we should have had the vehicles in inventory that we could have shipped over to replace hum-vees when roadside bombs started to get used. Instead it took roughly 2 years to mitigate the threat. The Army needs to develop a case of Next-War-itis, revamp the procurement system, and get it done.
As someone who actually worked as a Systems Engineer on the Crusader program, I cringe when I see pictures of the latest incarnation of the Crusader. It looks utterly ridiculous: kind of like a toy with a huge gun sticking out the front. Having said that, you should have no doubts that the technology behind this machine is impressive, and it is way better than the Paladin in many, many ways.
I agree with the assessment that airpower can do much of what artillery can do and do it better much of the time. However, airpower isn’t always available, and I believe the Army needs this kind of vehicle to serve either as a backup or as a complement to airpower in certain situations.
“..is more than adequate to give the Army’s maneuver formations mobile fire support if they square off against an enemy mechanized army..”
Yeah that relevant to todays war against Islamic extremeists….what a waste of money…..
Whether or not we need the NLOS-C is a debate with merits on both sides. Personally I think the Paladin’s time has come. Crusader was too damn big but had a few things going for it. Those things were improved upon and put into the NLOS-C. I will say this for the NLOS-C: unlike most big budget toys in the works right now, its pretty much on time, on budget, and ready for production. The chassis, tracks, and power plant are new concepts and may prove to be great upgrades when it comes time to improve or replace the rest of the armored fleet.
It can’t be carried by Chinook to places like Camp Blessing or the KOP. It can’t reach those places on it’s own because it’s too big and heavy for the ‘roads’ to those places.
I understand the concept that we have to be ready for the next large peer-competitor war, but this piece doesn’t do anything to win the war that we are currently fighting.
I like the people in Elgin. Decent, hard workers, all of them. That said, this isn’t anything other than the worst kind of congressional abuse of the defense procurement system.
Unfortunately, there’s a lot of times and situations where airpower can’t do shit. It’s stupid to send any ground force in without ORGANIC fire support. The NLOS is the only thing I’ve seen come out of the FCS that seems to actually work and have a chance of being actually fielded sometime soon. While I’m sure it’s a great system, it’s far from ideal in a lot of today’s tactical situations. I highly doubt this would be all that handy in Afghanistan, seriously, if you’re going to airlift it into a forward base, it’s be a far better use of resources to drop off a towed howitzer. Heck, in Afhanistan, I would think some 4″ mortars would be just the thing, that’s if we even still have them in the inventory.
Many moons ago, I was a reservist in a light infantry unit. The Army in it’s infinite wisdom, stripped us from our 82mm mortars at company level for 60mm ones, replaced the 4.2 inch ones from battalion and replaced those with 82mm. So basically, our organic fire support was reduced to nothing. So basically in our brigade our heaviest fire support were 105mm howitzers, not a comforting thought. I wonder what gee whiz system they thought was going to fill in the gaps?
Good Morning Folks,
I though we settled this last week. The NLOS will be bought for all the wrong reasons, BAE has greased enough politicians and Senator Inhofe didn’t get his Crusader.
The NLOS C is not any real improvement over the 60 years old M-109A6 Paladin. Then there is the building obsolesce of tube artillery. With the emergence of the M-30 and M-31 rounds for the M-270 MLRS. When these missiles were used in Iraq the Spec. Ops. guys who call the fire mission instantly gave the M-30 the nick name “The Assassin”, enough said.
With collateral damage the new buzz word on the battlefield tube artillery is pretty well doomed in it’s usage. Notun like the English War Bow, Field Artillery has had it best days. The M-30 /M-31 rounds rounds cost more then a 155mm projectile but the one shot one target kill capability of the M-30/M-31′s out to 60Km. make them more economical in taking out a target and creating fewer collaterals the a “fire for effect” call that takes out an area.
A possible correct to the lead here, I believe that the Mech. Field Artillery is no longer at Ft. Sill, but with the combined Mechanized Forces School that combines Mechanized Infantry, Cavalry, Armor, Artillery at Ft. Benning now.
ALLONS,
Byron Skinner
How about we just upgrade the paladin’s to pim? http://www.strategypage.com/militaryforums/4-3193.aspx It uses the same chasis as the bradley, which looks like it will be around for at least another 10 years if not 20. It uses most of the wiz bang stuff from the nlos-c, but at a far cheaper price. On vehicles that we already own. The FCS is a dream. and a stupid one at that. Its one thing for the chain of command be involved, but its another to take away the warfighters decision making ability. What are they supposed to stop and ask for permission to shoot for every shot now?
Back on topic, it makes much more economic sense to just deploy the PIM, and save the fcs vehicles for when we can afford them. The m1, and the bradley are fierce fighting machines. The stryker is just going to have to do until the future.
You can’t know if it is worth it until you know how much it costs. At $2.4 million (about the same as the cost of a mobile MLRS system) the Crusader would have been worthwhile. At $24 million each (with plenty of time left for cost overruns and delay before considering inflation since the cancellation), it was not.
If the NLOS-C ends up at $240 million each, it is very hard to make a case that it makes sense compared to alternatives like smart bombs, MLRS, UAV based missiles, cruise missiles, and guided tank rounds and guided artillery rounds from existing artillery equipment. If the NLOS-C were to drop below $3 million each, it would probably be well worth the expense.
Good Afternoon Folks,
The only ones seemingly tying to make a case for the NLOS C and the other vehicle components of the FCS is industry who stand to make some pretty good profits id these are bought.
The Red Legs” in the U.S. Marines and the U.S. Army have already voted and are buying the 155mm Howitzers it want with the purchase of the M777A 155mm for medium force units and the M119A 105mm for light forces. Both these howitzers are towed and can be moved around the battle field with helicopters.
With Afghanistan becoming the principle operational theatre for U.S. ground force the self propelled howitzer is not suitable for the mountain terrain where most of the fight is expected to take place.
It all really comes down to why buy weapon system the Generals aren’t asking for and is of no use in the current combat operational environment.
ALLONS,
Byron Skinner
The problem with NLOS-C is (besides the need to spend money for development) that it’s not superior to existing systems.
