This article first appeared in AviationWeek.com.
As the U.S. Air Force gets ready to recapitalize its current combat, search and rescue (CSAR) fleet, service and industry officials are hoping that history will repeat itself and the Defense Department will again realize the importance and need for a more modern dedicated CSAR fleet.
Almost immediately after Defense Secretary Robert Gates announced cancellation the Air Force’s $15 billion CSAR-X program to replace the existing HH-60 fleet — the service’s number two acquisition priority — the Pentagon issued a Resource Management Directive, according to industry and military sources. The directive would recapitalize the CSAR capacity at half of the Fiscal 2010 budget allotment, giving the service about $2.8 billion with which to work.
That will be a tough pill to swallow for the Air Force, as a major report from earlier this decade indicated. In its “Combat Rescue Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) Combat Rescue Future Recovery Vehicle Final Report,” from February 2002, service officials were less than keen about continuing with the aircraft for CSAR missions.
“The expert panel identified four deficiencies: visual lookout, avionics, workload, self-defense in terminal area, and alternate insertion and extraction (AIE) with wounded crew member. Each of these deficiencies was ranked as critical,” the AOA said.
At the same time, the Air Force is used to CSAR receiving short shrift.
“The tumultuous upswing and downswing of rescue forces throughout the last 50 years suggests that senior leaders’ interest in combat, search and rescue has been purely reactive to current events and not based on meeting ‘future’ contingency operations,” the AOA said. “Combat, search and rescue has always been marked by a lack of capabilities prior to hostilities due to decreases in force structure, followed by stop-gap thinking by military leaders and quick fixes to rebuild a rescue force only during times of combat or crisis.“
According to the AOA, the Emergency Rescue Squadron was first established during World War II in 1943, but it wasn’t until the Air Rescue Service began CSAR missions in the Korean War that the mission came into its own. By 1954, the ARS had 50 squadrons.
But after the Korean War it was cut down to 11 squadrons by 1961 — only to be rebuilt again three years later to meet needs in Southeast Asia.
In 1966, the newly dubbed Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service (ARRS) had a force structure of 10 helicopter detachments. By the early 1970s, there were 355 CSAR aircraft under the service.
But when Vietnam operations ended, that service was cut to 214 aircraft in 1976. A year later, the military started to buy the HH-60D Nighthawks.
In 1984, the budget called for 240 Nighthawks. Within three years the program would be canceled. After that, all remaining ARRS-assigned HH-53s were transferred to Special Operations and modified to Pave Low MH-53s.
Read the rest of this story, see how Gates is playing the split tanker buy proposal and putting up his dukes for a fight with Congress from our friends at Aviation Week, exclusively on Military.com.
– Christian


I suppose in the mind of some AF General:
1) The helicopter companies don’t pay enough, or offer a big enough position on their board compared to Lockheed Martin.
2) SAR takes away from “real” missions like air dominance.
2) Does it fly fast, shoot missiles and make glory for America?
3) Takes away money from “real” missions.
And the congressmen?
1) Does this milk cow squeeze out enough jobs in my jurisdiction?
Tell it all to the pilots who get shot down or go down in accidents. But what does 2.8 billion mean for the program? What can you do with that kind of money?
Things like this drive me crazy. We can cancel the Commanche a couple hundred-mil from completion after a multi-billion dollar project, but we can’t spare three billion to help recover pilots worth a lot of money in and of themselves during a time of unpopular casualty rates..
Is CSAR supposed to be multi-service? If so then screwing CSAR is bound to cause havoc.
I mean, AF pilots probably think they won’t get shot down much so maybe a new CSAR helicopter isn’t on their minds? But if I recall in OIF quite a few Apaches were shot down. You’d think that CSAR would receive a higher priority in light of it.
Does any other branch besides Air Force do the Special Forces approach to CSAR? Every branch is obviously going to have guys trained to pull people out of downed aircraft and vehicles, but I thought only pararescue (doctrinally) did behind enemy lines recovery. I know Marines experimented with TRAP for a while.
@ Earlydawn
When the sh*t hits the fan, you really don’t care WHO comes to get you, as long as they are friendlies. The 160th has pulled some people out of tight jams more than once.
The money needs to be shelled out. gates needs to remove his head from Obama’s rectium.
I’m really not trying to take a cheap shot or piss anybody off but have AF CSAR done much in OIF/OEF? I don’t really know about much of what’s going on in theater but I don’t recall ever hearing of AF CSAR crews picking anybody up since Gulf War 1. Seems like the Army has done most of these kinds of pick ups, mostly because it’s Army helicopters getting shot up (or so I guess) but I’m really just asking a question here.
Not to be a smart ass, but even with all of its development problems wouldn
JEFF,
I suppose since very few AF fixed-wing have been shot down that AF CSAR is farly un-busy.
