Another interesting thing Elder mentioned at yesterday’s breakfast was the potential reasoning behind the delay of the so-called Next Generation Bomber (the one tabbed for fielding in 2018).
Elder wasn’t sure if this was the reason but thought it might have played a large role in the decision, but he said President Obama’s desire to reengage in strategic arms talks with Russia might have impacted the decision to punt the NGB. Reason is, if you go ahead with NGB you’re making it a part of the negotiation process, and Elder saw no need — based on arcane counting rules for warheads per bomber — to include the putative NGB in the negotiations.
I suspect that one of the things that could be in play here, I don’t know this for a fact, it makes sense to me, is that you don’t want to lock yourself in on an airplane until you know what the counting rules are going to be. Why would I want a program this year that puts me in a bad position in terms of how I’m negotiating what the START negotiations are going to look like. … I would not want to tie my hands in the negotiations.
If this is true, it would be a shame that the Obama administration would undercut our long-range strike capability for a more favorable negotiating position on some pie in the sky resurrection of antiquated nuclear arms reduction talks. What, am I watching “War Games” or “Failsafe” here? Are we getting back into Game Theory? I thought 1989 was 20 years ago…The Russians must be laughing all the way to the arms control bank on this one. Now their 100 year-old bombers are going to be matched up against our 100 year-old bombers — in that equation, the Russkies win.
Since they’re looking at doing these negotiations this year, and I don’t know this for a fact that the secretary brought this up, normally I would say strategy should drive your force structure. … The counting rules in START for bombers are pretty onerous. … The way a B-52 is counted, it’s counted as carrying more weapons than you would want to carry operationally. … It’s a matter of let’s not lock ourselves in and save some money.
Elder said the 2018 timeline for the NGB was tied to the retirement of the Air Launched Cruise missile which gives B-52s enough standoff range to be a viable strategic deterrent. But with the NGB falling by the wayside, then the B-52 will have to last until 2040. Yikes!
But, hey, maybe Obama and his negotiators with the Russians (and the Paks and Indians and Chinese and French and Israelis, etc.) can make good on his commitment to a nuclear free world before we even have to worry about centigenarian strategic bombers making up the bulk of our inventory? But I’m not holding my breath.
– Christian
1) Nuclear warfare isn’t going to happen-because if it does-there’ll be nothing left to win. The Russians know that, and, maybe even Obama and Billary do too-who knows?? Stranger things have happened.
2)ICBMs make a lot more sense than expensive bombers-launched from subs, ships, siloes-they don’t need the expensive stealth, airframe, air refueling, ect. and, they’re plenty accurate enough and fast.
3)The AF doesn’t have a good record in regards to accquisition and nuclear stewardship, anyway.
4)This NGB LOOKs like a high tech nightmare-I’m no aerospace engineer, but this NGB is definitely experientmenting with some novel airframes, and, like th eOsprey and EFV, it’s guaranteed cost over run.
5)The NGB might make a good bargaining chip with the RUssians, if China didn’t already own our treasury.
Best bet, just come with Russia, and say “we can’t afford this crap anymore than you can, so let’s get serious. How we gonna disarm?“
The reality, is that nuclear weapons are built in deterence-doesn’t matter if you get eh first strike, you’re still screwed. So, why talk big when we can’t spend big? At this AIG-Chrsyler bailout point, if we got into an arms race with China or Russia, we could very well lose!!!!
@curtis
a well reasoned argument. A new design meant specifically for carrying a big bomb payload without all the bells and whistles, with minimal maintenence costs being a serious consideration
The survivability is ofcourse a continuing issue with such an airframe. make it a UAV? longer endurance but vulnerability to disruption of the satellite network? Alternative comprimise? make it stealthy — this is the line of reasoning that led to the overly costly B2.
There are arguments on both sides of the debate, but looking at past reasons to have a triad of nuclear defense (ICBM, Bombers and Nuclear Subs), it begs the question, what if any differences in mans approaches will change in the next century. I imagine not a lot in the next 25 to 50 years. So if the NGB is to potentially penetrate areas like Pakistan and well protected areas say like the next “Russia” with well defined/defended hard and nuclear hard targets then it becomes clear the low observable capabilities of a B-2 with very current electronics is a must. The ICBM’s will if necessary (I hope we never have to) complete the first round of target removals, but the manned need to evaluate and dispense the second round of offensive weapons is a vital key and important component in this end game scenario. I trust two or more operationally ready personal to make those type decisions.