M109A6 is mediocre at best in comparison to modern foreign SPHs.
The range and RoF data of NLOS-C that I saw was extremely mediocre in comparisons to truly modern SPHs like PZH2000, for example.
The AGM system could even be used on the FCS chassis, is more advanced in development – and apparently still superior.
http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2009/03/self-propelled-howitzers-china-ahead-of.html
Steve:
To answer your question about organic fire support: the army and the marines recently began fielding 120mm mortars at the battalion level (both stand alone and mechanized). In the army they’re an infantry MOS and in the marines its a field artillery MOS.
“agree with the assessment that airpower can do much of what artillery can do and do it better much of the time.”
……….yes but arty is much freakin cheaper..plus it can zone in and just poor the fire on for a long time.
Btw does anyone know if the NLOS or the M777 i think thats it the marines new lightweight arty use some of the same tech?
But my whole veiw of the NLOS is this its made for FCS which i think the whole idea of a entire army of lightweight tanks and amphibe vehicles is quite frankly stupid. Face it ppls the abrams is a monster expensive, heavy as hell, big, agressive looking, satan incarnate to the enviroment first people second crowd……and is the best tank in the world. It does the job superbly.
I think if the army wants to be faster and mor mobile it needs to focus on what it uses for transport. Or just make a light or better medium tank that can be airlifted into combat with stryker brigades or hell just buy more strykers.
But yea i was pissed when the crusader was canceled arty is one of those things that only a ground pounder can realy appriciate its not glamorous or amazing it just works….realy realy well.
Stryker MGS stupid i think the thing will explode when it fires. Why not just use a bushmaster? hell could a cutdown version of the bradlys turret fit in a stryker? use that.
My National Guard Cavalry squadron, part of a light BCT, has 120mm and 60mm mortars at the Troop(Company for you non-cav guys) level.
I don’t know why we’re keeping the 60mm systems. Probably because there are thousands of rounds in the supply depots, but there you are.
In any event, the whole FCS program needs to go away. What a waste of money that is. What idiot thought it would be a good idea to get Boeing, a company with exactly zero experience with ground combat systems to be the prime contractor on a system to rebuild the Army’s vehicle fleet from the ground up?
The first FCS-equipped units are supposed to be at IOC today, and we’re supposed to be transitioning from LRIP to full production right now. Nobody has seen a working prototype of any of the other FCS vehicles because there aren’t any.
soonergrunt said: “In any event, the whole FCS program needs to go away. What a waste of money that is. What idiot thought it would be a good idea to get Boeing, a company with exactly zero experience with ground combat systems to be the prime contractor on a system to rebuild the Army’s vehicle fleet from the ground up?”
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Boeing is the lead system integrator of multiple systems beyond the manned ground vehicles (MGV). The two subs doing the primary R&D and production of the MGVs are BAE and General Dynmanics. Nobody has more experience in combat vehicles than these two companies.
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soonergrunt: “The first FCS-equipped units are supposed to be at IOC today, and we’re supposed to be transitioning from LRIP to full production right now. Nobody has seen a working prototype of any of the other FCS vehicles because there aren’t any.”
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No major complex program I’m aware of has ever been asked to transition from LRIP to full production 6 years into the program. F-22 and V-22 certainly never did it. There have also been substantial FCS budget cuts each year.
In addition, the program was radically restructured to spin out systems to Infantry BCTs first to support the war in Afghanistan instead of continuing with original plans for manned ground vehicle production and FCS BCT fielding.
I invite you to educate yourself about the FCS manned ground vehicles to a greater degree at this link.
https://www.fcs.army.mil/mgvfocus/index.html
FYI, the airborne infantry LTC I used to work with in FCS swore by the 60mm mortar and its ability to provide light fire support while humping around less weight per Soldier.
Valcan:
The MGS works. Its fielded. Despite warnings during the testing phase, it hasn’t tipped over or fried the occupants. Its a 105mm cannon instead of a 25mm Bushmaster because its designed to be an assault gun for the infantry (walls, bunkers, light vehicles).
Valcan: “I think if the army wants to be faster and mor mobile it needs to focus on what it uses for transport. Or just make a light or better medium tank that can be airlifted into combat with stryker brigades or hell just buy more strykers.”
The army is buying more Strykers. The army is designing a medium tank (next piece of FCS). The Crusader was canceled because it was huge, expensive, and weighed as much as an Abrams during the same time frame GEN Shinseki wanted the Stryker because it was “lighter.” The army liked the tech; however, and incorporated it into the NLOS-C.
Sven, presumably you read the opinion of Strykerradar who pointed out that the NLOS-Cannon CAN do many things the M109A6 cannot.
The following quote concerning the PZH 2000 is listed in Wikipedia that illustrates that SP Howitzers can play a role in theaters like Afghanistan:
“The PzH 2000 was used for the first time in combat by the Dutch Army in August 2006 against Taliban targets in Kandahar Province, Afghanistan, in support of Operation Medusa. [2] Since then it has been used regularly in support of coalition troops in Uruzgan province, also in Afghanistan. The PzH 2000 was also used extensively during the Battle of Chora. It is known as “the long arm of ISAF”[citation needed]. The gun has been criticised by the Dutch in Uruzgan province as the NBC system designed for use in Europe cannot cope with the high level of dust in Afghanistan. The guns have been nicknamed the ‘beasts of Tarin Kowt’ by the Taliban[citation needed]. The guns have been modified with additional armor being fitted to the roof to protect against mortar rounds. There have been other reports of problems including the need to keep it in the shade unless actually firing, the damage it does to poorly built roads and a significant ‘cold gun’ effect necessitating the use of ‘warmers’.”
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It is worth noting that this SP Howitzer weighs 55 tons and still needed additional armor protection against mortars, let alone top-attack ATGMs and counterbattery munitions. You could deploy 3 NLOS-Cannons on a C-17 vs a single PZH 2000 which is critical for the U.S. Army that must deploy greater distances than European countries to potential theaters of conflict.
In addition, the NLOS-Cannon has superior all around protection, especially if equipped with the V-shaped underbody kit to protect against many IEDs.
