Our boy Greg Grant has an awesome scoop on DoD Buzz revealing key concepts in the upcoming Quadrennial Defense Review.
Clearly Gates has pushed the services to embrace an affliction of “this-war-itis” in forging a plan to build a military that can respond more effectively to unconventional threats.
I’m a bit leery of abandoning the “big war” capability the U.S. has become so dominant in, but I then think about the Israel/Hezbollah conflict in Lebanon and reason that even a near-peer competitor would try to employ similar tactics. Then I bounce back to the Georgia/Russia spat last year and think “well, maybe a near-peer would try to bludgeon its way through”… and back and forth.
Be that as it may, when you strip all the scenarios away, I think it makes sense to posture the U.S. military to fight these unconventional wars because it relies on innovation, quick thinking, a broad skill set and the abondonment of rigid planning. Set-piece, conventional wars can be won with adaptability and outside the box strategy and tactics — the same prerequisits for winning a “hybrid” war.
Greg writes:
The strategic review will run through the summer with the intent to have it wrapped in time to inform FY 2011 defense budget decisions. There is some concern in the Pentagon that the short time line might prove inadequate for a comprehensive strategic review and could produce a rushed product, according to sources I spoke with. The worry is that the outcome will reflect the thinking and biases of the newly installed Obama team in OSD without adequately accounting for the views of the services. The QDR will be run out of the office of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Michele Flournoy. Flournoy played a similar though less prominent role in the Clinton administration so she is familiar with games the services play during a QDR.
This QDR will use the 2008 National Defense Strategy as a point of departure. A big theme in the strategy document, and a point Gates emphasizes repeatedly, is the need to achieve balance across the military. Gates has clearly decided what the future of conflict will look like and he believes the services are weighted far too heavily towards large scale conventional war and wants to shift their focus towards the lower end of the conflict spectrum. Last years National Defense Strategy concluded that although U.S. predominance in conventional warfare is not unchallenged, it is sustainable for the medium term, given current trends, Gates said.
He also wants the QDR to capture battlefield lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan and believes those should influence force structure and spending decisions. His call for more aerial drones and his push for big investments in Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles are examples where battlefield lessons have influenced spending choices; we should expect more of these. Gates says fewer costly, leading-edge weapons are needed to insure against the rise of a great power; greater investment is needed to add troops and buy greater quantities of less technologically advanced weapons for hunting terrorists and waging counterinsurgency campaigns.
I’d encourage you to read the rest of his comprehensive report on DoD Buzz and give your own views on where Gates should take the services. One thing I will say is that the QDR tends to have an impact in the short term, but almost always reflects the trends of the day. If all of the sudden World War III breaks out, the 2014 QDR will look more like one that might have been written in 1980.
– Christian
{ 13 comments… read them below or add one }
“Be that as it may, when you strip all the scenarios away, I think it makes sense to posture the U.S. military to fight these unconventional wars because it relies on innovation, quick thinking, a broad skill set and the abondonment of rigid planning. Set-piece, conventional wars can be won with adaptability and outside the box strategy and tactics — the same prerequisits for winning a “hybrid” war.”
I think you got it partly wrong. If you take that large military capability and adapt it to a small unconventional war with out of the box thinking, then you’ll do okay. If you try to take a small military capability and adapt it to a large war, you’re f***ed.
Gates is not calling for the abandonment of conventional war capability…he just wants us to focus a little more on the here and now, “And so you really need to be prepared across a spectrum to deal with these capabilities. And that’s why I — going back to my crude carve-up of the budget of 40 percent dual-purpose, I think we have to be prepared all along that spectrum. And again, I think what people have lost sight of is I’m not trying to have irregular capabilities take the place of the conventional capabilities. I’m just trying to get the irregular guys to have a seat at the table and to institutionalize some of the needs that they have so that we can get the need”.
“And so you really need to be prepared across a spectrum to deal with these capabilities. And that’s why I — going back to my crude carve-up of the budget of 40 percent dual-purpose, I think we have to be prepared all along that spectrum. And again, I think what people have lost sight of is I’m not trying to have irregular capabilities take the place of the conventional capabilities. I’m just trying to get the irregular guys to have a seat at the table and to institutionalize some of the needs that they have so that we can get the need”.
I don’t think people would disagree with Gates except for the concern over the actual funding levels on top end systems. 187 F-22s only? Delaying bombers for a further 5-10 years?
Sure it took us 5 years to develop today’s MRAP, but the basic kit got into the fight in 2 years or so. How long does it take to conjure up a new F22 or ABL?
The delay in MRAP cost lives, but if we ever lose air superiority in a “conventional fight” against a “conventional enemy”, even momentarily, over a portion of the battlefield, we could be losing a thousand guys per hour. The Japanese accomplished that and more at Pearl Harbor using WWII technology. What will modern precision weapons do?
Sure it took us 5 years to develop today’s MRAP, but the basic kit got into the fight in 2 years or so. How long does it take to conjure up a new F22 or ABL?
The delay in MRAP cost lives, but if we ever lose air superiority in a “conventional fight” against a “conventional enemy”, even momentarily, over a portion of the battlefield, we could be losing a thousand guys per hour. The Japanese accomplished that and more at Pearl Harbor using WWII technology. What will modern precision weapons do?