What I want to know is why CSAR isn’t multi-service or joint? I can imagine AF CSAR guys sitting around waiting as helicopters go down because “the army guys will take care of it”. Dunno if it’s an accurate picture, but I’ve never thought of the branches as a happy family.
Perhaps a SARCOM (Search and Rescue Command) is required?
I think you guys are underestimating AF CSAR and PJs.
AF CSAR specializes in infiltrating unfreindly airspace and going into hot and heavy LZs, where most other helicopter forces specialize in trying to avoid them. CSAR aircraft have better sensor equipment for night time, bad weather, underfire flight. Most army and marine trans helos don’t. Most CSAR helos have refueling booms. Most army birds don’t.
While the primary mission is to fly deep into hostile turf to get downed pilots, that is not the only task that CSAR pulls. Airforce Pararescue men have taken 12 of the 22 airforce crosses handed out. PJ school has a 90 percent fail rate, higher then SEAL training, and the highest in our entire military. A CSAR helo was involved during the battle of Mogadishu, and one of them was awarded an AF cross.
For some real PJ history, look up the history of William Pitsenburger. He was a Senior Airman (E-4) who’s airforce cross was recently upgraded to the MoH.
Here’s his MoH citation:
Airman First Class Pitsenbarger distinguished himself by extreme valor on April 11, 1966 near Cam My, Republic of Vietnam, while assigned as a Pararescue Crew Member, Detachment 6, 38th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron. On that date, Airman Pitsenbarger was aboard a rescue helicopter responding to a call for evacuation of casualties incurred in an on-going firefight between elements of the United States Army’s 1st Infantry Division and a sizable enemy force approximately 35 miles east of Saigon. With complete disregard for personal safety, Airman Pitsenbarger volunteered to ride a hoist more than one hundred feet through the jungle, to the ground. On the ground, he organized and coordinated rescue efforts, cared for the wounded, prepared casualties for evacuation, and insured that the recovery operation continued in a smooth and orderly fashion. Through his personal efforts, the evacuation of the wounded was greatly expedited. As each of the nine casualties evacuated that day were recovered, Pitsenbarger refused evacuation in order to get one more wounded soldier to safety. After several pick-ups, one of the two rescue helicopters involved in the evacuation was struck by heavy enemy ground fire and was forced to leave the scene for an emergency landing. Airman Pitsenbarger stayed behind, on the ground, to perform medical duties. Shortly thereafter, the area came under sniper and mortar fire. During a subsequent attempt to evacuate the site, American forces came under heavy assault by a large Viet Cong force. When the enemy launched the assault, the evacuation was called off and Airman Pitsenbarger took up arms with the besieged infantrymen. He courageously resisted the enemy, braving intense gunfire to gather and distribute vital ammunition to American defenders. As the battle raged on, he repeatedly exposed himself to enemy fire to care for the wounded, pull them out of the line of fire, and return fire whenever he could, during which time, he was wounded three times. Despite his wounds, he valiantly fought on, simultaneously treating as many wounded as possible. In the vicious fighting which followed, the American forces suffered 80 percent casualties as their perimeter was breached, and airman Pitsenbarger was finally fatally wounded. Airman Pitsenbarger exposed himself to almost certain death by staying on the ground, and perished while saving the lives of wounded infantrymen. His bravery and determination exemplify the highest professional standards and traditions of military service and reflect great credit upon himself, his unit, and the United States Air Force.[4]
Trying to use non CSAR assets to fulfill the role will require alot of expensive upgrades to the other services’ helos’ and alot of additional training for thier pilots and crews.
But when you are in the thick of things, outnumbered and outgunned, with baddies on all sides, you want CSAR. You want PJs, and you do not want them coming in the best helos with the best pilots.
Curtis: Noted. Even so, it seems that the brass has little appreciation for CSAR, that or CSAR-X has sucked up enough money and the scaleback is one of those “intervention” moments executed in the hopes of encouraging program managers to get their crap together.
I’m really not trying to take a cheap shot or piss anybody off but have AF CSAR done much in OIF/OEF?
There have been thousands of personnel recoveries in OIF/OEF conducted by USAF CSAR forces. Additionally, CSAR contributes to domestic SAR operations, rescuing over 4,000 people during Hurricane Katrina and a few hundred since then. It’s not just for the recovery of pilots, and CSAR forces regularly conduct missions supporting MEDEVAC and SOF, the latter in conjunction with units such as the 160th SOAR.
And Charles, this was a decision made not by an Air Force general, but by Secretary Gates.
As for whether or not this is a joint mission, that’s a very good question. For example, Gates thinks you can simply deploy more Army UH-60s to make up for the lack of USAF HH-60s, but the Army 60s are not equipped with hoists and the additional special operations modifications necessary for CSAR missions, so it’s sort of a wash.