The NLOS-cannon autoloader reduces crew size from 5 in the PZH 2000 to 2 and also automates loading of the vehicle itself from PLS pallets.
Byron said: “The only ones seemingly tying to make a case for the NLOS C and the other vehicle components of the FCS is industry who stand to make some pretty good profits if these are bought.”
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Reply: Most in the Army with any real knowledge about FCS, and first hand experience at El Paso, are committed to FCS. I first wrote about an FCS-like force in 1991 in Armor magazine immediately following Desert Storm while stil in the Army as an AVIATOR. Why do so many believe that Soldiers lose their patriotism once they transition to the civil sector…especially since we generally make less than we did when in the Army?
To the best of my knowledge, the corporation I work for has a very small interest in FCS, and I am no longer associated with FCS in any way.
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Byron continues:
“The Red Legs” in the U.S. Marines and the U.S. Army have already voted and are buying the 155mm Howitzers it want with the purchase of the M777A 155mm for medium force units and the M119A 105mm for light forces. Both these howitzers are towed and can be moved around the battle field with helicopters.”
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Reply: Byron you know full well that towed howitzers support light, airborne, and air assault infantry units and Stryker units whose vehicles are too light to turn into self-propelled howitzers. Light units lack the mobility of FCS and heavy BCTs that require self-propelled howitzers to match mechanized maneuver mobility.
While Strykers have great ROAD mobility, they are less mobile off road, and have less armor and no active protection. There is also a vast difference between a Stryker weighing 40,000 lbs spread out over 8 small wheel footprints, and a NLOS-Cannon weighing 54,000 lbs with band tracks spreading the firing force over far more square feet of ground. That is why the Stryker cannot handle a 155m howitzer or a 120mm tank gun.
There is a marginally lethal mortar and rocket threat in Afghanistan and Iraq. That does not mean that will be the case in any other theaters where we fight. Yet we still saw that the Dutch up-armored the heavy PZH 2000 due to mortar threats. The IED threat would tear up a M109A6 or a PZH 2000, especially with so many 155 rounds on board. Artillery units must be able to shoot and scoot rapidly without worrying about IEDs/mines or smart top-attack ATGM or RPGs.
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“With Afghanistan becoming the principle operational theatre for U.S. ground force the self propelled howitzer is not suitable for the mountain terrain where most of the fight is expected to take place.”
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Reply: Tell that to the Dutch in the other post where I quoted from Wikipedia.
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“It all really comes down to why buy weapon system the Generals aren’t asking for and is of no use in the current combat operational environment.”
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Completely untrue Byron. I have read nothing but glowing articles/recommendations from the Army Chief of Staff, LTG Thompson, and LTG Vane to name just a few.
Heavy forces have fared impressively in Iraq, as would future FCS BCT units. Afghanistan is receiving 300 Strykers that could just as easily have been 300 FCS Manned Ground Vehicles. While light units continue to be ambushed, and Route 1 continues to be threatened, Strykers and future FCS BCTs could safeguard the valleys, routes, and Helmand province and still bring fire to bear in adjacent or distant mountains with 155mm precision guided munitions and 120 mm mid-range munitions that can reach up to 12 kms.
The MGS works. Its fielded. Despite warnings during the testing phase, it hasn’t tipped over or fried the occupants.
That isnt what im afraid of its the fact that the weapon itself is so powerful its just braking the damn machine plus ive never seen one fire on the move.
A mountain cannon? Like Sweden’s Archer? I would personally like us to have a mix of both systems.
Good Morning Cole,
Nice to see you back. First off to compare U.S. weapon systems to foreign weapons systems is rather folly. The only test is in the field and their the U.S. stands alone. The UK has some limited usage of their FA but nothing can come close to the U.S. M109 for combat use by the United States and allies who have bough the M-109. As we talked about last week when you were arguing for the medium division, the U.S. can air lift any piece of equipment it has including the M-109A6. True Cole, most likely you can get 2 NLOS C’s on a C-17 vs. a single M-109A6 but how often is this capacity needed once a decade?
One of the thing mentioned by other here today is overwhelming lack of support for the FCS, by retired officers who have no connection with the defense industry. I’ve been following this since Boeing and SAIC became the leads and have been following it’s support or its lack of both in the media and in personal conservations. To quote a Retire Army 06 who has combat experience with armor as well as leading a heavy brigade in NATO, as of yesterday when I asked for his thoughts on the NLOS C, just another “Gold Plated” system like Stryker that won’t get past its first fire mission in real combat.
I have noticed two omission for this weeks defense of the NLOS C, The estimated per unit cost and is it still to be transportable by the C-130?
As far as I can find the per unit cost of any of the FCS has ever been made public, don’t you think that since you are asking the taxpayer to buy the NLOS C at least they should know how much it cost? From what I’ve read that decision by Sec. Gates is expected on Monday.
If I recall the whole justification of the vehicles of the FSC were that like the Stryker to be fully deployable by the C-130. I notice this minor claim has kind of disappeared for the claims of the FCS.
ALLONS,
Byron Skinner
Afternoon Byron, hope you are having a good weekend as we wait to see what Sec of Defense Gates has decided.
You said: “Nice to see you back. First off to compare U.S. weapon systems to foreign weapons systems is rather folly. The only test is in the field and their the U.S. stands alone. The UK has some limited usage of their FA but nothing can come close to the U.S. M109 for combat use by the United States and allies who have bough the M-109. As we talked about last week when you were arguing for the medium division, the U.S. can air lift any piece of equipment it has including the M-109A6. True Cole, most likely you can get 2 NLOS C’s on a C-17 vs. a single M-109A6 but how often is this capacity needed once a decade?
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Someone else raised potential foreing alternatives. The point is that several European nations are buying modernized SP howitzers to replace M109s. That kind of shoots down the argument that towed howizers are sufficient and the M109 is good enough. Why would the U.S. not also realize that the M109 is long in the tooth, and the SP howitzer is still essential?