WW2 also showed how fast we can ramp up production as well. The F-22s technology is already dated and the Russians are only now developing 5th gen aircraft. They should start over at some point in the future…that’s if unmanned has not already usurped that role.
Drake: Good point re WWII production but the key platforms like B-17 and Sherman were well in hand before the war started. Now we’re talking about maybe not having much on the drawing board when next big war hostilities suddenly loom, whenever, if ever. And even with production lines already up and running like for Virginia class subs, and all the money in the world, it still takes years and years to fabricate one, make it SUBSAFE, get it through acceptance trials and post shakedown dockyard availability, get her first post-commissioning crew combat ready, and so on. Ditto for the post-Nimitz class CVN. This is what has me worried.
Regarding the amount of lead-up time when it comes to building, let’s not forget that SOF — who I believe as an Armchair General(TM) to have a place in whatever damn war — can’t be mass-produced at the snap of a finger either.
The military is not primarily a global police force, chasing down pirates or terrorists or whatever. As long as you’ve got a workable doctrine to pull off the shelf, you can get stuff like MRAPs, anti-piracy patrol boats or whatever into the field quickly. The same is NOT true of billion-dollar destroyers, F-22s, fancy lasers or whatever.
Focus on the “here and now?” Iraq is winding down and Afghanistan is a sideshow by comparison – and, in any case, it seems like we have plenty of tools in our toolbox. Gates’ strategy seems to be embracing wholeheartedly the very “last-war-itis” problem that he claims to be fighting against. At this point we’re at the tail end of a historical aberration, in which we didn’t face any credible Great Power threats. China and Russia are moving into the high-tech conventional arms race in a big way; right now would be the worst possible time to cut back on our own conventional capabilities.
Imagine if the British had gone into WW1 with an army of light infantry, designed and trained to fight Boers and colonial tribesmen… oh wait.
Weapons research is continuous…it does not start and end with an airframe or program. Just because weapon system A is canceled or finishes its run does not mean research into future systems dies with that program.
Military and industry unfortunately have gotten used to overindulging in peace time and overabundance. It seems defeatist to accept that all weapons systems have to take decades upon decades to effectively field in a reasonable period of time.
The future holds many challenges, but hearing the same refrain…that somehow if we don’t have a “specific” weapons platform it puts us in mortal danger, strikes me as alarmist and even disingenuous. We have not suddenly absolved our commitment to conventional warfare by cutting some less than optimal programs. Our ability to manage our economy and education will have a greater effect on our ability to stay competitive in the long run, than any one cut.
Sometimes it’s best to accept the fact that you didn’t get the best result for your money the first time around…and start over.
“Weapons research is continuous…it does not start and end with an airframe or program. Just because weapon system A is canceled or finishes its run does not mean research into future systems dies with that program…….
Sometimes it’s best to accept the fact that you didn’t get the best result for your money the first time around…and start over.”
Drake,
How do these musings solve the fact that going from research to production for modern weapon platforms development takes 20 years?
Actually, weapons research isn’t always continuous. To occur it needs to be funded, and sometimes it doesn’t get the funding. An example is the R&D for the next generation strategic deterrent ballistic missile nuclear submarine SSBN, to replace the 14 Ohio-class vessels whose safe hull lives of some 35 – 40 years will run out in the forseeable future. There’s been a gap of several years already in any meaningful design work on this. Designer talent at the relevant contractors, such as General Dynamics Electric Boat and Northrup Grumman Newport News Shipbuilding, as a result has been turning over and atrophying. Only now is money being budgeted (at least so far, in SECDEF Gates’s version) to this next-gen SSBN effort.
How do these musings solve the fact that going from research to production for modern weapon platforms development takes 20 years?
Posted by: citanon at April 11, 2009 07:58 PM
Musings…is all any of us have to offer, (including you) because we don’t make policy.
The Secretary of Defense and company are trying to solve many of these institutional problems as we speak. He won’t get much credit for his efforts, because as soon as you start canceling someone’s career project, all the stake holders start shouting your gutting defense spending and leaving the country open to certain peril.
Some people think everything is fine as is and can’t imagine why anyone would want a change
Actually, weapons research isn’t always continuous. To occur it needs to be funded, and sometimes it doesn’t get the funding. An example is the R&D for the next generation strategic deterrent ballistic missile nuclear submarine SSBN, to replace the 14 Ohio-class vessels whose safe hull lives of some 35 – 40 years will run out in the forseeable future. There’s been a gap of several years already in any meaningful design work on this. Designer talent at the relevant contractors, such as General Dynamics Electric Boat and Northrup Grumman Newport News Shipbuilding, as a result has been turning over and atrophying. Only now is money being budgeted (at least so far, in SECDEF Gates’s version) to this next-gen SSBN effort.
Posted by: Joe Buff at April 12, 2009 06:42 AM
I’m not familiar with that one… but at least it is currently being funded:)
People forget the greatest offensive tool of the last world war and that is the nuclear bomb. You think a conventional nation won’t have the guts to fire its nukes while it’s being invaded? Think again.
For this very reason, invasions on a massive scale like D-day will never happen to a fully nuclear nation. Which means the chances of a major conventional engagement on land or on the coast are highly highly unlikely.
Military planning should reflect this, because you then sacrifice the present for the future. (And only the present can actually EFFECT the future, to its a bad deal).
Small and unconventional wars are the future and winning them quickly and decisively, safeguards the future.