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	<title>Comments on: Eating Counterinsurgency Soup With a Knife</title>
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	<link>http://defensetech.org/2009/04/09/eating-counterinsurgency-soup-with-a-knife/</link>
	<description>The Future of the Military, Law Enforcement and National Security</description>
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		<title>By: Chuck</title>
		<link>http://defensetech.org/2009/04/09/eating-counterinsurgency-soup-with-a-knife/#comment-98296</link>
		<dc:creator>Chuck</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 14 Apr 2009 14:44:56 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://deftech.usmilblog.com/?p=4437#comment-98296</guid>
		<description>The biggest problem for Afghans is money.  Rough terrain (see the American Rockies) only means bad roads and other infrastructure when there isn&#039;t enough money to pay for it and maintain it.  And apparently there isn&#039;t enough money for good roads in all of Afghanistan, much less schools, hospitals, sewage treatment, etc.
The money is relevant to their military as well -- how large an army can Afghanistan financially support and equip?  If we build a 250,000-man army, do we have to foot the bill?  And if we don&#039;t, what do the trainees do when we leave?
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		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The biggest problem for Afghans is money.  Rough terrain (see the American Rockies) only means bad roads and other infrastructure when there isn’t enough money to pay for it and maintain it.  And apparently there isn’t enough money for good roads in all of Afghanistan, much less schools, hospitals, sewage treatment, etc.<br />
The money is relevant to their military as well — how large an army can Afghanistan financially support and equip?  If we build a 250,000-man army, do we have to foot the bill?  And if we don’t, what do the trainees do when we leave?</p>
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		<title>By: Charles</title>
		<link>http://defensetech.org/2009/04/09/eating-counterinsurgency-soup-with-a-knife/#comment-98295</link>
		<dc:creator>Charles</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 12 Apr 2009 05:34:52 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://deftech.usmilblog.com/?p=4437#comment-98295</guid>
		<description>Good lord as if &quot;surging&quot; does a damn thing. As if the British and the Soviets hadn&#039;t tried it before...
Surging put a dent in the enemy in Iraq, but it didn&#039;t end things until the Sunnis decided they were done shooting us.
In any case, the Afghanis, if they hate America, will fight with the tenacity of cornered animals. I do not think building up the army to an excessive size is good...didn&#039;t we get better results out of IA by growing it slowly; rather than bulking up quickly on troops? Iraqi Police on the other hand were bulked up rapidly and they became the hotbed of sectarianism for a while.
Therefore it behooves us to be careful, as the institutions we put up must not turn rancid, since it discredits America, discredits central government is counterproductive to counterinsurgency.
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		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Good lord as if “surging” does a damn thing. As if the British and the Soviets hadn’t tried it before…<br />
Surging put a dent in the enemy in Iraq, but it didn’t end things until the Sunnis decided they were done shooting us.<br />
In any case, the Afghanis, if they hate America, will fight with the tenacity of cornered animals. I do not think building up the army to an excessive size is good…didn’t we get better results out of IA by growing it slowly; rather than bulking up quickly on troops? Iraqi Police on the other hand were bulked up rapidly and they became the hotbed of sectarianism for a while.<br />
Therefore it behooves us to be careful, as the institutions we put up must not turn rancid, since it discredits America, discredits central government is counterproductive to counterinsurgency.</p>
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		<title>By: Bill Skinner</title>
		<link>http://defensetech.org/2009/04/09/eating-counterinsurgency-soup-with-a-knife/#comment-83377</link>
		<dc:creator>Bill Skinner</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 10 Apr 2009 05:01:48 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://deftech.usmilblog.com/?p=4437#comment-83377</guid>
		<description>Good evening.
Schrott&#039;s opinion may be very popular. I do not believe a great surge would give the desired results. The usa needs to win the propaganda war. Have the afgan people realize that radical Islam is tearing their country apart. The insurgents we are fighting are seen peoples champions.
Peace.
Bill Skinner
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		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Good evening.<br />
Schrott’s opinion may be very popular. I do not believe a great surge would give the desired results. The usa needs to win the propaganda war. Have the afgan people realize that radical Islam is tearing their country apart. The insurgents we are fighting are seen peoples champions.<br />
Peace.<br />
Bill Skinner</p>
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		<title>By: Hibbidyhai</title>
		<link>http://defensetech.org/2009/04/09/eating-counterinsurgency-soup-with-a-knife/#comment-83376</link>
		<dc:creator>Hibbidyhai</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 10 Apr 2009 03:21:38 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Nothing is ever that simple Schrott.
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		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Nothing is ever that simple Schrott.</p>
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