As for C-17 transport, Byron, try three 27-ton NLOS-Cannons per C-17 versus two M109A6. Not a major advantage, but when coupled with infantry carriers and mounted combat systems, primary elements of the combat arms mechanized force can deploy in record numbers…in record time. An airfield has a large perimeter. It needs many combat vehicles to cover it, and provide a quick reaction force, as well, right from the get go. The Bashur example of 5 Bradleys and 5 M-1s doesn’t cut it.
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Byron said:”One of the thing mentioned by other here today is overwhelming lack of support for the FCS, by retired officers who have no connection with the defense industry. I’ve been following this since Boeing and SAIC became the leads and have been following it’s support or its lack of both in the media and in personal conservations. To quote a Retire Army 06 who has combat experience with armor as well as leading a heavy brigade in NATO, as of yesterday when I asked for his thoughts on the NLOS C, just another “Gold Plated” system like Stryker that won’t get past its first fire mission in real combat.”
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reply: Are we providing anecdotal onesie/twosie evidence now Byron? I could name a dozen retired O-5 and O-6 combat arms officers who would gladly testify for FCS, and an equal number of active Army ones can be found in El Paso. When you understand FCS, you embrace it…and don’t pass judgment on systems you are unfamiliar with.
Clearly the Stryker has been successful in Iraq and soon will be in Afghanistan. It has demonstrated that a networked vehicle can be an extraordinary combat multiplier. Strykers already demonstrate capability to receive UAS video inside the vehicle and have sensors surrounding the vehicle and multiple screens on board.
FCS will carry this trend further, providing greater information on the common operational picture, access to organic units sensor and external ISR information, and capabilities to control both unmanned aircraft and ground vehicles from manned ground vehicles. This manned-unmanned teaming will transform warfare.
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Byron said: “I have noticed two omission for this weeks defense of the NLOS C, The estimated per unit cost and is it still to be transportable by the C-130?”
“As far as I can find the per unit cost of any of the FCS has ever been made public, don’t you think that since you are asking the taxpayer to buy the NLOS C at least they should know how much it cost? From what I’ve read that decision by Sec. Gates is expected on Monday.”
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Per unit cost of an FCS BCT, I believe is in the $6 billion range for each of 15 FCS BCTs. I mentioned that in our last go around, where we compared the cost of 1 FCS BCT to 24 C-17, or 42 F-22 aircraft, 84 V-22s that carry nothing but light forces (which a C-130 or helicopter can do), or one Navy aircraft carrier. While the C-17 is a wonderful aircraft, it cannot win a counterinsurgency or supply the enemy to death by itself. The F-22 cannot do anything about a counterinsurgency.
A carrier is a wonderful tool, but only if it can find targets. I recall watching the PBS show “Carrier” where not a single bomb was dropped during its tour in Iraq. When you add all the support ships in a Carrier group, costs and personnel skyrocket. Yet the Chinese may have a real chance of sinking a carrier in a single missile strike or suicide sub attack.
We need joint warfare to be sure. But it seems as though the Army portion of the joint warfare budget is always left with “good enough as is” instead of “could be a whole lot more effective, sensor-laden, deployable, lethal, sustainable, networkable, and survivable.”
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Byron said: “If I recall the whole justification of the vehicles of the FSC were that like the Stryker to be fully deployable by the C-130. I notice this minor claim has kind of disappeared for the claims of the FCS.”
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reply: First of all, the C-130 requirement was probably somewhat questionable to begin with. A C-130 is an intratheater airlifter, not an intertheater one. It would require far more and repeated tanker sorties to transport a unit from stateside to the U.S. by C-130. If you transport a Stryker unit with its slat armor, it is no longer C-130 transportable, either.
A C-17 with 3 FCS manned ground vehicles aboard will definitely require aerial refueling, but it can get the job done, get the vehicles offloaded in a hurry, and get off the ground in limited time with fewer aircraft on the ground and space used than 3 C-130s. If C-5s and C-17s can get an FCS BCTs trucks into theater, the C-130 can finish the job taking them to multiple airfields where combined arms battalions are already protecting the joint force on the ground.
The true tragedy of FCS marketing is that so many continue to think of it as a medium force, despite the fact that at 54,000 lbs, it nearly mirrors the original weights of the M109 and Bradley. Yet the FCS MGV version of each is lighter, better protected, more sustainable, more lethal, sensor-laden, and networked to the nth degree.
Only the tank is about equal with the FCS mounted combat system…and no surprise, it is frequently armor and cavalry officer who bad-mouth FCS the most. Yet Bradleys are part of the Cavalry so you would think Cav officers would want a superior Bradley replacement with superior sensors and reconnaissance/security capabilities given its silent electric-drive mode on battery power. It kind of makes you think a few too many Cav officers had one too many at the club or wore their Stetson’s too tight and killed brain cells.
It is beyond me that some associated with the Army would obstruct its modernization by failing to support the sole effort that transforms part of the heavy force into an ALL AROUND force, capable of fighting major conflict, or stability operations counterinsurgencies with equal ease.
“The true tragedy of FCS marketing is that so many continue to think of it as a medium force, despite the fact that at 54,000 lbs, it nearly mirrors the original weights of the M109 and Bradley. Yet the FCS MGV version of each is lighter, better protected, more sustainable, more lethal, sensor-laden, and networked to the nth degree.”
Cole, not to sound like a dick, but that last statement sounds like you read it out of a General Dynamics ad. I support the concept and some of the needs of FCS, but I’m withholding judgment until I can actually see the result. Much of the uber-networked sensor lethality business is still either on paper or being tinkered with at Bliss.
The Corps makes the same claims about the EFV. Right now that beast can’t cruise the Potomac without breaking down. I’m more optimistic about the NLOS-C’s prospects since it exists in an almost full-production form, has put thousands of rounds downrange, and isn’t on the cover of DoD-LEMONS QUARTERLY.
Cole,
Ok you said some things i agreed with some i didnt i think mostly we just misunderstood each other. I like the idea of having alot of craft based on a smilar design so you can have many parts easily at hand and enter changable like stryker.
The point i see though is the idea of changing the main battletanks out for smaller lighter easier to kill units. Abrams can survive 99% of IED it has proved emencly valuable in urban fighting as oppossed to what some said it would fail horribly at. Do i think a replacment for the abrams should be looked at yes using lighter materials to get the same or better armor strenght. A different powerplant that will alow it to stay highly mobile but use less fuel. Use lessons learned to make it more suitable to urban warfare. Automate the turret to reduce vehicle hight weight crew size etc. Many many more ideas.
Again im not saying all the ideas of FCS are bad just a few that over sour the deal. I guess in someways im one of those war is chaos trying to order it will just make you look stupid.
PS. with the sensors i wasnt just talking about failers on one vehicle but active enemy countermessures EMP etc.
Oh yea anyone know what happened to the heavy lift osprey? the big 4 engines sumbit%h thats supposed to function like a vstol herc?
Good Evening Cole,
Nice try on dodging the question of costs so I had to do a little searching, here is what I come up with.
The current M-109A2/A3 of which there is listed 2,087 in inventory has a per unit price of $48 million to include fire control systems and necessary support vehicles. At six tubes per battery that adds up to $288,000,000.00 bucks. I would assume that a BCT would have a whole battery.
Your estimate to equip a battalion would be in the $6,000,000,000.00 or to replace the entire inventory of M-109′s would cost, well I don’t think we need to go there to prove my point.
This is a HUGE increase in price, for what? It would look like that the defense contractors building this system are packing all the profit they expected to make on the entire FCS at about $230 billion into one part of it. If the DoD decides to buy the NLOS C I would hope that they would put it out to competitive bidding.
Oh by the way, Cole I noticed that there is a different picture on a NLOS C this week the last week. the design has been finalized hasn’t it?
In short Cole an increase of $4.2 billion per BATTERY of 18 guns over the M-109A2/A3 is a bit hard to sallow, especially since it offers nothing really new or that couldn’t be built into the M-109.
As far as support from military officers, I can see by the avalanche of posting here and last week that they are a rather select group, very select group. But again having ones name associated to a rip off like this would be a career ender for sure.
It appears that the days when SAI’s Robert J. Byster could hire Melvin Laird for the board and over night become a major defense contractor should be history too.
ALLONS
Byron Skinner
As I posted over at DoD Buzz, as PART of the FCS as a whole the NLOS-C works (works being a relative term to the FCS as a whole which is a GREAT Air Mech force but there ARE reasons why Air Mech forces are not promonant around the world) BUT as a ‘stand-alone’ SPH it does not. It simply lacks the shooting range, ROF & number of on-board rounds to stack up vs modern SPHs of other nations.
TB,
No the Crusader was not too big. It was only marginally larger than the M109 & weighed less than 45 tons (even the original ‘base-model” M1 Abrams weighed 63 tons) but OUTPERFORMED larger & heavier foreign SPHs.
And no the NLOS-C does not improve ANYTHING upon the Crusader. The closest you can come to comparing the NLOS-C to the Crusader is to say that the NLOS-C is ‘half a Crusader’.
Um are you serious over 200mil…..for one arty peice…….serious?…….ok f that
Byron,
THE $6 BILLION FIGURE WAS FOR THE ENTIRE FCS BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM….not just the artillery battalion. That is over 300 armored manned ground vehicles (“tank”, infantry carrier, recon & surveillance vehicle, mortar vehicle, cannon, evacuation, and recovery), and equal number of trucks, all the unmanned air and ground systems, the NLOS-Launch System, equipment for 3500 troops, and THE NETWORK AND SOFTWARE.
I’m not sure where you got your figures for the M109A6, but they are WAY OFF, as in too high, as well.
Byron,
THE $6 BILLION FIGURE WAS FOR THE ENTIRE FCS BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM….not just the artillery battalion. That is over 300 armored manned ground vehicles (“tank”, infantry carrier, recon & surveillance vehicle, mortar vehicle, cannon, evacuation, and recovery), and equal number of trucks, all the unmanned air and ground systems, the NLOS-Launch System, equipment for 3500 troops, and THE NETWORK AND SOFTWARE.
I’m not sure where you got your figures for the M109A6, but they are WAY OFF, as in too high, as well.
pfcem,
The reason there are not more air mechanization forces in the world is that NOBODY has anywhere near the number of C-17, C-5, and C-130 aircraft that we have. They also have more localized self-defense missions that usually do not involve deployment in any substantial numbers.
Nevertheless, many European nations are fielding rapid reaction expeditionary units. They just lack the airlift that we possess to deploy multiple battalion-sized elements.
pfcem said:
“And no the NLOS-C does not improve ANYTHING upon the Crusader. The closest you can come to comparing the NLOS-C to the Crusader is to say that the NLOS-C is ‘half a Crusader’.”
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The lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan is that massed artillery use in proximity to civilians is no longer acceptable. Add IEDs and we can no longer afford to move about the battlefield with 50 dumb artillery rounds on board ready to blow sky high if they are hit by an IED. The NLOS-Cannon will benefit from the V-shaped counter-IED kit. It also will be more likely to survive RPG, ATGM, and smart sensor-fuzed counterbattery attacks.
The NLOS-Cannon will transport more smart Excalibur rounds and will exploit more accurate dumb round fires, and multiple simultaneous rounds on targets rather than massive artillery barrages. They then scoot and can link up as necessary with PLS pallets with more ammunition, automatically loaded.
As for the 45 ton Crusader reference and claim that NLOS-Cannon is half a Crusader, you are partially correct. But would you rather have one C-17 transported Crusader on the ground firing 6 rounds a minute early in the conflict or 3 NLOS-Cannon firing 6 rounds per minute?
Hehehe the poor euros cant even invade darfur….with permission.
But some ppl want us to be just like then……great
To ensure that we fully understand the FCS costs per core brigade combat team, I refer you to this link for the 2008 Army Posture Statement, and specifically the paragraph titled: “What continued efforts does the Army have planned for the future?”
In it you will see that the cost per core brigade is estimated at $5.9-6.2 Billion for each of 15 BCTs. Obviously the earlier ones may cost more than the later ones.
The same paragraph also points out that FCS suffered $825 million in Congressional decrements of funding over the past 3 years. You cannot simultaneously accuse a program of not making progress while eliminating the funding to make that progress.;)
http://www.army.mil/aps/08/information_papers/transform/Major_Acquisition_Programs_Future_Combat_System.html
Good Morning Cole,
Lets see the cost of the M-109A2/A3 come out of BAE, since they make it I can only assume that they know what they are charging.
Since we have been only posting about the NLOS C this weekend, the FCS vehicles other then the NLOS C were the topic last week if I recall. I’m most interested that now your $6 Billion is for an entire BCT even though such a formations TO&E is only a minimally defined as a BCT Hq., and two battalions or more, I believe that in Iraq most Army BCT’s have four ground, Light Infantry, Mech. Infantry, Armor, Artillery battalions, a Marine Batallion etc. and an air battalion, and a BCT HQ .
You mentioned that a BCT would contain about 300 vehicles, thats a lot of iron on the ground since a full blown Heavy Division currently has about 300-350 armored vehicles depending on it configuration of either Armor or Mech. Infantry, the U.S. Heavy Division in NATO was 500 during the Cold War armored vehicles. Me thinks Cole that you are grasping for numbers here.
The FCS be it a Division or BCT is a formation with out a mission much like the Pentomic Division that was General Maxwell Taylor’s dream. The current balance between the robust Light Infantry Battalions and Heavy Mech. Battalions that currently exist with in the Army have the flexibly to respond to any call that can conceivably come up.
Getting back to the $6 billion. That can buy 2 1/2 Virginia Class Submarines, 3 Burke Class Destroyers or even 2 DD-100 Zumwalts or about 40% of a Ford Class carrier. That a lot of money for a concept, the Medium Division or now this week I guess it’s the Medium BCT, that even this past week the Army said was not needed.
The whole FCS program is procurement gone wild and may be the hands that will strangle the goose that lays the golden eggs for these uber defense contractors. The customer here is not the military but the American tax payer who signs the checks. Defense is naturally any countries number one priority but there is a point where Jan and Jo lunch box says the cost of baloney is just to high.
ALLONS,
Byron Skinner
@Cole:
The NLOS-C uses what? A 39 or 45 cal barrel? PzH2000 and other modern SPHs use 52cal and thus outrange NLOS-C.
The Rate of fire and maximum MRSI for PzH2000 is also better.
The NLOS-C won’t be deployable with any in-service NATO transport aircraft that cannot handle the PzH2000. A C-17 with a PzH2000 would have lots of payload left if it flies as far as another C-17 wih three NLOS-C on board – the advantage is thus not even remotely like 3:1.
Plus: Air deployability is vastly overrated anyway. You don’t do it on a large scale and you can airlift almost everything in small wars.
NLOS-C has furthermore inferior (if any) bomblet protection in comparison to PzH2000 according to publicized info.
PzH2000 isn’t perfect and a new SPH should share a common chassis and drivetrain with other standard vehicles such a medium wight MBTs, but PzH2000 is simply one generation ahead of NLOS-C in terms of pure fighting power. NLOS-C firepower is pretty much on par with late 70′s SPH tech unless they keep some highly unlikely performance stats secret.
Afternoon Byron, not sure where you got your cost figures when you said:
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“Lets see the cost of the M-109A2/A3 come out of BAE, since they make it I can only assume that they know what they are charging.”
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reply: I found several references to rebuilt M109s to include a $56 million contract with Pakistan for 115 howitzers at around $487,000 each, and a contract with Egypt for 201 refurbished howitzers for $43.7 million or $208,095 each. For the M109A6, a link had 164 LRIP + 786 Full Scale Production M109A6 for 950 total. The 786 M109A6 cost $334 million which is a unit cost of about $425,000 each. The first M109 was produced in 1962, so obviously it is far cheaper to modify an existing system…but you can only do that for so long. I found another link that said the cost of the Crusader was going to be $25 million each but that probably included R&D costs.
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Byron said: “Since we have been only posting about the NLOS C this weekend, the FCS vehicles other then the NLOS C were the topic last week if I recall. I’m most interested that now your $6 Billion is for an entire BCT even though such a formations TO&E is only a minimally defined as a BCT Hq., and two battalions or more, I believe that in Iraq most Army BCT’s have four ground, Light Infantry, Mech. Infantry, Armor, Artillery battalions, a Marine Batallion etc. and an air battalion, and a BCT HQ.
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reply: Cannot discuss the exact details of the FCS BCT TO&E, but it does have 3 combined arms battalions instead of just 2 in a heavy BCT. It does have an artillery battalion, RSTA squadron, and a Brigade Support Battalion paralleling a heavy BCT.
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Byron said: “You mentioned that a BCT would contain about 300 vehicles, thats a lot of iron on the ground since a full blown Heavy Division currently has about 300-350 armored vehicles depending on it configuration of either Armor or Mech. Infantry, the U.S. Heavy Division in NATO was 500 during the Cold War armored vehicles. Me thinks Cole that you are grasping for numbers here.
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reply: Yes Bryon, it is a lot of iron. It is not a medium BCT. That is why it can substitute for a heavy BCT or a Stryker BCT with equal ease. Combined arms battalions can be attached to light, airborne, and air assault infantry BCTs as well. It is a flexible design able to support the full spectrum of conflict. For more general information on vehicle quantities, suggest you google: Congressional Budget Study FCS Alternatives…which was flawed in many ways but also provides some decent vehicle number information.
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Byron said: “The FCS be it a Division or BCT is a formation with out a mission much like the Pentomic Division that was General Maxwell Taylor’s dream. The current balance between the robust Light Infantry Battalions and Heavy Mech. Battalions that currently exist with in the Army have the flexibly to respond to any call that can conceivably come up.
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reply: I’m not familiar with the Pentomic (sp?)division except that I thought it was oriented on nuclear warfare. It’s wholly unrelated to FCS. The FCS BCT provides all the flexibility of current BCTs and then some, in a modernized BCT that spins out systems into light and heavy BCTs as well. It can do everything a heavy BCT can do and a lot of things it cannot do, such as provide the same level of deployability, protection (superior for everything but the tank), lethality, sustainability, RSTA, and networking. It can do everything substantially better than a Stryker BCT, while providing true task-organized combat power to augment infantry BCTs in complex and urban terrain.
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Byron said: “Getting back to the $6 billion. That can buy 2 1/2 Virginia Class Submarines, 3 Burke Class Destroyers or even 2 DD-100 Zumwalts or about 40% of a Ford Class carrier. That a lot of money for a concept, the Medium Division or now this week I guess it’s the Medium BCT, that even this past week the Army said was not needed.”
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reply: 40% of a carrier whose catapult doesn’t work? Carrier costs also do not include the on board aircraft or battle group ships. The DDG-1000 speaks for itself. Virginia class subs can launch cruise missiles and field SEALS but frankly cannot support the full range of land contingencies the joint force requires. Same for more Burke class destroyers. The point isn’t that one Service’s systems should be bought instead of another…the point is the Navy and Air Force seldom have trouble getting financing for their warfighting needs while the Army can’t get major modernization program #1 through DoD or Congress as of late. What gives, when the Army is clearly bearing the brunt of warfighting in this and foreseeable future conflicts?
No, the Army has NEVER said it does not need FCS as you incorrectly claim. It will probably have to live with major FCS cuts and delays due to the budget and financial crisis. I just hope it is done in a smart way so the Army is not handicapped for the next 30 years with aging, less relevant legacy systems that specialize too much in one area.
Good Evening Cole,
Interesting, the two web site that I found information on the cost of the M-109A2/A3 had been up dated on April 5, today, guess what was missing.
I will admit the $48 million per gun unit include the M-99, and allowance for fire control systems, in a 6 gun battery and the support elements that the M-109 requires to function. It was a complete package price, which I believe is the only way to look at the cost of anything.
As for your other comments we have been around the block a couple of time on all them the past two weekends and I see no value in another trip. We simple are two people who have well though out opinions on this as I said before I have no desire to change anyone mind on this but did and still do think that the issue is of such importance that a through airing of it is in everybody’s interest and I think we have done that.
The main problems that I have with the FCS is:
Cost. No one has yet come up with a total system cost, as well as itemized costs.
Need: What is the mission of the FCS Vehicles, what capacity do they give our ground forces that they are either lacking or the current in place can’t do as effective as the FCS. Where is the support with in the Army, the AF supports the F-22′s and the F-35′s and General Officers have publicly came forward and disagreed with the Sec. of Defense. Admirals in the Navy have come out in support of the Zumwalt, Marine Generals have come out in strong support for the EFV, but the silence of senior Army officers is defining.
It take courage for career to come out and disagree with the boss in this case Sec. Gates who doesn’t hesitate to cut off heads for such actions. Quite frankly Cole being retired Army I find myself embarrassed as somewhat ashamed that noting is know by the interested members of the public of the FCS program. The refusal of the Army general staff to take a position the FCS is nothing short of dereliction of duty.
Tomorrow I hear Sec. of Defense Gates put his ideas of the 09/10 budget on the table, and the games have begun.
ALLONS,
Byron Skinner
Cole,
Still living in fantasyland I see.
The reason why AirMech units are not more prevalent around the wold is because the entire concept is a dream. The number of transport aircraft needed to “airlift” even a FCS unit is just too great for any sizable force. AND even the the “smaller lighter” FCS vehicle the difference between a FCS unit & “current” heavy unit IS NOT that great.
Number of C-17 sorties needed to deploy a Brigade
current heavy forces: 410
FCS: 340-380
Time heeded to deploy a Brigade
current heavy forces: 23 days
FCS: 19-20
In fact other than the Mounted Combat System vs M1A2 Abrams the difference between the FCS vehicle & the current forces vehicle they replace is negligible. For example the NLOS-C is 27 tons vs 32 tons for the M109A6 & the Infantry Carrier Vehicle is (HOPED TO BE) 30 tons vs 33 tons for the M1A3.
But the REAL kicker is that the combat vehicles themselves only make up a part of what makes a combat unit. For example a Modular Heavy
Combat Brigade consists of a total of 1680 vehicles – ONLY 370 of which are the tracked ‘combat’ vehicles. A FCS Brigade consists of a total of 1230 vehicles – ONLY 320 of which are the Manned Ground Vehicles.
***
The Crusader had a ROF of 12 rpm (with a water-cooled barrel so as to maintain a high ROF) & with a 56cal barrel out-ranged all other 155mm SPH. The NLOS-C has HALF the ROF & HALF the on-board ammunition & with a 38cal barrel does not out-range DECADES old 39cal SPHs like the M109.
And a C-17 could carry MORE than just one Crusader with the equivalent weight of three NLOS-C…It isn’t too far off to say that a unit could have two Crusader for every three NLOS-C. That is 24 rpm & 96 on-board rounds with GREATER range than any other 155mm SPH for the Crusaders vs 18 rpm & 72 on-board rounds that IS OUT-RANGED by modern 45cal & 52cal 155mm SPHs for the NLOS-Cs.
“Btw does anyone know if the NLOS or the M777 i think thats it the marines new lightweight arty use some of the same tech?”
NLOS-C is an M777 gun, mounted on a mechanised chassis and fitted with an autoloader, so for the gun at least there is full commonality. That, at least, is sensible – find a gun that the people on the ground think is good and put it on tracks.
Pretty sure it is the same light weight barrel.
Well if i read correctly all FCS is off so NLOS is going bye bye.
Glad we spent all that money for nothing :)
@valcan,
Well, we could very well end up with NLOS-C and no other FCS vehicles, since Senator Inhoffe keeps inserting language into the Defense Authorization bills that require the Army to fund NLOS-C.
Cole,
I see that even basic reading comprehension & math is too difficult for you.
SERIOUSLY WHAT PART OF 50-55 ton AVERAGE IS SO DIFFICULT FOR YOU TO UNDERSTAND? The MAJORITY of the 340-380 sorties will be WELL BELOW 50 tons. Troops, trucks & ALL KINDS of equipment take up space MORE so than weight…The only thing wrong with the 50-55 ton average is that the FCS MGVs ARE going to be heavier that what the study assumed.
THE WHOLE POINT OF AIRMECH IS TO “DEPLOY” A UNIT TO ONE LOCATION! Deploying your untit to THREE DIFFERNET LOCATIONS defeats the whole purpose. But STILL does not change the fact that the difference in TIME & NUMBER OF SORTIES between a FCS unit & a “traditional” heavy unit IS NOT THAT MUCH.
Having 205 C-17 vs 180 DOES NOTHING to change the inherent flaws in in the AirMech dream.
For ‘small’ (up to Company sized) unit operations, AirMech (& the FCS) makes sense but once you get up to a Brigade (I am on the fence about a Battalion) sized unit, the TIME & NUMBER OF SORTIES required makes it unrealistic EVEN FOR THE US.
pfcem said: “SERIOUSLY WHAT PART OF 50-55 ton AVERAGE IS SO DIFFICULT FOR YOU TO UNDERSTAND? The MAJORITY of the 340-380 sorties will be WELL BELOW 50 tons. Troops, trucks & ALL KINDS of equipment take up space MORE so than weight…The only thing wrong with the 50-55 ton average is that the FCS MGVs ARE going to be heavier that what the study assumed.”
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340-380 sorties is fiction. Around 308 sorties is FCS reality which is 25% less than that of a heavy BCT. Plus, the critical first two days of sorties transport nearly twice the FCS armor if multiple Abrams are transported by C-17s moving the heavy force. By the CBO’s own admission, around 55 C-17 sorties would be reduced if they carried 3 manned ground vehicles per aircraft.
CBO used 50-55 tons as the average for light, air assault, and airborne divisions which is nothing BUT HMMWVs, other trucks, helicopters, and light infantry. Why can you not fathom that the same kind of trucks can be transported on about 200 C-17 sorties to move 10,000-11,000 tons of BCT trucks? When coupled with another 108 sorties carrying 80 tons of manned ground vehicles the overall average can be nothing less than 60.5-63.8 tons. Do the math. 8640 tons transported by 108 sorties plus 200 sorties transporting 50-55 tons per C-17 (e.g., 10 uparmored HMMWVS is 50 tons, 2 loaded HEMTTs is well over 55 tons BEFORE the trailers are added) is 18,640-19640 tons which is an entire FCS BCT. Geez.
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THE WHOLE POINT OF AIRMECH IS TO “DEPLOY” A UNIT TO ONE LOCATION! Deploying your untit to THREE DIFFERNET LOCATIONS defeats the whole purpose. But STILL does not change the fact that the difference in TIME & NUMBER OF SORTIES between a FCS unit & a “traditional” heavy unit IS NOT THAT MUCH.
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Multiple points of simultaneous entry is the only way to go. You don’t put all your eggs in one deployment basket easily attacked by the enemy. Establishing noncontiguous defenses and airheads from the get go gets around the MOG issue.
Because forces are initially in the defense they expend little fuel and no ammunition unless the enemy attacks. Trucks can trickle in. Combat power, sensors, and C2 are required the first two days, and FCS units have sufficient supplies to go 72 hours without resupply. By 6 days, the whole she-bang is in country, while other heavy and FCS BCTs deploy by sea.
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Having 205 C-17 vs 180 DOES NOTHING to change the inherent flaws in in the AirMech dream.
For ‘small’ (up to Company sized) unit operations, AirMech (& the FCS) makes sense but once you get up to a Brigade (I am on the fence about a Battalion) sized unit, the TIME & NUMBER OF SORTIES required makes it unrealistic EVEN FOR THE US.
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You lack tactical and strategic vision. An entire FCS BCT does not need to deploy by air. Deploy combined arms battalion task forces and company teams as you mention. Those are often plenty for many threats at multiple airheads. Why are the Canadians deploying LAV III and tanks to Afghanistan, and recommending that we send some Abrams? Why are the Dutch deploying PZH 2000?
WHY IS THE U.S. SENDING 300 STRYKERS from 2nd Infantry Division to Afghanistan? C-17s and C-5s will deploy EVERY STRYKER this summer just as they could easily transport more capable FCS armor. OIF’s north Iraq Bashur airhead in 2003 is the classic example that 62 C-17s can either deploy inadequate light-heavy mixes or more capable light-FCS mixes.
Cole,
LOL
308 sorties IS fiction made up by your fuzzy math.
50-55 tons was used for a FCS unit (not that this number was was from when the FCS MGV were ‘expected’ to be ~24-25 tons but of course the NLOS-C came in at 27 tons & the ICV is HOPED to come in at ~30 tons & you can bet the MCS will end up being even heavier) so the actual number WILL be HIGHER. Not that IF 50-55 tons WAS for mom-mechonised ‘light’/airborne infantry as you imply then the FCS average would be EVEN HIGHER making the difference between a FCS unit & a “traditiona” heav forces unit EVEN LESS SIGNIFICANT.
I do not lack tactical OR strategic vision. I have stated MANY TIMES what IS good about the FCS. But UNLIKE you I do not live in some dream world where 340-380 C-17 sorties to deploy a FCS Bridage suddenly makes AirMech realist OR is enough of a “improvement” over 410 C-17 sorties to deploy a “traditional” heavy forces unit to get all excited about.
Again, the REALITY is that aside from the M1A2 Abrams vs the FCS MCV there IS NOT a major difference in weight the FCS MGVs & the “traditional” vehicles they replace AND the combat vehicles themselves only make up a PORTION of what a Brigade is – when you include all the troops/crew, trucks/utility vehicles & other supplies that make up a Brigade having FCS vehicles vs “traditional” vehicles DOES NOT make all that much difference.
Geez, please refer to Chapter 3, of the CBO study, page 59, footnote 4 which states:
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That estimate is based on an average load of 50 tons to 55 tons per C-17, which would limit the number of manned FCS vehicles per sortie to two. The Army argues that it may be possible to load
three manned FCS vehicles on a single C-17 aircraft. If that could be done, transporting an FCS brigade could require as many as 54 FEWER C-17 SORTIES